Escaping the Abdication Trap When Cooperative Federalism Fails

35 Pages·2017·0.59 MB·English

by  David A. Dana

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2017
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David A. Dana
Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law, [email protected]
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
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David A. Dana, Escaping the Abdication Trap When Cooperative Federalism Fails: Legal Reform After Flint,
44 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1329 (2017).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol44/iss5/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
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ESCAPING THE ABDICATION TRAP WHEN
COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM FAILS: LEGAL
REFORM AFTER FLINT
David A. Dana*
ABSTRACT
Flint has focused national attention on problems in drinking water
and, more broadly, failings in our cooperative federalism regarding
environmental regulation. This Article argues that, with respect to
our federal regime for safe drinking water, what we observe is a triple
abdication: abdication of responsibility on the part of the federal,
state, and local governments. This Article proposes making states
(and not just local water authorities) legally responsible for testing
water for lead and for disclosing test results. In addition, the Article
argues that water test results and other relevant information should
be made available to residents in visually-powerful, interactive, on-
line maps. Making states legally responsible and implementing new,
substantive requirements for testing and disclosure would help
motivate and empower citizens to lobby for public funding and would
make citizen suit litigation a more effective tool to combat abdication.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ........................................................................................... 1330
I. The Drinking Water Regime in Theory and in Practice ............ 1332
II. Why Do We Observe Abdication? ............................................. 1340
III. The Relationship (or Lack Thereof) Between Information,
Political Mobilization, and Law .................................................... 1348
IV. Legal Reform as Institutional Re-Design: Moving Away
from Cooperative Federalism ....................................................... 1349
V. The Role of Citizen Suits ............................................................. 1353

* Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. Many
thanks for helpful comments to Emily Benfer and Deborah Chizewer.
1329
1330 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV
VI. Making Lead Contamination Information Salient .................. 1356
Conclusion .............................................................................................. 1361

INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 2014, the residents of Flint, Michigan were poisoned
by lead in their drinking water.1 Federal, state, and local officials
ignored citizen complaints about their drinking water, despite the fact
that a university laboratory confirmed the presence of high levels of
lead in the water in August 2015.2 As a Task Force appointed by
Michigan’s governor concluded, “[t]he significant consequences of
these failures for Flint will be long-lasting. They have deeply affected
Flint’s public health, its economic future, and residents’ trust in
government.”3
Flint is one example of a larger phenomenon I label “the
abdication trap.” A great deal of health, safety, and environmental
law in the United States comports with a model that has been dubbed
“cooperative federalism,” in which states are called upon to be
regulatory partners with the federal government in the
implementation of federal programs.4 While much of the literature
and the law of cooperative federalism focuses on federal-state
relations,5 the reality is that the key relationships often are not only
between federal and state officials but also between state and local
officials. Broadly speaking, the federal government delegates
responsibility to the states, and the states delegate responsibility to a
range of local entities.6 With each delegation, there is supposed to be
a commitment to ongoing supervision and, if need be, a re-
assumption of authority by the delegator from the delegate in order

1. See Cara Cunningham Warren, An American Reset—Safe Water & A
Workable Model of Federalism, 27 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 51, 52 (2016).
2. Id. at 52, 79.
3. FLINT WATER ADVISORY TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 1 (2016) [hereinafter
TASK FORCE REPORT], http://flintwaterstudy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Flint-
task-force-report_2438442_ver1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/598N-TZU2].
4. See Ronald J. Krotoszyski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, The New Formalism,
and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of
Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61
DUKE L.J. 1599, 1602 (2012) (outlining a conception of cooperative federalism).
5. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation
of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 472–79 (2012) (discussing cooperative federalism
generally as a federal-state government dynamic).
6. See Justin Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV.
839, 841 (2017) (“Much federal law regulates the conduct of states. States, in turn,
delegate many of their federal responsibilities to local governments.”).
2017] LEGAL REFORM AFTER FLINT 1331
to meet the aims of the relevant regulatory regime. Especially in the
environmental context, as with the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act,7
citizen suits add another layer of complexity to governance.
This Article argues that, with respect to our federal regime for safe
drinking water, what we observe is not cooperative federalism but
rather a triple abdication: abdication of responsibility on the part of
the federal, state, and local governments.8 As a result, some localities
inadequately test for or fail to address problems in drinking water,
including problems with lead, as in Flint, Michigan.9 The triple
abdication of responsibility for addressing lead in water is in large
part due to the lack of political will at the federal and state level to
provide localities with the funding they realistically would need to
upgrade their infrastructure to remove lead pipes.10 The relevant
actors do not want to know, or do, anything about such problems
because there is simply not enough political will to secure the funding
to solve them.
This Article argues that the best way to address the deficit in
political will would be legal reforms in our safe drinking water regime

7. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-8 (West 2017).
8. Scholars have largely ignored the question of how the Safe Drinking Water
Act and other drinking water statutes fit within the larger framework of cooperative
federalism. A notable exception is A. Daniel Tarlock, Safe Drinking Water: A
Federalism Perspective, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 233 (1997)
(arguing that the drinking water law embodies mixed, often conflicting conceptions of
federalism).
9. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 3, at 43–45 (detailing the failures in
Flint).
10. See Warren, supra note 1, at 70 (discussing political will as a cause of failures
of federal drinking water programs at the local level). In December of 2016,
Congress did pass the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act
(“WIIN”) in an effort to improve drinking water infrastructure and authorize funding
for communities, like Flint, facing drinking water emergencies. See Pub. L. No. 114-
322, 130 Stat. 1628 (2016); see also Press Release, Debbie Stabenow, U.S. Senator for
Mich., Senate Passes Agreement to Provide Critical Help for Flint and Other
Communities, Clearing Way for President’s Signature (Dec. 10, 2016),
https://www.stabenow.senate.gov/news/senate-passes-agreement-to-provide-critical-
help-for-flint-and-other-communities-clearing-way-for-presidents-signature
[https://perma.cc/5BFD-K8B7]. Though its passage was touted as a bipartisan
success, WIIN and the funding that it provided fall staggeringly short of what will be
necessary to ensure the public has access to drinking water that is free from lead
contamination. See Auditi Guha, Federal Funding for Flint Water Crisis ‘Just a Tiny
Start,’ REWIRE (Mar. 23, 2017, 5:28 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2017/03/23/
federal-funding-for-flint-water-crisis-just-a-tiny-start/ [https://perma.cc/6ZY7-PVUC];
see also Christine Grimaldi, Flint Activist: Federal Aid Won’t Come Close to
Addressing ‘Human Cost,’ REWIRE (Dec. 13, 2016, 10:18 AM),
https://rewire.news/article/2016/12/13/flint-activist-federal-aid-come-close-addressing-
human-cost/ [https://perma.cc/772X-AYXZ].
1332 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV
that will provide those at risk of lead poisoning with clear, readily-
understandable information regarding the risks they face. In
particular, this Article proposes making not just local water
authorities, but states legally responsible for testing water for lead
and disclosing test results. In addition, the Article argues for water
test results and other relevant information to be made available to
residents in visually-powerful, interactive, on-line maps. Making
states legally responsible and implementing new substantive
requirements for testing and disclosure would help motivate and
empower citizens to lobby for public funding and make citizen suit
litigation a more effective tool to combat abdication. Prompted by
the crisis in Flint, there have been calls for state-level reform, and
some actual reform in Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, and California,11 that
suggest that the proposals in this Article, which would require
legislation at the state level, might be politically achievable.
Part I of this Article reviews the current legal regime, which is
governed by the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act and the Lead and
Copper Rule, and the abundant evidence of abdication of
responsibility within that regime. Part II addresses the question of
why we see abdication of responsibility at the federal, state, and local
levels, focusing on lead contamination’s lack of political salience and
hence the lack of political will as a primary explanation. Part III
advocates measures to more reliably and effectively produce and
disseminate information about lead in water directly to those who
face risk of lead poisoning. Finally, the Article takes up some
possible objections to its state-level, information-focused approach to
reform.
I. THE DRINKING WATER REGIME IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
Although the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”)12 has
been the subject of Congressional revisions since its initial passage in
1974, the basic structure has remained the same. “The 1974 law
established the current federal-state arrangement in which states may
be delegated primary implementation and enforcement authority for
the drinking water program.”13 Forty-nine states have assumed
primary implementation and enforcement authority, and “[t]he state-
administered Public Water Supply Supervision (PWSS) Program” has

