ea7 elhauge us antitrust & econ 2d

69 Pages·2011·0.36 MB·English

U S
NITED TATES
A L
NTITRUST AW
E
AND CONOMICS
S E C O N D E D I T I O N
by
E E
INER LHAUGE
Petrie Professor of Law, Harvard University
This publication was created to provide you with accurate and authoritative information concerning the
subject matter covered; however, this publication was not necessarily prepared by persons licensed to
practice law in a particular jurisdiction. The publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or other
professional advice and this publication is not a substitute for the advice of an attorney. If you require legal
or other expert advice, you should seek the services of a competent attorney or other professional.
Nothing contained herein is intended or written to be used for the purposes of 1) avoiding penalties imposed
under the federal Internal Revenue Code, or 2) promoting, marketing or recommending to another party
any transaction or matter addressed herein.
a 2008 THOMSON REUTERS/FOUNDATION PRESS
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S U M M A R Y O F C O N T E N T S
TABLE OF CASESMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM xiii
CHAPTER 1 IntroductionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 1

A. The Framework of Legal Issues Raised by Basic Antitrust Eco-
nomicsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 1
B. An Overview of U.S. Antitrust Laws and Remedial StructureMMMMMMMM 10
CHAPTER 2 Which Horizontal Agreements Are Illegal?MMMMMMMMM 49

A. Relevant U.S. Laws and General Legal StandardsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 49
B. Horizontal Price–FixingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 53
C. Horizontal Output RestrictionsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 77
D. Horizontal Market DivisionsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 87
E. Horizontal Agreements Not to Deal With Particular FirmsMMMMMMMMMMM 94
1. Boycotts by Unrelated RivalsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 95
2. Exclusions and Expulsions From a Productive Collaboration of
RivalsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 101
F. Are Social Welfare Justifications Admissible?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 114
G. Does Intellectual Property Law Justify an Anticompetitive Re-
straint? MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 153
H. Buyer CartelsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 169
CHAPTER 3 What Unilateral Conduct Is Illegal?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 178

A. Relevant Laws & Basic Legal ElementsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 178
B. The Power Element MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 183
1. Economic and Legal Tests of Market Power GenerallyMMMMMMMMMMMMM 184
2. Legal Tests of Monopoly PowerMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 191
3. Market DefinitionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 192
4. AftermarketsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 224
C. Second Element: Anticompetitive Conduct MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 233
1. General StandardsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 234
2. Predatory PricingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 236
3. Predatory Overpaying by a MonopsonistMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 259
4. The Economics of Price DiscriminationMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 263
5. Exclusions From Owned Property–Unilateral Refusals to Deal 268
6. Price SqueezesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 302
D. Causal Connection Between First and Second Elements Required? 310
E. Attempted MonopolizationMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 312
iii
iv SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 4 Vertical Agreements That Restrict Dealing
With RivalsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 323

A. IntroductionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 323
B. Exclusive DealingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 325
C. TyingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 359
D. Loyalty and Bundled DiscountsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 404
CHAPTER 5 Agreements and Conduct That Arguably Distort
Downstream Competition in Distributing a Supplier’s
Products MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 439

A. IntroductionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 439
B. Intrabrand Distributional Restraints on ResaleMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 442
1. Vertical Nonprice Restraints on DistributionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 443
2. Vertical Maximum Price–FixingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 451
3. Vertical Agreements Fixing Minimum Resale PricesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 458
4. How to Characterize AgreementsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 482
C. Price Discrimination That Arguably Distorts Downstream Compe-
titionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 487
CHAPTER 6 Proving an Agreement or Concerted ActionMMMMMMM 508

A. Are the Defendants Separate Entities?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 508
B. Standards for Finding a Vertical AgreementMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 528
C. Standards for Finding a Horizontal Agreement or Concerted Ac-
tionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 534
1. Parallel Conduct Equally Consistent With an Independent
MotiveMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 535
2. Parallel Conduct that Would Be Unprofitable if Not Engaged
in by Other Firms MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 545
3. Agreements or Practices That Facilitate Oligopolistic Price
CoordinationMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 562
CHAPTER 7 MergersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 585

A. Horizontal MergersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 590
1. Unilateral EffectsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 593
2. Oligopoly EffectsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 612
3. Post–Merger EntryMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 623
4. Efficiencies & Weighing the EquitiesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 628
5. The Failing Firm DefenseMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 646
6. The Relevance of Buyer Power, Sophistication, or ViewsMMMMMMMMMM 653
B. Vertical MergersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 664
C. Conglomerate MergersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 679
INDEXMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 695
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
TABLE OF CASESMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM xiii
CHAPTER 1 IntroductionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 1

