Democracy and Public Administration in Pakistan

254 Pages·2013·0.43 MB·English

by  Amna Imam

Public Administration I PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY/191
Dm
aa
Democracy and Public Administration in Pakistan uses the theoretical framework rm
informed by the work of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), which argues that new Democracy and
democracies which lack in instrumentation and protracted consultation, are prone
to disintegration and occupation by foreign forces. It argues that the protracted
D
consultation provided by the institute of District Magistrate generated better, humane,
e Public Administration
and civilized instrumentation, and that the demise of this institution in 2001 was
m
detrimental to protracted consultation and instrumentation, and hence for democracy
in the country. o
c in Pakistan
r
The authors argue, looking through the historical and quantitative lenses, that instead
a
of simply viewing path dependency as institutional inertia, it can be constructed
c
as a voluntary and intentional replication of best practices for public welfare, and y
therefore become an instrument for creating beneficial policies. The book looks at
a
the long history of District Magistracy from antiquity, the times of the Greeks, the
n
Persians, the Central Asians, the Mauriyas, and the Guptas to the creation of modern-
d
day Pakistan in 1947.

P
It quantitatively examines data from 1947 to 2011 to demonstrate that there is a u
link between the gradual weakening of the institution of District Magistracy in the
b
country and the disintegration and lawlessness of Pakistan. The authors contend that l
i
Pakistan’s democracy to date lacks a firm foundation, as evidenced by the country’s c
disintegration in 1971, violence and drugs in the 80s, crime-infested communities
A
in the 90s, terrorism in the 2000s, and the current volatile situation in Balochistan
d
and FATA, as well as high crime rates and a lack of security among the communities
m
of Pakistan. The book further contends that various and frequent major shifts in
the administrative structure of the country created vacuums which encouraged
i
adventurous elements to enter into the arena, further complicating the situation for a n
meaningful democracy to take roots in Pakistan. i
s
t
Democracy is not merely elections. It is about the people creating their own r
a
narratives and applying their own reasoning to make their own decisions peacefully
t
and in a civilized manner. For Pakistan to achieve this dream, it has first debate
i
o
and define its national core values and then to get down to the grassroots level to
n
simultaneously empower its people and provide an environment conducive to such

democratic pursuits. Peace, stability and security at the grassroots level is a must for i
n
this ideal to be achieved, and hence the role of vibrant, dynamic and people-centric
public administration which uses protracted consultation rather than brute force to
P
ensure instrumentation.
a
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s
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K14843
a
6000 Broken Sound Parkway, NW
Suite 300, Boca Raton, FL 33487 ISBN: 978-1-4665-1154-5 n Amna Imam • Eazaz A. Dar
711 Third Avenue 90000
New York, NY 10017
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2 Park Square, Milton Park
www.crcpress.com Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN, UK
9 781466 511545
w w w . c r c p r e s s . c o m
K14843 Rev mech.indd 1 11/18/13 1:23 PM
Administrative History of Pakistan • 67
TABLE 3.1
Transformations in the Role and Functions of the DC & DM through Different Eras in
Pakistan
Nomenclature
of Service Cadre Local
Era for DC & DM Quasi-Legislative Quasi-Judicial Governments
1947–1958 PAS and then Yes Yes No
(DC & DM) CSP
1959–1973 CSP Yes, somewhat Yes, somewhat No
(DC & DM) compromised compromised
1974–1985 DMG Yes, biased Yes, biased Yes
(DC & DM)
1986–1996 DMG Yes, more Yes, more No
(DC & DM) biased biased
1997–2002 DMG Yes, more biased Decreased, No
(DC & DM and more biased
then DCO)
2003–2008 DMG No No Yes
(DCO)
2009–2011 DMG and Yes, very biased No No
(DCO) then PAS
This chapter divided the time from 1947 (birth of Pakistan) to 2001 into
seven periods, on the basis of significant transformations in the role and
functions of the DC & DM. Table 3.1 summarizes those fluctuations.
