ARENDT AGAINST ATHENS Rereading The Human Condition

27 Pages·2002·0.13 MB·English

PTOsaLoI/TAICRAELNTDHTEAOGRAYIN/FSeTbAruTaHryE2N0S02
SOMEDISTANCEFROMGREECE:RETHINKINGARENDT
ARENDTAGAINSTATHENS
RereadingTheHumanCondition
ROYT.TSAO
GeorgetownUniversity
MissArendtismorereticentthan,perhaps,sheshouldbe,aboutwhatactuallywentonin
thispublicrealmoftheGreeks.
—W.H.Auden1
I
TheHumanConditionhaslonghadapeculiarstatusinthecriticalrecep-
tion of Hannah Arendt’s political thought.2 First published in 1958, it is
undoubtedly the most ambitious, and almost certainly the most accom-
plished,ofArendt’scompletedworks.Itcontainstheconsummatestatement
ofherdistinctivetheoriesofthepublicrealmandofpoliticalfreedom,which
aresurelyhermostimportantcontributionstopoliticaltheory.Yetevenmany
ofheradmirersbelievethatthissamebooksuccumbsmostfullytothefail-
ingsforwhichitsauthorismostoftenfaulted:unabashedelitism,indiffer-
encetomoralconstraints,andanaridlyself-containedidealofpoliticsthat
excludesbasicmattersofjusticefrompublicconcern.3Allofthosefailings,
moreover, would seem to stem from a single source: Arendt’s seemingly
unqualified admiration for the politics of the ancient Greek city-state, or
polis,whichfiguresprominentlyinthebook’sdiscussionsofpoliticalaction,
AUTHOR’SNOTE:IwouldliketothankAmyGutmann,GeorgeKateb,JeromeKohn,Alexander
Nehamas,andPaulSafierfortheirextensivecommentsonearlierversionsofthisessay,andalso
Ursula Ludz for information regarding Arendt’s translation of The Human Condition into
German.
POLITICALTHEORY,Vol.30No.1,February2002 97-123
©2002SagePublications
97
98 POLITICALTHEORY/February2002
freedom, and the public realm. The impassioned moral commitments so
manifestinherwritingsontotalitarianismandotherevilsinthepoliticsofher
owntimeseemstrangelyforgotteninthisbook’sapparentlyunstintingpraise
oftheclassicalpolis—notwithstandingtheinstitutionsofslaveryandoppres-
sionthatsustainedit,tosaynothingofthebelligerenceandstrifethatoften
infecteditsactualpolitics.Forthisreason,evensomeofArendt’smostvigor-
ouscriticaldefendershavetreatedthebookasapeculiaraberrationinher
thought,aregrettablelapseintoanunrealisticandirresponsiblenostalgiafor
thedaysofPericles’Athens.4
InthisessayIwouldliketocontestthebasicpremiseofthatopinion.Iwill
arguetothecontrarythatthroughoutTheHumanConditionArendtdeliber-
ately—andsystematically—attributestotheancientGreeksasetofbeliefs
aboutthenatureofpoliticsthatareatoddswithherowntheoreticalclaimsin
thissamebook.FollowingtheleadofasuggestiverecentarticlebyJacques
Taminiaux,Iwillseektoshowthatherunderstandingofactionanditslimits
fundamentallydepartsfromtheonesheattributestotheGreeks.5Letmebe
clear,though,thatmyaimhereisnotsimplytopresentanother,morepalat-
ablesidetoArendt’spolitics,norisittoshowthatherfeelingsfortheGreeks
weremoremixedthanisoftensupposed.6Itisinsteadtoproposeaninterpre-
tationoftherelevantsectionsofTheHumanConditionthatisabletomake
coherentsenseofwhatArendtsaysabouttheGreeksaspartofalargerargu-
ment,onethatsetsmanyofthebook’smostcommonlyquotedstatementsin
an entirely different light. My interest in vindicating the book against the
chargesofamorallyobtusenostalgiafortheGreeks’politicsisonlysecond-
ary,ameanstowardclarifyingArendt’stheoreticalclaimsaboutthenatureof
humanactivitiesandpoliticallife.Theconclusionsthatwillemergefrommy
rereadingofthetextisthatArendt’stheoryofthepublicrealmisconsider-
ablymoreexpansivethanherremarksonthepoliswouldseemtoindicate,
andthathercorrespondingcritiqueofmodernsocietyisbothmoresubtle,
andalsoagooddealmorecompelling,thanacomplaintthatwefailtoliveup
tosomedatedHellenicideal.