11. See infra text accompanying notes 114–18 (discussing state reforms in the
wake of Flint).
12. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f-300j-27 (West 2017).
13. MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31243, SAFE DRINKING WATER
ACT (SDWA): A SUMMARY OF THE ACT AND ITS MAJOR REQUIREMENTS 1 (2014).
2017] LEGAL REFORM AFTER FLINT 1333
been and “remains the basic program for regulating the nation’s
water systems[.]”14
States thus are the primary enforcers of the SDWA, but to achieve
and maintain primacy under section 1413 of the SDWA, “states must
adopt regulations at least as stringent as national requirements,
develop adequate procedures for enforcement (including conducting
monitoring and inspections), adopt authority for administrative
penalties, and maintain records and make reports as the Federal
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) requires.”15 As with all
delegated authority arrangements, states, as the delegated enforcers
of the SDWA, are not legally responsible or liable for substantive
violations of the Act; the only liable parties are the “owners” and
“operators” of “public water systems [that must] monitor their water
supplies to ensure compliance with drinking water standards and to
report monitoring to the states.”16 The state has obligations to the
federal government as long as it remains the primary enforcer of the
SDWA pursuant to a federal delegation of authority, but a state need
not continue to occupy that role.17
The SDWA not only gives a state authority to enforce the Act
when the federal government has delegated primacy to it, but it also
allows for federal inspections and administrative and civil
enforcement actions against owners or operators of local water
authorities, after providing the prescribed notice to the appropriate
state officials.18 In addition, the SDWA includes a citizen suit
provision whereby any citizen may sue “any person . . . who is alleged
to be in violation of any requirement prescribed by or under this
subchapter.”19

14. Id. Note that the EPA has never withdrawn primacy from a state after
granting it.
15. Id. at 6; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-2 (West 2017).
16. TIEMANN, supra note 13, at 7; see also Reply Brief in Support of Motion to
Dismiss for Defs. State Treasurer & Members of the Flint Receivership Transition
Advisory Bd. at 3, Concerned Pastors for Social Action v. Khouri, 194 F. Supp. 3d
589, 605 (2016) (No. 16-10277) (explaining that “[t]he SDWA applies to ‘owners’ and
‘operators’ of a public water system.”).
17. See Warren, supra note 1, at 62–63 (noting that as of 2016, all states except
Wyoming have opted for primacy).
18. TIEMANN, supra note 13, at 7, 13 (discussing Sections 1444 and 1414 of the
SDWA); see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 300g-3 (West 2017) (codifying Section 1414 of the
SDWA and reflecting 2016 amendments that clarified and expanded notice
requirements); 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-3 (West 2017) (codifying Section 1444 of the
SDWA).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-8 (West 2017).
1334 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV
In theory, then, there is both delegation and accountability in the
SDWA regime, as the model of cooperative federalism requires:
localities must report testing data and noncompliance to the states,
and the states must report such information to the EPA.20 Both
federal and state governments can bring informal or formal
enforcement actions, and the EPA retains the right to cancel its
delegation of primacy to a state and become the primary enforcer of
federal drinking water law in a state.21 In theory, the involvement of
three levels of government in the problem of drinking water
contamination guards against failure at any one level of government.
As a number of federalism scholars have argued, having multiple and
even redundant sources of government regulation can help ensure
that an objective is achieved, since failure by one or more sources can
be checked by others.22 In an ideal world, the SDWA regime would
work such that, if localities failed to meet their responsibilities, there
would be distinct checks: the states and, if the states failed to act as
checks, the federal government.
But in practice the SDWA regime does not operate at all like that,
even though there are of course some federal, state, and local officials
who work hard to safeguard the quality of drinking water and real
improvements have been made in many localities. In actuality, to
lesser or greater degrees in different parts of the Unites States, the
SDWA regime resembles a collective abdication, rather than a
cooperation, regime.23 The federal government abdicates its

