Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Artificial Intelligence

281 Pages·2013·2.11 MB·English

by  Jaap Hage (auth.)

Law and Philosophy Library 107
Michał Araszkiewicz
Jaromír Šavelka Editors
Coherence: Insights
from Philosophy,
Jurisprudence
and Artifi cial
Intelligence
Coherence: Insights from Philosophy, Jurisprudence
and Artificial Intelligence
Law and Philosophy Library
VOLUME107
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GutenbergUniversitat,Mainz,Germany
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Forfurthervolumes:
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Michał Araszkiewicz • Jaromír Šavelka
Editors
Coherence: Insights from
Philosophy, Jurisprudence
and Artificial Intelligence
123
Editors
MichałAraszkiewicz JaromírŠavelka
FacultyofLawandAdministration FacultyofLaw
DepartmentofLegalTheory InstituteofLawandTechnology
JagiellonianUniversity MasarykUniversity
Kraków Brno
Poland CzechRepublic
ISSN1572-4395
ISBN978-94-007-6109-4 ISBN978-94-007-6110-0(eBook)
DOI10.1007/978-94-007-6110-0
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Introduction
What does the concept of coherence represent? What role does it play in human
reasoningandinjustificationofbeliefsinparticular?Iscoherenceinlegalreasoning
necessary, sufficient, or desirable? The latter question, widely discussed by legal
philosophers during the past decades, leaves no space for doubts regarding the
influence of coherentism on mainstream research in the areas of legal theory,
philosophy,andjurisprudence.Inphilosophyandcognitivesciences,coherentismis
oftenmentionedasoneofthepossiblecandidatesforageneraltheoryofjustification
anda verypotentexplanationofhowhumanbeingsmakesenseof theworldthey
live in. Therefore, the topic is important not only from the point of view of legal
philosophyand jurisprudencebut from the standpointof other disciplines such as
cognitivescienceandartificialintelligenceaswell.
Initially,theconceptofcoherencebecametheobjectofinterestofphilosophers.
Interestinglyenough,thefirstdevelopedaccountsofthisconceptdifferconsiderably
inbothformandcontentfrommajorityofcontemporaryworkoncoherence.This
is due to the fact that these early elaborations were developed by philosophers
who belonged to the philosophical school of Absolute Idealism (cf., for instance,
the work of F. Bradley or H. Joachim). Otto Neurath, a member of the famous
Vienna Circle, coined the early conceptionof coherence,which is still referredto
in the context of epistemology. Let us recall the famous passage from his paper
“Protocol Statements” (Erkenntnis 1932, p. 206–209; quotation after N. Rescher,
TheCoherenceTheoryofTruth):
Thereisnowayoftakingconclusivelyestablishedpureprotocolsentencesasthestarting
pointofthesciences.Notabularasaexists.Wearelikesailorswhomustrebuildtheirship
ontheopensea,neverabletodismantleitindry-dockandtoreconstructitthereoutofthe
bestmaterials.Inunifiedsciencewetrytoconstructanon-contradictorysystemofprotocol
sentencesandnon-protocolsentences(includinglaws).Whenanewsentenceispresented
touswecompareitwiththesystematourdisposal,anddeterminewhetherornotitconflicts
withthatsystem.Ifthesentencedoesconflictwiththesystem,wemaydiscarditasuseless
(orfalse)(:::)Onemay,ontheotherhand,acceptthesentenceandsochangethesystem
thatitremainsconsistentevenaftertheadjunctionofthenewsentence.Thesentencewould
thenbecalled“true”.Thefateofbeingdiscardedmaybefallevenaprotocolsentence.No
sentenceenjoysthenolimetangerewhichCarnapordainsforprotocolsentences.