ThepresenttendencyamongscholarswritingaboutArendtistoapproach
herworkthematically,cullinghermoststrikingstatementsonanygiventopic
fromavarietyofsourcesatonce.Thatapproachmaybeunobjectionablein
itself,butithasencouragedthepracticeofseveringthosestatementsfrom
theirintendedargumentativecontextandtreatingherbooksthemselvesaslit-
tlemorethanhaphazardcollectionsofaphoristicdicta.Evenwhenscholars
havedealtsolelywithTheHumanCondition,theyhavegenerallypaidlittle
heedtotheintricatestructureofthebook’sforty-fivediscretesectionsortoits
author’sexpectationthatherreaderswillbebornethroughthosesectionsby
the flow of her cumulative argument. As it happens, Arendt’s comments
Tsao/ARENDTAGAINSTATHENS 99
abouttheGreekpolisoccurmainlyintwowidelyseparatedpartsofthebook,
the first in chapter 2, “The Public and the Private Realm” (primarily in
§§4-6),andthesecondinchapter5,“Action”(§§27-28).Itisinthefirstof
thesediscussionsthatArendtdrawsmostexplicitlyonGreekideastoeluci-
date her ideas about what properly constitutes a truly “political” public
realm.Yetthesecondisnolessfrequentlyquotedwhencriticstrytoexplain
hersupposedadmirationfortheGreeks’politics;itcontainsherwell-known
description of the polis as an arrangement intended “to multiply the occa-
sionstowin‘immortalfame’”andtoserveas“akindoforganizedremem-
brance”foritscitizens’greatdeeds(§27:197-98).WhatIwillseektoshow,
however,isthatArendt’spurposesinthosetwopartsofthebookfundamen-
tallydiffer,andthatthepointofthatseconddiscussionispreciselytodraw
attentiontobeliefsoftheGreeksthatshecannotherselfendorse.
That second account of the polis, occurring in the middle of chapter 5,
“Action,”canbeproperlyunderstoodonlyinlightoftheoreticalclaimsabout
thenatureofhumanactivitiesthatArendtadvancesoverthecourseofthe
longstretchofthetextthatseparatesitfromthefirst,backinchapter2,“The
PublicandthePrivateRealm.”Andthosetheoreticalclaims,inturn,make
senseonlyintheirimmediatecontext,whichhaslittletodowithanyideas
shetakesfromtheGreeks.Aswewillsee,theybelonginsteadtoanargument
whoseaimistoexplaintheconditionsunderwhichhumanactionassuchis
comprehensible;itisArendt’sresponsetoaphilosophicalproblemconcern-
ing the possibility of freedom that she inherits from Kant. Unfortunately,
because her first description of the polis is presented before her theory of
actionisfullyinplace,whatshesaysabouttheGreeks’beliefstheretendsto
overshadowand,asitwere,discolormanyofthoselatertheoreticalclaims,
whichinturnobscuresthecriticalthrustofhercommentsaboutthepolisin
chapter5.Tocorrectforthisdistortion,myprocedureinthisessaywillbeto
beginbyintroducingthephilosophicalcoreofthetheoryofhumanactivities
thatArendtdevelopsoverthecourseofthebookasawhole,includingcrucial
elementsofthattheorythatshedoesnotpresentuntiltheopeningsectionsof
chapter5itself.OnlyafterthatwillIbrieflyconsiderherpreliminarydiscus-
sionoftheGreeksinthepertinentsectionsofchapter2.Iwillthenreturnto
chapter 5 for a detailed examination of Arendt’s later discussion of the
Greeks’politicsthere,focusingononesectioninparticular,§27,“TheGreek
Solution.”Myreconstructionofherargumentinthatsectionwillshownot
onlythatherownunderstandingofactiondepartsfromtheGreeks’,butthatit
doessoinawaythatclarifiestheintendedlimitsofherpriorappealtotheir
ideaswithrespecttothenatureofthepublicrealm.
