Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the Periphery

163 Pages·2004·19.611 MB·English

by  TALIAFERRO, JEFFREY W.

BALANCING RISKS
Avolume in the series
CORNELL STUDIES IN SECURITYAFFAIRS
Great Power Intervention
.EDITED BYRobert J.Art, Robert Jervis, AND Stephen M. Walt
in the Periphery
W.
JEFFREY TALIAFERRO
CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS
Ithaca and London
Allrights reserved. Except forbrief quotations inareview, this book,
or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without TablesandFigures vii
permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address
Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512East State Street, Ithaca, Acknowledgments ix
New York14850.
Abbreviations xiii
Note on Translations, Romanization, and Stylistic Conventions xvii
1. Power Politics and the Balance ofRisk
2. Explaining Great Power Involvement in the Periphery
3. Germany and the 1905Morocco Crisis
4. Japan and the 1940-41 War Decisions
Taliaferro, JeffreyW.
Balancing risks :great power intervention inthe periphery / Jeffrey 5. The United States and the Korean War (1950-51) 132
w.Taliaferro.
6. The Limits ofGreat Power Intervention in the Periphery 173
p.em.- (Cornell studies insecurity affairs)
Includes bibliographical references and index. 7. Implications ofthe Argument 218
ISBN0-8014-4221-4(alk.paper)
1. World politics-20th century. 2. Great Britain-Foreign
Notes
relations-1901-1910. 3. Japan-Foreign relations-1912-1945· 4·
United States-Foreign relations-1945-1953· 5. Index
Imperialism-History-20th century. I. Title. II. Series.
D511.T322oo4
327.1'09'04-dC22
Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible
suppliers and materials tothe fullest extent possible inthe publish-
ing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC
inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or
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our website atwww.comellpress.cornell.edu.
2DOO
Table 1.1Three theories offoreign policy 9
Table 1.2List ofobservations in the principal cases 20
Table 1.3Central decision makers in the principal cases 23
Figure 2.1Causal logic ofbalance-of-risk theory 41
Table 3.1 Summary ofGerman leaders' risk behavior
in the 1905-1906Morocco crisis 92
Table 4.1 Summary ofJapanese leaders' risk behavior
in the 1940-41war decisions 130
Table 5.1 Summary ofTruman administration's risk
behavior in the Korean war, 1950-51 170
Table 6.1Central decision makers in the control cases 174
Table 6.2Summary ofrisk behavior in the control cases 215
The development of this book required me to take several profes-
sional and intellectual risks. Along the way, Ihave incurred many debts
to teachers, colleagues, and institutions. I am particularly indebted to
two scholars at Harvard University. Stanley Hoffmann encouraged me
to ask important questions, while giving me the freedom to PurSue my
interests and never trying to steer me in a different direction. Stephen
Peter Rosen agreed to serve as an adviser when institutional and intel-
lectual hurdles seemed insurmountable. During my first two years in
graduate school Yuen Foong Khong encouraged me to investigate the
link between leaders' perceptions and foreign policy. I owe a tremen-
dous intellectual debt toJackS.Levy,who inspired me not only to apply
prospect theory to the study of foreign policy but to go beyond the ex-
tant literature. He has been exceedingly generous in providing trenchant
criticisms and suggestions at various stages.
Robert Jervis of Columbia University, coeditor of Cornell Studies in
Security Affairs, is everything that one could want in a reviewer and
scholarly editor. His detailed and thoughtful comments have had a sig-
nificant impact on the final project. (Asit happens, his 1993Political Psy-
chology article, ''The Political Implications of Loss Aversion," first
aroused my interest in the phenomena ofgreat power intervention inthe
periphery.) He will always be my model of what a scholar should be. I
also thank the outside reviewer for Cornell University Press for his de-
tailed and useful comments. That reviewer, who recently revealed him-
self as Michael C. Desch, helped me refine my treatment ofoffensive re-
alism and suggested apossible avenue for afuture project. Finally,Ijoin
a long line of authors indebted to Roger Haydon at Cornell University
Press. His wit, comments, and encouragement made the entire publica-
tion process immeasurably easier.
