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LEADING ON TOP OF THE WORLD: LESSONS FROM INTO THIN AIR
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Leading on Top of the World: Lessons from Into Thin Air
In May 1996, a rogue blizzard blindsided several teams of mountain climbers attempting
to scale Mount Everest. Nine climbers died in the frigid conditions after enduring wind
chill temperatures in excess of 100 degrees below zero (Fahrenheit).I n 1997, author
John Krakauerc hronicled his own first-hand account of the Everest disasteri n his best-
selling book Into Thin Air. Using Krakauer'sa ccount as a backdrop, this article
examines several of the leadership theories and concepts demonstratedi n the failed
climb. Specifically, this article explores the skills approach,s ituationall eadershipt heory,
and team leadership concepts, as well as the influence of power bases and trust on
decision making. Finally, teaching strategies are discussed that the readerm ay find
useful when using this work to develop leadership competencies in others.
Keywords: Situational leadership theory, team leadership, non-fiction, leadership skills
"Wisdom comes easily after the fact" (Krakauer, 1997, p. 285).
In May 1996, a rogue blizzard blindsided several teams of mountain climbers attempting to
scale Mount Everest. Enduring wind chill temperatures in excess of 100 degrees below zero
(Fahrenheit), nine climbers died in the frigid conditions.
Jon Krakauer was one of the survivors that day. As a journalist for Outside magazine,
Krakauer had been sent to join an Everest ascent team under the guidance of renowned New
Zealand guide Rob Hall. An experienced climber, Krakauer arrived in Nepal with the intent of
writing an article about the mushrooming commercialization of the once-feared mountain.
However, in the aftermath of the well-publicized tragedy, Krakauer met his commitment to
Outside with a very different-and personally painful-article which gave readers first-hand
insight into the Everest disaster.
While Krakauer's physical recovery came quickly, his emotional and psychological recovery
proved to be nearly impossible. The events during his months in Nepal were simply
overwhelming. Feeling his Outside article was iftadequate to truly convey the full scope of the
tragedy, Krakauer wrote a highly-acclaimed and cathartic book about his experiences entitled
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government
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Into Thin Air. In this brilliant and chilling work, Krakauer describes the terror of the storm, the
bravery of his colleagues, and the tragic decisions made by many-including himself.
Into Thin Air provides great insight into the leadership decisions and actions which
contributed to the loss of life. This chapter utilizes Into Thin Air as a backdrop for examining
several leadership theories and concepts demonstrated in the failed climb. The skills approach,
situationall eadership theory, and team leadership concepts will be explored, as well as the
influence of power bases and trust on decision making. Finally, several teaching strategies will
be discussed that the reader may find useful when using this work to develop the leadership
competencies of others.
In order to devote the greatest time to the analysis of Krakauer's book, it is assumed that the
reader has already read Into Thin Air, or is at least familiar with the basic events on Mount
Everest in May 1996. Analyses will include some minimal set-up from the story, but will not
include all details.
Background
To fully investigate the events on Everest in May 1996, it is essential to understand the
backgrounds of the two lead guides, Rob Hall and Scott Fischer, because it is their leadership
decisions that will be primarily examined in this paper.
Hall was a 36-year old New Zealander who was extremely experienced and revered as one of
the top guides on the mountain. By all accounts, he was a steady, serious leader who made
decisions methodically and rationally. He was the principle owner of a guided expedition
company called "Adventure Consultants."
Scott Fischer was one of Rob Hall's chief competitors in the guided expedition business,
leading an organization called "Mountain Madness." The 40-year old Seattle native was known
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to be an excellent mountaineer, although he did not possess Hall's organizational skills.
Krakauer describes Fischer as a skilled guide with "frat-boyish" tendencies (1997, p. 11). Fischer
had a famously strong will and a very high threshold for pain. These qualities, coupled with his
charismatic personality, made Fischer very well respected on the mountain.
Most of the climbers on Everest in 1996 had paid around $65,000 for the opportunity to scale
the world's highest mountain. Rob Hall had allowed Jon Krakauer to join the team at a greatly
reduced rate because of the publicity and free advertising Krakauer's Outside article would
undoubtedly bring. Likewise, Scott Fischer's clients had paid similar fees. Like Hall, Fischer's
team included a media journalist who would likely bring tremendous marketing opportunities in
exchange for a trip to the summit.
Both guides led teams of approximately eight climbers ("clients") and approximately 15
additional guides and equipment aides (usually the indigenous Sherpa population) through the
actual ascent and during the several months of acclimation prior to the climb. All of their clients
were experienced climbers, but none would be considered to be experts. Instead, they had paid
handsomely for guides like Hall and Fischer to take them to the top of the world's highest peak.
Both Hall and Fischer were killed on Mount Everest during the blizzard as they attempted to
lead clients off the mountain.
