Table Of ContentEXAMINATION OF
This edition published by Thoemmes Press, 2000
McTAGGART'S PHILOSOPHY
Thoemmes Press
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Thoemmes Press US Office
BY
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Sterling, Virginia 20166, USA
C. D. BROAD
http://www.thoemmes.com LrIT.D. (Cantab.); F.B.A.
Fellow and Lecturer in the Moral Sciences, Trinity College, camb ridge;
S!dgwlck Lecturer In the University of <Jam bridge. Author of
Perception, Physics, and Reality: Scientific Thought:
The Mind and iUJ Place in Nature; and
Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy Five Typl!B of Ethical Theory
3 Volumes: ISBN 1 85506 852 4
Reprinted from the 1933-8 edition
with permission from Cambridge University Press
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A CIP record of this title is available from the British Library
Publisher's Note
CAMBRIDGE
The Publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
quality of this reprint but points out that some
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To
A. A. WYNNE WILLSON
"The proper study of XANkind is XAN"
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
ANALYTIC TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface page xlix
Directions to the Reader lvi
BOOK I
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Non tibi Tyndaridis facies invisa Lacaenae,
Culpatusve Paris, divum inclementia divum Argument of Book I 1
l ' •
Has evertit opes, sternitque a culmine Troiam,
CHAPTER I
VERGJL Aeneid Book n
MoTAGGART'S METHOD AND ITS RELATIONS
TO OTHER METHODS
1. METHOD AND AIM OF MoTAGGART's ENQUIRY 3-9
The object is (A) to discover what characteristics be-
long (a) distributively, or (b) collectively, to all that
exists 3
And {B) to derive from the conclusions of (A) conse-
quences about empirically known existents. This
has three divisions, viz. 4
(a) to show that certajn apparent characteristics are
delusive, (b) to explain how such delusions are pos
sible, and (c) on this basis to conjecture the real
nature of the existent . 4-5
The method in (A) is wholly a priori, except for two
empirical premises 5
An empirical premise may be an object of knowledge,
and the privacy of its subject is no objection for
McTaggart's purpose 5-6
The introduction of the Principle of Determining
Correspondence, as the only way of avoiding a cer
tain alleged contradiction, is a characteristic feature
of McTaggart's method 6-7
Analogies and differences between this procedure and
that of Leibniz and Spinoza 7-8
Complete certainty is claimed for the results of (A) and
(B, a); for those of (B, b) and (B, c) only high
probability . 8
viii CONTENTS CONTENTS ix
2· l. Does anything exist? page 22-23
It is doubtful whether the former claim is justified in
view of the epistemological status of the Principle of McTaggart holds that we know empirically that
Determining Correspondence page 8-9 something does in fact exist, but that we do not
know a priori that there must be existents . 22
The rejection of Time and Change is the result of a
self-contained argument 9 McTaggart's argument uses a suppressed premise, but
the premise is quite certain . 22-23
2, RELATIONS OF MOTAGGART'S METHOD TO OTHERS 9-18
It is not clear whether McTaggart held that the fact
2· 1. Relation to Kant . 9-12
that there are existents can be seen to be contingent
McTaggart's method is not epistemological or tran or only that it cannot be seen to be necessary 23
scendental 9-10
The claims of epistemology to dictate to ontology
cannot be accepted 10--12 CHAPTER III
But the omens are unfavourable to any system of
IS EXISTENCE <:!.Q-EXTENSIVE WITH REALITY?
constructive metaphysics 12
(I) CHARACTERISTICS AND POSSIBILITIES
2·2. Relation to Hegel . 12-18
McTaggart was most un-Hegelian in his neglect to McTaggart holds that anything that was a par~icular,
or that directly or indirectly characterised a
criticise the categories with which he worked 12
particular, would be existent 24
The Nature of Existence was originally planned on
There seem prima facie to be terms which are not
Hegelian lines, but, in the end, dialectical argument
existents, viz;, non-characterising characteristics,
was abandoned for ordinary deductive reasoning . 13
possibilities, and propositions. Are there such
Two points of unlikeness between McTaggart's method terms? And, if so, are they not existents? 24-25
and Hegel's .