Amongmyaimsinthisessayistodemonstrate,ifonlybypartialillustra-
tion, that The Human Condition amply rewards this kind of detailed, sec-
100 POLITICALTHEORY/February2002
tion-by-sectionattention.Iwillthusrefrain(untiltheveryend)frompursu-
inganyofthemanypossiblepointsofcontactwithArendt’sotherworks.Yet
thereisoneothertextofherstowhichIwillbereferringextensivelyhere—an
undulyneglectedlatertextofTheHumanConditionitself.Ithasbeentoolit-
tlenoticedbystudentsofArendt’sworkthatsheinfactwrotetwo,signifi-
cantlydifferentversionsofTheHumanCondition.Bothwerepublishedin
herlifetime,andindeedbotharecurrentlyinprint—indifferentlanguages.
Thefirstistheoriginal1958edition,whichArendtwroteinEnglish.Thisis
theversionofthebookthathasgenerallybeenreadbyscholars,atleastthose
writinginEnglishorFrench.ThesecondisArendt’sowntranslationofthe
bookintoGerman,publishedin1960asVitaactiva:oderVomtätigenLeben.7
Althoughostensiblyonlyatranslation,theslightlylaterGerman-language
versionactuallycontainsalargenumberofsmallbutsignificantdepartures
fromtheoriginal,mostlyintheformofdiscreet,clarifyingadditions—which
remain all but undocumented. Not surprisingly, though, these revised pas-
sages,addedbyArendtinherownnativetongue,oftenilluminatehermean-
ingatpreciselythepointswheretheEnglish-languageoriginalismostdense
andobscure.8
II
ArendtusestheLatinphrase‘vitaactiva’asaportmanteautermtocover
thethreeactivitieswhose“elementaryarticulations”shesetsouttodescribein
TheHumanCondition’sthreecentralchapters:‘labor’,‘work’,and‘action’.9
These three activities are “fundamental,” she says, “because each corre-
spondstooneofthebasicconditionsunderwhichlifeonearthhasbeengiven
toman”—namely,thatwearelivingbeings,thatweinhabitaworldofour
ownmaking,andthatwesharethatworldwithotherpeople(§1:7).Labor,for
Arendt,includesallthatweneedtodo(orhavedonebyothers)tosustainand
reproduceourbodies,thatis,tosatisfytherecurring,naturalneedsweshare
withalllivingthings.Thecategoryof‘labor’assheusesitthusextendsalso
toconsumptionandto(sexual)reproduction,whichtogetherwithlaborinthe
ordinarysense(i.e.,procuringthemeansofsubsistence)adheretothemeta-
boliccyclesthroughwhichallbiologicallifeissustainedandregenerated.In
contradistinctiontothatmetabolic(orquasi-metabolic)activity,Arendtuses
thetermworkexclusivelytodescribetheproductionofdurablethings:tools,
shelter,andthecountlessotherman-madeobjectsthatassistourlaborand
thattogethercomposewhatshecalls“thehumanartifice.”Whilelaborcon-
formstotheunceasingnaturalrhythmsofgrowthanddecay,theactivityof
work,whichsheoftenalsocalls‘fabrication’,affordsussomelimitedmas-
Tsao/ARENDTAGAINSTATHENS 101
tery over those same processes, interposing a measure of stability onto
nature’sceaselessflux.Action,finally,iswhat“goesondirectlybetweenmen
withouttheintermediaryofthingsormatter”(§1:7).Ratherthansustainour
bodies or add things to our world, action’s effects are felt in what Arendt
describesastheintangible“webofhumanrelationships”thatexists“wher-
evermenlivetogether”(§25:184);ofthethree,shesays,actionaloneiswhat
bestowsmeaningonourlivesandourworld(§33:236).