20. ERIK OLSON & KRISTI PULLEN FEDINICK, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE
COUNCIL, WHAT’S IN YOUR WATER? FLINT AND BEYOND 13 (2016) [hereinafter
NRDC Report]; TIEMANN, supra note 13, at 7.
21. For an example of the EPA threatening to exercise that right, see generally
Lillian Reed, State Could Lose Authority to Monitor Drinking Water, EVENING SUN
(Feb. 20, 2017, 1:50 PM), http://www.eveningsun.com/story/news/2017/02/17/state-
could-lose-authority-monitor-drinking-water/97596042/ [https://perma.cc/2QP5-
PWUU].
22. See generally William Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism,
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108 (2005) (explicating the argument for redundant
enforcement authorities). The flip side of redundancy, arguably, is a lack of
accountability, as each level or source of government can blame another for
unpopular action or inaction. See David A. Dana, The Case for Unfunded Federal
Mandates, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995) (explaining the nonaccountability critique of
blurring the roles of different levels of government, but also noting that “there is
evidence that some voters do not carefully distinguish among federal, state and local
governments,” but rather vote based on their general levels of satisfaction with
“government”).
23. For an argument that abdication by states of responsibilities to localities is a
broad phenomenon crossing many areas of federal law, both constitutional and
statutory, see Weinstein-Tull, supra note 6, at 841 (“Much federal law regulates the
conduct of states. States, in turn, delegate many of their federal responsibilities to
2017] LEGAL REFORM AFTER FLINT 1335
responsibility for safe drinking water, essentially leaving the states
and localities on their own.24 The states—or at least some of them—
then abdicate their responsibility for safe drinking water, leaving the
matter to the localities. Finally, some localities abdicate their
responsibility to provide truly safe water to the owners and operators
of public water systems. As a result of this three-step abdication,
some water consumers, especially in poor and rural communities, are
deprived of something we should all agree they deserve as citizens of
a comparatively wealthy nation, if not simply as human beings—water
that is safe to drink.25 Nor has there been effective citizen suit
litigation to check the abdication by federal, state, and local actors.26
Thus, as shown in Figure 1, the SDWA regime radically departs from
the ideal-type of cooperative federalism.

local governments. This Article argues that states do more than delegate those
responsibilities; they abdicate them. They do not monitor local compliance with
those laws, they disclaim responsibility for the actions of their local governments, and
they relinquish the legal capacity to bring their local governments into compliance.”).
Weinstein-Tull is addressing contexts where the law is reasonably clear that states
have primary obligations under federal constitutional or statutory law but
nonetheless lean heavily on the argument that localities should be the subject of any
litigation brought by advocacy groups or aggrieved citizens. In the SDWA context,
however, states (at least arguably) lack any primary legal obligations under federal
law, so the abdication problem is not one merely of rhetoric and political argument,
but rather is a problem in the law itself. See id.
24. To be fair to the EPA, it repeatedly has threatened states with removal of
their primacy under SDWA, but the threats are just that, as the EPA currently lacks
the resources to fulfill the role of the states as enforcers and regulators, however
inadequate some states are in these roles. See, e.g., David E. Hess, DEP Lacks
Resources to Enforce Minimum Federal Safe Drinking Water Regulations, PA.
ENVTL. DIG. BLOG (Jan. 31, 2017, 6:16 AM), http://paenvironmentdaily.blogspot.com/
2017/01/epa-dep-lacks-resources-to-enforce.html [https://perma.cc/8GN8-657A]
(highlighting repeated empty threats from the EPA and the corresponding
inadequacy of the state agency’s ability to remedy problems). But see, e.g., Press
Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Awards $100 Million to Michigan for Flint
Water Infrastructure Upgrades (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/
newsreleases/epa-awards-100-million-michigan-flint-water-infrastructure-upgrades
[https://perma.cc/FB33-ELM2] (showing scenario in which funding was provided by
federal agency to assist state agency in regulatory capacity).
25. See generally Warren, supra note 1, at 51–70 (documenting failures of SDWA
regime).
26. See infra Part V.
1336 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV
Figure 1. Expectations of Cooperative Federalism and the
Corresponding Realities of Abdication
Cooperative Federalism The Abdication Trap
Effective federal oversight of states Federal abdication to states
as regulators and localities as
regulated entities
Effective state oversight of localities State abdication to localities
as regulated entities
Localities as compliant regulated Localities’ failure to comply with
entities regulation
NGOs/citizen groups checking NGOs unable to check failures
federal, state, and/or local failures