14
I. NON·OHARAOTERISING CH.A.RAOTERISTICS • 25--53
Hegel's meaning is not clear. A proposed interpreta-
tion 15--16 l · l. MoTaggart's View 25--29
A second proposed interpretation 16-17 McTaggart distinguishes between the characteristics
of actual particulars and characteristics in general.
The third point of unlikeness . 17-18
The latter would not be existents 25
The fourth point of unlikeness 18
The distinction, as drawn by McTaggart, seems un
tenable 25--26
CHAPTER II
He seems to have mistaken an epistemological distinc
REALITY AND EXISTENCE tion between two ways of describing a characteristic
for an ontological distinction between characteristics
I. REALITY 19-21
themselves 26-27
McTaggart holds that Reality is an indefinable generic
characteristic, incapable of degree, and that Exist McTaggart's argument to show that there are no non
ence is a specific form of it . existent characteristics. It assumes that every part
19
of an existent must be an existent 27
Reasons for rejecting the view that there is a cha
racteristic of which "reality" is the name 20 Criticism and restatement of the argument 27-28
The word "part" is so ambiguous that no weight can
2. EXISTENOE 21-23 be attached to McTaggart's premise . . . 28
The distinction between" existend" and "subsistend" 21
His argument depends on so widening the criterion of
They are mutually exclusive, but are not determinates existence that the conclusion is wholly trivial • 28-29
under a determinable 21-22
BMCT b
x CONTENTS CONTENTS xi
*1·2. Independent Discussion of the Subject page 29-53 Solution of Hume's problem about the idea of the
missing shade of colour. Definition of "Compound
Three arguments in favour of there being non-charac-
Ideas" page 40
terising characteristics. The first two are certainly
invalid . 29-30 Definition of "Empirical Concepts" 41-42
Definition of "a priori Concepts" 42
The third is concerned with Ideal Limits, such as
perfect straightness 30-31 *1·221. Concepts of Ideal Limits • 42--45
Concepts of Ideal Limits are either compound em
*1·21. The Problem of Ideal Limits 31-38
pirical concepts of a certain kind or ideas of super
Plato's ideal particulars are, in any case, superfluous 31 latives . 42
We know, from perceptual experience, what it is to Some comp~ratives do, and some do not, involve the
"look straight" 32 notion of a superlative 42--43
Knowing what it means to "look straight", we know The idea of a perfectly straight object might be the
what it means to "be straight" 32-33 idea of an object than which it is logically impossible
for anything to be straighter 43-44
"Straightness" is a positive name for a partly negative
term . . . . . . . . . 33-34 The notion of "straighter" is an empirical concept;
the knowledge that this comparative has a super
The statement that it is doubtful whether anything is
lative is a priori 44
perfectly straight is ambiguous . . . . 34--35
*1·222. Concepts of Categories 45-46
It is most plausible if it is taken to mean that there is
no physical edge with regard to which we can be Two analyses of causal propositions which would make
sure that it is exactly straight 35 the concept of Causation empirical. Neither seems
satisfactory 45
Even if this were true, ther~ might be sensibilia which
we know to be exactly straight. And, even if this It is possible, but by no means certain, that the con
were not so, we might know, or have good reason cept of Causation is a priori . 46
to believe, that there are some exactly straight
*1·223. Concepts of Ethical Characteristics 46-47
sensibilia . . . . . . . . 36
Unless a purely naturalistic analysis of ethical pro
The fact that some perceived objects have looked
positions be possible, the concepts of ethical cha
exactly straight does not prove that any sensibilia
racteristics are almost certainly a priori 46-47
have been exactly straight . 36-37
*1·23. Positive Theories of a priori Concepts 47-53
But there is no reason to doubt that some sensibilia
have in fact been exactly straight 37 Two theories are possible, viz., that of Innate Ideas
and that of Non-perceptual Intuition 47.
