Buying In and Selling Out: African-American Ownership of Record Labels in the Twentieth Century

312 Pages·2017·1.42 MB·English

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LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
2016
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Stuart Lucas Tully
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College
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Tully, Stuart Lucas, "Buying In and Selling Out: African-American Ownership of Record Labels in the
Twentieth Century" (2016). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 3246.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/3246
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BUYING IN AND SELLING OUT:
AFRICAN-AMERICAN OWNERSHIP OF RECORD LABELS
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
n
i
The Department of History
y
Stuart Tully
B.S., Mississipbpi College, 2002
M.A., Louisiana State University,2009
Ma 2016

y
To Warren,
This one is for you
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Charles Shindo guided this project from inception to completion and his
direction has been immensely impactful. He has been gracious, insightful, and above
all encouraging of this project. I must thank him for humoring me during all the
seemingly endless visits to his office that somehow always turned out productive
thanks to his advice. I would also like to thank my other committee members for
their support in creating this work. Louisiana State University has been a wonderful
environment and I am grateful for my time here.
On a personal note, I have to thank my family and friends who have passed
and exceeded any possible expectations. To my parents, who gave support in all
definitions of the word throughout my graduate school career. To my colleagues and
fellow Americanists, who have provided camaraderie beyond my imagination. But
above all, I have to thank my wonderful wife Carole, who has encouraged more than
any other individual, as well as tolerated my at times single-mindedness during the
beginning of our life together. I love you, more than words can say.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………………………..iii
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….v
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………………………...1
Chapter One: Harry Pace and Black Swan Records: 1921-1923…...……………………….18
Chapter Two: The Economic and Cultural Decisions of Harry Pace……………………….40
Chapter Three: Berry Gordy’s Motown: 1959-1988……………………………………………..79
Chapter Four: The Economic and Cultural Decisions of Berry Gordy…………………..109
Chapter Five: Def Jam, Russell Simmons, and Hip Hop: 1984-1999……………………..165
Chapter Six: The Economic and Cultural Decisions of Russell Simmons………………230
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………….281
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………………….289
Vita………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….305
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ABSTRACT
Throughout the twentieth century, African-American owned record labels
seemingly served as embodiments of entrepreneurialism’s capacity to generate
social uplift for the race as well as wealth. However, an examination of Black Swan
Records, Motown, and Def Jam Records, demonstrates how this assertion is
undermined by the actions of their owners.
Harry Pace founded Black Swan Records in 1921 not only to showcase black
artists, but also prove the African-American audience was capable of appreciating
classical music and other high culture. However, faced with financial pressures, Pace
expanded the genres recorded on Black Swan to include jazz and other genres
deemed “low” culture, as well as released records by white artists under black
names.
Berry Gordy’s refusal to allow his Motown artists to take a public stance on
the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s came from his belief that their participation
would be detrimental to the company’s profitability. Gordy’s belief in selling black
respectability to the commercial mainstream formed the basis of much of his
decisions in running Motown, and became its ultimate legacy.
Although Russell Simmons sought to market black rebellion under the
assumption white consumers would find it more authentic, his decisions made as
owner of Def Jam was demonstrated how entrenched black music had become
within mainstream culture. When artists went too far in their persona of rebellion,
such as members of Public Enemy, Simmons was quick to cast them aside in order to
preserve the label’s viability.
v
The three owner’s actions to remain commercially successful despite
seemingly in opposition to their stated cultural and racial goals demonstrate the
priority of economic realities inherent in consumer culture taking precedence over
idealistic efforts. In commodifying race, the resulting music was foremost a
commercial product, and diminished its cultural value. This work challenges earlier
studies of African-American popular music by arguing that the positive attributes of
presenting black artists to a mainstream audience were weakened by the economic
considerations of running a business and the demands of a consumer culture.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 23, 1900, a group of African-American professionals from across