Arendt’streatmentofthesethreeasdistinct,independentactivitiesmayat
first seem rather implausible. After all, much of what people actually do
wouldobviouslyqualifyformorethanoneofthesethreelabels,asinthecase
ofthe“work”performedbyawage-earningartisan,acraftsmanwhosetrade
isalsohisliving.YetArendt’saimisnottoprovideadefinitivetaxonomyof
possibleactivities,asiftoshunteveryinstanceofhumanendeavorintoone
andonlyoneofthreerubrics.Whatsheseekstoprovide,rather,isasetofdis-
creteabstractionsfromthewelterofworldlyactivity,eachwithitsownlogic
ofexplanationandeachcorrespondingtoadifferentdynamicofchangeand
persistenceintime.Inotherwords,hercontentionisthatinsofaraswhatever
wedobelongstooneoftheseactivities,itwillnecessarilyconformtothat
activity’sparticularexplanatorylogicandtemporaldynamic.Considerthat
caseofthewage-earningartisan.Insofarasheworks,hiscraftwillyielda
final result, a lasting product that will persist in the world apart from its
maker;theactivityendswhenitsintendeddesignisfulfilled.Insofarashe
labors,though,thatsingular,teleologicalsequenceissubsumedwithinthe
ongoingrhythmofeffortandrest,ourartisan’sdailygrind.Thebodilyneeds
heservesinearninghiswageswillneverbesatedaslongashelives,andso
theactivityneverwillcease—thoughhemaycontrivetogetotherstobearthe
bruntofitstoilforhim.Insofarashelabors,moreover,theneedsheanswers
aremuchthesameasanyoneelse’s;themarketthatsetshiswagestreatshim
asoneofanaggregateonly.Hemaybesimilarlyanonymousinsofarashe
works:neithertheprocessofmakingnortheproductsmadeneedbearthe
maker’sname.Butnosuchanonymityispossibleinsofarasheacts:ifheisto
sharehistools,say,orcarryoutacontract,hisfellowsmustbeabletorecog-
nizeandkeeptrackofhisdoingsasadistinctindividualamongothers.
Wemightsaythatthesethreeactivitiescorrespondtothewaysinwhich
weareabletomakesenseofdifferentkindsofchangeinourlivesandinour
world—’change’, that is, in a general sense, akin to what Aristotle called
‘kinesis’.AnodtoAristotleisappropriatehere,forthekindsofprocesses
thatArendtassociateswithlabor,work,andaction,respectively,correspond
roughlytoAristotle’sownaccountsofthesame(withhernotionof‘labor’
substitutingforthe‘nutritive’activityhehadattributedtoalllivingbeings).10
ButifArendt’scategoriesresembleAristotle’s,hertheoreticalprojectputs
102 POLITICALTHEORY/February2002
heragooddealclosertoanotherphilosopher,Kant.Eschewingtheformer’s
metaphysicalambition,sheinsteadadoptswhatisineffectalooselyKantian
strategyoftranscendentalargument,whoseaimistoarriveatuniversaltruths
abouttheworldsolelyfromthenecessary(i.e.,transcendental)conditionsof
ourexperienceofthatworld,withoutanyappealtothenatureoftheworldas
itmightbe“initself.”11InTheCritiqueofPureReason,Kanthadsoughtto
deriveaprioriprinciplesvalidforanypossibleexperiencesolelyfromthe
wayourcognitivefacultiesmustorganizeallsuchexperience.12Therelevant
senseof‘possible’forKantisthus‘possibletounderstand’:anyobjectwe
perceiveoreventweexperienceisfundamentallystructuredbyineluctable
constraintstoourunderstandingitself.SotooforArendt,thoughhercatego-
riesapplyatalowerlevelofabstraction,namely,tothepossibleformsofspe-
cifically human activity in the world.13 In other words, her abstract theses
concerningessentialattributesoflabor,work,andactionderivefromwhat
shetakestobethefundamental(andnumericallyfinite)waysinwhichweare
able to comprehend the basic kinds of continuity and change that human
beingsareabletoeffectthroughtheirownactivity.
TheimplicitKantianbackgroundtoArendt’sprojectpointstothespecial
complexityofthatprojectinthecaseofaction.Inthecasesoflaborandwork,
wemightsay(veryroughly)thatArendt’sprojectissimplytosupplycatego-
riesappropriatetomorespecifictypesofexperiencethanKant’sanalysishad
covered.Inthecaseofaction,though,Kant’sanalysisitselfleavesanobsta-
clethatArendtmustsomehowsurmount.Action,assheusestheterm,con-
sistsintheexerciseofhumanfreedomintheworld;toqualifyassuch,itmust
becomprehensibleasaspontaneousinitiative,anovelbeginning(§24:177-
78).ButKanthadfamouslyargued(inasectionoftheCritiqueknownasthe
Third Antinomy) that our experience can contain no truly spontaneous
events;thatissimplybecausetheruleofregularcausation—imputingacom-
pleteseriesofantecedentcausestoanyevent—isitselfoneofthoseconstitu-
tiverulestowhichourcognitioninvariablyconforms.14WhatKanthimself
hadconcludedfromthisisthattheconceptoffreedomthereforehasvalid
applicationonlyoutsideourcognitiveexperienceoftheworld,thatis,with
referencetoourownfacultiesofreasonandrationalvolition(whosework-
ingsintheworldwecanneitherwitnessnorcomprehend).Thatconclusion
couldnotsatisfyArendt,though,becauseherowntheoreticalinterestliesin
ourabilitytomakesenseofhumanactionsastheyaffectourworld,thatis,
frompreciselythethird-personpointofviewthatKant’spositionwouldpre-
clude.Theburdenofhertheoryisineffecttospecifyanalternativeconcep-
tualschemabywhichweareabletocomprehendspontaneoushumaninitia-
tives as such. Rather than overturn the principle of physical causation, as
appliedtoeventsgenerally,Arendtseekstosupplementitwithanaccountof
Tsao/ARENDTAGAINSTATHENS 103
anothermodeofcomprehension,oneappropriateforeventsonlyinsofaras
theypertaintohumanagency.Heraiminthisrespectisnotsomuchtoprove
thatfreehumanactionsarepossibleasitistoanswerhowitispossibleforus
tocomprehendaction,giventhefactthatwedo—andwhatformanysuch
comprehensionmusttake,givenitsapparentincompatibilitywiththecausal
explanationofphysicalstates.Itisonthebasisofthenecessaryconditions
attendantonthatalternatemodalschema(asitwere)thatshethengoesonto
derivethebasicfeaturesthatallcomprehensibleactionmustshare.
