Table Of ContentPHILOSOPHY U Empiricism at
e
b
Howcanweunderstandempiricalevidence?ThiswasthetopicoftheViennaCircle’sproto- e
l
col-sentence debate, which in its main thrust lasted from 1929 to 1936 and ended with the
threemajordisputantsstillatodds. the Crossroads
Contrarytorecentlegend,noneoftheleadingViennaCircletheoristswerefoundationalist
empiricistsinanytraditionalstyle.Theonewhocameclosest,MoritzSchlick,pursuedahighly
individualisticcoursethatsoughttosatisfyempiricism’sconcernwiththereliabilityofitsbasic
databyshowingpartsofeverydaydiscoursetobesecurelygroundedinour‘formoflife’.
For Rudolf Carnap, empiricism meant developing logico-linguistic frameworks that
The Vienna Circle’s Protocol-Sentence Debate
allowedtheclearexhibitionoftheresponsivenessofstatementsformulatedwithinthemto E
intersubjectivelyavailableevidence.
m
OttoNeurath’sconceptionofempiricismwasbuiltuponatheoryoffallibleacceptance
conditions for scientific testimony. His program of unified science comprised not only the
p
variousfirst-orderempiricalandformalsciencesbutalsotheirmetatheory,whichemployed
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Empiricism at the Crossroads
Carnap’s Student Notes, 1910-1914
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t
i
m
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p
es Chapter 1
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u
r
i
a
f
t
p
ce Introduction: Naturalism and Deflationism,the Vienna Circle
x
e
,
er and the Protocol-Sentence Debate
h
s
i
l
b
u
p
e
h
t
om The Vienna Circle’s so-called protocol-sentence debate concerned the form,
r
f
n content and status of scientific evidence statements and extended throughout
o
i
s most of the public phase of the Circle from 1929 to 1936, with Rudolf Carnap,
s
i
rm Moritz Schlick and Otto Neurath as its main protagonists. Notwithstanding its
e
p
t being remembered mainly as an accumulation of errors—or perhaps because of
u
o
h it— this debate has never been far from the horizon of analytical epistemology.
t
i
w W.V.O. Quine’s proposal to naturalize epistemology was clearly marked by his
m
r
fo reading of Carnap’s early contributions to this debate. Wilfred Sellars’s critical
y
an remarks on Schlick’s “Konstatierungen” form a major premise of his argument
in against the myth of the given. And, more recently, Ernest Sosa sought to gain
d
ce neo-foundationalist ground by castigating the supposed errors of Neurath’s
u
d
ro coherentism in a Schlickean vein.1 My purpose in revisiting the debate is to
p
re investigate its own course in the first place and only then to pronounce, in a pre-
e
b liminary way, on what might still be learned from it.
t
o
n Like the philosophy of the Vienna Circle generally, the protocol-sentence
y
a
M debate is much richer than common portrayals of it suggest, both in terms of the
.
ed variety of positions taken and in terms of their fruitfulness. For instance, when
v
r
se we do consider the debate in due detail, we find that Quine was not the first nat-
e
r
uralizer of epistemology in the history of logical empiricism, that Schlick was not
s
t
gh quite the foundationalist he was portrayed as, and that Neurath was not commit-
i
r
l ted to internalist justifications of an individual’s beliefs. In other words, many of
l
A
. the types of meta-epistemological reflections that philosophers became used to
t
ur in response to the failure of the logical empiricist project as commonly con-
© 2007. Open Coe copyright law. 1cth.e Seive Veed iQe—unpinnuaet t(Ci1ni9gr6c 9lseac) ii,et Snseecllelfa. r oFsn a( 1rs9 ef5rc6ou m[r1e 9b 9feo7i,un 6ng8d –na7at3ii]ov)en, Sse—omswape (ir1re9i c9ai7sl)rt.es,a ditys upnrodteargwoanyi swtsi tshaiwn
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Coap 1
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2 Chapter 1
empiricismitself under threat and in trying to meet this threat accepted that
r their efforts would not leave empiricism unchanged. With the protocol-sen-
o
S. tence debate serving as the public forum for these reflections, it is not only
.