the country met in Boston, Massachusetts for the first annual meeting of the
National Negro Business League. Over the course of two days, exhibitors gave
presentations on black-owned businesses in coal mining, potato farming,
undertaking, floristry, and a host of other diverse industries.1 In addition, presenters
forecasted the business outlook for black enterprise across the nation. The
attendees of the annual meeting came at the bequest of Booker T. Washington, who
had organized the league. Washington had achieved national notoriety for his
“Atlanta Compromise” speech delivered at the Atlanta Cotton States and
International Exposition, five years before, in which he advocated for mechanical
and agricultural work as the method by which African-Americans could ultimately
achieve social equality with white people. Washington also recognized that black
owned businesses served as an important means through which African-Americans
could demonstrate their value to the rest of America. Washington invited all black
businessmen to join the league, whose ranks included lawyers, doctors, and small
business owners as well as farmers and craftsmen. The League formally
incorporated in New York City the following year and eventually grew to include
hundreds of individual chapters throughout the nation.
Washington was not alone among African-American thinkers at the turn of
the century emphasizing the necessity of black-owned businesses to gain equality.
Even W.E.B. Dubois, who typically opposed Washington, agreed that black-owned
1 Records of the National Negro Business League. Black Studies Research Sources. Microfilm. Bracey,
John and Meier, August eds. University Publications of America. 5.
1
businesses should be a major hallmark of any plan to achieve civil rights. The
Declaration of Principles, drafted by Dubois and William Monroe Trotter after the
inaugural 1905 meeting of the Niagara Movement, decried the South’s prejudice in
oppressing small business enterprise and impeding advancement. This rhetoric was
continued in the platform adopted by the National Negro Committee in 1909. The
Committee, which would change its name to the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People the following year, similarly stated that the
transition of a primarily unskilled black labor force into skilled labor was a key
focus. The stress on black enterprise was felt throughout the African-American
community with later organizations, such as Marcus Garvey’s United Negro
Improvement Association, continuing this emphasis on black ownership of
businesses throughout the early part of the twentieth century.
Encouraging black entrepreneurialism as a tent pole for a larger push for
greater Civil Rights continued throughout the twentieth century. As black
entrepreneurs gained more financial success and notoriety, it was believed that
their individual achievements would translate into increased equality for the rest of
the race. Organizations such as the National Negro Business League perpetuated this
idea. The League, which changed its name to the National Business League in 1967,
still exists, with goals virtually identical to those set down by Washington in 1900.
Its website states its vision is to “Empower and Uplift the Black Community through
Business and Economic Development” and its mission is “to Create Wealth in and for
the Black community”2 The continued existence of the League demonstrates the
2 “National Business League Vision”. Retrieved 11/12/16. http://nblgw.org/the-nbl-s-vision
2
pervasiveness of this idea through the years. This belief that the economic growth of
black entrepreneurialism would correlate with an increased social elevation for the
whole of the race became prevalent in African-American society throughout the
twentieth century, and impact the development of several businesses.
The burgeoning recording industry seemed an ideal laboratory to test the
potency of black entrepreneurialism for four main reasons. First, the medium as a
whole was still relatively new. Although Thomas Edison had first introduced
electronic recordings with his 1877 invention of the phonograph, other companies
such as Columbia and Victor came up with their own imitations. At the time of the
first meeting of the National Negro Business League in 1900, these companies
comprised the “Big Three” of recording devices and held most of the patents and
national distribution over the record business. This resulted in Edison, Columbia,
and Victor holding a virtual monopoly on recorded music. This oligarchical control
stood until the mid-1910s, when a series of successful lawsuits and patent
expirations allowed for new record labels to be formed.
Secondly, although the record industry was newly expanded, the business of
selling music had already proven to be lucrative. Manufacturers of printed music
and musical instruments had grown immensely in the beginning of the twentieth
century. By the end of World War I, American music industries had produced more
than $335 million in goods.3 Eager customers purchased pianos, sheet music, and
other musical merchandise in droves, and musical recordings were posed to

3 David Suisman. “Co-Workers in the Kingdom of Culture: Black Swan Records and the Political
Economy of African American Music.” The Journal of American History Vol. 90, No. 4 (Mar., 2004),
1296.
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