InTheHumanCondition,Arendtaddressesthisproblemratherobliquely,
primarilyinthefirstthreesectionsofchapter5:§24,“TheDisclosureofthe
Agent in Action and Speech,” §25, “The Web of Relationships and the
EnactedStories,”and§26,“TheFrailtyofHumanAffairs.”Itwillsufficefor
ourpurposesformetosketchsomeofherbasictheoreticalclaimsinthose
sectionswithoutgoingintothe(oftenobscure)detailsofhersupportingargu-
ments.15Accordingtoheraccount,theschema(touseKant’sterm)through
whichactionmakessenseiswhatshecallsan“enactedstory.”Unlikeacausal
explanation—which would dissolve human behavior into a complicated
seriesofstimuliandreactionsgovernedbyuniformnaturallaws,withaninfi-
niteregressofcausestrailinganygiveneffect—everysuchstoryhasadis-
cretebeginningandend,spanningauniquesequenceofeventsthattogether
yieldasingular(ifoftendiscursivelyelusive)meaning.Whatmakesitpossi-
bleforhumanactionstocohereintostories,accordingtoher,istheirrelation
toadistinct,uniqueindividual,whoseownlifeisitselftemporallybounded
bybirthanddeath.16Andthosestoriesaremeaningfulbyvirtueofthefact
that their events occur within, and affect, an (always) already meaningful
“webofhumanrelationships.”17Thatis,actionsaremeaningfulbyvirtueof
thewaytheyfulfill,disappoint,exceed,orsurprisethemutualexpectations
thatconstitutehumanrelationships:“itisbecauseofthealreadyexistingweb
of human relationships, with its innumerable, conflicting wills and inten-
tions,thataction...‘produces’storieswithorwithoutintentionasnaturally
asfabricationproducestangiblethings”(§25:184).Thekeywordhereis‘be-
cause’:itisbecausewefindourselvesactinginanalreadyexistingwebof
relationshipsthatwecanmakesenseofour“movements”withrespecttoone
another as discrete, meaningful stories, each of which begins with a new
“insertion”intothatweb—anovelimbroglio,asitwere—andleadsuptoa
conclusivedénouement.