Chapter 4 will provide a theoretical framework to study the issue, while
Chapter 5 will analyze data according to the theoretical framework.
REFERENCES
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2. Khan, R. 2009. Pakistan—A dream gone sour. Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University
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3. Wilder, A. 2009. The politics of civil service reform in Pakistan. Journal of International
Affairs 63 (Fall/Winter) (1): 19–37.
4. McAdam, D., S. Tarrow, and C. Tilly. 2001. Dynamics of contention. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
5. Ibid.
6. Gorvine, A. 1965. The civil service under the revolutionary government in Pakistan.
Middle East Journal 19 (3): 321–336.
© 2010 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
68 • Democracy and Public Administration in Pakistan
7. Government of Sindh, and others v. Sharaf Faridi and others. 1993. Judgment in Civil
Appeals Nos. 105-K to 107-K of 1989, decided on March 31 by the Supreme Court of
Pakistan. PLD 1994 Court 105.
8. Ibid.
9. Khurshid, K. 2011. A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan: The structural-functional
history (1601–2011). Faisalabad, Pakistan: Pak TM Printers.
10. Gorvine, The civil service under the revolutionary government in Pakistan, p. 321.
11. Kennedy, C. H. 1987. Bureaucracy in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p.
246.
12. Shafqat, S. 1999. Pakistani bureaucracy: Crisis of governance and prospect of reforms.
The Pakistan Development Review 38 (4) Part II (Winter): 995–1017.
13. Huntington, S. P. 1968. Political order in changing societies. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 250–253.
14. Niaz, I. 2010. The culture of power and governance of Pakistan: 1947–2008. Karachi,
Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 320.
15. Shafqat, Pakistani bureaucracy.
16. Von Vorys, K. 1965. Political development in Pakistan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
17. Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan.
18. Mason, P. 1985. Men who ruled India. (abridged ed.) London: Jonathan Cape Ltd.,
384.
19. Niaz, The culture of power and governance of Pakistan: 1947–2008.
20. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Niaz, The culture of power and governance of Pakistan: 1947–2008.
24. Gorvine, The civil service under the revolutionary government in Pakistan.
25. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
26. Ibid.
27. Shafqat, S. 2011. Civil services reforms and 18th Amendment. Research series
“Strengthening Federalism in Pakistan.” Online at: http://www.civiceducation.org/
wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Civil-service-reforms-and-the-18th-Amendment.pdf
(accessed on November 8, 2012).
28. Venkatesh, S. 2008. Gang leader for a day: A rogue sociologist takes to the streets.
London: Penguin Books.
29. Ibid.
30. Sherdil, A. Z. K. 2002. Brief on restoration of executive magistracy as a mechanism
of public peace and order. Online at: http://azksherdil.com/Publications/Brief%20
on%20restoration%20of%20Executive%20Magistracy.pdf (accessed November
12, 2012).
31. Ibid.
32. Mason, Men who ruled India.
33. Imam, A. 2010. Pakistan: Not a lost cause. Democrat and Chronicle (December). Online
at: http://www.democratandchronicle.com/article/20101213/LOCAL17/12130337/
Pakistan-not-a-lost-cause
34. Shafqat, Pakistani bureaucracy.
35. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
36. Ibid.
© 2010 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
Administrative History of Pakistan • 69
37. Sundaram, L. 1929. Mughal land revenue system. Surrey, U.K.: Basheer Muslim
Library Series. Online at: http://archive.org/stream/mughallandrevenu035075mbp/
mughallandrevenu035075mbp_djvu.txt
38. Mukhia, H. 1981. Was there feudalism in Indian History? The Journal of Peasant
Studies 8 (3).
39. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
40. Shahb, Q. 1986. Shahab nama. Lahore, Pakistan: Sang-e-Meel Publishers.
41. Burki, I. J. 1969. Twenty-five years of the civil service in Pakistan: A re-evaluation.
Asian Survey 9 (4): 239–254.
