ARCOE-09 report

22 Pages·2009·0.48 MB·English

olume umber
V 3, N 9
eptember
S 2009
www.thereasoner.org
ISSN1757-0522
“classical” tradition of Carnap, Hempel and Nagel
ontents
C has been definitively superseded by the more
recent trends in the “new” philosophy of sci-
§1 Editorial 1 ence and in the sociology of scientific research.
Logical analysis and “rational
§2 Features 2 reconstruction”—or “explication”,
as Theo prefers to call it—are still
§3 News 9 importanttoolsforthephilosopher
of science. This is a main mes-
§4 What’sHotin... 16
sage of his Structures in Sciences
(KluwerA.P.,2001),an“advanced
§5 Introducing... 17
textbook”inwhatTheohasdubbed
“neo-classical philosophy of sci-
§6 Events 18
ence”. His previous book, From
§7 CoursesandProgrammes 21 Instrumentalism to Constructive
Realism(KluwerA.P.,2000),isanoutstandingessayof
§8 JobsandStudentships 21 the neo-classical approach, and includes Theo’s main
results concerning confirmation, empirical progress
and truth approximation (also known as verisimilitude
or truthlikeness). In his career, Theo has worked on
§1
an impressive variety of philosophical problems, such
ditorial
E as inductive logic, explanation, reduction and the
structuralist view of scientific theories. His results on
IamdelightedtobetheguesteditorofthisissueofThe these topics are probably best illustrated by the papers
ReasonerandIwishtothankJonWilliamsonandFed- collected in the two volumes of Essays in Debate with
ericaRussofortheinvitation.Iwillopenthisissuewith TheoKuipers(Rodopi, 2005), editedbytwoofTheo’s
aninterviewwithTheoA.F.Kuipers.TheoisProfessor former PhD-students, Roberto Festa and Jeanne Peij-
of Philosophy of Science at the University of Gronin- nenburg,andaformerpost-doc,AtochaAliseda.Thirty
gen, where he taught till this academic year a number seven philosophers and scientists from all over the
of courses firmly entrenched in the analytical tradition world comment on his work, and Theo replies to each
of“formal”philosophyofscience. of them in a lively debate which is the best evidence
As he made immediately clear in our conver- of the importance of his philosophical activity. Theo’s
sation, Theo disagrees with the idea that the last edited book is General Philosophy of Science:
1
Focal Issues (Elsevier, 2007), the first volume of the more attracted by areas taught by former students and
Handbook of the Philosophy of Science edited by Dov co-workers of Beth, notably philosophical logic (Else
Gabbay, Paul Thagard and John Woods. The book Barth) and philosophy of science (Hans Mooij, Peter
collectsanumberofarticlesbyleadingscholarsonthe Wesly). Finally,Iprofitedalotfromthecoursesinan-
central topics in (neo-classical) philosophy of science alytical philosophy of Gabriel Nuchelmans in Leiden.
and it is likely to become a standard reference for the Carnap, Hempel and Nagel on the one hand and Pop-
scholarsinthisfield. perontheotherattractedmethemost,thefirstthreefor
I’m keeping this editorial short, in order to let Theo theirstyleandmethod,Popperforhisideas. Thesefour
tellyouabouthisintellectualhistoryandhisphilosoph- representwhatIliketocall“classicalphilosophyofsci-
ical views. This preamble was to say that Theo is one ence”. Bytheway,myfalsestartinatechnicalscience
of the few persons I know who can answer such ”big institution explains my lifelong interest in design sci-
questions” like: What is philosophy of science? What ence,anareathatusedtobeneglectedinphilosophyof
isitspropermethod?Whathassciencetodowithtruth? science.
As the reader will see, in our conversation we touched GC:YourtextbookStructuresinScience(2001)isa
uponeachoftheseproblems. manifestoofwhatyoucallthe“neo-classical”approach
to philosophy of science. Here, you complain that
GustavoCevolani
“the philosophy of science seems to have lost its self-
Philosophy,Bologna
confidence” and propose the neo-classical approach to
overcome this “crisis”. Which are the essential ideas
underlyingthisapproach?
TK: From the seventies on it became fashionable in
§2
international philosophical circles, and even more in
eatures
F Dutch circles, to suggest that authors like Kuhn and
Feyerabend successfully abolished the insights of the
InterviewwithTheoKuipers classics, not to speak of the upcoming relativist soci-
ologists of science. However, many cute babies were
GustavoCevolani:Firstofall,thankyouforagreeingto thrownawaywiththebathwater,suchasthefollowing.
bethismonth’sinterviewee. AsfarasIknow,youstud- It was wrongly concluded that the distinction between
ied mathematics, and you only later became interested observationallawsand(genuine)theoriesdependedon
inphilosophy. Canyoustartbytellingushowyoufirst theassumptionofatheory-freeobservationallanguage.
got into logic and philosophy of science as an area of AsarguedbyLakatos,Kuhn’sglobalanalysisofscien-
research? Aretheresome“bignames”inphilosophyof tificbehaviourcouldwellbereinterpretedasillustrating
science that, more than others, influenced your way of the rationality of science. Refinement of Nagel’s anal-
thinkinganddoingresearch? ysis of reduction was perfectly possible, as shown by
TheoKuipers: Lookingforthenearestnon-Catholic Nickles, Schaffner and Sklar. Finally, “concept expli-
academic institution to study mathematics, I went in cation”couldwellremainthemainmethod,andinfact
1964 to the Technische Hogeschool (a polytechnic) in this happened in analytical philosophy of science, al-
Eindhoven,whereIgotmykandidaats(B.Sc.) in1967. thoughitwasseldomacknowledged. Insum,asarule,
However, Idislikedtheinstrumen- the worthwhile insights of the critics of classical phi-
talistwayoflearningmathematics. losophyofsciencecouldandshouldbeusedforrefine-
Since I wanted to understand the ments, leading to neo-classical philosophy of science.
workingof,e.g.,differentiationand LetmementiontheexampleaboutwhichIclaimtoim-
integrationtricks,Ienrolledinphi- prove upon Lakatos: non-falsificationist behaviour of
losophyofmathematicsattheUni- the instrumentalist type, as documented by Kuhn and
versity of Amsterdam. I liked the Lakatos, is perfectly rational, because it is more effi-
courseontheFoundationsofMath- cientfortruthapproximationthanstraightforwardfalsi-
ematics by Haskell B. Curry, the ficationistbehaviour.