Arendt’s conception of action’s specific mode of comprehensibility
servesasthebasisforherprincipalthesesconcerningthe(transcendental)
conditions under which action as such is possible. The most important of
theseconditionsiswhatshecalledthe“disclosureoftheagent’sidentity.”In
the first section of chapter 5, “The Disclosure of the Agent in Speech and
104 POLITICALTHEORY/February2002
Action”(§24),shesays,“theprimordialandspecificallyhumanactmustat
thesametimecontaintheanswertothequestionaskedofeverynewcomer:
‘Whoareyou?’”(§24:178).Thatwayofputtingitisperhapsmisleadingly
grandiose;theideaitselfissimple.Everyactionmust“contain”theagent’s
identitysomewhatinthesensethatabankcheckmustbearavalidsignature
forittoberecognizedassuch.Thatis,actionmustbeassignabletoadistinct,
identifiablepersonifitistomakesensewithinastory,sinceitisaroundindi-
vidualprotagoniststhatthedisparateeventsofastorycohere.“Actionwith-
outaname,a‘who’attachedtoit,ismeaningless”:thereisnobodythereto
tell the story about (§24:180-81; cf. VA §24:222). Without a recognizable
protagonistwhoseinitiativesothersmayidentifyassuch—andrespondwith
initiativesoftheirown—therewillbenostorytheretobetold(§25:190).For
thisreason,actionispossibleonlyunderconditionsinwhichpeoplearewill-
ingtoannouncetheirprojects,layclaimtotheirdeeds,andgiveothersastake
inhowtheyturnout.ThatisanideaArendtexpressesmostclearlyinapas-
sageaddedintheGermantext:
[Das]Risiko,alseinJemandimMiteinanderinErscheinungzutreten,kannnuraufsich
nehmen,werbereitist,indiesemMiteinanderkünftigzuexistieren,unddasheißtbereit
ist,imMiteinanderunterseinesgleichensichzubewegen,Aufschlußzugebendarüber,
wer er ist, und auf die ursprüngliche Fremdheit dessen, der durch Geburt als
NeuankömmlingindieWeltgekommenist,zuverzichten.(VA§24:220;cf.HC§24:180)
[The]riskofmakinganappearanceasa‘someone’amongotherscanbetakenonlyby
whoeverisreadytoexisthenceforthamongothersinthisway,andthatmeansbeing
readytomoveamongothers,togiveoutwhooneis,andtorenouncetheoriginalforeign-
nessofanewcomerbornintotheworld.
Without the agent’s own readiness to make himself known—“announcing
whathedoes,hasdone,andintendstodo,”assheputsit—actionisimpossi-
ble; that is, our capacity to comprehend any such conduct as action is
thwarted(§24:178-79).18Buttheagent’sownreadinessto“moveamongoth-
ers”isnotallthatisneededforactiontobepossible.Thoseothersamong
whomhe“moves”mustalsobereadytorecognizeandacknowledgethose
movementsasuniquelyhis.19Onlywhenbothconditionsaremetcantherebe
whatArendtcalled“thespaceofappearances,”thefiguratively“in-between”
space“wheremenexistnotmerelylikeotherlivingorinanimatethingsbut
maketheirappearanceexplicitly”(§27:198-99).Foractiontoberecogniz-
ableassuchtheagentmustactivelymakeanappearance—orasArendtputs
it in the German passage just quoted, “in Erscheinung zu treten,” literally,
“stepintoappearance.”20Thismannerof“makinganappearance”anewwith
respecttotheexpectationsthatinhereinhumanrelationshipsiswhatconsti-
tutesaction’sspontaneousbeginnings;thecapacitytodosoisthusasinequa
Tsao/ARENDTAGAINSTATHENS 105
nonofhumanfreedom.Humanaffairs—andthereforepolitics—canbecom-
prehendedasthestuffoffreehumanactiononlyifeachpersoninvolvedis
willingandabletostepintothisfigurativespacewithinitiativesofhisown,
andonlyifhisfellowsarewillingandabletorecognizethemassuch.
III
In“TheDisclosureoftheAgentinSpeechandAction,”thefirstsectionof
chapter5,Arendtsaysinpassingthat“fullappearance”ofactionispossible
onlyin“thepublicrealm”(§24:180).Butsheoffersnoelaborationonthat
latterideainthissection,soherreadersarelefttofallbackonherearlierdis-
cussionofthetopicinchapter2,“ThePublicandthePrivateRealm.”Itisin
thatearlierdiscussion(precedingthebook’smainanalysesoflabor,work,
andaction)thatshefirstassociatesherideasaboutthenatureofthepublic
realmwiththeancientGreekpolis.ThereshedrawsontheGreeks’beliefs
aboutthepolisprimarilytoexplainherownratherunconventionaldistinction
between a public realm that is genuinely “political”—allowing for human
freedom—andonethatismerely“social.”Assheusestheterm,“society”
consistsspecificallyin“thepublicorganizationofthelifeprocessitself”and
“theform[oflivingtogether]inwhichthefactofmutualdependenceforthe
sakeoflifeandnothingelseassumespublicsignificance”(§6:46).Bythat
definition,anysuch“social”associationispredicatedonthefactthatthepeo-
ple so organized are driven by the uniform, unceasing needs of their bod-
ies—the incessant cycles of labor and consumption—and so may be pre-
sumedtohavelittlechoicebuttointeractinthewaythattheydo.Sheargues
thatthedemandsof“society”inthissensehaveincreasinglyoverrunthepub-
licrealminmoderntimes,bringingtheirinherentpresumptionofuniformity
andunfreedomtohumaninteraction.Itistoillustratewhatshebelieveswas
atstakeinthatperniciousdevelopmentthatshecontrastsitwiththeverydif-
ferentkindofpublicrealmthatshetakestheGreekpolistorepresent.
“AccordingtoGreekthought,”shesays,“thehumancapacityforpolitical
organizationisnotonlydifferentfrombutstandsindirectoppositiontothat
naturalassociationwhosecenteristhehome(oikia)andthefamily”(§4:24).
Thepolis,astheGreeksunderstoodit,wasnotanassociationofhouseholds,
butanotherkindoforganizationentirely,establishedtoallowthecitizensto
engageinactivitiesessentiallydifferentfromandunrelatedtothesatisfaction
ofbodilyneedsthattookplaceineachcitizen’sdiscrete(anddiscreet)house-
holdeconomy.Assheputsit,“Noactivitythatservedonlythepurposeof
makingaliving,ofsustainingonlythelifeprocess,waspermittedtoenterthe
politicalrealm,andthisattheriskofabandoningtradeandmanufactureto
106 POLITICALTHEORY/February2002
the industriousness of slaves and foreigners” (§5:37). She argues that the
Greeks’relegationoflaborandbodilynecessitytothehiddendomainofthe
household—notwithstandingthetremendousinefficiencythatarrangement
entailed—waswhatpreservedthepolisasaseparatespaceforthecitizens’
freedom.
ItisbecausetheGreeksrecognizedthefundamentalunfreedominvolved
inservicetothosebodilyneeds,sheclaims,thateventhemostegalitarianand
freedom-lovingamongthemdeemeditappropriateforthehouseholdrealm
toberuledbyinequalityandforce.Yetwhilethecitizensofthepolisreliedon
theserviceofdisenfranchisedwomenandslaves,thatisnottosaythatfor
Arendttheirfreedomconsistedinthatpowertocommandothers’labororin
theleisureaffordedthereby.Onthecontrary,shesays,
Tobefreemeantbothnottobesubjecttothenecessityoflifeortothecommandof
anotherandnottobeincommandoneself....Thuswithinrealmofthehouseholdfree-
domdidnotexist,forthehouseholdhead,itsruler,wasconsideredtobefreeonlyinsofar
ashehadthepowertoleavethehouseholdandenterthepoliticalrealm,whereallwere
equals.(§5:32)
Torequiretheserviceofslaveswasnolessasignofbondagetonecessity,on
thisview,thantoserveasone.Masteryoverthehouseholdwasatmostcon-
ducivetofreedom,inthatitprovidedtheopportunity(forsome)toenteradif-
ferent“realm”wheremencoulddealwithoneanotheronadifferentfooting
entirely.Whatthepolisitselfprovidedwastheoccasionforcitizenstocom-
portwithoneanotherfreelyasequals,asiftheywerenotsubjecttothebond-
ageofbodilyneedsatall.Wehavealreadyseenwhythisshouldbesignificant
for Arendt’s theory: action itself (and thus freedom) depends crucially on
people’sreadinesstorecognizeoneanother’scapacityforit.Thecitizens’
freedom,inshort,derivedfromtheircapacitytodisregardthefactthatthey
toowereenmeshedallthewhileinthehousehold’sunfreedom,asbeholden
tobodilyneedsasanyoneelse.Whatmadethepolisaspaceforfreedomwas
thuspreciselyitscitizens’mutualacknowledgmentandrecognitionasacting
beings.
Here in chapter 2, however, Arendt does not very clearly distinguish
betweenwhatshetakestobethetruetheoreticalbasisfortheGreeks’politi-
calfreedom,ononehand,andthewholesetoftheirbeliefsandpracticesthat
shecitesasevidenceforthehistoricalfactthattheysoughtthatfreedominthe
polis,ontheother.Thiscreatessomeunfortunateambiguityinheraccountof
thepublicrealminthischapter.Considerjustthisonewell-knownpassage:
[Their]publicrealmitself,thepolis,waspervadedbyafiercelyagonalspirit,where
everybodyhadconstantlytodistinguishhimselffromallothers,toshowthroughunique