U
their results but also the discussions themselves that are of interest for a phi-
r
e
nd losophy of science that claims awareness of its own past (if only not to repeat its
u
ed errors).
t
t
mi This introduction will set the stage for the lengthy inquiry needed to make
r
pe good these claims. First, to provide some further motivation for considering
s
se the protocol-sentence debate as a site for discussions about the renewal of
u
ir empiricism, the simile of Neurath’s Boat is introduced as a motto for natural-
a
f ism in the context of systematic epistemology. Its promise is discussed in the
t
p
ce wider context of the Vienna Circle’s philosophy of science, especially Carnap’s
x
e
, deflationism (1.1). Then we backtrack a bit to give a first overview of the
r
e
h Vienna Circle as a whole and its philosophy (1.2) and the different interpreta-
s
i
bl tive strategies that have been employed to come to terms with it (1.3). (These
u
p
e intermediate two sections can be skipped by readers familiar with the terrain.)
h
t
Then the setting for the detailed reconstruction of the protocol-sentence
m
o
fr debate that follows is provided (1.4), ending with an overview of the course of
n
io investigation (1.5).
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s
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p
t
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o
h
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i
w
m
r I.1 Neurath’s Boat as a Motto for Naturalism
o
f
y
n
a
n Everybody familiar with contemporary analytical philosophy is likely to have
i
d come across the simile known as “Neurath’s Boat”: “We are like sailors who
e
c
du must rebuild their ship on the open sea, never able to dismantle it in dry-dock
o
r
ep and to reconstruct it there out of the best materials.” (1932d [1983, 92]) For
r
e Quine, to whose adoption its wide coinage is owed, this simile eloquently
b
ot expresses that it is impossible for philosophers to succeed in basing scientific
n
ay knowledge on indubitable foundations, and the moral that flows from this: epis-
M
d. temology should be naturalized. Very broadly, this means that the theorist of
e
rv knowledge should forego the a priori standards of traditional epistemology and
e
s
re presuppose the available results of scientific investigations in order to under-
s
ht stand scientific knowledge. Science must be made to ‘explain itself’. The boat
g
ri simile has come to encapsulate this naturalistic approach to epistemology.
l
Al Despite Quine’s frequent remarks on the Neurathian provenance of the “para-
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rt ble of the mariners”, however, it is by no means obvious whether it meant for
u
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Debate Revisited
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Introduction 3
The answer that will be developed here is that Neurath did indeed develop
r a conception of naturalistic philosophy of science, albeit a rather unusual one
o
S. that must not be mistaken with Quine’s. In different respects, Neurath’s natu-
.
U
ralism is both more radical and less radical than Quine’s and, as a result, holds
r
e
nd out different promises to epistemologists of science. In fact, it will be argued
u
ed that Neurath’s naturalism represents but one part of the Vienna Circle’s
t
t
mi enduring legacy for the philosophy of science. Another equally valuable part
r
pe consists in Carnap’s contribution; the complementarity of their approaches is
s
se the topic of Chapter 12. The initial focus on Neurath’s naturalism recommends
u
ir itself for good reasons, however. It confounds in the most spectacular manner
a
f what is still the received view of Vienna Circle philosophy and it allows the
t
p
ce most direct interpretive route to what this has long obscured. For to ask what
x
e
, Neurath’s naturalism was and how it manifested itself is to ask just what went
r
e
h on in the Vienna Circle’s notorious protocol-sentence debate. Reconstructed
s
i
bl in situin this debate, a rather different conception of the philosophy of science
u
p
e emerges than what standard histories of the logical positivism provide.
h
t
Indeed, the recognition of the plurality of conceptions of philosophy of science
m
o
fr entertained in the Vienna Circle is the very first result of revisiting its protocol-
n
io sentence debate.
s
s
i
m
r
pe 1.1.1 Neurath’s Boat and the Theory of Scientific Knowledge
t
ou The systematic questions in the theory of knowledge are generally organized
h
t
wi most easily around the question of scepticism. To be sure, Neurath had no
rm sympathy for radical scepticism as a positive theory, nor did he think it worth
o
f
y his while to try to refute it. Yet sceptical questions provide a fitting heuristic
n
a
n for his program, if only partially so. Scepticism can frame questions that
i
d Neurath did respond to, albeit at a level skeptics would find insufficient to
e
c
du allay their concerns. Neurath sought to keep in check the individualist
o
r
ep excesses of traditional philosophy, but he saw no need for systematic sceptical
r
e challenges once reasoned and evidence-based intersubjective agreement
b
ot underlay judgments. (Like idealism, radical scepticism fell by the wayside of
n
ay his naturalism on account of its unsustainable absolutization of the individual
M
d. knower.)