Summary. The case of Ideal Limits gives no ground
for thinking that there are non-characterising *1·231. Theory of Innate Ideas 47-51
characteristics . . . . . . . . 37-38 The theory must take the form that there are innate
dispositions to form certain dispositional ideas 48
*1·22. A priori Concepts and Innate Ideas 38-42
Statement of the theory • 48-49
The distinction between "Occurrent" and "Dis-
positional" ideas . 38 In this form it can meet all the usual objections, and
it may well be true 49-51
To ha~e an idea of x is not merely to have an x-like
image . 39
*1·232. Theory of Non-perceptual Intuition 51-53
The distinction between "Intuitive" and "De- The innateness <?f an idea would not guarantee its
scriptive" ideas 39-40 validity 51
b-2
xii CONTENTS CONTENTS xiii
Statement of the theory. It would avoid this difficulty page 52 And because true belief must be distinguished from
knowledge page 63
And yet it would be compatible with the possibility of
mistakes in the application of a priori concepts . 52-53 Summary. Definition of the term "Proposition" 63-64
It implies that, if I have an a priori concept of a cer 2. MpsT WE ASSUME THAT THERE ARE PROPOSITIONS? • 64-78
tain chara-0teristic, I must have lmown at least one
The facts described above may be expressed by saying
fact in which that characteristic is a predicate 53
that there are "Co-referential Sets of Judgments" 64
2. POSSIBILITIES • 54-55
2· 1. Go-referential Sets of Judgments 64-66
McTaggart's account of the nature of Possibilities
seems unduly negative 54 It is possible to define a Pickwickian sense of the word
"Proposition" in terms of co-referential sets 64
It would be compatible with Leibniz's view that the
actual world is one of numerous possible alternative There certainly are "Propositions", in this sense, and
worlds . 54-55 they certainly have the properties usually assigned
to them, if these be suitably re-defined 65
2·2. The Intentionality of Judgments 66-78
CHAPTER IV Does the fact that judgments are "intentional" imply
that there are propositions in the literal sense? 66
IS EXISTENCE CO-EXTENSIVE WITH REALITY?
(II) PROPOSITIONS 2·21. Go-referential Sets do not require Propositions 66-68
Summary of McT~ggart's statements about proposi McTaggart accounts for co-referential sets, by means
tions. He does not define the term "Proposition" 56 of the Correspondence Theory of truth, without
assuming that there are propositions 66-67
McTaggart's definition of "Facts". He makes state
ments which are inconsistent with it 57 But this theory of truth is not universally accepted . 67
And it is possible to account for the facts without it 67-68
1. WHAT ARE "PROPOSITIONS", AND WHY ARE THERE
SUPPOSED TO BE PROPOSITIONS? 58-64 2·22. Does the Intentionality of Judgments require Pro
Four fundamental facts about judgments, which positions? 68-70
would generally be admitted 58-59 The argument for the affirmative answer to this ques
The natural interpretation.of them is that every judg tion 68-69
ment-situation has an objective constituent, and It is inconclusive, for the objective constituents of
that this is neutral, timeless, and independent of judgments might not be public or neutral or time
being judged . . . . . . . 59 less 69-70
If the relation of being judged is dyadic, such objective 2·221. McTaggart's attempt to dispense with Propositions 70-71
constituents must be internally complex . . 60-61 .
What doesMcTaggart mean bysayingthateverybelief
It is possible that this relation is not dyadic. Those "professes" to correspond to a certain fact? 70
who hold that there are propositions assume that it"
When this metaphorical expression is interpreted his
is dyadic 61
argument breaks down 71
They also hold that truth and falsehood, in their
*
primary sense, belong to propositions, and that they 2· 222. Independent Attempt to dispense with Propositions 71-76
belong only in a derivative sense to judgments . 62 Example of a singular characterising judgment. It
Propositions must be distinguished from facts becalise involves know ledge of three facts. This may be called
there are false beliefs and true disbeliefs 62-63 its "Noetic Framework" 72
xiv
CONTENTS CONTENTS xv
There must also be a special relation between this 2. CRITIOAL COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE 0LASSIFIOATION page 84-98
lm~wledge and the thought of a certain one alter
native. This relation may be called "Insertion" in 2· l. Arguments against Relations . 84-87
the. case of belief, and "Extrusion" in that of dis Leibniz's argument is circular . 84
belief
page 72-73 Bradley's argument depends on treating relations as
Generalisation of the example . if they were particulars 84-85
73-74
Analysis, on the same lines, of an existential judgment It also involves a failure to distinguish between what
74-75
is presupposed by all relational judgmenw, as such,
Further generalisation; "Knowing" and "T kin f
granted " . a g or and what each relational judgment expresses 85-86
75-76
Attempt to state the real ground of Bradley's objec
2·23. TM Correspondence Theory . .
