Argument, Inference and Dialectic: Collected Papers on Informal Logic with an Introduction by Hans V. Hansen

168 Pages·2001·7.52 MB·English

by  Robert C. Pinto (auth.)

ARGUMENT. INFERENCE AND DIALECTIC
Argumentation Library
Volume 4
Series Editors:
Frans H. van Eemeren, University ofA msterdam
t Rob Grootendorst, University ofA msterdam
Joseph Wenzel, University ofI llinois
John Woods, University of Lethbridge
ARGUMENT,
INFERENCE AND
DIALECTIC
COLLECTED PAPERS
ON INFORMAL LOGIC
WITH AN INTRODUCTION
BY HANS V. HANSEN
by
ROBERT C. PINTO
Department of Philosophy,
University of Windsor,
Windsor, Ontario, Canada
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-90-481-5713-6 ISBN 978-94-017-0783-1 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-0783-1
Printed an acid-free paper
AII Rights Reserved
© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2001
No part ofthe material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanica1,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE vii
INTRODUCTION by Hans ViIh. Hansen IX
1. Overview of Chapters 1-12, ix
2. Retrospective: Logic, Dialectic and the Practice of Rational Criticism, xx
Chapter 1: DIALECTIC AND THE STRUCTURE OF ARGUMENT
1. Introduction, 1
2. Presumption and Burden of Proof, 2
3. Do there have to be "objective standards" for assessing arguments?, 4
4. Conclusion, 8
Chapter 2: GENERALIZING THE NOTION OF ARGUMENT 10
1 Doxastic attitudes other than belief, 11
2. Propositional attitudes other than doxastic attitudes, 15
3. Nonpropositional objects of conscious attitudes, 17
4. Conclusion: further questions, 19
Chapter 3: LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY AND ARGUMENT APPRAISAL 21
1. Introduction, 21
2. Appraising premisses, 23
3. Suitability of inferential link, 26
4 Conclusion, 31
Chapter 4: THE RELATION OF ARGUMENT TO INFERENCE 32
1. Arguments and inferences, 32
2. Inference, 39
3. Logical pragmatics, argumentation theory and the evaluation
of inference, 43
Chapter 5: INCONSISTENCY, RATIONALITY AND RELATIVISM 46
1. Why is inconsistency a fault?, 46
2. How serious a fault is inconsistency?, 49
3. When is it reasonable to tolerate inconsistency?, 51
4. What about relativism?, 54
Chapter 6: POST HOC, ERGO PROPTER HOC 56
Chapter 7: LOGIC, COHERENCE AND PSYCHOLOGY 64
v
vi TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 8: LOGIC, COHERENCE AND PSYCHOLOGY REVISITED 73
1. Introduction, 73
2. Understanding a domain as necessary background of any reasoning, 74
3. Is the understanding ofa domain susceptible of propositional or sentential
representation?, 75
4. Understanding, coherence and rationality, 78
Chapter 9: LOGICAL FORM AND THE LINK BETWEEN
PREMISSES AND CONCLUSION 81
1. Preliminaries, 81
2. Semantic entailments, 85
3. Inductive inferences and Goodman's paradox, 89
4. The effect of pragmatic considerations on the validity of inductive
generalization, 95
5. Conclusion, 96
Chapter 10: ARGUMENT SCHEMES AND THE EV ALUA TION
OF PRESUMPTIVE REASONING 98
1. In what sense does presumptive reasoning/argument
constitute a sui generis class?, 98
2. Are there normative argument schemes? 100
Chapter 11: PRESUMPTION AND ARGUMENT SCHEMES 105
1. Presumptive reasoning, 105
2. Argument schemes, 108
3. Do argument schemes have normative force?, 109
4. What is the point of identifYing argument schemes?, 111
Chapter 12: COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE OF RATIONAL
CRITICISM 113
1. Cognitive science at the extremes, 113
2. What if the eliminativists are right?, 117
Chapter 13: LOGIC, DIALECTIC AND THE PRACTICE
OF RATIONAL CRITICISM 126
I. Introduction, 126
2. The nature of the undertaking to which these papers are devoted, 128
3. Revisiting "Dialectic and the Structure of Argument" - the
role of dialectic, 130
4. Revisiting "Dialectic and the Structure of Argument", - relativism 134
5. Conclusion, 140
REFERENCES 141
INDEX 145
PREFACE
Chapters 1-12 of this volume contain the papers on infonnal logic and
argumentation that I've published and/or read at conferences over the last 17 years.