successor of Evert W. Beth, and GC:Afundamentalthemeofyourresearchhasbeen
other foundational courses by Kees Doets. Moreover, the concept of verisimilitude or truthlikeness, and its
inmyextendedminorinmathematicsIlearnedalgebra, applications. Can you explain in a few words what
topology and probability theory. This was the kind of verisimilitude is and why it is important for philoso-
mathematics that I would have liked to have had from phers of science? A curious impression one may gain
the beginning, which would have been the case had I exploring the literature is that verisimilitude is mainly
started immediately at a “normal” university. In that a “European affair”: is this impression misleading?
case,however,itisunlikelythatIwouldhaveswitched Moreover, it isn’t difficult to find discussions of scien-
to philosophy. As a matter of fact, I became even tific progress or realism that don’t even mention truth-
2
approximation: whatarethereasonsforsuchalackof cated terms. One example is the (qualitative) explica-
interest? tionoftheintuitionthatempiricalprogressisfunctional
TK:Letmefirstamplifythiselementofsurprise. An fortruthapproximation,byprovingfirstofallthe“suc-
important success of the first decades of (constructive) cess theorem”, according to which (actual, but not di-
analyticphilosophywasthediscovery,notablybyRus- rectlyassessable)truthapproximationentailsassessable
sell, Carnap, Hempel, Beth and Barth, that the recog- empiricalprogress. Themethodologicalimportanceof
nitionoftherelational characterofconceptscanbean this (simple) theorem stems from the fact that empiri-
important means in the solution of age old philosophi- cal progress can best be achieved by the instrumental-
calproblems. Thispertainsnotintheleasttoasymmet- ist methodology, according to which a falsified theory
ric relations that are constitutive for comparative con- remains in the game as long as it is more successful
ceptslike“longerthan”,“causedby”,etc. Similarlyfor thanother(falsified)theories,whereasthefalsification-
theconcept“betterthan”,andhencefor“improvement” istmethodologyissupposedtodisqualifysuchtheories
and“progress”. EvenmorethanEuropeanones,Amer- altogether.
icancontributorstotherealism-antirealismdebateseem GC: Arthur Fine has famously claimed that “real-
tobeunawareofthepossiblerelevanceofthisinsight. ism is dead”, and many philosophers seem to agree
Onecontinuestotalkinclassificatoryterms:“true”ver- with him. You have devoted much effort to defending
sus “false” theories and reference claims on the realist a fairly strong form of scientific realism, “constructive
side, and “empirically adequate” versus “inadequate” realism”. Howhealthyisrealismtoday,inyourview?
theoriesontheempiricistside.Theweakeningto“(not) TK: Arthur Fine and his fellow diehard empiricists
approximately true theories” does not help, for it re- remaintotakeonlyhardnosedrealismintoaccount.Re-
mainsnon-comparativeandcanexplicate“progress”at alistresponsesintheliteraturetotheantirealistcharges,
mostinasimplified, arbitraryway. Comparethiswith such as Laudan’s famous pessimistic meta-induction,
“(not)moreorlesslong”toexplicategrowth. Fromthe usuallyareretreatsofrealismofanon-comparativeand
relational point of view it is rather plausible to think anon-constructivenature. Inbothrespectsmykindof
in terms of “empirically more successful” and “closer realism, being constructive and comparative, is weak,
to the truth”, the latter being the crucial notion behind butitisstillaseriouskindofrealism(seemy“Compar-
“verisimilitude” (or truthlikeness). In terms of my fa- ativerealismasthebestresponsetoantirealism”,toap-
voriteexample,itmaywellbethatEinstein’stheoryis pearinLogic,MethodologyandPhilosophyofScience.
false, it may even be far from the truth, but we have Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Congress,
goodempiricalreasonstoassumethatitisclosertothe Clark Glymour, Wang Wei and Dag Westertahl (eds.),
truth than Newton’s. In general, a false theory may or Beijng, 2007). That is, although I neither believe in
may not be close to the truth, but in both cases it may some kind of essentialism, leading to an ideal vocabu-
be closer to the truth than another one. The latter is laryfittingthenaturalworld,norintheideathatmostof
moreeasytoassess,howeverprovisional,thanthefor- ourmostsuccessfultheoriesaretrue,Ibelieveintwore-
mer,notablybycomparisonofempiricalproblemsand alistconvictions. First,sciencecanconstruct,byprofit-
successes. ingfromempiricalfindings,moreandmoresuitablevo-
GC:Astrikingaspectofyourworkisyour“formal” cabulariesfordomainsofthenaturalworld,allofwhich
approachtophilosophicalproblems,whichisverydif- haveanunknownstrongesttruetheory,thatis,thetruth
ferentfromtheinformaland“narrative”approachesso about a given domain in a given vocabulary, and, sec-
popular in contemporary philosophy of science. What ond,bysearchingempiricallymoresuccessfultheories
are the advantages of a formal approach to philosophy we approach that truth, as a rule. Without such a re-
of science and, more particularly, what is the role of fined kind of realism there remain two mysteries. For
“theorems” in such discipline? As an example, a cen- the short term dynamics of theories it would be a mir-
tral result of your From Instrumentalism to Construc- acle why certain theories remain more successful than
tiveRealism(2000)isthesocalled“Successtheorem”. otherones;thisisavariantofPutnam’sno-miraclesar-
Canyouexplaininafewwordstheintuitivecontentand gument. Moreover,therewouldbenobasisforthelong
methodologicalimportanceofthisresult? term, clearly successful, dynamics of science, accord-
TK:Asarule,oneengagesintheexplicationofone ingtowhich,forthetimebeing,notjustthemostsuc-
or more concepts in order to explicate intuitions or to cessfultheories,butonlyextremelysuccessfulonesget
dissolveparadoxesinwhichtheseconceptsarecrucial. acceptedas(approximately)true. Theimportantconse-
In case of intuition explication, the subsequent task is quenceofthis’theoreticalinduction’isthattheirtheo-
to prove a theorem to the effect that the intuition, if reticaltermscanbeaddedtotheobservationalvocabu-
reformulated in explicated terms, becomes either jus- lary,inthesensethattheybecomeapplicable,thatis,it
tified, demystified or undermined, whatever the case becomesdeterminablewhethertheyapplyornot. How-
may be. In case of dissolving a paradox, it has to be ever,forpracticingscientiststhereisnocompellingrea-
shown that it can no longer be construed in the expli- son to become a constructive comparative realist. As
3
longastheyaimatimprovingtheirtheoriestheyserve asintellectualprisons.
