Embracing Scientific Realism (Synthese Library, 445)

249 Pages·2021·3.112 MB·English

by  Seungbae Park

Synthese Library 445
Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology,
and Philosophy of Science
Seungbae Park
Embracing
Scientific
Realism
Synthese Library
Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology,
and Philosophy of Science
Volume 445
Editor-in-Chief
Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, USA
Editorial Board Members
Berit Brogaard, University of Miami, USA
Anjan Chakravartty, University of Notre Dame, USA
Steven French, University of Leeds, UK
Catarina Dutilh Novaes, VU Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Darrell P. Rowbottom, Lingnan University, Hong Kong
Emma Ruttkamp, University of South Africa, South Africa
Kristie Miller, University of Sydney, Australia
The aim of Synthese Library is to provide a forum for the best current work in the
methodology and philosophy of science and in epistemology. A wide variety of
different approaches have traditionally been represented in the Library, and every
effort is made to maintain this variety, not for its own sake, but because we believe
that there are many fruitful and illuminating approaches to the philosophy of science
and related disciplines.
Special attention is paid to methodological studies which illustrate the interplay
of empirical and philosophical viewpoints and to contributions to the formal
(logical, set-theoretical, mathematical, information-theoretical, decision-theoretical,
etc.) methodology of empirical sciences. Likewise, the applications of logical
methods to epistemology as well as philosophically and methodologically relevant
studies in logic are strongly encouraged. The emphasis on logic will be tempered by
interest in the psychological, historical, and sociological aspects of science.
Besides monographs Synthese Library publishes thematically unified anthologies
and edited volumes with a well-defined topical focus inside the aim and scope of the
book series. The contributions in the volumes are expected to be focused and
structurally organized in accordance with the central theme(s), and should be tied
together by an extensive editorial introduction or set of introductions if the volume
is divided into parts. An extensive bibliography and index are mandatory.
More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/6607
Seungbae Park
Embracing Scientific
Realism
Seungbae Park
School of Liberal Arts
Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology
Ulsan, Korea (Republic of)
ISSN 0166-6991 ISSN 2542-8292 (electronic)
Synthese Library
ISBN 978-3-030-87812-2 ISBN 978-3-030-87813-9 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87813-9
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland
AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and
transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar
or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the
editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface
Arthur Fine declared that “the realist programme has degenerated by now to the
point where it is quite beyond salvage” (Fine, 1986, p. 149). This declaration was
natural in the 1980s. In 1962 and 1980, respectively, Thomas Kuhn and Bas van
Fraassen published The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and The Scientific Image
in which they mounted formidable objections to scientific realism. Over the past
several decades, however, scientific realists have tackled the forceful objections,
criticized scientific antirealism, and advanced new arguments for scientific realism.
As a result, scientific realism, in my view, looks better than before. This does not
mean, however, that the debate between scientific realists and antirealists has ended.
It only means that scientific antirealists have the chance to sharpen their old objec-
tions, to develop new objections, to diffuse the criticisms against scientific antireal-
ism, and to refute the new arguments for scientific realism. In my view, the realism
debate is as exciting as ever. It is a fruitful research program which constantly pro-
vides researchers with enticing new topics.
This book summarizes and develops the ideas that I have already put forward in
journals including Axiomathes, Foundations of Science, Inquiry, Journal of General
Philosophy of Science, Social Epistemology, and Studies in History and Philosophy
of Science. The task of each chapter is as follows. Chapter 1 undermines several
standard objections to the no-miracles argument. Chapter 2 criticizes various ver-
sions of the pessimistic induction leveled against scientists, realists, and scientific
theories. Chapter 3 displays epistemic and pragmatic disadvantages of scientific
antirealism. Chapter 4 introduces six new arguments for scientific realism which are
distinct from the no-miracles argument. Chapter 5 critically responds to five vari-
ants of putative realism. Chapter 6 explores the issue of how to formulate scientific
realism and antirealism. Chapter 7 argues that scientific understanding is a boon for
scientific realists, but not for scientific antirealists. Chapter 8 develops a new account
of scientific progress, and then explores how five rival accounts of scientific prog-
ress relate to scientific realism and antirealism. Chapter 9 criticizes mathematical
realism and defends mathematical antirealism. Chapter 10 attempts to establish that
scientific realism is a better philosophical framework for scientific practice than is
v
vi Preface
scientific antirealism. Chapter 11 presents several new topics for future debates
between scientific realists and antirealists.
My deepest intellectual debt goes to my graduate advisor, Richard Healey of the
University of Arizona. This book would not exist without the graduate courses that
I took from him and the undergraduate courses that I TA-ed for him. The epistemol-
ogy and philosophy of mind courses that I took from Alvin Goldman also pro-
foundly influenced this book. I also owe an intellectual debt to other great thinkers
around the world whose papers and/or books have been inspirational to me. They
include Mario Alai, Jamin Asay, Alexander Bird, Benjamin Callard, Finnur Dellsén,
Simon Fitzpatrick, Philip Kitcher, Larry Laudan, Peter Lipton, Timothy Lyons,
Moti Mizrahi, Alan Musgrave, Thomas Nickles, Hilary Putnam, Stathis Psillos,
Samuel Ruhmkorff, Jamie Shaw, Kyle Stanford, Bas van Fraassen, and Brad Wray.
My gratitude also goes to anonymous referees of Synthese Library and the journals
to which I submitted my papers. Their sharp and insightful comments have been the
driving force to improve my thoughts. I am also grateful to my wife (Hyegyoung
Gong) and three daughters (Jihye Park, Jeongae Park, and Suzie Park) for the delight
that they offered while I was writing this book. I am also thankful to Dave Truncellito
and Jill Flohil for helping me on editorial matters. Last but not least, I thank Otávio
Bueno, Editor-in-Chief, for inviting me to contribute to Synthese Library.
Ulsan, Korea (Republic of) Seungbae Park
Contents