A. The Framework of Legal Issues Raised by Basic Antitrust Eco-
nomicsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 1
B. An Overview of U.S. Antitrust Laws and Remedial StructureMMMMMMMM 10
CHAPTER 2 Which Horizontal Agreements Are Illegal?MMMMMMMMM 49

A. Relevant U.S. Laws and General Legal StandardsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 49
B. Horizontal Price–FixingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 53
United States v. Trenton PotteriesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 53
Questions on Trenton PotteriesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 55
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) v. Columbia Broadcasting SystemMMMMMM 56
Questions on BMIMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 63
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc’yMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 65
Questions on MaricopaMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 73
Texaco Inc. v. DagherMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 74
Questions on Texaco v. DagherMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 76
C. Horizontal Output RestrictionsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 77
NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of OklahomaMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 78
Questions on NCAAMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 86
D. Horizontal Market DivisionsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 87
Palmer v. BRGMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 87
Questions on Palmer v. BRGMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 89
U.S. DOJ/FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among
CompetitorsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 91
Questions on FTC–DOJ Guidelines MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 94
E. Horizontal Agreements Not to Deal With Particular FirmsMMMMMMMMMMM 94
1. Boycotts by Unrelated RivalsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 95
Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway–Hale Stores, Inc.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 95
Questions on Klor’sMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 97
Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTCMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 97
Questions on Fashion Originators’MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 100
2. Exclusions and Expulsions From a Productive Collaboration of
RivalsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 101
United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass’nMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 101
Associated Press v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 105
Questions on Terminal RR and Associated PressMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 107
Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific StationeryMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 109
Questions on Northwest StationersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 113
F. Are Social Welfare Justifications Admissible?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 114
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMM 115
Questions on Professional EngineersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 120
FTC v. Indiana Federation of DentistsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 122
v
vi TABLE OF CONTENTS
F. Are Social Welfare Justifications Admissible?—Continued
Questions on Indiana DentistsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 126
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’nMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 127
Questions on Trial Lawyer’s Ass’nMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 131
California Dental Ass’n v. FTCMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 132
Questions on California DentalMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 140
Burdens and Orders of Theory and Proof after California DentalMMM 141
The Policy Relevance of Nonprofit StatusMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 142
The Legal Treatment of Nonprofits Under U.S. LawMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 143
United States v. Brown UniversityMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 144
Questions on United States v. BrownMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 151
G. Does Intellectual Property Law Justify an Anticompetitive Re-
straint? MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 153
United States v. General ElectricMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 154
Questions on General ElectricMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 156
United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc. MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 158
Questions on New WrinkleMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 160
U.S. DOJ/FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellec-
tual Property (1995)MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 161
Questions on the U.S. GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 168
H. Buyer CartelsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 169
Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal SugarMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 169
Questions on MandevilleMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 172
Countervailing Power and the Problem of the Second BestMMMMMMMMMMM 174
CHAPTER 3 What Unilateral Conduct Is Illegal?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 178