Several scholars were kirid enough to provide detailed comments on
some or all of the manuscript: Mia Bloom, Thomas J.Christensen, Dale
Copeland, James W. Davis, Jr., Jonathan DiCicco, Mark Haas, Colin
Elman, Bernard I. Finel, Benjamin Frankel, Alastair lain Johnston, Paul
Kowert, EricJ.Labs, JeffreyW.Legro, Sean M.Lynn-Jones, Patrick Thad-
deus Jackson, James McAllister, Benjamin Miller, Barry Posen, Gideon
Rose, Randal Schweller, Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Gary J.Schaub, Jr.,and
Stephen Van Evera. Two colleagues in particular, Rose McDermott and
William J.Boettcher, helped me sharpen my treatment ofprospect theory tion. Shea W.Peacock, and our two "research cats," Sheena and Duncan
and risk behavior. have lived with this project longer than anyone else. Without their love:
Ipresented portions ofthis book at seminars at the Massachusetts In- support, and seemingly inexhaustible patience, this book would never
stitute of Technology's Security Studies Program, the University of Vir- have seen the light ofday. Idedicate this book to my father, John W.Tal-
ginia's Woodrow Wilson Department ofGovernment, and Harvard Uni- iaferro, who has always encouraged me in everything that Ihave done,
versity's Center for Basic Research on the Social Sciences. I thank and to the memory of my mother, Althea M. Taliaferro, who taught me
participants in those seminars for many helpful comments. The students to never give up and to always have faith.
in my C01,lrseon "the rise and the fall ofthe great powers" at Tufts Uni-
versity not only endured my endless ruminations about Japanese expan-
sion in the 1930s,but also asked questions that helped sharpen the dis-
cussion in chapters 4and 6.Iam indebted toMatthias Maas, Christopher
Greller, and Ezequiel Reficcofor research and translation assistance. The
translations by Chaim D.Kauffman and James W.Davis, Jr.,ofDie Grosse
Politik der Europiiischen Kabinette were invaluable in completing my early
research on the 1905-1906Morocco crisis.
Completion ofthis book would not have been possible without ajun-
ior faculty research grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation, Inc.,
and asemester-long research leave provided by the Officeofthe Dean of
the School of Arts and Sciences at Tufts University. I did the early re-
search as a graduate associate at Harvard's Center for International M-
fairs (now the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs). Mellon
Dissertation Fellowships and a National Science Foundation Pre-
doctoral Fellowship supported the earlier stages of the project. Ray-
mond Geselbracht, Sam Rushay, and others at the Harry S.Truman Li-
brary in Independence, Missouri, were invaluable in gathering archival
material on the Korean War. The Political Science Department at Tufts
has been supportive over the past fiveyears. One could not ask forbetter
colleagues than Robert Devigne, Richard Eichenberg, Shinju Fujihira,
Malik Mufti, Elizabeth Remick, and VickieSullivan. Tony Smith, in par-
ticular, has been agreat adviser and agood friend.
Portions ofchapters 1and 2appeared as "Security-Seeking under An-
archy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered," International Security 25, no. 3
(winter 2000/2001); "Correspondence: Brother, Can You Spare a Para-
digm? (Or,WasAnybody EveraRealist?)," International Security 25,no. 1
(summer 2000);and "Power Politics and the Balance-of-Risk: Hypothe-
seson Great Power Intervention in the Periphery," Political Psychology 25,
no. 1(April 2004).Portions of chapter 4 appeared as "Quagmires in the
Periphery: Foreign Wars and Escalating Commitment in International
Conflict," Security Studies 7,no. 3(spring 1998).Ithank MITPress, Frank
Cass Publishers, and Blackwell Publishing for permission to use that
material here.
The best part of completing this book is that my family and friends
will no longer have to tread gingerly about the timetable for its comple-
British Documents on the Origins ofthe War, 11vols. ed.
H. P.Gooch and Howard Temperly. London: His
Majesty's Stationary Office, 1926-38.
BFO British Foreign Office
Cab. Cabinet Papers, United Kingdom
CCP Chinese Communist party
CDD Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak
of the European War. London: Fisher Unwin, 1915.