thepurposeoftruthapproximation.Butphilosophersof GC: Let me conclude this interview with a com-
sciencethatremainunconditionalempiricistspersistin pletelydifferentandmoregeneralquestion. Thefateof
a kind of (indeed, strictly speaking, unrefutable) skep- philosophy and that of liberty are strictly intertwined.
ticismthatneglectsthetaskoftryingtounderstandthe The Netherlands has been the home of freedom of
verypossibilityofsuccessfulscientificpractice,leaving speechsincethetimeofSpinoza. Nowadays,however,
thatadoublemystery. Bytheway,regardingmorever- thisglorioustraditionseemstobeunderattack. Thevi-
sus less successful theories we can only apply the rule olentdeathsofPimFortuynandTheovanGoghandthe
ofinferencetothebestone,thatis,themostsuccessful frighteningthreatstoAyaanHirsiAliandGeertWilders
one,astheclosesttothetruth,aplausiblecorrectionof immediately spring to my mind. The so called “Van
so-called inference to the best explanation (as the true der Horst affaire”—a recent case of self-censorship at
theory). UtrechtUniversity,whereProf. vanderHorstdelivered
GC:Thefruitfulinteractionofphilosophyofscience an expurgated version of his retirement lecture, skip-
with logic and Artificial Intelligence has recently pro- ping any reference to Islamic antisemitism—suggests
duced a number of new methodological research pro- that even academic freedom is at risk. Can you share
grams: whichare,inyouropinion,themostinteresting with us your feelings about the present situation of in-
andpromisingones?Arethereanyparticulartopicsthat tellectualandpoliticalfreedominyourcountry?
youwouldrecommendtophilosophygraduatestudents TK: That you, abroad, have heard of this unhappy
startingouttoday? Utrecht affair surprises me. A short answer to your
TK: My favorite example would be “computational questionisalmostimpossible.Anyviolenceofafunda-
philosophy”ingeneraland“computationalphilosophy mentalistnature,beitofecological(incaseofFortuyn),
of science”, as initiated and developed by Herbert Si- Islamic (in case of Van Gogh), Jewish (in case of Ra-
mon, Pat Langley, Paul Thagard, and several others, bin),orChristian(incaseoftheabortiondoctorGeorge
in particular. In the latter, one tries to solve classical Tiller)nature,shouldofcourseseverelybecondemned.
problemsinthephilosophyofsciencewithmeansthat Moreover,itshouldbepossibletoutteranycriticismof
have been particularly developed in cognitive psychol- whatever nature and subject. Assuming some mature
ogyandartificialintelligenceresearch. Thekindofre- prudence, based on understanding of educational limi-
sults aimed at are computer programs that enable cer- tationsofmanyamongus,theintellectualandpolitical
tain cognitive tasks, or at least to simulate them, such freedom in our country is still very impressive. As a
as, discovering laws from data, designing hypotheses, philosophicaladdendum,Iwouldliketoconcludewith
evaluation and revision, concept formation, proposing the claim that debates about “respect” in this context
experiments,etc.Tobesure,thepossibilityforthecom- frequentlyareatcross-purposes. Westillhavetolearn
putational philosophy of science to be of considerable theconceptualdistinctionbetweentwokindsofrespect,
practical relevance is still far away. However, in prin- viz.meretoleranceandseriousappreciation.
cipletheperspectiveofmoreorlessstandardcomputer
assisteddiscovery,evaluationandrevisionneednotre-
CanNatureMakeanArgument?
mainsciencefiction.
GC: Before, I asked you about your “intellectual The American philosopher C.S. Peirce (1839-1914)
models”. Now, I would also like to ask you about the claimedthatarguments,andmoregenerally,“processes
“bad examples” in philosophy of science. I was sur- of reasoning,” should not be looked at as a strictly hu-
prised, but also amused, to find an article where you man affair. Processes of reasoning, Peirce argued, are
criticised “the Pavarottis of analytical philosophy”. I indicativeof“mind”andhebelievedthatmindisfound
couldn’treadit,sinceitwasinDutch,butperhapsyou throughoutthewholeofnature—notjustwithinthehu-
maytellussomethingaboutitscontents? man intellect. An argument, defined as “a process of
TK: Without denying that philosophers such as inferenceleadingtoaconclusion,”thuscomestocover
Wittgenstein,Quine,Putnam,DavidsonandRortyhave a wide array of cosmic expressions on Peirce’s view
alsowrittenclear,originalanddefensiblepapers,about (Peirce, 1931: Collected Papers of Charles Sanders
which analytical philosophy can be proud of, they fre- Peirce, Harvard University Press, 6.456.) Peirce’s the-
quently write so vaguely, unclearly and incomprehen- sis was that the universe displays various processes of
siblythattheycaneasilycompetewiththosecontinen- reasoningandthattheseprocessesareevidencedinthe
talphilosophersthataredenouncedfortheirobscurity. world’sphenomena,mostapparentlythroughtheevolu-
As with the latter, the messages of the former usually tionarydevelopmentthatledtohumanbeingswhoex-
make some sense, but when understood it is clear that plicitlystateargumentsassuch.
theycouldhavebeenpresented“claireetdistinct”ina Peircethoughtthattheuniversetendstobehave“rea-
constructive analytical way. Now the writings of both sonably,”yethealsothoughtthatcosmicrationalityal-
groups too often function temporarily or permanently lows for statistical variation from established law. Na-
4
ture’s laws are taken to be the conclusions of argu- Colligation is a very important part of rea-
ments made by developing cosmic rationality. These soning, calling for genius perhaps more than
arguments are not deductive, however; they are induc- anyotherpartoftheprocess. Manylogicians
tive, and the drawn conclusions always retain a degree refuse the name of reasoning to an inferen-
of probability in their accuracy. The conclusions of tial act of which colligation forms no part.
