Clayfield, Anna (2013) An unfinished struggle?: the guerrilla experience and the shaping of ...

330 Pages·2017·10.93 MB·English

by  Christine Middleton

AN UNFINISHED STRUGGLE?
THE GUERRILLA EXPERIENCE AND THE
SHAPING OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE
CUBAN REVOLUTION
BY ANNA CLAYFIELD, BA (Hons), MA
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
December 2013
Abstract
In the years that immediately followed the victory of the rebel forces in 1959. the
new leaders of the Cuban Revolution seemed to approach the task of revolutionary
governance as a continuation of the guerrilla campaign in the sierra. The
leadership's empirical management of the Revolution in power betrayed its guerrilla
roots, and resulted in an inchoate political system headed by charismatic guerrilleros.
By the end ofthe first decade, however, it seemed that the Revolution's guerrilla past
had been all but forgotten, as it established closer ties with the Soviet Union and
subsequently underwent a process of 'institutionalisation'. Since that time, many
Western scholars of Cuba have commented on the increased role of the military in
the revolutionary leadership, and in other aspects of the Revolution which would
normally be considered to be beyond the remit of most armed forces. These scholars
have concluded that the pervasive presence of the military is evidence of the
'militarisation' of the Cuban Revolution.
This thesis calls into question this notion of a 'militarised' Revolution by arguing
that such a perspective overlooks the guerrilla origins of both the Cuban armed
forces and the Revolution more broadly, in addition to the signs and symbols that
point to an on-going legacy of these origins in revolutionary Cuba. Using evidence
derived from an analysis of the hegemonic discourse of the Revolution at different
stages in its trajectory, this study demonstrates that the lived experience of guerrilla
warfare has shaped the beliefs and values that have underpinned the Revolution since
1959. Together, these beliefs and values comprise a unique political culture in which
the figure of the guerrillero is revered, and in which the guerrilla campaigns of the
Cuban historical narrative are presented as unfinished struggles. The thesis argues
that the active cultivation of this political culture has contributed to legitim ising the
long-standing presence of former guerrilleros in the revolutionary leadership, and
has helped to gamer the support of civilians for the revolutionary project. In addition
to challenging the idea of a 'militarised' Revolution, this study also undermines the
widely accepted notion that the Revolution was thoroughly 'Sovietised' during its
second decade. An examination of the hegemonic discourse of the 1970s reveals
that, while the Revolution transformed structurally during those years, the guerrilla
ethos which had buttressed the revolutionary project in the 1960s remained
unchanged.
Acknowledgements
This doctoral research would not have been possible without the financial support
provided by the University of Nottingham, for which I am truly grateful. It has been
a privilege to spend over three years studying a country for which I hold a passionate
interest. I am also thankful to the Society for Latin American Studies and the
Graduate School at the University for awarding me funding to conduct field work in
Cuba, an experience which was vital to the furtherance of this research.
My greatest debt is to my two supervisors, Professor Antoni Kapcia and Dr. Gareth
Stockey, for their continued support, patience, invaluable feedback, and for believing
in me and this project; I have gained immeasurably from their insight and expertise.
I would also like to express my gratitude to the many people who helped me during
my research trip to Cuba. For their guidance and advice, I am grateful to Fernando
Martinez Heredia, Hal Klepak, Raul Rodriguez de la 0, Jose Bell Lara and Eduardo
Yasells Ferrer; for their friendship and kindness, to Elga Gonzalez and Barbara
Danzie; and for keeping me going and sharing daiquiris, to Raquel Ribeiro.
In the UK, fellow students and colleagues at Nottingham and in the Cuba Research
Forum more broadly have helped to make the research process enjoyable and
enriching. Special thanks go to my family and close friends for their on-going
encouragement and understanding throughout the period of my PhD. In particular, I
owe a huge debt of gratitude to my readers (Mum, Dad, Felicity and Michael); to my
parents for always being supportive and for letting me follow my own path; and to
David, for everything.
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Table of Contents
List of Acronyms ..................................................................................................................... 4
Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 5
A 'militaristic' Revolution? ............................................................................................... 12
A New Approach: The Guerrilla Legacy, Political Culture, and Discourse Analysis ...... 39
Chapter One ........................................................................................................................... 53
Conceptualising the Perpetuation of the Guerrilla Ethos in the Cuban Revolution
What is Foquismo? ............................................................................................................ 54
'Sierra Maestra Complex', 'Guerrilla Mentality', or Guerrillerismo? .............................. 87
Guerrillerismo, Discourse and Power ................................................................................ 99
Chapter Two ......................................................................................................................... 105
Guerrillerismo in the I 960s
Textual Analysis (1959-1969) ......................................................................................... 115
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 174
Chapter Three ....................................................................................................................... 178
Guerrillerismo in the 1970s
Textual Analysis (1969-1981) ......................................................................................... 184
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 255
Chapter Four ........................................................................................................................ 262
The Cuban Revolution in the I 990s: A Return to Guerrillerismo?