A. Relevant Laws & Basic Legal ElementsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 178
B. The Power Element MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 183
1. Economic and Legal Tests of Market Power GenerallyMMMMMMMMMMMMM 184
2. Legal Tests of Monopoly PowerMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 191
3. Market DefinitionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 192
United States v. du Pont & Co. (The Cellophane Case)MMMMMMMMMMMMM 193
du Pont (The Cellophane Case) and Various Bases for Defining
MarketsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 199
U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 205
Note on the U.S. Market Definition GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 216
Is Market Definition Necessary?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 218
Technical Methods Used in Market DefinitionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 221
4. AftermarketsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 224
Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 224
Questions on KodakMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 232
C. Second Element: Anticompetitive Conduct MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 233
1. General StandardsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 234
2. Predatory PricingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 236
a. Below–Cost Predatory PricingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 237
Brooke Group Ltd. (Liggett) v. Brown & Williamson Tobac-
co Corp.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 237
Note and Questions About BrookeMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 245
The U.S. Conflict on the Proper Cost MeasureMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 248
Elhauge, Why Above–Cost Price Cuts to Drive out Entrants
Do Not Signal Predation or Even Market Power—and the
Implications for Defining CostsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 249
b. Above–Cost Predatory PricingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 251
TABLE OF CONTENTS vii
C. Second Element: Anticompetitive Conduct—Continued
Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct
in the Air Transportation IndustryMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 252
Note and Questions on the Proposed U.S. Department of
Transportation Enforced PolicyMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 254
United States v. AMR Corp.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 255
Questions on American AirlinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 259
3. Predatory Overpaying by a MonopsonistMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 259
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross–Simmons Hardwood LumberMMMMMMMMMMM 259
Note and Questions on WeyerhaeuserMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 263
4. The Economics of Price DiscriminationMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 263
5. Exclusions From Owned Property–Unilateral Refusals to Deal 268
Otter Tail Power Company v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 269
Questions on Otter TailMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 274
Should Natural Monopolies Be Immune From Monopolization
Liability?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 278
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 278
Questions on Aspen SkiingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 285
Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 288
Questions on the Kodak Duty to Deal With RivalsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 290
Verizon Commun. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. TrinkoMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 291
Questions on Verizon v. TrinkoMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 297
Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization StandardsMMMMMMM 298
The U.S. Essential Facilities DoctrineMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 299
The Application of U.S. Antitrust Duties to Deal to Intellectual
PropertyMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 301
6. Price SqueezesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 302
Pacific Bell Telephone v. Linkline CommunicationsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 303
Questions on LinklineMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 309
D. Causal Connection Between First and Second Elements Required? 310
Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization StandardsMMMMMMMMMMMM 310
Monopoly LeveragingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 312
E. Attempted MonopolizationMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 312
Lorain Journal v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 312
Questions on Lorain JournalMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 314
United States v. American AirlinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 315
Questions on American Airlines Attempted Cartel CaseMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 317
Spectrum Sports v. McQuillanMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 318
Note and Questions on Spectrum SportsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 320
CHAPTER 4 Vertical Agreements That Restrict Dealing
With RivalsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 323

A. IntroductionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 323
B. Exclusive DealingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 325
United States v. GriffithMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 330
Note and Questions on Griffith and Lorain JournalMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 332
Standard Fashion v. Magrane–HoustonMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 334
Questions on Standard Fashion MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 335
Standard Oil and Standard Stations v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 335
Questions on Standard StationsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 340
FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising ServiceMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 341
Cumulative ForeclosureMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 343
Tampa Electric v. Nashville Coal MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 346
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS
B. Exclusive Dealing—Continued
Note and Questions on Tampa ElectricMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 350
United States v. MicrosoftMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 351
The U.S. Lower Court Splits on Foreclosure Thresholds and
Terminability RelevanceMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 357
Questions on Microsoft’s Exclusive Dealing HoldingsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 358
C. TyingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 359
Jefferson Parish Hospital v. HydeMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 371
Questions on Jefferson Parish MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 381
Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 384
Questions on KodakMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 390
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 391
Questions on Illinois Tool WorksMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 395
United States v. MicrosoftMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 397
Questions on U.S. Microsoft Case Holdings on TyingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 403
D. Loyalty and Bundled DiscountsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 404
United States v. Loew’s Inc.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 414
Questions on Loew’sMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 416
FTC v. Brown ShoeMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 417
Questions on FTC v. Brown ShoeMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 419
Concord Boat v. Brunswick Corp.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 419
Questions on Concord BoatMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 422
LePage’s Inc. v. 3MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 423
Questions on LePage’sMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 430
Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealthMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 430
Questions on Cascade HealthMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 436
The U.S. Lower Court Splits on Loyalty and Bundled DiscountsMMMM 437
CHAPTER 5 Agreements and Conduct That Arguably Distort
Downstream Competition in Distributing a Supplier’s
Products MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 439

A. IntroductionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 439
B. Intrabrand Distributional Restraints on ResaleMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 442
1. Vertical Nonprice Restraints on DistributionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 443
Continental T.V. v. GTE SylvaniaMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 445
Questions on SylvaniaMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 450
2. Vertical Maximum Price–FixingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 451
State Oil Co. v. KhanMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 453
Questions on State Oil v. Khan MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 458
3. Vertical Agreements Fixing Minimum Resale PricesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 458
Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 458
Notes and Questions on LeeginMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 479
4. How to Characterize AgreementsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 482
a. Are Dual Distribution Agreements Vertical or Horizontal or
Neither?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 482
b. Vertical Agreements to ‘‘Boycott’’ the Rival of a Dealer
Without Any Procompetitive JustificationMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 483
NYNEX v. DisconMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 483
Questions on NYNEX v. DisconMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 486
C. Price Discrimination That Arguably Distorts Downstream Compe-
titionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 487
Robinson–Patman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 487
FTC v. Morton Salt Co.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 488
TABLE OF CONTENTS ix
C. Price Discrimination That Arguably Distorts Downstream Compe-
tition—Continued
Questions on Morton Salt MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 492
Texaco v. HasbrouckMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 493
Questions on Texaco v. HasbrouckMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 499
Volvo Trucks N.A. v. Reeder–Simco GMCMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 500
Questions on VolvoMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 505
Other Robinson–Patman Act ProvisionsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 507
CHAPTER 6 Proving an Agreement or Concerted ActionMMMMMMM 508

