Delegation in the Regulatory State: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe

199 Pages·2008·0.67 MB·English

by  Fabrizio Gilardi

Delegation in the Regulatory State

Delegation in the
Regulatory State
Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western
Europe
by
Fabrizio Gilardi
Lecturer in Political Science,University of Lausanne,
Switzerland
Edward Elgar
Cheltenham,UK • Northampton,MA,USA
© Fabrizio Gilardi 2008
All rights reserved.No part of this publication may be reproduced,stored in
a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means,electronic,
mechanical or photocopying,recording,or otherwise without the prior
permission of the publisher.
Published by
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
Glensanda House
Montpellier Parade
Cheltenham
Glos GL50 1UA
UK
Edward Elgar Publishing,Inc.
William Pratt House
9 Dewey Court
Northampton
Massachusetts 01060
USA
A catalogue record for this book
is available from the British Library
Library ofCongress Cataloguing in Publication Data
Gilardi,Fabrizio.
Delegation in the regulatory state :independent regulatory agencies in
Western Europe / by Fabrizio Gilardi.
p.cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1.Delegation of powers—Europe,Western.2.Administrative
agencies—Europe,Western—Decision making.3.Public
administration—Europe,Western—Decision making.I.Title.
JF225.G55 2008
352.8′283094—dc22 2007040572
ISBN 978 1 84720 447 9 (cased)
Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd,Bodmin,Cornwall
Contents
List of figures vii
List of tables ix
Preface and acknowledgements xi
1. Introduction 1
2. The institutional foundations of the regulatory state 13
3. Delegation to independent regulatory agencies:credibility,
political uncertainty,and veto players 28
4. The formal independence of regulators:empirical analysis 55
5. Interdependent delegation:the diffusion of independent
regulatory agencies 73
6. The diffusion of independent regulatory agencies:empirical
analysis 106
7. Conclusion 124
8. Appendices 140
Bibliography 155
Index 181
v

Figures
1.1 The spread of independent regulatory agencies in Western
Europe 2
1.2 The formal independence of regulators in Western Europe
(country averages) 3
3.1 The subsidy game 33
3.2 Discount functions and temporary preference reversals 37
3.3 The investment game (1) 40
3.4 The investment game (2) 41
3.5 The investment game (3) 42
4.1 The formal independence of regulators:average values for
countries and regulatory domains 59
4.2 Political uncertainty in four countries 61
4.3 Veto players and the formal independence of regulators
(country averages) 62
4.4 Replacement risk and the formal independence of regulators
(country averages) 63
4.5 The formal independence of regulators as a function of veto
players and the regulatory domain (predicted values) 66
4.6 The formal independence of regulators as a function of
replacement risk and the regulatory domain (predicted values) 67
4.7 The formal independence of central banks as a function of
veto players (predicted values) 70
4.8 The formal independence of regulators as a function of
replacement risk (predicted values) 71
5.1 S-shaped diffusion curve 75
5.2 S-shaped diffusion curves with different slopes 76
5.3 Sigma convergence 77
5.4 Beta convergence 78
6.1 The spread of independent regulatory agencies in
economic regulation 107
6.2 The spread of independent regulatory agencies in social
regulation 108
6.3 The probability that an independent regulatory agency is
established as a function of political constraints and
liberalization (predicted values) 116
vii
viii Figures
6.4 The probability that an independent regulatory agency is
established as a function of liberalization and the partisan
composition of governments (predicted values) 117
6.5 The probability that an independent regulatory agency is
established as a function of replacement risk and political
constraints (predicted values) 118
6.6 The probability that an independent regulatory agency is
established as a function of replacement risk (predicted
values) 119
6.7 The probability that an independent regulatory agency is
established as a function of the share of existing independent
regulators (predicted values) 121
7.1 Case selection:the formal independence of regulators 128
7.2 Case selection:the establishment of independent regulatory
agencies (positive cases) 132
7.3 Case selection:the establishment of independent regulatory
agencies (negative cases) 133
Tables
2.1 Regulatory agencies in selected countries and domains in
2007 23
4.1 The formal independence of regulators:statistical analysis 64
4.2 The formal independence of central banks:statistical
analysis 69
5.1 Mechanisms of policy convergence 79
5.2 Policy diffusion,convergence and transfer 81
5.3 Tax competition as prisoner’s dilemma 96
6.1 The diffusion of independent regulatory agencies:
statistical analysis 114
ix