these arguments are explicable in terms of reasoning Suchaninferentialacttheycallimmediatein-
expressions “developing in a pattern of concrete rea- ference. This term may be accepted; but al-
sonableness” (Peirce, 1931: 3.4.) Peirce thought that thoughcolligationcertainlygivesahigherin-
the laws of the universe congeal into statistical habit tellectualitytoinference,yetitsimportanceis
and these habits represent conclusions that are suscep- exaggerated when it is represented to be of
tible to modification over time. Any phenomenon in more account than the conscious control of
theuniversecanrepresentasetofpremisesleadingtoa the operation. The latter ought to determine
conclusion. For example, a poem or a symphony may thetitleofreasoning(Peirce,1931: 2.442)
appear to be a finely crafted argument. Peirce wrote,
“The Universe as an argument is necessarily a great Colligationsetsreasonersapartfrommerecomputa-
work of art, a great poem—for every fine argument is tional machines—what Peirce in 1887 called “logical
a poem and a symphony—just as every true poem is a machines”—because while machines may draw infer-
soundargument.”(Peirce, 1931: 5.119.) AsIinterpret ences(drawingconclusionsfromgivenpremises),com-
Peirce’stheory,humanbeingswouldbeoneconclusion puterslackthespontaneityfoundintheactofforming
ofcosmicrationalityforwerepresentthedevelopment arguments based on colligated inferences. It might be
of statistical variations within the process of evolution said that colligation is what demonstrates the freedom
that have stabilized into the phenomenon of a species, andspontaneityoftheuniverse’smind-likecharacterto
a living habit of the universe. The “conclusion” of the makeitsarguments,securingcosmicrationalityagainst
human being isn’t a finished product, however. Some- any sort of strict logical or metaphysical determinism,
thinglike“humanity”isconstantlyundergoingrevision or sheer chance associated with a series of “mindless”
andmayalsoserveasapremisetofurtherothercosmic happenstanceevolutionaryeventsthatsimplyappearas
arguments. A general point or conclusion “humanity” argumentsbutarenot. AsPeirceputit,
had been made with reasons leading up to that point.
Everyreasoningmachine...hastwoinherent
Inturn,theconclusionitselfservesasanotherpremise,
impotencies. In the first place, it is destitute
andsoon.
of all originality, of all initiative. It cannot
ThereisadegreeofambiguityregardinghowPeirce find its own problems; it cannot feed itself.
thoughtthattheuniverseappearstobringtogetherdif- Itcannotdirectitselfbetweendifferentpossi-
ferentpremises—differentevolutionaryphenomenain- bleprocedures...Inthesecondplace,theca-
cludingspecies,laws,andotheritemsoftheuniverse— pacity of a machine has absolute limitations;
andthenassertconclusions(lawsorstatisticalregulari- it has been contrived to do a certain thing,
ties)basedonthearrangementofthosephenomena. If, and it can do nothing else (Peirce, Writings
forexample,conclusionsslowlychangeoverthecourse of Charles S. Peirce: Bloomington: Indiana
of time, then the possibility that today’s conclusions UniversityPress,6.70)
maybedrawndifferentlytomorrowindicatesacontin-
gent linkage between premises and conclusion. This Nature—andlivingbeingswithinit—arereasonersif
challengeswhetherany“argument”hasbeenmadeatall theyareabletocolligatepremisesandventureconclu-
because the phenomenon of conclusions simply could sions. The universe seems to be the greatest reasoner,
be the result of randomly pieced together phenomena asithasmadethemostprofoundarguments.
that have consistently appeared as arguments, but are Ifhumanbeingsareacosmicconclusionthennature
not, or the conclusions could be the result of a blind hasmadeanargumentthatisableto“argue”backabout
guess,notdeliberatereasoning.IbelievethataHumean itscreator,asitwere. Andsotheuniverseisnotama-
might critique Peirce’s theory in this way. Similar ob- chine with pre-set rules determining what the conclu-
jectionsareraisedagainstteleologicalargumentsfordi- sions must be. Rationality in nature only seems to say
vinementalityanddesign. whattheconclusionsmaybe.Ifhistheoryofcolligation
iscorrect,IbelievePeirce’sclaimthatnaturecanmake
Peirce answered this objection through his theory
an argument should be able to withstand the same sort
of “colligation.” Colligation consists in the activity of
ofcriticismsleveledagainstteleologicalarguments.
bringing together certain premises that one believes to
beevident,yetthathavenotbeenpreviouslyconsidered LeonNiemoczynski
together. Thisactivityinvolvesadegreeofchanceand ImmaculataUniversity
spontaneity,butisdirectedinintent. Peircewrotethat,
5
WaveringaboutLogic Thefirsttroublewiththissuggestionisnotwhichde-
viantlogiconeshouldgoontospecify(whetherPriest’s
This paper was stimulated by Fabien Schang’s recent
LP, or either of the four-valued logics of Belnap and
discussion of a new paraconstent logic in this journal.
Dunn,orSchang,orsomeother;therearesomany‘on
But it centres on much broader questions to do with
themarket’.)Itiswhetheryoushould(orevencould,to
paraconsistent logics generally. It points to the rele- generalagreement)specifyanylogicatall.Forifoneis
vance of ambiguous pictures and their proper formal
dealing with someone who cannot make up their mind
descriptionsintheunderstandingofsupposedlycontra-
about, or is confused or inarticulate about, whether a
dictorysituations,showingtherebythatthereisnologic
box is empty or not, why should one think that they
atallinthemindsoftheinconsistent. Therearerepre-
would firmly accept, or could work in a clear-headed
sentations of contradictions, in a certain limited sense, way with, any offered logic? They could just as eas-
butonemustnotbedrawnintotakingthoserepresenta-
ilyvacillatewithrespecttotheprinciplesorpractiseof
tionsasrepresentingarealityinanysense.
that,aswell! Butiftheyareuncertainaboutwhatlogic
Fabien Schang, in the context of an assessment of toapply,orhavedifficultieswithitsconsistent(sic)ap-
somemattersinmypaper(1995: ‘ParaconsistentLog- plication,thentheirfailuretodrawtheclassicalconclu-
ics?’ Journal of Philosophical Logic 24, 451–4), has sion from their state of irresolution and confusion has
now proposed a four-valued logical system to handle quiteadifferentanalysis. ItisnotjustExplosionthatis
some difficulties by means of a paraconsistent logic indoubt, forthem, butmaybeallotherlogicalrulesas
(2009: ‘Inconsistent Logics! Incoherent Logics?’ The well!