Textual Analysis (1990-1999) ......................................................................................... 267
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 296
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 299
Cuba: A Guerrilla Nation?
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ 315
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List of Acronyms
CDR Comites de la Defensa de la Revolucion
EIR Escuelas de Instruccion Revolucionaria
FAR Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
FEU Federacion Estudiantil Universitaria
FMC Federacion de Mujeres Cubanas
MINFAR Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas
MNR Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias
MIT Milicias de Tropas Territoriales
OLAS Organizacion Latinoamericana de Solidaridad
PCC Partido Comunista de Cuba
PSP Partido Socialista Popular
SEPMI Sociedad de Educacion Patriotico-Militar
SMO Servicio Militar Obligatorio
UJC Union de Jovenes Comunistas
UNEAC Union de Escritores y Artistas de Cuba
UMAP Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Produccion
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Introduction
On 24 February 2008, Raul Castro officially succeeded his brother Fidel as President
of both the Council of State and the Council of Ministers of Cuba, following a
nineteen-month period in which he had provisionally held these positions, owing to
Fidel's poor health. Fidel's choice of successor was by no means a surprise, given
that Raul already occupied the posts of First Vice-President of the Council of State,
and Minister of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR). Raul was thus the
obvious choice to take over the reins of power.
Even less surprising, perhaps, has been Raul's selection of new members, along with
the promotion of existing ones, for the Council of State since his succession. As the
Minister of the FAR since 1959, Raul had always been considered first and foremost
a military man, as someone more suited to instilling tough military discipline than
negotiating revolutionary politics (Bardach, 2009; Dumont, 1974; Latell, 2005). The
long-standing commentator on the Cuban Revolution, Irving Horowitz, for example,
recently described Raul Castro as 'the orthodox military figure' who 'has become the
spokesman for all things military and the heir apparent to the revolution itself. His
orthodoxy extends to the cut of his uniform' (Horowitz 2008, 137). Accordingly,
then, Raul wasted little time in surrounding himself with men cut from a similar
cloth. Several well-known raulistas have been awarded membership of the Council,
while others have been granted a direct vertical promotion. I Among the latter was
seventy-two-year-old Julio Casas Regueiro who, having held the position of First
Vice-Minister of the FAR up until that point, found himself promoted to one of five
vice-presidencies of the Council, in addition to replacing Raul as the Minister of the
I Rau/istas is the term used to describe those loyal to Raul Castro within the revolutionary leadership.
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FAR.2 Similarly, Ramiro Valdes Menendez, one of only three men to have been
awarded the title Comandante de fa Revofucion. occupies a vice-presidential post on
both the Council of State and the Council of Ministers.3 He had previously been
made Minister of Information and Communications following Fidel's temporary
hand-over of power in 2006. The perhaps inevitable upshot of these new
appointments was a purging of numerous officials in the Cuban leadership, notably
the comparatively young and reformist figures of Carlos Lage, former Vice-President
ofthe Council of State, and Felipe Perez Roque, hitherto Foreign Minister.
As mentioned, the ascendancy of high-profile military figures into the upper
echelons of the Cuban leadership is in keeping with Raul Castro's long-established
image as, above all, a military man. Yet, for many observers, not only was this
increase in power and influence awarded to the military fitting with the picture of
Raul, but of the Cuban Revolution in general. In other words, there exist a large
number of Western academics who, since the early years of the Revolution, have
commented on the supposed 'militarism' of the Revolution and, in turn, its
transformation of Cuban society into a populace that could be described as
'militarised' (Bonachea and San Martin, 1972; Bunck, 1994; Dumont, 1974;
Horowitz, 2008). The granting of additional authority to members of the armed
forces has therefore caused little alarm; on the contrary, it is widely seen as a
vindication of this long-held view that the Revolution is a militarised system of
governance. Other events of recent years have also served in some ways to confirm
this widespread perception: Bastion 2004, for instance, a strategic military defence
2 Julio Casas Regueiro passed away on 3 September. 20 II.
3 The other two figures upon whom the title of Comandanle de la Revoluci6n has been bestowed are
Juan Almeida Bosque and Guillermo Garcia Frias. both former guerril/eros who played prominent
roles in the Revolution's insurrectionary phase.
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exercise involving hundreds of thousands of Cubans (both members of the armed
forces and civilians), is perhaps an explicit example of the so-called 'militarisation'
ofthe Cuban Revolution.