Skills Approach
Northouse (2004) details the 1955 work of Robert Katz, who identified leadership as a set of
skills that could be intentionally developed over time. Specifically, Katz suggested that
leadership (he used the term "administration") was primarily a function of three basic personal
skills: technical, human, and conceptual (Northouse, 2004, p.36).
Technical skills
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Technical skill is "having knowledge about and being proficient in a specific type of work or
activity" (Northouse, 2004, p.36). As might be reasoned, technical skills are highly specialized to
a particular discipline or set of competencies. Katz's research indicated that leaders should have
technical proficiency, especially at lower and middle levels of management. Both Rob Hall and
Scott Fischer relied on their considerable technical skills to safely lead their teams of clients to
the top of the mountain.
By any objective standard, both Hall and Fischer were exceptionally skilled climbers and
guides. Both were respected by their peers and possessed tremendous technical skill. Hall had led
39 clients to the summit during his previous four ascents. He was known for his meticulous
attention to detail and organizational skills. He studied weather patterns and historical data and
could predict the precise date that was most likely to yield a successful trip to the summit.
Krakauer describes Hall as being one of the most revered men on the mountain:
Hall's.. .compound served as the seat of government for the entire Base Camp,
because nobody on the mountain commanded more respect than Hall. Whenever
there was a problem-a labor dispute with the Sherpas, a medical emergency, a
critical decision about climbing strategy-people trudged over to our mess tent to
seek Hall's advice. (Krakauer, 1997, p.65)
Like Hall, Scott Fischer also enjoyed great trust and credibility on the mountain. While he did
not possess Hall's reputation for meticulous planning, Fischer was an experienced veteran of
many high-altitude ascents.
Clearly, both guides were well-qualified in their technical skill. Katz hypothesized that
technical skill was less important the more a leader moved up the managerial ladder. However,
5
in this case, the technical skill of these men was the single most distinguishing factor as they led
their groups. They had knowledge and experience the others simply did not have.
Human skills
Human skill is "having knowledge about and being able to work with people" (Northouse, 2004,
p.37). In common language, "human skill" might sometimes be referred to as "people skills."
Both Hall and Fischer had exceptional "people skills." Krakauer (1997) describes Hall as a
"gregarious (and) skillful raconteur with a caustic Kiwi wit.. .I liked him immediately" (p.33).
Fischer was even more charismatic, according to Krakauer (1997), "He had the kind of
gregarious, magnetic personality that instantly won him friends for life. Hundreds of
individuals-including some he'd only met once or twice-considered him a bosom buddy" (p.
68).
Northouse explains how Katz's concept of "human skills" goes farther than a friendly
personality. It also includes creating "an atmosphere of trust" (Northouse, 2004, p.37) and
becoming sensitive to the needs of others. In the cases of Hall and Fischer, their personalities
combined with their technical expertise to give them tremendous influence on the mountain.
Influence, according to Northouse, is the core of leadership (p.3).
Conceptual skills
Conceptual skills are "abilities to work with ideas and concepts" (Northouse, 2004, p.38).
Leaders with conceptual skills are able to take information-often incomplete pieces of data--
and use that information to make informed decisions. In the case of Rob Hall and Scott Fischer,
each of these men had proven their ability to think clearly and use current data to predict future
conditions and, therefore, make informed decisions.
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However, it is difficult to criticize a leader's ability to use conceptual skills while on the
frozen slope of Mount Everest at 29,000 feet above sea level (the altitude of a modem passenger
jet aircraft). Altitude creates oxygen deprivation, which produces slow thinking and poses
considerable health risks after prolonged exposure. It should be remembered that Hall and
Fischer made their decisions during that raging storm in 1996 with exhausted bodies and oxygen-
deprived minds. Their conceptual skills might have been very solid under normal conditions, but
were severely lacking on that fateful afternoon.
Analysis of the Skills Approach
Research regarding the skills approach has been expanded in recent years. In 2000, Mumford,
Zaccaro, Harding, Jacobs, and Fleishman, describe how leaders develop their skills over time,
and how career experience "helps leaders to improve their skills and knowledge" (as cited in
Northouse, 2004, p.48). These researchers also expanded the theory to include "environmental
influences", which "represent factors in a leader's situation that lie outside the leader's
competencies, characteristics, and experiences" (as cited in Northouse, 2004, p.48). This
expansion of the skills approach concept would help describe how-even with Hall and
Fischer's considerable expertise honed over many years-the environmental factors present on
the mountain that day were simply overwhelming.
One of the major criticisms of the skills approach to leadership is that it "is weak in predictive
value. It does not explain specifically how variations in social judgment and problem solving
skills affect performance" (Northouse, 2004, p.51). In other words, the skills approach gives a
picture of the requisite competencies needed for leadership, but does not ensure that those
qualities will produce leadership in a given situation. The possession of technical, human, and
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conceptual skills simply allows for one to have the potential to lead in a given situation
(emphasis added). They do not, however, guarantee leadership.