Reasoner 3.7, 8–9). I am not sure that this system is Thereisamoreconclusivelogicalpointtomakethan
neededonthebasisofmyarticle,sincewhatIrelevantly this,asweshallsee,butbeforethatitisworthwhilere-
saidtherewasnotasSchangrepresentsme,butinstead memberinghowfactualtheabovestateofaffairsoften
merely that Graham Priest’s paraconsistent ‘negation’ is. Forlookingatthemattersociologically,intermsof
wasnotcontradiction(asPriesthasinsistentlyclaimed), the kind of stories that some people enjoy, there is a
butsubcontrariety.AndSchangevenagreesthatcontra- well-known genre of literature that, often enough, fol-
dictoriesandsubcontrariesdohavethepropertiesthatI lows the above pattern in a broader sense: the scripts
tookthemtohave. ofB-grademovies. Insuchstoriescontinuityandcon-
I also, in my paper, provided a critique of a four- sistency are not the virtues honoured elsewhere, since
valued system that has the same overall structure comprehension of the details of the plot is not a vital
as Schang’s: Belnap and Dunn’s well-known system requirement on the part of appreciative audiences for
which has ‘told true/told false’ in place of Schang’s this kind of entertainment, even in the places where it
‘heldtrue/heldfalse’. SoIwillnotrepeatmy1995ar- might be possible. What matters to the kind of audi-
gument against such four-valued logics here. Instead I encethatenjoyssuchmoviesisthefastpacedactionor
shalltaketheopportunitytopresentamuchlargerargu- grippingdramaofsceneafterdiscretescene,nomatter
ment against Schang. Indeed it is an argument against how disjointed or how connected they are. The atten-
any recommendation for a paraconsistent logic. The tion span of the audience members evidently can last
pointcametomeafterreadingPriest’saccountof‘Syl- through an episode, but their memory does not seem
van’s Box’ (1997: ’Sylvan’s Box: A Short Story and tostretchmuchfurther. Sonaturallytheirmindsdonot
TenMorals’NotreDameJournalofFormalLogic38.4, ‘explode’:theyjustdonot(maybeevencannot)puttwo
573–582.) andtwotogether!
Priest’s story is supposedly about himself, wavering However, one must separate out the supposed activ-
aboutwhatisinabox. Atfirsthedoesnotseeanything ities of characters in stories and films from the actual
inthebox,andsoconsidersittobeempty. Butthenhe activities of the readers and viewers of such entertain-
notices a small statue in the box and is more inclined ments. For the more rigorous point to make, with re-
to say it is not empty. Disregarding the opportunity to gardtothestoryin‘Sylvan’sBox’andthelike,isthat,
makequalifiedremarkslike‘it’salmost/largelyempty’, indeed,itisjustastory. Soanobjectiveaccountofthe
heisstilldrawntosaying‘itisempty’, whichistaken matterrequiresthatthedetailsofthestoryarepreceded
toimplythatheispreparedtodescribethesituationby by a context-setting operator such as ‘according to the
meansofacontradiction.Butthefactthatreadersofthe story’. But it is well known that there is no need for a
storydonotdrawtheclassicalconclusionfromthisin- paraconsistentlogictoaccountforinconsistentstories,
consistencyiswhatPriestthinksisthemostsignificant anymorethaninconsistentbeliefs. Onecaneasilyhave
thing. ForbytheclassicalruleofExplosioneverything Bap.Ba¬p (where ‘¬’ is Boolean negation), while the
can be derived from a contradiction. Priest therefore logicofthesituationremainsquiteclassical.Whatisre-
draws the moral that some paraconsistent logic is re- quiredisnotsomenewparaconsistentlogic,butmerely
quired to describe the situation, i.e., a logic in which anintensionallogic,forinstanceinthebeliefcasethat
Explosiondoesnothold. providedbytheprobabilisticanalysisofdegreesofbe-
6
lief common in Decision Theory. I have myself pro- theimpossible. It’simpossible!
posed such a logic applicable to aesthetic enjoyments
HartleySlater
quitegenerallyin(1993: ‘TheIncoherenceoftheAes-
Philosophy,UniversityofWesternAustralia
theticResponse’BritishJournalofAesthetics33,168–
72.) Whatisthenactuallythecaseisquiteorderly,and
separatedfromtheconfusionthatmightseemtobethe
casetoabelieverwhosemindisinacompletewhirl. TheConsilienceofComplexEvidence
Specifically (see my 1993: ‘Probabilistic Founda- The Consilience of Inductions takes place
tions for Operator Logic’ British Journal for the Phi- whenanInduction,obtainedfromoneclassof
losophy of Science 44, 517–30) one can have Bap and facts, coincides with an Induction, obtained
atthesametimeBa¬p,ifBapholdsjustsolongasa’s from a different class. This Consilience is a
subjectiveprobabilityofpisgreaterorequaltoahalf. testofthetruthoftheTheoryinwhichitoc-
Notice that one then still cannot have Ba(p.¬p), which curs. (William Whewell, Philosophy of the
showsformallynotonlyjusthowitisthattheconfused Inductive Sciences (1847) in Selected Writ-
agent ‘cannot put 2 and 2 together’, but also how it is ings of William Whewell, ed. Yehuda Elkana
that the various things represented do not form them- (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984),
selves into some alternative world or reality. For the 121-384,p.257.)
conjunctive rule Adjunction crucially fails with proba-
At the age of 37, Robert Joiner was diagnosed with
bility: onecanhaveitprobablethatpandprobablethat
small-cell lung cancer. Believing the cause was his
qwhileitisnotatallprobablethatp.q.