e
rv Systematically speaking then, the central problems of the theory of knowl-
e
s
re edge concern the justification of knowledge claims and are most directly raised
s
ht by sceptical questions. Sceptical questions challenge the claim that we do pos-
g
ri sess knowledge at all. (They can be raised about all kinds of knowledge claims,
l
Al and within each kind, about all areas; in this study, we are concerned with
.
rt empirical scientific knowledge claims.) Over the course of history, sceptical
u
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t le world; since Nietzsche, scepticism even doubts the existence of an “inner”
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4 Chapter 1
world, in particular, the correct grasp of the content of one’s own mental
r states.3The interest of sceptical arguments, however, lies not only in raising a
o
S. question of fact, namely, whether we have knowledge, but also in raising a
.
U
more conceptual question, namely, what knowledge is. They do so because
r
e
nd they raise the question of right—“Are we justified in our knowledge claims?”—
u
ed and so raise the question of what kind of justification is appropriate for knowl-
t
t
mi edge claims.
r
pe Against the sceptical challenge, the defense may either accept the sceptic’s
s
se premises and show the mistakes in the reasoning, or accept the sceptic’s rea-
u
ir soning and challenge the premises in more or less radical ways. In common ter-
a
f minology, the defense against the sceptic may either be foundationalist or
t
p
ce antifoundationalist. Foundationalists hold that all empirical knowledge con-
x
e
, sists of basic and non-basic beliefs, and that basic, non-inferentially justified
r
e
h beliefs can be found.4Antifoundationalists, by contrast, hold that there are no
s
i
bl non-inferentially justified beliefs that could help the justification of empirical
u
p
e knowledge claims; consequently, they must provide an alternative account of
h
t
the structure of justification.
m
o
fr Different ways in which theorists may understand the sceptical challenge
n
io must also be distinguished. Concerned with the knowledge claim of science, for
s
s
mi instance, they may understand their task to provide its defense ‘from without’
r
pe or ‘from within’. That is to say, they may seek to defend it starting from prem-
t
ou ises held uncontroversially true or by assuming the truth of some of the claims
h
t
wi of science to be defended. The naturalistic approach engages with scepticism
rm only as a heuristic strategy and so attempts a defense ‘from within’. Accordingly,
o
f
y naturalists may entertain conceptions of the nature of justification at odds with
n
a
n attempts to answer the radical sceptic. For instance, externalist conceptions
i
d have been developed that deny what traditional internalist ones insist upon,
e
c
du roughly, that knowers themselves must have access to or be in possession of the
o
r
ep justification for their beliefs.5
r
e Whereas the foundationalist owes an account of the nature of basic beliefs
b
ot and of the relation of “epistemic ascent” from the basic to the non-basic beliefs,
n
ay the antifoundationalist owes an argument establishing that no non-inferentially
M
.
d
e
v
er 3. On the absence of idealism in Greek philosophy, see Burnyeat (1982); for the anticipa-
s
re tion of contemporary radical scepticism in Nietzsche, see his (1883–88 [1968, #476]):
ts “Our inner world, too, ‘appearance’!” For a Vienna Circle appreciation of Nietzsche see
gh Frank (1917); for observations on the Vienna Circle’s reception of Nietzsche, see Fischer
i
r (1982a); especially on Neurath’s, see Nemeth (1992).
l
Al 4. As is apparent from this characterization of foundationalism, justification is here
t. understood to concern the grounds or reasons for a person’s believing a proposition. The
r
u focus is on doxastic justification, as opposed to propositional justification, which justi-
© 2007. Open Co copyright law. fojw5uig.ea syTsst ihptfahiirpcsoep a piptlsoii roevsosneip tr ittoyohos n aritoattih ulow ejgnua h sspa; ta hipstfie ieliceosra sssKtuooionepo;r nh bnw yetb hhlloieaieftntv h besC sc(ea.1ic er9Iannn9mac 9spee)o tt fohufoaferr rn t isasheussderu tvherVeia.siyde biontafnic orakne coaCelni ner ectpp lieeisxs tttaeeetmmr naooallllol,oi gsgiimytc ,as ihl s aot newdrdoem xvinaeinsrt,teo iirlct--
e nalisms.