These papers are reproduced here pretty much unchanged from their first
appearance; it is my intention that their appearance here constitute a record of my
positions and arguments at the time of their original publication or delivery. I've
made minor changes in fonnat, in the style of references, etc., for the sake of
consistency; I've also corrected typographical errors and the like. The only extensive
changes in wording occur in the last few pages of Chapter 7, and were made only to
enable the reader to see more clearly what I was getting at in my first attempt to
write about the notion of coherence.
Chapter 13 was written expressly for this volume. It looks retrospectively at the
contents of the first 12 chapters and attempts to highlight the unifying themes that
run through them. It also revisits the ideas about dialectic that occupied my first
paper, reworking them in light of later developments in my thinking but also re
emphasizing themes about which I've tended to remain silent in the last few years.
****
This volume would never have seen the light of day were it not for the
encouragement and help of my colleague Hans V. Hansen. It was he who proposed
the idea of this volume, who persuaded Kluwer and the Argumentation Library to
publish it, and who has supplied an Introduction that offers the reader an external
perspective of the papers. My debt to him is enonnous.
****
The sources for Chapters 1-12 are as follows.
Chapter 1 was previously published under the title "Dialectic and the structure of
argument" in Informal Logic 6 (1984), pp. 16-20. Copyright 1984 Infonnal Logic.
All rights reserved. It is reprinted by pennission.
Chapter 2 was previously published under the title "Generalizing the notion of
argument," in van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Blair and Willard, eds., Proceedings of
the Second International Conference on Argumentation, vol. IA. (Amsterdam:
SICSAT, 1991), pp. 137-46. Copyright 1991 SICSAT. All rights reserved. Reprinted
by pennission.
Chapter 3 was previously published under the title "Logic, epistemology, and
argument appraisal," in Johnson and Blair, eds., New Essays in Informal Logic.
Windsor: Infonnal Logic, 1994. pp. 116-24. Copyright 1994 Informal Logic. All
rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.
Chapter 4 was first published under the title "The relation of argument to
inference," in van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Blair and Willard, eds., Perspectives and
Approaches. Amsterdam. Sic Sat, 1995. pp. 271-86. Copyright 1995 SICSAT. All
rights reserved. Reprinted by pennission.
Vll
Vlll PREFACE
Chapter 5 was first published under the title "Inconsistency, rationality and
relativism" in Informal Logic 17 (1995), pp. 279-88. Copyright 1995 Informal
Logic. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.
Chapter 6 was first published under the title "Post hoc, ergo propter hoc," in
Hansen and Pinto, eds., Fallacies: Classical and Contemporary Readings
(University Park: Penn State Press, 1995), pp. 302-11. Copyright 1995 Pennsylvania
State University Press. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.
Chapter 7 was first published under the title "Logic, coherence, and psychology"
in Hansen, Tindale and Colman, eds., Argumentation and Rhetoric (compact disc).
St. Catharines: OSSA, 1998. Copyright 1998 Robert C. Pinto. All rights reserved.
Chapter 8 ("Logic, coherence, and psychology revisited") was read at Ontario
Philosophical Society, University of Toronto, November 1997 and is previously
unpublished.
Chapter 9 is scheduled for publication under the title "Logical form and the link
between premiss and conclusion," in Tindale, Hansen and Raposo, eds.,
Argumentation at the Century's Turn (compact disc): st. Catharines: OSSA.
Copyright 2000 Robert C. Pinto. All rights reserved.
Chapter 10 was first published under the title "Argument schemes and the
evaluation of presumptive reasoning," ProtoSociology 13 (1999), pp. 50-58.
Copyright 1999 ProtoSociology. All rights reserved. Reprinted by permission.
Chapter II ("Presumption and Argument Schemes") was read at Central States
Communication Association Conference, Detroit, April 2000 and is previously
unpublished.
Chapter 12 ("Cognitive Science and the Future of Rational Criticism") is
previously unpublished. Earlier versions were read at the Thirteenth Annual
Conference on Critical Thinking, Sonoma State University, August 1993, at the
Seminar on Reasoning and Argumentation, organized by the International
Conference and Research Center for Computer Science in Schloss Dagstuhl, August
1993, and at the Philosophy Department Colloquium of the University of Waterloo
in November 1993.
****
I want especially to thank my colleagues Tony Blair and Ralph Johnson for their
help, guidance and lively criticisms over many years. Without them, my interest in
these topics would probably not have begun and would certainly not have been
sustained. Ralph Johnson, in particular, offered criticism of some of the material
written expressly for this volume. I am indebted to David Hitchcock for many
helpful suggestions and criticisms. I also want to express my appreciation to the
editors of the Argumentation Library, especially Frans van Eemeren for his
encouragement and John Woods for trenchant criticisms of earlier drafts of some of
the papers reprinted here. Finally I want to acknowledge the assistance of Susan
Zwartbol-Jones of Kluwer, which was indispensable in seeing this project through to
completion.
