Blind Obedience: The Structure and Content of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

345 Pages·2009·2.775 MB·English

by  Meredith Williams

BLIND OBEDIENCE
There is considerable debate amongst philosophers as to the basic philoso-
phical problem Wittgenstein is attempting to solve in the Philosophical
Investigations. In thisbold and originalwork, Meredith Williams argues that
it is the problem of “normative similarity.”
In Blind Obedience Williams demonstrates how Wittgenstein criticizes tra-
ditional, representationalist theories of language by employing the “master/
novice” distinction of the learner, arguing that this distinction is often over-
looked but fundamental to understanding philosophical problems about
mind and language.
The book not only provides revealing discussions of Wittgenstein’s corpus
butalsointricateanalysesoftheworkofBrandom, Dummett,Frege,Sellars,
Davidson, Cavell and others. These are usefully compared in a bid to better
situate Wittgenstein’s non-intellectualist, non-theoretical approach and to
highlight its unique features.
Meredith Williams is Professor of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University,
USA. Her areas of research are the later Wittgenstein and philosophy of
mind and psychology.

BLIND OBEDIENCE
Paradox and Learning in the Later
Wittgenstein
Meredith Williams
Thiseditionpublished2010byRoutledge
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©2010MeredithWilliams
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereprintedor
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ISBN 0-203-87081-6 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN10:0-415-55300-8(hbk)
ISBN10:0-203-87081-6(ebk)
ISBN13:978-0-415-55300-1(hbk)
ISBN13:978-0-203-87081-5(ebk)
FOR MICHAEL WILLIAMS
Onemuststartout witherrorandconvertitinto truth.
Thatis,onemustrevealthesourceoferror,otherwisehearingthetruthwon’tdo
anygood.Thetruthcannotforceitswayinwhensomethingelseisoccupyingits
place.
To convince someone of the truth, it is not enough to state it, but rather one
mustfindthe pathfromerrortotruth.
LudwigWittgenstein, “RemarksonFrazier’sGoldenBough”
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements ix
List of abbreviations x
1 Structure and content of the Philosophical Investigations 1
Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy 3
The method of description 9
Wittgenstein’s theoretical diagnosis: from mistake to paradox 12
Two domains: linguistic mastery vs initiate learning 19
The structure of the book 22
Notes 23
2 Playing the game 26
The Fregean picture of language 27
Wittgenstein’s rejection of “Frege’s idea” 31
Thebuildersgame:rudimentarylanguageoranimalsignaling? 43
Dummett’s challenge: sense vs force 52
Conclusion 68
Notes 69
3 The domestication of reference 77
The problem of normative similarity 1: ostensive definition 77
Rejection of Quine’s picture of language 89
Objects and paradigms 97
Ostensive teaching and social practices 104
Notes 108
4 Logical form and the paradox of thought 112
The subliming of logic 112
Frege’s Idea and the paradox of thought 117
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CONTENTS
Davidson’s challenge: meaning and logical form 125
The limits of systematicity 132
Notes 140
5 Rules and the paradox of interpretation 145
The problem of normative similarity 2: rules and
interpretation 146
Two pleas for interpretation 160
The community view and reductionism 171
The individualist view and mystification 177
Notes 183
6 Normativity and the threat of regularism 189
Rules and regularities 189
The public basis of normativity 195
The social basis of normativity: the negative argument 204
The social basis of normativity: the positive argument 210
Notes 220
7 Necessity and the threat of psychologism 226
Two forms of holism 227
Stage-setting: conventions without decisions 234
Background technique: necessity without metaphysics 240
Normativity and “psychologized” necessity 247
Learning, trust and certainty 254
Notes 262
8 Sensation and the paradoxes of consciousness 267
The problem of normative similarity 3: consciousness 268
Theepistemologyofsubjectivity:paradoxofself-knowledge 269
The ontology of subjectivity: paradox of sensation 283
Cartesian thought experiments and the expressivist view 289
Criteria, deception and the new problem of other minds 299
Notes 309
9 Concluding remarks 313
Bibliography 316
Index 325
viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I have been working to understand the later Wittgenstein for well over 20
years. Blind Obedience is the culmination of this study. I have learned much
from others, both individuals and books, though I can no longer remember
themall.Muchofthematerial,theoreticalandargumentative,istobefound
in earlier form in previously published articles. All have been reworked in
light of the line of argument developed in Blind Obedience. These are the
following:
Chapter 1 relies on “Method and Metaphilosophy in Wittgenstein’s Phi-
losophical Investigations,” in Pasquale Frascolla, Diego Marconi and
Alberto Vololini, (eds), Wittgenstein: Minds, Meaning and Metaphilosophy
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming).
ThediscussionofQuineinChapter3hasitsoriginsin“TheEtiologyofthe
Obvious,” in Wittgenstein, Mind and Meaning (London:Routledge,1999).
Chapters 4 and 5 contain discussions of Davidson that draw upon “Witt-
genstein and Davidson on the Sociality of Language,” The Journal for the
Theory of Social Behaviour, Vol. 30 (2000).
Discussion of Brandom’s work, primarily in Chapter 5, draws upon
material in “The Social Basis of Normativity in Wittgenstein and Brandom:
Interpretation or Agreement,” in R. Haller and Klaus Puhl, (eds), Wittgen-
stein and the Future of Philosophy: A Reassessment after 50 Years (Vienna:
Öbvhpt, 2002).
Chapters 5 and 6 draw upon “Rules, Community and the Individual” and
“ThePhilosophicalSignificanceofLearningintheLaterWittgenstein,”both
reprintedinmyWittgenstein,MindandMeaning(London:Routledge,1999).
I would like to thank those from whom I received lively criticism when
presentinganyofthesepapersatconferencesanduniversities.Ialsofoundthe
criticalreviews of themanuscriptfor Routledgevery helpful, and hope that I
have adequately addressed their concerns. In addition I want to thank Alex-
ander James for putting together the bibliography and the index, and editing
the final version of the manuscript, which he pursued in hischaracteristically
careful and thorough way. Finally, and most importantly, I thank Michael
Williamsfor hiscriticalinsight,helpfulediting,andyearsofsupport.
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