76-78 tion to relations 86-87
McTaggart was mistaken in thinking that supp.orte .
of the ;rroposition Theory regarded propositions: 2·2. Oan Qualities be dMpensed with if Relations be ac
cepted? • 87-89
the Objects to which true judgments correspond .
77
Criticism of Mc'.l'aggart's form of the Correa d McTaggart dismisses the question without adequate
Theory . . . . pon ence discussion 87-88
77-78
Independent discussion of the question 88-89
Restatement of the Correspondence Theory
78
2·3. Oan a Term be related to itself? 90-92
McTaggart holds that it can. His examples fall into
two classes . 90
BOOK II
In the first class the alleged relation of a term to iwelf
CHARACTERISTICS AND PARTICULARS is symmetrical. It is doubtful whether a term can
stand in such a relation to iwelf . 90-91
Argument of Book II .
In the second class the alleged relation is non-sym
79
metrical. We must distinguish between direct and
CHAPTER V indirect relations . 91
CHARACTERISTICS. (I) DIVISION INTO It is doubtful whether a term can stand in any direct
relation to i welf . 91-92
QUALITIES AND RELATIONS
2·4. Generated Characteristics 92-98
1. McTAGGART'S CLASSIFICATION
81-84 McTaggart thinks that people have wrongly believed
di~erence ~elat~ons ~an b~
The between Qualities and that relations can be reducied to qualities because
sdheispcsr ibed but not defined. Relations and. R e1 a t1' 0n- they really do generate qualities • 92-93
Every relationship generates a ;'Rel~tion~l Qu~Iity ,; 81 2·41. Qualities generated by Relationships 93-94
and also another relation, according to McTaggart McTaggart is probably mistaken in holding that there
82 are any such qualities . 93-94
McTaggart seems to confuse generated relationshi
and generated relations ps 2·42. Relationships generated by Qualities 94-96
82-83
C~~r~~rist~?s w~~h ~alle~
are not .gene;ated. are The distinction between the "Constituents" of a fact
O~~nal . . Or1gmal qualities and the relational and their "Form of Union" in the fact 94
qualities ~ec~ly generated by original relationships The fact that certain constituenw are united in acer
are called Primary Qualities,,. All other q l't'
a re ca1 1 e d "Re peatm. g Qualities" . . u.a 1 1e.s tain way in a certain fact is a new fact generated by
the former · 94-95
83
xvi CONTENTS
CONTENTS xvii
This generated fact may be called "relational" in a·
Attempt to interpret and criticise McTaggart's argu·
slightly extended sense page 95-96
ment. So far as it is intelligible it seems to be in·
2·43. Re"lationshilps gem:,rated by Re"lationships 96-98 valid . page 104-105
An argument like the one just mentioned proves that A second argument of McTaggart's 105-106
there are such relationships. The series of generated
He fails to notice that it is symbols, which are parti·
relationships is unending, but it is not logically
culars, and not characteristics that" have meaning" 106
vicious 96-98
Though he has produced no valid argument for his
3. THE "NATURE" OF A TERM 98-100 contention, it may be true and even self-evident 106-107
McTaggart defines this as the conjunction of all its
2. INDEPENDENT DISOUSSION OF THE SUBJECT 107-127
qualities 98
On this definition the nature of a term will change 2· l. Oompound Oharacteristics 107-108
with any change in its relationships and with mere It seems very doubtful whether there are such cha
lapse of time 98-99 racteristics 107-108
And the nature of every term will be infinitely com. 2·2. McTaggart's tacit Assumptions 108-111
plex . . . • . . . ·. . 99
He seems to have been guided unwittingly by an
McTaggart's definition is open to criticism on three analogy between composite characteristics and
grounds 99-100 figures composed of dots 108-109
An amended definition proposed. The question of dis- This analogy breaks down in at least two respects '. 109-110
positional properties deferred to Chap. xrv, Section 3 100
McTaggart's only test for the distinction between
simple and composite, compound and complex,
characteristics seems to be linguistic usage . ll0-111
CHAPTER VI
*2·3. The Nature of Analysis 111-118
CHARACTERISTICS. (II) DIVISION INTO SIMPLE, We start with the notion of likeness and unlikeness
COMPOUND, AND COMPLEX between certain particulars. Different kinds of like·
ness . 111
I. STATElllENT OF MoTAGGART's THEORY
101-107
A likeness may be more or less "extensive" and more
l · l. Sim.pk, Oompound, and Oompkx Oharacteristics 101-102 or less "intensive" . 111-112
Characteristics are first divided into "Simple" and The notion of an "Aggregate Resemblance" between
"Composite", and composite characteristics are certain particulars. A common name may be given
then subdivided into "Compound" and "Complex" 101 in respect of an aggregate resemblance 112-113
An analysis may be "partial" or "total", and a total Analysis of a more extensive aggregate resemblance