v
vi Introduction
The quoted passage is, undoubtedly, a manifest of anti-foundationalism. No
belief or sentence should be seen as immune to revision. However, if the overall
coherence of set of beliefs is responsible for acceptance or rejection of a given
elementofit,itseemsnecessarytodefinetheconceptofcoherence.Althoughsome
oftheauthorsexpressedskepticalviewsasregardsthepossibilityorusefulnessof
elaborating a more precise account of this concept (for instance, Hilary Putnam
chooses this skeptical stance), the epistemologists of the twentieth (and twenty-
first) century devoted much attention to make the concept more precise and
understandable. Let us mention, for instance, the work of Nicholas Rescher (The
CoherenceTheoryofTruth,OxfordUP1973)orLaurenceBonJour(TheStructure
of Empirical Knowledge, Harvard UP 1985). The concept of coherence has been
intensively elaborated in the field of analytic epistemology since then, which has
led to many interesting results, in particular in connection with the probabilistic
accountof coherence.Some papers included in this volume present recent results
fromthisfield of research,andtheyarealso includedbecausetheyare relevantto
legallyimportantcontextsofreasoning,forinstancelegalfact-finding.
As regards jurisprudence, coherence has become one of the favorite topics in
thelastseveraldecades.Theresearchhasbeenconsiderablyinfluencedbygeneral
philosophicalresearchoncoherence,buttherealitiesofjuridicaldiscourseandthe
juridical postulate of coherence of the legal system (be it the system of statutory
normsoraseriesofprecedents)werealsoanimportantshapingfactor.
Painting with a verybroadbrush,it couldbe stated that the historicaldevelop-
mentoflegalaccountsofcoherencemaybedividedintotwostreams:(1)thestream
ofDworkinianjurisprudence,whichemphasizedtheroleofthejudgeinfindingthe
rightlegalanswerbymeansofinterpretingthelawinthecontextoflegalprinciples
andpolicies(alsointhedynamiccontextofcreatingalineofjudgmentswhichcan
bepossiblycomparedtowritingachainnovel)and(2)theanalyticalstreamwhich
aimed at accounting for a proper place for coherence in a broader model of legal
reasoning(NeilMcCormick,RhetoricandtheRuleofLaw,OxfordUP2005)orat
basingsuchmodelontheconceptofcoherence(AleksanderPeczenik,OnLawand
Reason,Springer2008(2nded).Moreover,theanalysisofactualuseoftheso-called
argumentfromcoherenceinlegalreasoningcreatesanimportantcontextofjuridical
inquiryconcerningthisconcept(forinstance,StefanoBertea,“DoesArguingfrom
CoherenceMakeSense”,Argumentation19,2005).Ofcourse,thepresentstateof
artasregardslegal-philosophicalcoherenceresearchisfar morecomplicated,and
the degree of complication is caused by many factors. We hope that this volume
offersareliable(ifnotcomplete)reportconcerningthepluralityofpresentviewsin
thiscontext.
The conceptof coherenceattracts cognitivescientists and artificial intelligence
researchersaswell.Inparticular,thetheoryofcoherenceasconstraintsatisfaction
developed by the Canadian cognitive scientist and philosopher Paul Thagard (for
instance,CoherenceinThoughtandAction,MITPress2000)hasbecameinfluential
(and controversial) since the beginning of the twenty-first century in the context
of application of this theory to the domain of law. A few chapters present in this
volume discuss this theory of coherencein legalcontexts. It should also be noted
Introduction vii
thatinthefieldofartificialintelligenceandlawresearch,theconceptofcoherence
provedfruitfulasregardsthe“theoryconstruction”approachto modelingof legal
reasoning(cf.theworkofTrevorBench-Capon,GiovanniSartor,orJaapHage).
Althoughtheoverviewpresentedaboveis oversimplified,we believethatthese
three viewpoints, the general philosophical one, the legal-philosophical one, and
the perspective of cognitive science and artificial intelligence research, are very
relevant, or even crucial, to grasp the contemporaryunderstandingof the concept
of coherence. Of course, these three viewpoints on coherence do not exhaust the
space of possible and actual research. It is also not the case that philosophical
elaborationofcoherencecomesalwaysfirst,thenitisabsorbedbylegalphilosophy,
and finally implemented in formalized systems in artificial intelligence and law
research. The actual picture is much more complicated. For instance, sometimes,
legal philosophers offer very important contributions to the general theory of
coherence, and artificial intelligence researchers may be influenced directly by
philosophicalaccountofcoherence,eveniftheyapplytheirresultstolegaldomain.
Sometimes,differentmultidirectionalinfluencesarenotmadeexplicit.Sometimes,
coherentist authors working on one field are not completely aware of relevant
researchconductedintheneighboringfield.