42. Gorvine, The civil service under the revolutionary government in Pakistan, p. 323.
43. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
44. Venkatesh, Gang leader for a day: A rogue sociologist takes to the streets.
45. Musarrat, R., and M. S. Azhar. 2012. Decentralization reforms in Pakistan during
Ayub and Zia era. Journal of Public Administration and Governance 2 (1): 123–133.
46. Gorvine, The civil service under the revolutionary government in Pakistan.
47. Ibid.
48. International Crisis Group, Asia Report (2010). Reforming Pakistan’s civil ser-
vice. Online at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/paki-
stan/185%20Reforming%20Pakistans%20Civil%20Service (accessed on August 14,
2012).
49. Gorvine, The civil service under the revolutionary government in Pakistan.
50. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Shafqat, Pakistani bureaucracy.
55. Gorvine, The civil service under the revolutionary government in Pakistan, p. 324.
56. Khan, R. 1997. Pakistan—A dream gone sour. Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford University
Press.
57. Musarrat and Azhar, Decentralization reforms in Pakistan during Ayub and Zia era.
58. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
59. Niaz, The culture of power and governance of Pakistan: 1947–2008.
60. International Crisis Group, Reforming Pakistan’s Civil Service.
61. Ibid, p. 104.
62. Khan, Pakistan—A dream gone sour.
63. Gorvine, The civil service under the revolutionary government in Pakistan.
64. Niaz, The culture of power and governance of Pakistan: 1947—2008. Karachi, Pakistan:
Oxford University.
65. Ibid, p. 106.
66. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
67. Jalal, A. 1995. Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia: A comparative and
historical perspective. Lahore, India: Sang-e-Meel Publications.
68. Shafqat, Pakistani bureaucracy.
69. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
70. Shafqat, Pakistani bureaucracy.
71. Khan, Pakistan—A dream gone sour.
72. McAdam et al., Dynamics of contention.
73. Cornelius Commission Report of 1962.
74. Niaz, The culture of power and governance of Pakistan: 1947–2008.
© 2010 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
70 • Democracy and Public Administration in Pakistan
75. Burki, Twenty-five years of the civil service in Pakistan.
76. Shafqat, Civil services reforms and 18th Amendment.
77. Ibid.
78. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
79. Wilder, The politics of civil service reform in Pakistan, pp. 1, 19–37.
80. Shafqat, Civil services reforms and 18th Amendment.
81. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
82. Ibid.
83. Wilder, The politics of civil service reform in Pakistan.
84. Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan.
85. Khan, Pakistan—A dream gone sour.
86. Ibid.
87. Gorvine, The civil service under the revolutionary government in Pakistan.
88. Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan.
89. Kurland, P. B., and R. Lerner (eds.) 2000. The Founders Constitution. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
90. International Crisis Group, Reforming Pakistan’s civil service.
91. Shafqat, Pakistani bureaucracy.
92. Wilder, The politics of civil service reform in Pakistan.
93. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
94. Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan.
95. Waseem, M. 1997. Affirmative action policies in Pakistan. Ethnic Studies Report XV (2),
July.
96. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
97. Ibid.
98. Shafqat, Civil services reforms and 18th Amendment.
99. Wilder, The politics of civil service reform in Pakistan.
100. Ibid.
101. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
102. Ibid.
103. International Crisis Group, Reforming Pakistan’s civil service.
104. Khan, Pakistan—A dream gone sour.
105. International Crisis Group, Reforming Pakistan’s civil service.
106. Government of Sindh, and others v. Sharaf Faridi and others.
117. Venkatesh, Gang leader for a day: A rogue sociologist takes to the streets.
108. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Venkatesh, Gang leader for a day: A rogue sociologist takes to the streets.