analysis may be "proximate" or "ultimate" 102 into a conjunction of several less extensive aggre
gate resemblances 113-114
1·2. Must a Oomposite Oharacteristic have an UUimate
Analysis? Suggested definitions of the terms "Simple" and
102-107
"Composite", "Definable" and "Indefinable" 115-116
McTaggart holds that it must, though the ultimate
analysis may be of infinite complexity *2·31. Inseparabl,e Oharacteristics 116-118
102-103
He seems to have confused knowing a composite cha. Inseparable characteristics are here taken to be de·
racteristic with knowing its ultimate analysis . terminables whose determinate values are capable
103-104
of independent variation 116
For, otherwise, how could he be so sure as he is that
no human mind could know any charaote~istio which Instead of talking of several inseparable characteristics
had an infinitely complex ultimate analysis? we may talk of a single determinable with several
104
"degrees of freedom" . 117
xviii CONTEN'TS CONTENTS xix
It is possible that familiar determinables, like colour,
CHAPTER VII
have more degrees of freedom than we suspect . page 117-118
PARTICULARS. (I) THE NOTION OF SUBSTANCE
*2·4. The Nature of Definition 118-127
McTaggart uses two arguments to show that anything
Relation of analysis to definition 118-119
which had existence would necessarily have some
The formulation of a definition of a word is the sign other characteristic. The first is circular . page 128-129
that an aggregate resemblance has been analysed
The second tacitly assumes the empirical premise that
into a conjunction of less extensive resemblances , 119
there is at least one characteristic beside existence 129
The element of linguistic convention which is present
in all definitions 119-120 Every existent, according to McTaggart, lacks some
characteristic. Another empirical premise is tacitly
*2·41. Three important Kinds of alleged Definition 120-127 assumed in his argument here 129-130
*2·411. Definitions in Arithmetic 120-121 Every existent has as many qualities, positive and
The nature of the Arabic notation and of the rules of negative, as there are positive qualities 130-131
Arithmetic 120-121 Every existent has at least one positive quality beside
existence 131
*2·412. Definitions in Geometry 121-125
There is no objective ground for singling out one of 1. SuBSTANOE 131-166
the innumerable properties of the circle as its l·l. MoTaggart's Notion of Su-Ostance 132-141
"definition" 122
McTaggart's definition would make facts substances,
"Sensible Circularity" is indefinable. "Mathematical which he did not intend. Even when this is allowed
Circularity" is described in terms of sensible circu for, it defines "Particulars" rather than "Sub
larity; this is its "Primary Description" 122-123 stances" in the usual sense . 132
The ordinary "definition" of "circularity" is really an McTaggart's proof that there are particulars. It is
"Immediate Secondary Description" of it. Other conclusive 133
properties of the circle are "Mediate Secondary
McTaggart's refutation of the view that a" substance"
Descriptions" 123
is really a complex quality. He probably misunder· ·
Three comments on these distinctions 123-124 stood the theory . 133-134
A fourth comment. Properties which are inseparable The theory, as interpreted by him, is certainly false;
in one system of geometry will not necessarily be so but his refutation of it is invalid . 134-135
in another 124-125
McTaggart's answer to the objection that a particular
*2·413. Definitions of Natm·al Kinds 125-127 would be "a something, I know not what" . 135-136
McTaggart suggests three causes which have made
They are not definitions in the strict sense. Locke's
many people doubt whether there are particulars,
"rationa~ parrot" settles this point 125
whilst not doubting that there are characteristics . 136
They function as definitions only because of a con
Prof. Stout's question to believers in Substance 136-137
tingent law of co-existence within a set of cha
racteristics 125-126 McTaggart's answer. The relation of inherence pre
supposes non-relational facts 137
The various properties of a geometrical figure are
mutually inferable, those of a Natural Kind are not. It is not clear what Prof. Stout means by his question 137-138
Two reasons why this distinction is less important
McTaggart uses the word "substance" to cover both
than it seems at first sight 126 occurrents and continuants, and tacitly assumes
The real distinction between Natural Kinds and kinds that there is no fundamental distinction between
of geometrical figure 126-127 the two .· 138-139
xx CONTENTS
CONTENTS xxi
Prof. Stout regards the distinction as fundamental,
*1·22. Can either Things or Processes be dispensed with? page 151-166
and confines the name "substance" to continuants.