There is abundant evidence of abdication at all levels. Indeed, no
one seems to contest the proposition that, at least as regards lead in
water, the legal regime fails to fulfill its theoretical promise. One
starting point for unpacking the pattern of abdication is the EPA’s
1991 Lead and Copper Rule (“LCR”), which was intended to
prescribe testing for and responses to lead in drinking water in
approximately 68,000 public water systems nationwide.27 From the
outset, however, the LCR has been criticized as setting too low an
action level for lead in water; for providing for too little and too
infrequent testing for lead; for leaving too much discretion to local
water authorities as to how, when, and where to test for lead; and for
leaving too much discretion to authorities regarding corrosion control
treatment.28 Despite twenty-five years of intensive criticisms and
near universal agreement among public health experts that the LCR
is inadequate, the EPA has been unable to enact a stronger version of
the LCR.29 The EPA itself has recognized the many flaws of the
LCR, and has agreed that there is a need for “clear and robust revised
sampling requirements, strengthened reporting, [and] transparency

27. See NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 12.
28. See generally Brady Dennis, The EPA’s Lead-in-Water Rule Has Been
Faulted for Decades. Will Flint Hasten a Change?, WASH. POST (May 5, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/epas-lead-in-water-rule-has-
been-faulted-for-decades-will-flint-hasten-a-change/2016/05/04/8d25bb12-0de9-11e6-
bfa1-4efa856caf2a_story.html?utm_term=.7604819be849 [https://perma.cc/4Y29-
U5LH] (summarizing these criticisms and tracing the history of the Rule); see also
NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 12–13 (discussing failures in the Rule and
recommending reforms).
29. See Dennis, supra note 28 at 1, 3.
2017] LEGAL REFORM AFTER FLINT 1337
provisions that ensure consumers have rapid access to relevant
information and public education materials.”30
A recent report on lead in water by the Natural Resources Defense
Council (“NRDC”) documents that, even within the terms of the
LCR, there is gross non-enforcement.31 As the NRDC explains,
based on the EPA’s own violations and enforcement database, “in
2015, over 18 million people were served by 5,363 community water
systems that violated the Lead and Copper Rule,” including failures
to test for lead.32 In 2015, too, “1,110 community water systems
serving 3.9 million people showed lead levels in excess of 15 parts per
billion (ppb)”—the federal action level—“in at least 10 percent of the
homes tested.”33 The geographic scope of LCR violations and lead
level exceedances is “extraordinary.”34
Moreover, the EPA database very substantially understates the
problem; as the NRDC explains, “NRDC has documented
underreporting problems in the EPA’s drinking water database for 25
years,” and “the EPA itself admits that ‘audits and assessments have
shown that violation data are substantially incomplete.’”35 Even
those violations that are documented are rarely subject to formal or
informal enforcement actions, leading the NRDC to conclude that
there is a “lack of accountability [that] sends a clear message to water
suppliers that knowingly violate the Lead and Copper Rule, with state
and federal complicity: [t]here is no cop on the beat.”36
A USA Today investigative report, also drawing on the EPA’s
database, identifies almost 2000 water systems spanning all fifty states
where testing has shown excessive levels of lead contamination over

30. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, LEAD AND COPPER RULE REVISIONS WHITE
PAPER 4 (2016) [hereinafter EPA WHITE PAPER]. Whether the EPA under the
Trump Administration will continue to call for revisions to the LCR, however, is not
yet clear. But cf. Mae Wu, How Trump’s Budget Drains Drinking Water Protections,
NRDC: EXPERT BLOG (June 19, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/how-trumps-
budget-drains-drinking-water-protections [https://perma.cc/H6Z2-5WHD] (noting
statements made by the administration and the current funding and policy priorities).
31. See NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 12–15.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE
ASSURANCE, NATIONAL PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS COMPLIANCE REPORT 3 (2013),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/sdwacom2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T9CE-R34R]).
36. NRDC Report, supra note 20, at 6.