Weareoftheopinionthattheinterchangeofviewsbetweengeneralphilosophy,
legaltheory,andartificialintelligenceresearchcanbeveryfruitfulforeachofthese
disciplines, providing mutual inspiration and increasing understanding of a given
topic.Hopefully,thisbookrealizesthis aimatleast to someextent,asregardsthe
concept of coherence and the role it plays in justification in general and in legal
justificationinparticular.
The first chapter, written by Jaap Hage, introduces the reader to the realm of
coherentism by means of comparison to its competitor, foundationalism. In this
chapter,threedifferentkindsofcoherentismarepresented—epistemic,constructive,
and integrated coherentism. It is argued that integrated coherentism should be
favored against the other two kinds on the grounds it best corresponds to the
principlesunderlyingcoherentism.
The second chapter,written by Stefan Schubertand Erik Olsson, addressesthe
generalconceptofcoherenceaswell,butinthecontextoflegalfact-finding.Atthis
time,thereasoningofthejuriesbecomesthecenterofattention.Itisacknowledged
thatcoherencereasoningistoberegularlyfoundinthereasoningofthejuries.Itis
arguedthatthereexistsaninterestinglinkbetweencoherenceandreliabilitythatis
muchmoreclearandusefulthanasupposedlinkbetweencoherenceandtruth.
SimilarideasarefurtherdevelopedinthefollowingchapterwrittenbyWilliam
Roche. He introduces what can be called as a probabilistic account of coherence
anddevelopshisownmodelwhichheinteraliacomparestothemodelproposedby
Olsson.Healsoaddressesthewell-knownproblemofjustifiedinconsistentbeliefs.
Roche’s chapter, like the chapter of Schubert and Olsson, is an example of the
applicationofformalmethodstotheproblemofcoherence.
In the fourth chapter, Juan Manuel Pérez Bermejo focuses his attention on
the concept of coherence in general. He introduces the reader to a large variety
of coherentist literature in legal philosophy and extracts what he calls “the most
viii Introduction
meaningfulandwidelyknownmetaphors.”Thesemetaphorsarecarefullyassessed
withregardtotheidentificationofsharedpatterns.Bermejoarguesthatthepatterns
are concordance,cohesion,unity,and comprehensibility.Thus, he tries to achieve
a substantial clarification of the concept of coherence. He does so by means of
informalanalysischaracteristicforhumanities.
Bartosz Broz˙ek’schapterexploresthe roleof coherencein legalinterpretation.
Heembraceshermeneuticphilosophyasthebasisforfurtherthoughts.Ontheone
hand, he argues that interpretation plays only a limited role in legal reasoning.
However,herecognizescoherenceasacriterionofinterpretation—perhapsthesole
criterion.
In the following chapter, Giovanni B. Ratti puts the defeasible deontic logic
under a very hard scrutiny. He argues that these kinds of logics have deficiencies
that are often overlooked. For example, he claims that they are not capable of
solvingnormativeinconsistencies.Assomeformalisms,basedoncoherence,canbe
considereddirectcompetitorstoformalismsbasedondefeasiblelogic,thischapter
presentsaverystrongprocoherentismargument.
Aldo Schiavello makes objectivity the principle point of his considerations. In
his search for an alternative theory of objectivity to the account of natural law
and positivism (opinion of majority), he embraces conventionalism. He does so
despite the existing limits he introduces to the reader. Moreover, there are strong
connectionsbetweenconventionalismandcoherence.
The next chapter, written by Kenneth Ehrenberg, works with the notions of
pattern languages and institutional facts. It is a unique account of law using
methodsembracedby object-orientedcomputerprogramming.A parallelbetween
thisapproachandSearle’stheoryofinstitutionalfactsisdrawn.However,themain
pointiseaseoftherepresentationoflegalrulesbycomputersystems.
In the followingchapter,Wojciech Cyruldevelopsan accountof a textological
approach.Itargueslegaltextsgreatlydifferfromothertraditionalkindsoftextsin
having a so-called hypertextnature. This contributesto the idea of intertextuality,
whichisbeingrelatedtocoherenceinlaw.