Meaning of the question . 151
He also holds a peculiar theory about universals . page 139
Some would hold that every Process must be a state
Attempt to give a clear statement of Prof, Stout's
of, or a process in, or a set of facts about, a Thing 151-152
theory . 139-140
If a buzzing noise is going on, what Thing is the sub-
The differences between McTaggart and Prof. Stout
ject of this Process? 152-153
reduce to two. Criticisms on Prof. Stout's theory. 140-141
It is difficult to conceive of any kind of answer to such
It is possible that there is really no serious difference
a question when it is rightly understood 153
between McTaggart and Prof. Stout about con
tinuants 141 Those who hold that noises are mental would not be
prepared to say that some mind is buzzing whenever
*1·2. Independent Discussion of the Notion of Substance 141-166 ' a buzzing noise is going on . 153-154
It is unreasonable to ignore the prim.a f acie distinction Perhaps they would say that some part of some mind
between occurrents and continuants 142 is buzzing 154
*1·21. Processes and Things 142-151 Analogies and differences between a noise and a move-
ment. There is no analogy in the case of sound to
Processes and Things are, pr,ima facie, two different
seeing an object resting 154-155
kinds of particulars 142-143
This increases the difficulty of regarding a process of
Some particulars seem to be clear instances of Pro sound as the changing of some Thing in respect of
cesses; some to be clear instances of Things; and some quality 155
some to occupy an ambiguous position 143
The upshot of the discussion is that we may have to
A Process is something to which the adjectives admit the possibility of "Absolute Processes" . 155-156
"starting", "stopping", and "going on " can be It seems impossible to regard a Process as a set of facts
literally applied 143-144 about a particular, a series of determinate cha-
There is a derivative sense in which these adjectives racteristics, and a series of moments 156
can be applied to compound Things 144 Can Things be dispensed with in favour of Processes?
Kant's objection to the Scholastic proof of the im The case of physical movements . 156-157
mortality of the soul. It is either invalid or irrele
We talk of waves and shadows as "moving". Distinc-
vant to the Scholastics 144-145
tion between "Transmission of State" and "Trans
Independent discussion of this argument 145-146 lation of Stuff" 157
Things "persist through" periods; Processes "go on It might be alleged that transmission of state involves
for" periods 146 periodic translation of stuff • 157-158
Processes have temporal parts, which are successive But this view need not be accepted by those who
phases; and they are qualified by adjectives like accept substantival Absolute Space 158
"steady" and "fluctuating" 147
We talk of a Process "continuing" and yet "changing
Difference between "I hear the same noise again" and in certain respects". Analysis of such statements 159
"I see the same chair again" 147-148
To state the analysis accurately we need to introduce
Dispositional and non-dispositional adjectives 148-149 the notion of "Quality- Ranges" . 160
The former can be conjoined with Thing-names, not Enumeration of certain properties of quality-ranges 160-162
with Process-names 149-150
Summary of the argument about Absolute Processes 162-163
Summary of this sub-section. Philosophical relevance
What is the nature of visual sensibilia and images?
of grammatical distinctions • 150-151
They seem more like Things than like Processes 163