Robert C. Pinto
University of Windsor
INTRODUCTION
by Hans Vi/h. Hansen
Many of the prejudices held by the traditional logician are scrutinized in the
papers that make up this volume. The status and authority of argument standards, the
concepts of 'argument,' of 'inference,' and of 'argument cogency' are all re
considered. The seriousness of inconsistency and its relation to reasoning and to
relativism is taken up and put in a new light. A traditional fallacy is given an
exemplary treatment which forces us to see that it is much more difficult than we
had thought to decide whether this fallacy has been committed. The role of logical
form in determining argument strength is brought into question, as is the idea of
normative argument schemes. And the possible consequences that modem cognitive
psychology could have for logic and reasoning are explored. These topics, and
others that revolve about them, are the subject of this book. On each of the questions
raised, Pinto has something challenging to say to the person who thinks that logic is
a finished project and that in its present state it is an adequate instrument for
understanding and evaluating argument discourse.
I. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 1-12
1.1 Chapter 1: Dialectic and the structure ofa rgument.
The first of the essays in this collection, "Dialectic and the structure of argument,"
dates from 1984. In it, Pinto elaborates on a Socratic claim about the nature of
I
dialectic: that its aim is to bring just one other person into agreement with one's own
views. He draws two important consequences from this conception of dialectic.
First, that the only rules to which dialogue is subject are those recognized by both
parties, and secondly, that the understanding and evaluation of arguments is
dependent on understanding the dialectical interchange in which they occur.
In Pinto's view, it is the correlative notions of presumption and burden of proof
which give order to dialectical interchanges. He defines these concepts dialectically.
A proposition is presumptive just in case, if an opponent refuses to concede it, she
has the obligation (or burden of proof) to make a case against it. Within this
I It is an interesting coincidence that this essay first appeared the same year in which van Eemeren and
Grootendorst published their landmark work, Speech Acts in Argumelltative Discussions. The
Canadian and Dutch argumentation scholars did not become familiar with each others work until a
few years later.
ix
x INTRODUCTION
framework, a good argument may be taken as one which creates a presumption for
its conclusion (and thereby creates a burden on the one who would oppose it).
What is needed next are some general rules that tell us when an argument does
create a presumption for its conclusion. Pinto refers to such rules as 'presumption
policies' and these must be accepted by both parties in the dialogue. However, an
important point about presumption policies is that they can themselves become the
subject of discussion. Thus, if a dialectical other balks at accepting a presumption
policy one has used to establish a conclusion, then perhaps, after further
argumentation about the acceptability of the policy, she may be brought to accept it,
and the discussion can resume. But the debate about whether to accept a particular
presumption policy is still a discussion between the two people involved in the
dialectical interchange; moreover, the acceptability of a presumption policy depends
on the possibility that it can be discussed, and consequently accepted by the two
participants. (If they were to reject the policy after discussing it, it would lose its
force.)
Thus Pinto seems to be advocating a kind of intersubjective internal ism as the
source of dialectical standards: not only must the presumption policies be jointly
agreed upon by the participants in the dialogue, there is no external, or outside,
source of legitimacy for the policies. Rather than give a proof of this position, Pinto
attempts to show us its plausibility by illustrating it with two examples, one a 'usual
case' argument, the other an argument for the confirmation of an hypothesis. I will
not review these here, but I should indicate to the reader that Pinto has re-thought
some of his views on dialectic, and his modifications are found in the final chapter
of this collection (Chapter 13). Most significantly, he now recognizes a role for
those 'outside' the dialogue on the ground that any dialectic discussion takes place
within the context of the intellectual community to which its participants belong.
1.2 Chapter 2: Generalizing the notion ofa rgument.
In this essay, Pinto outlines three kinds of argumentation that seem to fit
uncomfortably with the standard definition of 'argument' as a set of premisses that
are intended to justify the truth or acceptability of a conclusion.
Mainstream logicians, as well as some informal logicians, embrace the idea that
arguments aim only at inducing belief. Pinto finds this to be too narrow a conception
of argument since the point of an argument may only be to incline us to believe its
conclusion, or suspect its truth, or consider it possible, rather than to
straightforwardly believe it is true. He refers to the attitude of belief and belief-like
attitudes as doxastic attitudes. The point being made is then that an argument may
aim to induce doxastic attitudes other than straightforward belief toward the
proposition at the core of its conclusion. This possibility is not part of the usual
presentation of what an argument is or does, and it widens the scope of arguments.
Doxastic attitudes are not the only ones one can have towards a proposition.
Nondoxastic propositional attitudes include such as things as hoping, wishing,
fearing, or anticipating, that something is or will be the case. Thus, an argument