In turn, many academics are of the opinion that such a 'militarisation' process is
central to understanding the longevity of the political careers of prominent military
figures such as Raul Castro. The literature which attests to the "militarism' of the
Revolution has viewed the process as one which has legitimised the revolutionary
leadership's long-standing hold on power through its accompanying authoritarian
approach to disciplining the Cuban population, the creation of a hierarchical society,
the concentration of political power in the hands of a select few, and the active
promotion of a 'siege mentality'. It is widely accepted that, combined, these factors
have played a key role in the survival of the Revolution since the late-1960s, and
have enabled those at the helm of the revolutionary project to maintain a firm grasp
on the reins of power (Goure, 1989; Horowitz, 2008; Malloy, 1971; Petras and
Morley, 1985).
However, such a perspective overlooks another defining feature of these high
ranking military officials, which may help to explain their political endurance. Not
only are men like Raul Castro prominent members of the armed forces, they are also,
inescapably, former guerrilleros. Raul, Casas Regueiro and Valdes Menendez all
played pivotal roles in the sierra during the uprising against the then dictator,
Fulgencio Batista, which commenced with the landing of the Granma in eastern
Cuba on 2 December 1956, and ended in January 1959 with the flight of Batista from
Cuban shores, and the subsequent installation of the Revolution in power. It is,
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therefore, interesting that those who helped to usher in the era of the Cuban
Revolution in power in 1959 still find themselves in distinguished roles within the
revolutionary leadership (with the exception, now, of Casas Regueiro), particularly
given the various transformations and crises experienced by the Revolution
throughout its trajectory. What is more, the 'militarisation' perspective fails to
address the fact that the FAR has its origins in, and developed out of, the Ejcrcito
Rebelde, the very guerrilla force which sprang up in the isolated mountain regions of
Cuba, and in which the above names participated.4 These historical roots of the FAR
render it distinct from other more traditional militaries, and particularly those in the
rest of Latin America, which have been created and developed for the service of a
state power (Klepak 2005, 2010). Cuba's armed forces, in contrast, were founded
upon a struggle waged by, and for, the people. The military historian Hal Klepak has
written of this distinction, stating that the FAR 'are in their own minds different from
other Latin American armed forces because of their revolutionary past and their
revolutionary tradition. They see themselves truly as the "people's army" of a
revolutionary people' (Klepak 2005,56).
Moreover, to talk of the 'militarisation' of the Cuban Revolution is to suggest that
the FAR exist as a monolithic entity completely removed from the civilian sphere,
though exercising authority over it. Such a suggestion indicates a lack of
understanding as to how the armed forces operate in Cuba, and how they relate to the
rest of the population. Since the creation of the Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias
(MNR) in 1959, a volunteer force under the control ofthe FAR (though not part of it
4 Ejercito Rebelde was the name adopted by the guerrilla forces which fought in the sierras of Cuba
during the struggle against the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista between July) 956 and January) 959.
After the fall of Batista, the Ejercito Rebelde was gradually transformed into the FAR, a
transformation set in motion by the creation of the Ministerio de las Fuer7.as Armadas Revolucionarias
(MINFA R) in October) 960 (Perez, Jr. ) 976, 26)
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as such), the Revolution has cultivated a force of reservists who occupy roles in both
the civilian and military spheres, thereby blurring the lines between the two. By the
same token, many military personnel have assumed responsibilities in the civilian
sphere, as will become clear in the ensuing literature review. In addition, it should
be noted that the labelling by non-Cuban observers of certain figures within the
political sphere as 'military' does not necessarily indicate that such men currently
serve, or have ever served, in the FAR. Many of those who possess military titles
were awarded them solely on the back of their participation in the guerrilla struggle
of the 1950s, and may not have been actively involved in any 'military' activity
thereafter (aside from their roles as reservists).
Furthermore, unlike the influence of military officials which, as will be discussed
later, only really came to the fore in the late 1960s, it should be acknowledged that
the guerrilla element within the leadership has, of course, been in place since the
very inception of the Cuban Revolution. The sustained presence of the guerrilla
cohort within the leadership is telling in that it is indicative of a continuity within the
Revolution from the insurrectionary phase onwards. This continuity, in turn, leads
one to question how the longevity of the political careers of these ex-guerrilleros.
and not, therefore, military men, has been legitimised in the eyes of the Cuban
public.
Clues which might explain this legitimacy are plentiful in contemporary
revolutionary Cuba, particularly in the images and slogans promulgated by the
leadership. In Havana's Plaza de la Revoluci6n, for example, the outline of the
image of Ernesto 'Che' Guevara has for many years adorned the Ministerio del
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