114. Suddle, M. S. 2002. Reforming Pakistan police: An overview. Paper presented at
120th International Senior Seminar Visiting Experts Papers.
115. Ibid.
116. Khurshid, A treatise on the civil service of Pakistan.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
© 2010 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
Administrative History of Pakistan • 71
121. International Crisis Group, Reforming Pakistan’s civil service.
122. Guess, G. M. 2005. Comparative decentralization lessons from Pakistan, Indonesia,
and the Philippines. Public Administration Review 65 (2) (Mar.–Apr.): 4, 217–230.
123. Ibid.
124. Braibanti, R. 1959. The civil service of Pakistan, a theoretical analysis. South Atlantic
Quarterly (Spring).
125. Gorvine, The civil service under the revolutionary government in Pakistan.
126. Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan.
127. Shafqat, Pakistani bureaucracy.
128. Khan, F. J., and M. Din. 2008. Attitude towards civil service of Pakistan: A perception
survey. The Pakistan Development Review 47(4): 779–790.
129. Ali, A. 1899. A short history of the Saracens: Being a concise account of the rise and
decline of the Saracenic power and of the economic, social and intellectual development
of the Arab nation from the earliest times to the destruction of Bagdad, and the expul-
sion of Moors from Spain. London: MacMillan and Co.
130. Abia Umma v. Saibu, 71-D. C. Kandy, 3, 019, Present: Wood Renton A. C. J. and De
Sampayo A. J.(1914). Online at: http://www.lawnet.lk/docs/case_law/nlr/common/
html/NLR17V338.htm (accessed November 10, 2012).
131. Darr, A. 2013. Judiciary goes native. Daily Dawn, Opinion. Online at: http://www.
dawn.com/news/1018721/judiciary-goes-native/?commentPage=1&storyPage=1#co
mments
132. Kurland and Lerner, The Founders Constitution.
133. Ibid.
134. McAdam et al., Dynamics of contention.
© 2010 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

4
Theoretical Framework
INTRODUCTION
An effective democracy has two interrelated characteristics—a robust civil
society and a capable state. A free and lively civil society makes the state
and its agents more accountable by guaranteeing that consultation takes
place not just through electoral representation (periodic mandates), but
also through constant feedback and negotiation.1
A stable2 mechanism of protracted consultation,3 or what Heller4 calls
constant feedback and negotiation, irrespective of periodic mandates, was
made possible in Pakistan by means of the DC & DM (district commis-
sioner & district magistrate). What is more important is that he utilized his
protracted consultation functions to complement instrumentation of rule
of law,5,6 ensuring a capable state.7 Strong instrumentation and reasonable
protracted consultation, in turn, warrants an effective democracy.8
Since the DC & DM’s protracted consultation supplements his instru-
mentation, this chapter argues that comparing fluctuating levels of
instrumentation with varying quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial func-
tions of the DC & DM, through different time periods, will give us an
idea about the best mix of the DC & DM’s functions, which can guaran-
tee optimal conditions of protracted consultation and instrumentation,
for the country to enter into the zone of citizenship.9 When a country
is securely in the zone of citizenship, it is likely to sustain meaningful,
constitutional democracy.10
As demonstrated quite vividly in Chapter 3, little serious, in-depth intel-
lectual resources were expended in Pakistan on designing or preserving
the institutional pre-requisites of enduring, participative democracy.11 A
nation whose intellectual leaders do not feel the need or do not have the
capacity to engage in civilized, meaningful, and reasoned debate about the
© 2010 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 73
74 • Democracy and Public Administration in Pakistan
administration and conception of justice12 and about the boundaries of
executive and judiciary can be quite susceptible to frequent miscarriages
of justice. And, since justice is the undeniable foundation of a stable state,
of enforcing the writ of the state, and of instrumentation, a state that is not
able to accurately conceptualize justice and implement justice is highly
unlikely to enforce its authority. As a result, it is bound to be unstable.
