Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife

273 Pages·2002·13.32 MB·English

by  John Nagl

COUNTERINSURGENCY
LESSONS FROM
MALAYA AND VIETNAM
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COUNTERINSURGENCY
LESSONS FROM
MALAYA AND VIETNAM
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife
JOHN A. NAGL
PEABGERp) Westport, Connecticut
London
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Nagl, John A., 1966-
Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam : learning to eat soup with a
knife / John A. Nagl.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-275-97695-5 (alk. paper)
1. Malaya—History—Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960. 2. Counterinsurgency—
Malayasia—Malaya. 3. Great Britain. Army—History—Malayan Emergency,
1948-1960. 4. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975—Underground movements.
5. Counterinsurgency—Vietnam. 6. United States. Army—History—Vietnamese
Conflict, 1961-1975. I. Title.
DS597.N27 2002
959.5*04—dc21 2002025205
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.
Copyright © 2002 by John A. Nagl
All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be
reproduced, by any process or technique, without the
express written consent of the publisher.
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2002025205
ISBN: 0-275-97695-5
First published in 2002
Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881
An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc.
www.praeger.com
Printed in the United States of America
The paper used in this book complies with the
Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National
Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984).
10 9 8 7 6
Copyright Acknowledgments
Excerpts from "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: British and American Army
Counterinsurgency Learning During the Malayan Emergency and the Vietnam War," World
Affairs 161(4):(Spring 1999), reprinted with permission.
Excerpts from the Templer Papers © Miles Templer are reprinted with permission of Miles
Templer. All rights reserved. International copyright secured. The author is grateful to Miles
Templer for permission to cite his father's papers.
Figures 1.1 and 8.1 are adapted from Richard Downie's "Learning from Conflict" diagram.
Originally appeared in Learning from Conflict. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998. Reprinted with
permission.
"To make war upon rebellion is messy and slow,
like eating soup with a knife."
—T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom
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Contents
Illustrations ix
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction xiii
List of Abbreviations xix
Part I. Setting the Stage
1. How Armies Learn 3
2. The Hard Lesson of Insurgency 15
3. The British and American Armies: Separated by a Common
Language 35
Part II. Malaya
4. British Army Counterinsurgency Learning During the
Malayan Emergency, 1948-1951 59
5. The Empire Strikes Back: British Army Counterinsurgency in
Malaya, 1952-1957 87
vlii • Contents
Part III. Vietnam
6. The U.S. Army in Vietnam: Organizational Culture and
Learning During the Advisory Years, 1950-1964 115
7. The U.S. Army in Vietnam: Organizational Culture and
Learning During the Fighting Years, 1965-1972 151
Part IV. Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
8. Hard Lessons: The British and American Armies Learn
Counterinsurgency 191
9. Organizational Culture and Learning Institutions: Learning
to Eat Soup with a Knife 213
Selected Bibliography 227
Index 245
Illustrations
Figure 1-1 The Institutional Learning Cycle: The Process of
Doctrinal Change 8
Figure 1-2 Question Set #1: Was the Army a "Learning
Institution"? 10
Figure 2-1 Five Principles of Counterinsurgency 29
Figure 2-2 Question Set #2: Did the Army Develop a Successful
Counterinsurgency Doctrine? 30
Figure 3-1 A Comparison of the Organizational Cultures and
Counterinsurgency Doctrines of the British and
American Armies before Malaya and Vietnam 51
Figure 4-1 Did the British Army Develop a Successful
Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Malaya, 1948-1951? 79
Figure 4-2 Learning in Malaya, 1948-1951 80
Figure 5-1 Relative Effectiveness of Information Services 94
Figure 5-2 Classification of Incidents, 1951-1954 102
Figure 5-3 The Reckoning 103
Figure 5-4 Did the British Army Develop a Successful
Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Malaya? 104
Figure 5-5 Learning in Malaya 107
Figure 6-1 Viet Cong Terrorism Against Civilians, 1957-1965 136