Both Hall and Fischer possessed technical, human, and conceptual skills and were supremely
confident in their abilities. In fact, one could argue that Hall and Fischer had a certain level of
overconfidence in their skills, and that overconfidence was one of the key factors to their poor
judgment on the mountain that day. Perhaps both guides had gotten lax in their appreciation for
this dangerous mammoth of nature called Everest. From 1921 to 1996, for every four people who
reached the summit, one person had died in the attempt. Krakauer describes corpses lying along
the trail, visible to all that Everest was still a mighty force. "Hall had become so adept at running
climbers of all abilities up and down Everest that he got cocky perhaps," writes Krakauer after
the ordeal. "He may well have thought there was little he couldn't handle" (Krakauer, 1997,
p.284). Likewise, Fischer may have also become too complacent. "We've got the big E figured
out," he commented to Krakauer before their journey, "...these days, I'm telling you, we've built
a yellow brick road to the summit" (Krakauer, 1997, p. 70).
In addition to the natural environment that impacted their decisions, Hall and Fischer were
also under a great deal of pressure from the business environment present during the climb. For
example, in mountain climbing (especially with a peak as unpredictable as Everest), it is
essential to have a pre-determined turn-around time in order to get all of the climbers back safely
to the shelters before the historically-poor afternoon weather arrives. However, on the day of the
Everest disaster, high paying clients were tantalizingly close to the summit. As the stakes rose,
Hall and Fischer felt more and more pressure to succeed.
This makes sense from a psychological perspective. The $65,000 entry fees for these
excursions are not insignificant, in either amount or their impact on the decision-making of the
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guides. Guides feel pressure to perform when entrusted with that kind of money. Moreover, the
clients often feel they are owed a trip to the top-it becomes an entitlement. In fact, some
previous clients had actually sued their guides for a failure to reach the summit. Krakauer's quote
from a veteran guide sums up the relationship quite succinctly: "We think that people pay us to
make good decisions, but what people really pay for is to get to the top" (p. 237).
When one takes these situational factors into account, it is easy to see how Hall and Fischer
might have felt undue pressure to keep going. Their considerable technical, human, and
conceptual skills might have actually clouded their judgment on this day. They were too close to
quit. This type of behavior is a result of "escalation of commitment," which refers to the
"tendency to stick with an ineffective course of action when it is unlikely that the bad situation
can be reversed" (Kinicki and Kreitner, 2003, p. 186). The turn-around time of 2:00 p.m. passed
and they remained on the mountain for more than two additional hours, trying to shuttle clients
to the top.
Applying the skills approach to this leadership situation, both Hall and Fischer possessed all
of the skills necessary to make sound choices that afternoon and evening. However, having the
right skills did not ensure that they would exhibit sound leadership decisions in that setting.
Sadly, the events on Everest highlight the failures of these men to make sound decisions that day.
Team Leadership
In 1989, Larson and LaFasto found eight characteristics that were regularly associated with
team excellence: (1) Clear, elevating goal, (2) Results-driven structure, (3) Competent team
members, (4) Unified commitment, (5) Collaborative climate, (6) Standards of excellence, (7)
External support, and (8) Principled leadership (as cited in Northouse, 2004, p.211). This section
9
will briefly explore each of these characteristics and, where appropriate, connect them to the
team dynamics present on Everest in 1996.
Clear, elevating goal
Obviously, the goal of standing atop the highest peak on the planet would be a motivating goal
for any serious climber. As a result, one might assume that the team of climbers had a clear goal
of achieving the summit together. Deeper analysis indicates that reaching the top was more a
collection of individual goals, rather than a team goal. While no one was actively rooting against
another person to reach the summit, it is clear that this was not a unified team goal, as much as it
was an individual goal for each climber. Consider Jon Krakauer's words on the morning of the
final ascent, "Each client was in it for himself or herself, pretty much. And I was no different: I
sincerely hoped Doug (Hansen) got to the top, for instance, yet I would do everything in my
power to keep pushing on if he turned around." (Krakauer, 1997, p. 171).
Results-driven structure
The structure of the team is important and should be consistent with the team abilities and
desired end goals. Is it possible that both Hall and Fischer were using a structure/system that had
worked with previous teams, but was not appropriate for their 1996 group of clients?
Competent team members
The competence of the climbers on Everest that May is questionable. While they certainly were
not novices, "no client on Hall's team... had ever reached the summit of any 8,000-meter peak,"
says Krakauer (1997, p. 96). Their abilities were so disparate that they did not practice together.
"My fellow clients and I were like a ragtag collection of pretty decent small-town softball
players who'd bribed their way into the World Series... It was clear to me (that) none of us... had