Stability being an important prerequisite for democracy,13 such a state
might not be able to successfully implement it.
As careless as Pakistan was in settling the question of executive and
judiciary, and checks and balances,14 it was equally thoughtless in deter-
mining the boundaries of politics and administration. With child-like
selfishness and immaturity, Pakistan’s partisan groups, institutions, orga-
nizations, and electoral alike dogmatically used self-serving, shallow slo-
gans, not reason, to further their relative preeminence.
There is an urgent need to have an exhaustive scrutiny of the institution of
DC & DM, its quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions with respect to
separation of powers and politics–administration dichotomy, and the role
of these functions in protracted consultation and instrumentation, which
are vital for animated democracy. This chapter attempts to fill this hole.
In addition, although the field of research has contributed to aspects of
democracy and administration,15 administrative structures and democ-
racy,16-18 separation of powers,19 politics–administration dichotomy,
quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial functions of administration,20 their
application, procedures, and impacts are yet to be fully understood, espe-
cially for developing countries of the old world.
In addition, although scholarly literature has paid some attention to
democracy in the developing world, it is quite anemic in its contents oth-
erwise. The phenomenon is not explored in detail for developing countries;
linkages between administrative setups and democracy, distribution and
separation of powers in developing countries, politics–administration
dichotomy, and the mechanisms of protracted consultation and instrumen-
tation in developing countries require meticulous and exhaustive study.
This chapter attempts to fill this gap in the field of scholarship, as well
as practice, as far as Pakistan is concerned. Its innovative and grounded
examination of these concepts is expected to assist in better comprehen-
sion of the issues involved and possible remedies that may be employed to
create sustainable and meaningful democracy in the country.
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first presents the underlying
theoretical framework of this research. It is based on the work of McAdam,
© 2010 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
Theoretical Framework • 75
Tarrow, and Tilly21 and Heller22; it argues that unbiased quasi-legislative
functions performed by the apolitical DC & DM of 1947 led to protracted
consultation by the DC & DM, which assisted the DC & DM in imple-
menting effective instrumentation in the district. If across-the-board, fair
instrumentation was actually visible on the ground in the form of reduced
incidents of all kinds of crimes, then one can contend that the original,
apolitical quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions of the DC & DM
are essential for a buoyant democracy in the country, and vice versa.
The second part of the chapter discusses the theoretical underpinnings
of the concept of separation of powers in the context of Pakistan. It argues
that the concept as understood in Pakistan is devoid of substance. In
Pakistan, it is understood as clear-cut separation, instead of as a system of
checks and balances,23 whereas this is not practical in an integrated state
and, despite hectic efforts, has not been achieved in Pakistan. All it could
achieve in Pakistan was an unreasonable and poorly executed redistribu-
tion of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions to offices other than
that of the DC & DM, with undesirable consequences.
The third part examines the politics–administration dichotomy. It
studies the theories and historical developments of the concept. It then
attempts to apply it to Pakistan. It shows that this idea, too, has dynam-
ics of its own unique to Pakistan. In Pakistan, it is generally construed as
administrative partiality of the DC & DM. This hampers neutral applica-
tion of law, and, hence, instrumentation in the country.
The fourth part discusses the empirical model of this research, which will
be tested in Chapter 5. The chapter ends with a summary of its discussions.
PART 1: CORE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The theoretical framework of McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly24 argues that a
strong democracy requires (1) strong instrumentation and (2) robust pro-
tracted consultation. “Strong instrumentation” refers to the capability of
a state to enforce its authority, provide order, security, and smooth ser-
vice delivery to the citizens. “Protracted consultation” is the ability of the
state to consistently engage citizens in decision making. A state is able to
sustain democracy if it has the ability to enforce its authority and ensure
protracted civic engagement simultaneously.25 If the state fails in strong
instrumentation, irrespective of the strength of protracted consultation,
© 2010 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC