Do U.S. security commitments discourage nuclear proliferation?

126 Pages·2.4 MB·English

by  Wilshusen, John D

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY CA 93943-510-
DUDLEY KNOXLIBRARY
NAVAL POSTGRADUATESCHOOL
MONTEREY, CA93943-5101

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California
THESIS
DO SECURITY COMMITMENTS
U.S.
DISCOURAGE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION?
by
John D. Wilshusen
December 1997
Thesis Advisor: Peter R. Lavoy
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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December 1997. Master's Thesis
TITLEAND SUBTITLE Do U.S. Security Commitments Discourage 5. FUNDINGNUMBERS
NuclearProliferation?
AUTHOR(S) John D. Wilshusen
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Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION
MontereyCA 93943-5000 REPORTNUMBER
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11. SUPPLEMENTARYNOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those ofthe author and do not reflectthe
official policy or position ofthe Department ofDefense orthe U.S. Government.
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum200words)
U.S. policy makers claim that nuclear weapons are needed to guarantee security commitments and
discourage the international spread ofnuclear weapons. This thesis evaluates the link between
security guarantees and efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. It draws three conclusions based on
case studies ofthe use ofconventional security commitments and nuclear security guarantees to
prevent nuclear weapons development in South Korea and Taiwan. First, nuclear security guarantees
alone are not sufficient to prevent proliferation. Second, strong conventional commitments made
credible by visible presence offorces are sufficient to prevent nuclear proliferation whenthe direct
security threat is conventional. Third, when the security threat being faced includes nuclear weapons,
nuclearproliferation prevention requires both a nuclear security guarantee and a physically evident
conventional military guarantee. Two implications for security policy follow from these findings.
First, nuclear weapons are necessary in the modern security environment. Second, nuclear security
guarantees are not credible without the stationing ofconventional forces.
14. SUBJECTTERMSNuclearweapons, proliferation, nonproliferation, South Korea, 15. NUMBEROF
Taiwan, security commitment, security guarantee, U.S. nuclearpolicy PAGES 115
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
DO SECURITY COMMITMENTS
U.S.
DISCOURAGE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION?
John D. Wilshusen
'i
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., University ofMissouri-Columbia, 1990
Submitted in partial fulfillment
ofthe requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1997
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