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Introduction 5
justified propositions can be found and an account of the nature of justification
r without foundations. Neurath’s simile of the Boat suggests that inferential jus-
o
S. tification was all the justification that could be provided for scientific knowl-
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edge claims and that any hope for a secure defense of science ‘from without’ had
r
e
nd to be abandoned. Thus Neurath requires, first, an argument against founda-
u
ed tions, and, second, an account of how that non-foundationalist, naturalistic jus-
t
t
mi tification would go. Neurath’s argument against foundations and his positive
r
pe account long remained unknown. In fact, there continues to be considerable
s
se puzzlement over how Neurath could have anticipated a naturalistic approach to
u
ir scientific knowledge, for the Vienna Circle to which he belonged is commonly
a
f held to have pursued the radically different strategy of opposing the sceptic
t
p
ce head-on with, more or less, traditional foundationalism.
x
e
, Among others, it is this matter that this study seeks to address in its full
r
e
h complexity. In order to do so, care must be taken not to let our expectations of
s
i
bl what we might find frame our perception of the protocol-sentence debate too
u
p
e rigidly. For instance, as introduced above, Neurath’s Boat speaks to the phe-
h
t
nomenon of knowledge and the fallibility of the justifications we can provide.
m
o
fr We should be wary, however, of translating this concern without much ado into
n
io that of traditional epistemology. What the protocol-sentence debate was about
s
s
mi was the basis of scientific knowledge claims. Whether this easily translates into
r
pe concern with the justificatory basis for the beliefs of individual knowers is
t
ou debatable. Neurath and, in a different way, also Carnap were clearly concerned
h
t
wi with epistemological matters broadly speaking. But we would bar access to their
rm most distinctive contributions were we to read them as theses pertaining to
o
f
y individualist epistemology.
n
a
n
i
d 1.1.2 Neurath and Quine on Naturalism
e
c
du Much contemporary philosophical interest in the Vienna Circle concerns its
o
r
ep role in the formation of the views of Carnap and Quine. When such interest is
r
e focussed upon the Circle’s philosophies of empirical science, as opposed to
b
ot its philosophies of logic and mathematics, contemporary discussion typically
n
ay sees “the” Vienna Circle opposing Quine on the topic of naturalism, for it
M
d. rightly views Quine to be in opposition to Carnap. Typically, one wants to
e
rv know whether Quine was justified in his particularly radical conception of
e
s
re naturalism: need naturalistic epistemology renounce appeal to meanings and
s
ht propositional attitudes; indeed, must it shun all social science? Moreover,
g
ri was Quine justified in rejecting any separation of logical and empirical state-
l
Al ments such that his epistemological holism was unable to draw any distinc-
.
rt tion between the two and had to reject any conception of the a priori
u
© 2007. Open Co copyright law. w6.h FaotBsro ugete vQneeurr?ianle d’si srcaudsisciaoln osp opfo sciotniotnem wpaosr naroyt tehpei sftiermst onlaotguicraall isntaitcu rreaslpisomn,s es eweh eic.gh.
e Kornblith (1985), Maffie (1990), Laudan (1990), Kitcher (1992), Goldman (1994).
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6 Chapter 1
Carnap had to face.6In the Vienna Circle, Neurath urged that the philosophy
r of science be naturalized.7 What is more, Neurath’s challenge to Carnap was
o
S. not only, as a matter of historical fact, a precursor of, but also, as a matter of
.
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r doctrine, an alternative to Quine’s. In particular, and quite apart from other
e
d
n doctrinal differences that obtained between them, Neurath sought to develop
u
ed something quite simple in conception yet very hard to realize: a conception of
t
t
mi scientific knowledge as a tool for empowerment, an instrument of emancipa-
r
e
p tion. With Neurath, naturalism shouldered the concerns that motivated the
s
se early Marx and Engels in their “Theses on Feuerbach” and German
u
ir Ideology.8What makes Neurath interesting therefore is not just his de facto
a
f
t anticipation of a naturalistic philosophy of science, but the different, wider
p
ce objectives behind his naturalism. Yet still before this “ideological” dimension
x
e
, of the philosophy of science is touched upon, there are significant differences
r
e
sh that must be noted lest the “real” Neurath once again slip through the inter-
i
l
b pretive net.9
u
p
e To fix ideas, let’s ask what makes for a “naturalized” or “naturalistic” the-
h
t
m ory of knowledge. Here recall the warning that all too often no distinction is
o
r
f drawn between general epistemology and philosophy of science, with the
n
io result that, as in the case of Quine, it is left unclear whether what he called
s
s
mi “epistemology naturalized” was his model for philosophy of science or for
r
e
p epistemology in general. Yet it is not clear that the two are indeed coincident:
t
ou their units of analysis can reasonably be claimed to be different. In epistemol-
h
t
wi ogy it is the beliefs of an individual for which justification is to be provided; by
m
or contrast, in philosophy of science it is public knowledge claims that are to be
f
y substantiated. This difference may not seem to amount to much at first glance,
n
a
n but the pursuit of justification for these different types of knowledge claims
i
ed can lead to the adoption of quite different philosophical strategies. In Chapter
c
u
d 11, we shall discuss in detail the striking results that emerge when knowledge
o
r
ep claims are discussed as public ones of a particular type rather than as expres-
r
be sions of an individual’s beliefs. Yet even before that we shall see how related
t
o differences over how to legitimate scientific knowledge claims emerged in the
n
ay course of the protocol-sentence debate and led to different positions by differ-
M
d. ent theorists. While Neurath must be read as a philosopher of science, Schlick,
e
v
er by contrast, drew no such distinction between epistemology and philosophy of
s
re science; Carnap displayed a different attitude again, arguing initially from the
s
ht perspective of individualistic epistemology but switching to the explication of
g
i
r public knowledge claims roughly half-way through the protocol-sentence
l
Al debate.
.
t
r
u
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t le (2004b), (2005a). For more literature in this topic, see fn. 39 below.
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Introduction 7
So what does it mean for naturalistic philosophy of science to ‘explain sci-
r ence by science’? Given the ongoing developments in naturalism, it is best to
o
S. characterize this program not in terms of any particular doctrines which would
.
U
prejudge its outcome, but rather in terms of its overall methodology. One char-
r
e
nd acterization that suggests itself is that what makes inquiries naturalistic is the
u
ed decision to employ only such concepts as can be explicated, in turn, by concepts
t
t
mi which have proven themselves in the explanation of processes antecedently
r
pe understood to be “natural” ones.10Only ultimately scientifically legitimate con-
s
se cepts may thus figure in the justification of knowledge claims. Clearly, every-
u
ir thing depends on what’s considered natural. Note here that Quine tended to
a
f take a very strict view of the matter. Natural processes were processes happen-
t
p
ce ing in space and time and open to empirical inquiry. Quine thus replaced talk of
x
e
, “epistemic priority” by talk of “causal proximity to sense receptors” (1969a,
r
e
h 84–5), talk of “subjective similarity” by talk of “innate quality spaces” (1968a
s
i
bl [1969b, 123], 1975, 69–71), and talk of “the given” by talk of “observation sen-
u
p
e tences” (1975, 73). Observation sentences in turn were defined as “occasion
h
t
sentences”—as opposed to standing or eternal sentences—whose occasion is not
m
o
fr only intersubjectively observable, but generally adequate, moreover, to elicit
n
io assent to the sentence from any present witness conversant with the language.
s
s
mi For Quine then, neurophysiology, evolutionary biology and behavioristic psy-
r
pe chology furnished the explication of the epistemological concepts required by
t
ou naturalism. Both Quine and Neurath required a scientific explication of the
h
t
wi epistemological concepts of science. They differed on what kind of sciences
rm could be employed in this explication.
o
f
y To get a sense of what is involved in Neurath’s non-standard naturalism,
n
a
n consider two different ways of reading Neurath’s Boat.11There are what can be
i
d called the “austere” and the “rich” readings of what is involved in re-building
e
c
du the metaphorical ship, understood to represent scientific knowledge. Both
o
r
ep readings agree that it is impossible to repair any deficiencies in the body of sci-
r
e entific knowledge by stepping beyond it and appealing to insights that could not
b
ot be challenged. The two readings disagree on the standards with which such an
n
ay repair of science ‘from within’ has to meet. According to the austere reading,
M
d. whatever cannot meet the individuation conditions of physical kinds has to be
e
rv consigned to the scrap-heap of mythology and cannot be used in reconstruction.