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CINCFE Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Forces in the Far East
CINCUNC Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command-
Korea
COI Committee on Imperial Defence, United Kingdom
CPVs Chinese People's Volunteers, Korean War
CPVA Chinese People's Volunteer Army, People's Republic of
China
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CWIHP Cold War International History Project, Washington,·
D.C.
CWIHPB Cold War International History Project Bulletin
DA Department of the Army
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
000 Department of Defense
005 Department of State
DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
DGFP Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1818-1945, Series
C and D. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State,
1933-37 and 1937-45.
DSB U.S. Department of State, Department ofState Bulletin
FEAF Far East Air Force, U.S. Air Force
FEC Far Eastern Command
FRUS U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States, multiple vols. Washington, D.C: GPO, various NSC National Security Council
years. NSRB National Security Resources Board
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations ofthe United OIR Office of Intelligence Research, U.S. Department of
States, 1943: Conferences at Cairo and Tehran. State
Washington, D.C: GPO, 1961. PLA People's Liberal Army (People's Republic of China)
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations ofthe United PPP:HST Public Papers of the President: Harry S. Truman
States: Japan, 1940-1941,2vols. Washington, D.C: GPO, PPS Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State
1943·
PRC People's Republic of China
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
PRO Public Records Office, United Kingdom
States, 1945: The Conference ofBerlin (Potsdam
PS "Princeton Seminars," Dean G. Acheson Papers, Harry
Conference), 2vols. Washington, D.C: GPO, 1960.
S.Truman Library, Independence, Missouri
German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914,4 vols., ed. E.
T.s.Dugdale. London: Methuen, 1928. President Secretary's Files, Harry S.Truman Papers,
Harry S.Truman Library, Independence, Missouri
Die Grosse Politik der Europiiischen Kabinette, 1871-1914,
ROC Republic of China (on Taiwan)
39 vols. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft rur Politik
und Geschichte, 1922-1927. ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)
Harry S.Truman Papers, Harry S.Truman Library, SCAP Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers-Pacific
Independence, Missouri SE Special Estimates
HSTL Harry S.Truman Library, Independence, Missouri SRRKW Selected Records Relating to the Korean War, Harry S.
Truman Papers, Harry S.Truman Library,
IGHQ Imperial General Headquarters (Japan)
Independence, Missouri.
IJA Imperial Japanese Army
USAFIK U.S. Army Forces in Korea
IJN Imperial Japanese Navy
UN United Nations
IMTFE Court Papers, Exhibits, Interrogations, Trial Transcripts,
UNC United Nations Command, Korea
and Judgments ofthe International Military Tribunal for the
FarEast, 1946-48. Washington, D.C: GPO, 1948. USAKW U.S. Department of the Army, United States Army in the
Korean War, 3vols. Washington, D.C: GPO, 1961-1972.
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
White House Central Files, Harry S.Truman Papers,
KMAG Korea Military Advisory Group
Harry S.Truman Library, Independence, Missouri
KMT Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist party)
White House Office Files, Harry S.Truman Papers,
KPA Korean People's Army (North Korea)
Harry S.Truman Library, Independence, Missouri
LC Library of Congress
War in Asia and the Pacific, ed. Donald S. Detwiller and
MSA Mutual Security Agency Charles B.Burdick, 15vols. U.S. Army Center for
MSFE U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services and Foreign Military History: Washington, D.C, 1980.
Relations Committees, Military Situation in the FarEast,
82nd Cong., 1session, 1951.
National Archives, Washington, D.C, and College
Park, Maryland
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIB National Intelligence Estimate
NME National Military Establishment
NOTE ON TRANSLATIONS, ROMANIZATION,
AND STYLISTIC CONVENTIONS
Throughout the text, Japanese proper names appear in Japanese
order: surname first followed by given name (e.g.,TojoHediki instead of
Hediki Tojo),except in cases ofWesterners ofJapanese origin. The same
rule applies to Chinese and Korean proper names in the text, except in
cases of Westerners of Chinese or Korean origin. The one exception to
this rule isSyngman Rhee (YiSung-man), the founding president of the
Republic ofKorea. Rhee, who spent over thirty years in the United States
before the liberation of Korea in 1945, rendered his name in Western
order (given name followed by surname). To simplify locating works
cited in the notes, however, the names ofJapanese, Chinese, and Korean
authors appear in Western order, with the surname last.