Marcello Guarini offers a perspective of cognitive science for the purpose of
case classification. He starts with some insights of neural network research. He
suggests coherence as constraint satisfaction might possibly play a role at the
level of reflective or explicit reasoning. Thus, he opens the topic of coherence as
constraintsatisfactionthatisassessedindetailwithinthefollowingchapters.
In the following chapter, Jaromír Šavelka argues that coherence as constraint
satisfactionshouldbeconsidereda viablecandidateforjudicialreasoningsupport
mechanisms. The argumentation is opened by a brief description of the main
objectionsagainsttheemploymentofanyabstractformalismintojudicialreasoning.
Thesesoundobjectionsarethentransformedintoalistofrequirementsthatshould
be met by any formalism considered for a judicial reasoning support mechanism.
Finally,itisarguedthatcoherenceasconstraintsatisfactionmeetstherequirements.
Michał Araszkiewicz considers the current model of coherence as constraint
satisfaction to be a promisingbasis for a modelof legalargumentation.However,
he identifies serious deficiencies of this formalism on the technical level. He
Introduction ix
specificallypointsoutthatargumentationwithincoherenceasconstraintsatisfaction
frameworkisnotstructured:thenatureofrelationsisunclear,andclearguidelines
for the selection of relevant elements are missing. He suggests these issues to
becomethesubjectoffutureresearchwhileprovidingsomeinitialsolutionstothe
exposedproblems.
In the last chapter, Amalia Amaya also focuses on coherence as constraint
satisfaction. She agrees with Šavelka and Araszkiewicz in considering coherence
asconstraintsatisfactiontobethebestfittingaccountofcoherenceforthepurpose
oflaw. Ingeneral,she presentsten theseson coherencein law anddiscussestheir
details. These are mostly theses on the nature of coherentism. She is in line with
Araszkiewiczbypointingoutanumberofissuesthatshouldbesubjectedtofuture
research.
The idea to preparethis bookdatesback to June 2011.At thattime, we held a
workshoptitledArtificialIntelligence,CoherenceandJudicialReasoningattached
totheThirteenthInternationalConferenceonArtificialIntelligenceandLaw2011
thattookplaceatUniversityofPittsburghSchoolofLaw,Pittsburgh,Pennsylvania.
At the workshop, a number of interesting addresses and following discussions
convinced us that coherence has become a topic of interest for lawyers, legal
theorists,philosophersbutalsoprofessionalsfromotherdisciplines.Sincethen,we
havestartedtocommunicatewithotherpeopleenthusiasticaboutthetopic,andin
consequencewehavebeenabletocollecttherichmaterialsthatarenowpresented
tothekindreaderasthebookheorsheiscurrentlyreading.
Finally,wewouldliketothankKevinAshley,TomvanEngers,BurkhardSchäfer
and Giovanni Sartor for the initial idea and encouragement to hold the Artificial
Intelligence,CoherenceandJudicialReasoningworkshop.Ourgratitudealsogoes
toKevinAshley,TomaszGizbert-Studnicki,JaapHage,L.ThorneMcCarty,Radim
Polcˇák,andErichSchweighoferfortheirsupportduringworkshoppreparations.We
wouldalsoliketothankalltheICAIL2011conferenceorganizersforprovidingus
with the opportunity to hold the workshop, especially to Tom van Engers, Kevin
Ashley, and Anne Gardner. We appreciate Hrafn Asgeirsson, Kenneth Ehrenberg,
MarcelloGuarini,andWilliamRochefortakingactivepartintheworkshop,andwe
alsothankthosewhohavevisitedtheworkshopandhelpedthespeakerstofurther
developtheirinitialideas. We thankAmaliaAmaya,JuanManuelPérezBermejo,
BartoszBroz˙ek,WojciechCyrul,KennethEhrenberg,MarcelloGuarini,JaapHage,
ErikJ.Olsson,GiovanniBattistaRatti,WilliamRoche,AldoSchiavello,andStefan
Schubert for their contributions to this book. Last but not least we would like to
thanktheSpringereditorialteam,especiallyNeilOlivier,fortheirkindsupportand
helpduringtheeditorialprocess.
MichałAraszkiewicz
JaromírŠavelka