e
s
e
r
s
t
gh 10. Paul Pietroski helped with this formulation long ago. Since the formal sciences are
i
r typically involved in explanations of natural processes, Ernest Nagel and Richard
l
Al Brandt’s classic definition of the meta-epistemological doctrine of naturalism is upheld,
t. in particular its second part. According to them, naturalism holds that epistemological
r
u statements are truth-valuable, that “epistemological terms can be explained by way of
© 2007. Open Co copyright law. etmr1hem1lee.e pn Fpvitoarrsonri ic ctnta ewd lts aohast ”neda deai of mnlfboedptgr ateiihricnniaactelt ar d c“le oebsancpydi ciiessneentpgnectsmses oos oe,rf xl yatoc nhogludebic sstBaiehvlora epavtltra yl it,ibnik wyoce niiw ttp.hha”leeyo ( s ul1o aht9ft au6tcve5soeri,m n ttxhhgpie ieaoiy r)st .imhasmeournes e tcop bofi egst tnhjeueimtd itgvoheeledo sog tirnaiicte taushl s oet ae fls riQ gmshutasti tn ioenef-
e and Davidson see Hookway (1988).
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Debate Revisited
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8 Chapter 1
Given the austere reading, Neurath’s Boat means that natural science explains
r (knowledge of) natural science. According to the rich reading, all human cog-
o
S. nitive endeavors could serve as replacement planks and beams to keep the ship
.
U
of science afloat, provided one condition is met. This condition is that the
r
e
nd assertions characteristic of these various enterprises be empirically testable
u
ed (and thus, presumably, something less than a reduction of all explanatory
t
t
mi types to physical types is required). Given the rich reading, Neurath’s Boat
r
pe means that natural and social science explains (knowledge of) natural and
s
se social science.
u
ir It is clear that the austere reading is Quine’s, but which one was Neurath’s?
a
f To claim that the rich reading was what Neurath intended would support the
t
p
ce earlier claim that Neurath’s naturalized philosophy of science not only consti-
x
e
, tuted a precursor, but also an alternative to Quine’s. It is also pretty clear that
r
e
h only the rich reading supports a conception of scientific knowledge compatible
s
i
bl with the idea of knowledge as an instrument of emancipation. However, what I
u
p
e called the “rich reading” of Neurath’s Boat is more liberal also in still another
h
t
sense. It allows not only the empirical sciences to aid in the explanation of sci-
m
o
fr entific knowledge claims. This is important. To say that the assertions of the sci-
n
io ences that help in explaining science must be “empirically testable” suggests
s
s
mi that Neurath’s naturalism shares Quine’s rejection of the distinction between
r
pe the logical and the empirical and his semantically undifferentiated epistemo-
t
ou logical holism. This suggestion is problematical, however.
h
t
wi To begin with, this suggestion is misleading for one simple reason: as a log-
rm ical empiricist Neurath shared in the overall strategy of considering mathemat-
o
f
y ical knowledge as broadly speaking logical knowledge and its propositions as
n
a
n analytical ones, in contrast to the synthetic propositions of the empirical sci-
i
d ences. Nowhere does Neurath indicate dissent from this strategy that was basic
e
c
du to the Vienna Circle’s rejection of the a priori philosophies of old and of the syn-
o
r
ep thetic a priori of Kant. But this suggestion is also problematical in another
r
e respect. It presupposes that naturalism in the theory of knowledge must reject
b
ot the epistemological distinction between the logical and the empirical in the
n
ay manner of Quine. Yet it is not clear that naturalism must do so, unless it were
M
d. only another name for radical empiricism.12
e
v
r
e
s
re 1.1.3 Naturalism and Deflationist Philosophy of Science
s
ht An alternative emerges once the motto ‘explaining science by science’ is recon-
g
ri sidered. What according to this motto is considered “unnatural”, is only the
l
Al attempt to explain science by supra-scientific means: to explain it by appeal to
.
rt the kind of insight that cannot be sustained by any science. (Just that, of course,
u
© 2007. Open Co copyright law. ts1ht2re.u NValoi,et enn,na ftaou Crr aiirnlicssltmea no dcpeop,e osrse necdeon ta tnr uadtl tceeo momupbtt saa tpbtype desa ealls ft -“sotm ytlheedeta snpcahiteyunsricaclesiss”t .oi)cf U leonpgidsietcer ma snuodclo hmg aisa cttsoh neto--
e reserve a place for the a priori under some description: Rey (1998), Goldman (1999).
tl
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EBSCO Publishing : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 1/25/2022 8:07 PM via UNIVERSITY OF YORK
AN: 1095217 ; Thomas Uebel.; Empiricism at the Crossroads : The Vienna Circle's Protocol-Sentence
Debate Revisited
Account: s3122557