In keeping with the Japanese practice of referring to a deceased em-
peror according to his reign name and not his personal name, Iuse the
term Emperor Showa instead of Emperor Hirohito (the name by which
he isuniversally known in the West).The same rule applies to his prede-
cessors: Emperor Taisho (instead of Emperor Yoshihito) and Emperor
Meiji (instead of Emperor Mutsuhito). Macrons indicate long vowels in
Japanese words and names, except in the case of well-known place
names (e.g.,Tokyo).
I employ the Pinyin transliteration of most Chinese proper names,
places, and organizations (e.g., Mao Zedong, Zhou En Lai, and Beijing,
instead of Mao Tse-Tung and Chou En-Lai, and Peking). However, for
places, organizations, and persons associated with Nationalist China
(1926-49) and the Republic ofChina on Taiwan (1949-present), Iuse the
Wade-Giles system of transliteration (e.g., Chiang Kai-Shek and the
Kuomintang instead ofJiang Jieshi and the Guomintang). TheTaiwanese
government uses Wade-Giles transliterations in officialEnglish language
documents.
The given names ofRussian and German officials appear in the origi-
nal language or in the case of Russian, the approximate transliteration
into Latin script (e.g., Heinrich instead of Henry or Mikhail instead of
Michael). Imake an exception in cases where the English translation ofa
Russian proper name is more common in the scholarly literature (e.g.,
Tsar Nicholas II instead of Tsar Nikolai 11). With the exception of the
Russian title tsar, the military ranks, government offices,royal and noble
titles ofallofficialsappear in English (e.g.,the German emperor Wilhelm
IIinstead ofKaiser Wilhelm 11).Furthermore, the English translations of
Germanic titles ofnobility and rank precede the person's given and sur-
names in the text instead of coming between the given name and sur-
name (e.g., Prince Bernhard von Bulow instead of Bernhard Fiirst von
BALANCING RISKS
BUlow or Bernhard Prince von BUlow or General Count Alfred von
Schlieffen instead of General Alfred Graf von Schlieffen). Finally, in the
case of British hereditary peers below the degree of duke or life peers
(after 1958), the person's full title appears in the initial reference fol-
lowed by the courtesy form in subsequent references <e.g.,the marquess
of Salisbury, the earl of Selbourne, and Viscount Haldane, then subse-
quently, Lord Salisbury, Lord Selboume, and Lord Haldane}.
[1]
Power Politics and the Balance of Risk
This bookexamines arecurrent puzzle in world politics. Greatpowers frequently initillte
risky diplomatic and military interventions in the periphery-regions that tWnot di-
rectly threaten the security ofagreat power's homeland. They often persist infailittgin-
terventions despite mounting political, economic, and military costs. More surpris,ng,
great powers often undertake risky strategies toward other great powers in an effort to
continue failing interventions in strategically inconsequential regions.
During the cold war, the United States and the Soviet Union expended
blood and treasure todefend clientsinthe Third World.TheUnited States,
for example, found itself in an inconclusive and arguably self-defeating
war in defense ofSouth Vietnam. President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary ofState Dean Rusk, and other 0ffi-
cials repeatedly escalated air and ground operations against Viet Cong
guerrillas and North Vietnam, despite credible infonnation that such
strategies had alow probability ofachieving the war's stated objective:the
preservation ofSouth Vietnam.1Rather than extricate itselffrom an expen-
siveand increasingly unpopular war, theNixon administration extended it
into Cambodia and Laosinorder towin concessions from North Vietnam.
In December 1979, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, De-
fense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, the KGBchairman Yuri Andropov, and
other Politburo members hoped to use minimal force to secure a stable
Soviet-aligned government in Afghanistan. Instead, the Soviet leader-
ship soon found itself in a prolonged guerrilla war against Afghan
rebels, which exacerbated tensions with the United States, fueled the
Reagan administration's defense buildup, and ultimately contributed to
the Soviet Union's collapse.2