A. Are the Defendants Separate Entities?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 508
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 508
Questions on CopperweldMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 512
The Relevance of Agency RelationsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 514
American Needle v. National Football League MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 515
Note and Questions on American NeedleMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 523
B. Standards for Finding a Vertical AgreementMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 528
Monsanto Co. v. Spray–Rite Service Corp.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 529
Questions on Monsanto MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 532
C. Standards for Finding a Horizontal Agreement or Concerted Ac-
tionMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 534
1. Parallel Conduct Equally Consistent With an Independent
MotiveMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 535
Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film DistributingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 535
Questions on Theatre EnterprisesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 537
Matsushita Electric v. Zenith RadioMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 537
Questions on MatsushitaMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 542
Cement Manufacturers Protective Ass’n v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMM 543
Questions on Cement ManufacturersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 545
2. Parallel Conduct that Would Be Unprofitable if Not Engaged
in by Other Firms MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 545
a. Where Parallel Conduct Is Implausible Without an Explicit
AgreementMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 545
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United
StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 545
Questions on Eastern States LumberMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 547
American Column & Lumber v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 547
Questions on American ColumnMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 552
American Tobacco v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 553
Questions on American TobaccoMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 555
b. Where Parallel Conduct Follows Common Invitations or
Secret MeetingsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 555
Interstate Circuit v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 555
Questions on Interstate CircuitMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 559
c. Where Parallel Conduct Can Be Explained by Oligopolistic
Price InterdependenceMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 561
3. Agreements or Practices That Facilitate Oligopolistic Price
CoordinationMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 562
Maple Flooring Manufacturers Ass’n. v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMM 563
Questions on Maple FlooringMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 568
United States v. Container Corp.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 569
Questions on ContainerMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 573
x TABLE OF CONTENTS
C. Standards for Finding a Horizontal Agreement or Concerted Ac-
tion—Continued
United States v. United States GypsumMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 575
Questions on GypsumMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 578
FTC v. Cement InstituteMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 579
Questions on Cement InstituteMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 584
CHAPTER 7 MergersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 585

A. Horizontal MergersMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 590
1. Unilateral EffectsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 593
U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 593
Questions on the U.S. Guidelines on Unilateral EffectsMMMMMMMMMMMM 604
FTC v. Staples, Inc.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 605
Questions on StaplesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 611
U.S. Agency Enforcement ActivityMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 612
2. Oligopoly EffectsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 612
U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 612
Questions on U.S. Guidelines on Oligopoly EffectsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 616
Qualitative v. Empirical AssessmentsMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 616
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 616
Questions on FTC v. HeinzMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 622
3. Post–Merger EntryMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 623
U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 623
Questions on U.S. Guidelines on EntryMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 626
FTC v. Staples, Inc.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 626
Questions on StaplesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 628
4. Efficiencies & Weighing the EquitiesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 628
U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 628
Questions on U.S. GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 630
Merger Efficiencies and Total v. Consumer WelfareMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 631
Note and Questions on Consumer Welfare v. Total WelfareMMMMMM 634
FTC v. Staples, Inc.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 635
Note and Questions on StaplesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 638
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co.MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 639
Questions on FTC v. HeinzMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 644
How to Balance the Equities in Merger CasesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 645
5. The Failing Firm DefenseMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 646
International Shoe v. FTCMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 646
Note and Questions on International Shoe v. FTCMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 648
Citizen Publishing v. United StatesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 649
Note and Questions on Citizen’s PublishingMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 650
U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 652
Note and Questions on Merger Guidelines on the Failing Firm
DefenseMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 652
6. The Relevance of Buyer Power, Sophistication, or ViewsMMMMMMMMMM 653
a. Mergers Between Buyers That Create Buyer PowerMMMMMMMMMMMM 653
U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 655
b. Should Mergers Between Sellers Be Deemed Constrained by
Buyer Power?MMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 656
U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger GuidelinesMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 656
Questions on Whether Buyer Power Should Alter Assess-
ments of Mergers That Otherwise Create Seller Market
PowerMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMMM 656