1 In Defense of the No-Miracles Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The NMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Laudan’s Objection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 The Rejection of the Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 IBE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.6 Evolutionary Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.7 The End of History Illusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.8 Ad Hoc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.9 Empiricism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.10 Surrealism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.11 Predictive Similarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.12 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2 Critiques of the Pessimistic Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.2 The Pessimistic Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3 Problematic Positions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.1 The Classic PI and IBE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.2 The Classic PI and Evolutionary Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 The Grand PI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.1 Four Intrinsic Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.2 The PUA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.3 The Relative PI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.4.4 The PI over Realists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.5 The Epistemic PI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4.6 The Problem of Misleading Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4.7 Proportional Pessimism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
vii
viii Contents
3 Critiques of Scientific Antirealism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.2 The PI Over Antirealist Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3 The PI Over Pessimists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4 The PI Over Antirealists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.5 Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.6 Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.7 Two Epistemic Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.8 Epistemic Reciprocalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.9 Empiricism and the Problem of Unobserved Anomalies . . . . . . . . . 59
3.10 Constructive Empiricism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.11 Gap Antirealists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.12 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4 Six New Arguments for Scientific Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2 The Optimistic Induction Over Realists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.3 The Argument from Undiscovered Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.4 The Argument from Neighboring Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.5 The Counter-Induction for Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.6 The English Notion of Rationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.7 The Grand Optimistic Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.8 Tu Quoque . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5 Critiques of Five Variants of Putative Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.2 Entity Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.3 Minimal Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.4 Axiological Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.5 Van Fraassen’s Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.6 Selective Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.6.1 An Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.6.2 Common Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.6.3 Distinctive Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.6.4 The PIs against Selective Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.6.5 The Six New Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.7 The Argument from a Bad Lot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6 Formulating Scientific Realism and Antirealism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.2 Formulational vs. Epistemological . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.3 Wide and Narrow Formulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Contents ix
6.4 Epistemic, Attributive, and Conditional Formulations. . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.5 A Pragmatic Advantage of the Epistemic Formulation . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.6 Conceptual and Empirical Objections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.7 Doxastic Conditionalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.8 Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7 Scientific Realism and Scientific Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.2 No Belief? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
7.2.1 Belief and Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
7.2.2 Acceptance and Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.2.3 Empiricism and Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
7.3 No Justification? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
7.3.1 The Episode of Einstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
7.3.2 Explanation or Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.4 No Truth? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.4.1 Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.4.2 Past Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
7.4.3 Anti-epistemism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
7.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
8 Scientific Realism and Scientific Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
8.2 The Historical Episode of Semmelweis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
8.3 The Problem-Solving Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
8.4 The Semantic Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
8.5 The Noetic Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
8.6 The Epistemic Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
8.7 The Evidential Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
8.7.1 Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
8.7.2 A Comparison with the Problem-Solving Account . . . . . . . 166
8.7.3 A Comparison with the Semantic Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
8.7.4 A Comparison with the Noetic Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
8.7.5 A Comparison with the Epistemic Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
8.7.6 Objections and Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
8.8 Relationships to Realism and Empiricism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
8.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
9 Scientific Realism and Mathematical Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
9.2 Mathematical Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
9.3 The Abstract World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
9.3.1 The Argument from Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179