exposuretoPCBs(polychlorinatedbiphenyls)contam-
By formalising the situation using an intensional
inating the insulating oil in the electrical transform-
logic one therefore introduces a needed separation be-
ers his job required him to disassemble and repair, he
tween what is actually the case in the world and what
sued the manufacturer, General Electric. His attor-
isbelievedorrepresentedtobethecaseinsomemind, neys proffered experts to testify to various toxicologi-
or some picture. That needed separation is just what
cal,invivo,invitro,andepidemiologicalstudies,argu-
is missing not only in Priest’s quasi-autobiographical
ing that, while none of these was enough by itself to
case,butalsoinotherofferingsbyenthusiastsforpara- establish his claim, taken together they were sufficient
consistent logics. For instance, Chris Mortensen, in
to meet the standard for proof of causation. Exclud-
the same volume as Priest’s story about Sylvan’s Box
ing Joiner’s experts, the District Court granted sum-
(1997: ‘Peeking at the Impossible’ Notre Dame Jour-
mary judgment to G.E.; endorsing the legitimacy of
nalofFormalLogic38.4,527–534),wantedtosaythat,
Joiner’sexperts’“weightofevidencemethodology,”the
since Escher’s ‘Penrose Triangle’ represents both that
Court of Appeals reversed; but the Supreme Court re-
the nearest point is higher than the furthest point, and
versedagain,withonlyJusticeStevensseeinganymerit
that the nearest point is lower than the furthest point,
inJoiner’sepistemologicalargument(GeneralElectric
thereforesomeparaconsistentlogicmustbeworkingin
Co.v.Joiner,522U.S.136(1997)).
the minds of viewers. Why, Mortensen asked, is this
WhateverthecaliberofMr.Joiner’sevidencespecifi-
figureseenasa2Drepresentationofanimpossible3D
cally,itisclearthatsomecombinationsofpiecesofevi-
structure rather than a representation of a disjointed,
dencereallycanwarrantaconclusioneventhoughnone
possible one? The answer is that, if a viewer does the ofthepiecesbyitselfwouldbesufficienttodoso.Think
formerthen,intheterminologyofaesthetictheory,heis
ofthecomplexcongeriesofevidencewithrespecttothe
‘under-distancing’—see,forexample,my(1987: ‘Fic-
theory of evolution; the intersecting lines of evidence
tions’, British Journal of Aesthetics 27, 145–55.) For
suggesting that there was once bacterial life on Mars;
ifthe viewerkeeps hisproper ‘aestheticdistance’then
or the array of archeological, documentary, etc., evi-
he will realise that there is merely the appearance of a
denceoftheRomanconquestofBritain. Whewellgave
contradiction,andinnosensetherealityofone.
us a good word for this phenomenon—“consilience,”
The drawing does not represent that both p and ¬p “jumping together”—but no real explanation of which
hold, for a certain ‘p’; instead it both represents that p congeriesofevidencewarrantaconclusiontoahigher
holdsandrepresentsthat¬pholds. Ithastwoaspects, degree than any of their components, or why. The
inotherwords,andnomorethanWittgenstein’s‘duck- account I developed in Evidence and Inquiry (1993;
rabbit’representssomethingatoncebothaduckanda 2nd expanded ed. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books,
rabbit, Penrose’s Triangle does not represent anything 2009, chapter 4) and Defending Science—Within Rea-
as simultaneously both higher and lower than some son (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003, chapter
otherthing. Notonlydoessuchasituationnotactually 3)canhelp.
arise,itcannotevenbeimagined,ordrawn. Sothereis Evidence ramifies, like the entries in a crossword
nomore‘peekingattheimpossible’thanthereisseeing puzzle. How reasonable a crossword entry is depends
7
on: (1) how well it fits with the clue and already- ofelevatedriskofDamongthoseexposedtoS—
competed entries; (2) how reasonable those other en- thiswillenhancesupportiveness. Theinterlocking
tries are, independent of the one in question; and (3) willbetighter,andtheenhancementofsupportive-
howmuchofthecrosswordhasbeencompleted. Simi- nessgreater,themorenarrowlytherelevantterms
larly,howwellevidencewarrantsaclaimdependson: arespecified(e.g.,ifDis“small-celllungcancer”
rather than “lung cancer” or just “cancer”). This
E1. howstrongtheconnectionisbetweentheevidence toowillenhancewarrant.
andtheconclusion: supportiveness;
What I have offered is a theoretical analysis, not an
E2. howsolidtheevidenceitselfis,independentofthe
algorithmforassessingtheweightofcomplexevidence.
conclusion: independentsecurity;
Moreover, though we sometimes speak of supportive
evidenceasmakingaconclusion“likely,”orofawell-
E3. how much of the relevant evidence the evidence
warranted conclusion as “likely to be true,” these are
includes: comprehensiveness.
epistemiclikelihoods,nottobeconfusedwiththeprob-
abilities in the sense of the classical probability cal-
The more supportive the evidence with respect to a
culus (see Haack, Defending Science, p.75). But this
conclusion,thebetterwarrantedthatconclusionis.But,
analysisisenoughtosuggestplausibleanswerstosuch
while the more independently secure the evidence fa-
frequently-contestedquestionsaswhetherepidemiolog-
vorabletoaconclusionis,themorewarrantedthatcon-
ical evidence is essential to proof of causation (no);
clusion, the more independently secure the evidence
whetherashowingofadoublingofriskisrequired(no,
against aconclusionis,thelesswarrantedthatconclu-
it is neither necessary nor sufficient); and whether an-
sion. Similarly, the more evidence there is favorable
imalstudiesshouldbeexcludedwhenepidemiological
toaconclusion, themorewarranteditis; butifadding
evidenceisavailable(no).
moreevidencemakesthecombinedevidencelesspos-
Abstractedfrom“ProvingCausation: TheHolismofWar-
itive, theincreaseincomprehensivenesswilllowerthe
rant and the Atomism of Daubert,” Journal of Health and
degreeofwarrant.
BiomedicalLaw,IV.2,2008:253-89.
So: acombinationofpiecesofevidencewillwarrant
aconclusiontoahigherdegreethananyofitscompo- SusanHaack
nents when, but only when, combining the various el- Philosophy/Law,UniversityofMiami
ements enhances supportiveness; and/or enhances the
independentsecurityoffavorable(orlowersthatofun-
favorable) evidence; and/or enhances comprehensive-
TheRelativityoftheIdentityoftheSelf
nessbyintroducingfurther,nolessfavorable,elements.
Applying my analysis to the types of evidence typ-
Supposethatintheyear5009ascientistbuildsanexact
ically proffered in a toxic tort case, we see how com-
physical clone of someone from the past. This clone
binedevidenceEwillsometimessupportacausalcon-
lives exactly the same life—from birth to death—of
clusionCtoahigherdegreethananyofitscomponents
the original person; the clone lives in a simulated en-
alone:
vironment that replicates in every detail all aspects of
theoriginal’sexperiencesthroughoutherlifespan. This
◦ Ewillbemorecomprehensivethananyofitscom-
clone(letusassume)sharesalloftheoriginal’sphysical
ponents alone; and, if the additional elements are
and mental characteristics from birth to death. Do the
positive,thiswillenhancewarrant.
originalandtheclonesharethesameSelf? Theanswer,
◦ Whileaddingevidencefromanimalstudiesortox- we claim, is relative to a point of view (first-person or
third-person); there is not an ‘absolute’ answer to this
icology,etc.,won’tmakeaflawedepidemiological
question.
studylessflawed(noraddingepidemiologicalev-
Takethefollowingassumptions: wedefinePersonas
idence make a flawed animal study less flawed),
aphysicalobjectextensionallydetermined,occupyinga
additionalevidencemaymaketheconclusionofa
particularspace-timeregion. EachparticularSelf isde-
flawedstudymoresecurethanitwouldotherwise
finedasasetofintentional/mentalattitudes(temporally
be. Thiswillalsoenhancewarrant.
determined) held consciously by a person throughout
◦ If the elements of E interlock to form an ex- herlifespan.
planatoryaccount—as, e.g., evidenceofabiolog- Let P1 stand for the original person who is
icalmechanismbywhichexposuretosubstanceS cloned. Her Self consists in the finite set S1, S1 =
might bring about disorder D, or evidence that S A1t,A2t,...,Ant,wheretheelementsareintentionalat-
contains b, which is known to be associated with titudesheldbyP1atcertainspecifictimes. Oneimpor-
D,wouldinterlockwithepidemiologicalevidence tant aspect in the present scenario is related to the fact
8
thatP1(forsomereason)knowsaboutthecloningsce- ferentspace-timebodiesinR. Now,shouldP3consider
nario. Letk∗standforthisparticularknowledge. Inthis thatthereisonlyoneself,i.e.,(S1 = S2) = S∗? Given
case, k∗ ∈ S1. In addition, P1 believes that she is the the extensionality principle of set identity it seems she
originalandnottheclonelivinginthesimulation(bel∗, should. But, since ‘P1 (cid:44) P2’ is true for P3, the utter-
where,likewisebel∗ ∈S1). ance‘IamP1’expressingbel∗hasatruth-valueforher.
Consider now ‘P1’s Life’, which refers to the Inparticularbel∗ istrueconcerning P1andfalseinre-
set of the totality of P1’s physical actions, relations specttoP2. Oncebel∗ ∈S∗,itturnsoutthatS∗ isaset
and interactions—including sensorial interactions— withabeliefheldtobetrueandfalseatthesametime
withthephysicalenvironmentthroughoutherlifespan. bythesameSelf! P3hastorationallyassumethatthere
Given a global four-dimensional coordinate reference aretwosets,S1andS2,wherebel∗istrueregardingS1
R,whereR=< x,y,z,t>,P1’sLifeconsistsinaspace- but false concerning S2. So, S1 and S2 cannot corre-
timeregionframedwithinlocalcoordinatereferenceR(cid:48), spond to the same Self but to different Selves. P1 has
where R(cid:48) =< [x(cid:48),x(cid:48)(cid:48)],[y(cid:48),y(cid:48)(cid:48)],[z(cid:48),z(cid:48)(cid:48)],[t(cid:48),t(cid:48)(cid:48)] >. Per- oneSelfandP2another.
sonP1correspondstoafour-dimensionalbodyframed Although this result has the flavour of a somewhat
withinR(cid:48). paradoxicalresult, allthatitrevealsisthattheidentity
Considernow P2tobetheclonelivinginthesimu- of a self is always relative to an epistemological per-
lation. P2’sLifereplicatesP1’sLifeinallpossiblede- spective: an egocentric-first person or an allocentric-
tailsincludingitsframingwithinR(cid:48) (insidethesimula- third person one. It depends on how the Self is
tionthespatio-temporalreferencesareexactlythesame identified from each perspective: for the first person
asthoseof P1’sLife). Accordingly, froma‘insidethe (her)‘Self’isidentifiedasthesetofherownconscious
simulation’perspective,PersonP2consistsinthesame mental contents, whereas the third person identifies a
space-timeregion(orbody)asPersonP1. Self (other than its own) by relating that set with its
IfS2isthecompletesetofintentionalattitudesheld bearer.
by P2 at certain specific times, then k∗ ∈ S2 and
Joa˜oFonseca&KlausGa¨rtner
bel∗ ∈S2,sinceP1andP2areexactlythesameintheir
PhilosophyofLanguage,NewUniversityofLisbon
conscious mental contents over the same time frame.
So,S1andS2haveexactlythesameextension,which
means that, by the extensionality principle, S1 = S2,
i.e.,thereisonlyoneset(callitS∗).If,bydefinition,the
§3
SelfofP1andP2correspondtothesetsS1andS2re-
ews
spectively,itfollowsthatP1andP2havethesameSelf. N
Thisfollowsevenassumingthatk∗ ∈S∗,i.e.,evengiven
that‘P1 (cid:44) P2’forP1/P2(sincek∗ ∈ S1andk∗ ∈ S2). ControlledNaturalLanguage,8–10June
Given that ‘P1 = P2’ in terms of P1/P2’s epistemic
access it is impossible for P1/P2 to know if (myself) The Workshop on Controlled Natural Language took
S∗ correspondstoP1orP2(P1andP2occupyexactly place on 8-10 June 2009 on the Sicilian island Maret-
the same space-time region within R(cid:48) coordinate refer- timo. Extendedabstractsofthecontributionswerepub-
ence and so, they are extensionally identical—are the lishedasCEURWorkshopProceedings.
same four-dimensional body). Therefore, the sentence Insteadofdescribingeachofthe24paperspresented
‘Iam P1’utteredby P1or P2atanytime(meaning‘I my report focusses on some significant language as-
amnottheclone’expressingthecontentofbel∗)lacks pectsandafewimportantapplicationsandtools.Please
a truth-value for P1/P2. That is, bel∗ is not capable notethatmyselectionishighlysubjective.
of epistemic vindication for P1/P2. This captures the LanguageAspects
phenomenologicalintuitionthat,evenifyouknowthat One hotly debated topic was decidability. Ian Pratt-
thereisanabsolutereplicaofyou,youcanneverknow Hartmannhasbeenworkingonthecomputationalcom-
ifyou(auniqueSelf)aretheoriginalorthereplica. It plexity of natural languages and presented several de-
alsoillustrateswhyitmakessensetoaskwhichperson cidable and undecidable fragments of English. Johan
you are, the original or the replica, but not which self BosproposedacontrolledfragmentofDiscourseRep-
you are. It is meaningless to ask if yourself is really resentationTheorywithasemanticsbasedonthetwo-
yourself in normal, rational and non-pathological con- variablefragmentoffirst-orderlogicwithequality. In-
ditions. terestingly Johan began his talk with the warning that
Considernowthescientistresponsibleforthecloning evenadecidableproblemmaytakeagestobesolved.
ofP1intheyear5009andletthescientistbeP3(i.e.,P3 Paula Engelbrecht et al. reported on end-user eval-
‘creates’P2). LetP3’s‘pointofview’coordinaterefer- uations testing the understandability of individual lan-
ence be R (the global < x,y,z,t > coordinate system). guage constructs of Rabbit, a controlled language that
For P3 ‘P1 (cid:44) P2’ since P1 and P2 correspond to dif- can be translated into OWL. Tobias Kuhn presented
9
a general framework—based on graphical notations— Monastery situated in the charming north region of
to evaluate controlled natural languages and compare the Czech Republic. The symposium presented talks
them to other formal languages. First results are very by almost thirty researchers from North America, Eu-
positive. Peter Clark et al. discussed the difficult topic rope and Australia, including the invited speakers JC
of naturalness versus predictability. Kaarel Kaljurand Beall(UniversityofConnecticut,“Truth,Necessityand
discussedstrategiesforparaphrasingcontrollednatural Abnormal Worlds”), Nuel Belnap (University of Pitts-
language and introduced two paraphrasing approaches burgh, “TruthValues, Neither-True-Nor-False, andSu-
forAttemptoControlledEnglish. pervaluations”)andStephenRead(UniversityofStAn-
The Grammatical Framework GF of Aarne Ranta et drews, “Field’s Paradox and its Medieval Solution”).
al. provides a high-level grammar formalism and a li- Keeping the traditional spirit of the symposium most
brary to implement controlled languages. GF allows ofthepresentedpapersprincipallycontributedtophilo-
userstoconcurrentlycoversimilarfragmentsinseveral sophical and mathematical logic, history and philoso-
naturallanguages,andprovidestoolsforauthoringand phyoflogic,andphilosophyoflanguage.
translation. JC Beall discussed the obstacles arising from the
Rolf Schwitter addressed the problem of anaphora addition of a necessity operator to his deflation-
resolution and suggested a new approach based on in- ary/dialethethic theory of truth presented in Sprandels
teractiveknowledgeacquisition. ofTruth(Oxford,2009). NuelBelnapsurveyedtherole
There was a discussion of the “Controlled Natural ofauxiliaryparameterswithrespecttotheformalrecon-
Language Manifesto” that several authors are collec- struction of truth in terms of supervaluations. Stephen
tivelywritingasaGoogledocument. Readtracedideasleadingtoasolutionofseveralrelated
ApplicationsandTools paradoxes (Curry’s, Field’s, Pseudo-Scotus’) based on
Rick Shiffman et al. reported on a novel application revisingtheT-scheme,whichcanbefoundinworksof
ofcontrollednaturallanguagesinthefieldofmedicine. medievalphilosopherThomasBradwardine.
Clinicalpracticeguidelinesadvisepractitionersonhow Among others, we have to mention the excellent
totreatpatientsoptimally.Asetofguidelineswasman- performance of Greg Restall (“Always More”), who
ually translated into Attempto Controlled English and showed some impressive tricks with his new unary
broughtinaformthatallowstheiruseindecisionsup- propositional operator, defined as a counterexample
portsystems. to the standard possible worlds account of proposi-
Marco Cramer et al. presented the Naproche project tions. Heinrich Wansing and Yaroslav Shramko (“The
that uses controlled natural language to express and to Slingshot Argument and Sentential Identity”) inquired
check mathematical proofs with the help of proof rep- into the possibility of proving the Fregean Axiom in
resentationstructures. non-Fregean logic and opened an interesting perspec-
Ronald Denaux et al. presented ROO, an authoring tive on the famous Slingshot argument. Sebastian
toolfortheontologylanguageRabbit.ROOisrelatedto Sequoiah-Grayson (“Ajdukiewicz Functions and Basic
similarapproachestofacilitatetheconstructionofcon- Inference”) employed the idea of interaction between
trolledlanguagetexts,forinstancethepredictiveeditors information states in a single agent deductive setting,
proposedbyKuhn(AceWiki)andSchwitter(PENG). withtheintentiontoresolvetheproblemsthatarecon-
GordonPaceetal.useacontrollednaturallanguage nectedwiththeepistemicinterpretationoftheKaxiom.
toformulatecontractsthatarethentranslatedintotem- Michal Pelisˇ and Ondrej Majer (“Logic of Questions
poraldeonticlogic. Theydiscussedtheimplicationsof from the Viewpoint of Dynamic Epistemic Logic”)
combiningtemporalanddeonticlogiconthedesignof sketched a formal analysis of the role of questions in
thecontrolledlanguage. theprocessofcommunicationthatcombinestheLogic
Finally,SilvieSpreeuwenbergetal.discussedtheap- ofquestionswiththeDynamicEpistemicLogic.
plication of controlled language to business rules and As it is impossible to mention all the notable lec-
presented the “Semantic of Business Vocabulary and tures that were presented, we have to be selective, but
BusinessRules”(SBVR). thefollowingonesdeservetobementionedatleastina
fewwords:TomaszPlacek(“OnAttempting”)analyzed
NorbertE.Fuchs theconceptofattemptinginthestitframeworkandLi-
DepartmentofInformatics,UniversityofZurich onel Shapiro (“Deflating Logical Consequence”) con-
sidered the possibility of a deflational attitude towards
the concept of logical consequence. Curtis Franks’
Logica,22–26June paper (“Reasoning about Meta-Theory in Weak The-
ories”) concentrated on the idea of using weak theo-
The 23rd annual symposium Logica, organized by ries of arithmetic to separate meta-theoretical notions
the Institute of Philosophy of the Czech Academy that stronger theories fail to distinguish. Marie Duzˇ´ı
of Sciences, was held on June 22–26 in the Hejnice (“Tenses and Truth-Conditions: A Plea for If-Then-
10