Appearance and Reality

413 Pages·04.05 MB·English

by  Francis Herbert Bradley

APPEARANCE AND REALITY
A METAPHYSICAL ESSAY
F. H. BRADLEY
Second Edition (Revised), with an Appendix
1897
Francis Herbert Bradley
b.30/01/1846, London
d.18/09/1924, Oxford.
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PREFACE (1893)
I HAVE described the following work as an essay in metaphysics. Neither in form nor extent does
it carry out the idea of a system. Its subject indeed is central enough to justify the exhaustive
treatment of every problem. But what I have done is incomplete, and what has been left undone has
often been omitted arbitrarily. The book is a more or less desultory handling of perhaps the chief
questions in metaphysics. There were several reasons why I did not attempt a more systematic
treatise, and to carry out even what I proposed has proved enough for my powers. I began this book
in the autumn of 1887, and, after writing the first two fifths of it in twelve months, then took three
years with the remainder. My work has been suspended several times through long intervals of
compulsory idleness, and I have been glad to finish it when and how I could. I do not say this to
obviate criticism on a book now deliberately published. But, if I had attempted more, I should
probably have completed nothing. And in the main I have accomplished all that lay within my
compass. This volume is meant to be a critical discussion of first principles, and its object is to
stimulate enquiry and doubt. To originality in any other sense it makes no claim. If the reader finds
that on any points he has been led once more to reflect, I shall not have failed, so far as I can, to be
original. But I should add that my book is not intended for the beginner. Its language in general I
hope is not over-technical, but I have sometimes used terms intelligible only to the student.
The reason why I have so much abstained from historical criticism and direct polemics may be
briefly stated. I have written for English readers, and it would not help them much to learn my
relation to German writers. Besides, to tell the truth, I do not know precisely that relation myself.
And, though I have a high opinion of the metaphysical powers of the English mind, I have not seen
any serious attempt in English to deal systematically with first principles. But things among us are
not as they were some few years back. There is no established reputation which now does much
harm to philosophy. And one is not led to feel in writing that one is face to face with the same
dense body of stupid tradition and ancestral prejudice. Dogmatic Individualism is far from having
ceased to flourish, but it no longer occupies the ground as the one accredited way of “advanced
thinking.” The present generation is learning that to gain education a man must study in more than
one school. And to criticise a writer of whom you know nothing is now, even in philosophy,
considered to be the thing that it is. We owe this improvement mostly to men of a time shortly
before my own, and who insisted well, if perhaps incautiously, on the great claims of Kant and
Hegel. But whatever other influences have helped, the result seems secured. There is a fair field for
any one now, I believe, who has anything to say. And I feel no desire for mere polemics, which can
seldom benefit oneself, and which seem no longer required by the state of our philosophy. I would
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rather keep my natural place as a learner among learners. If anything in these pages suggests a more
dogmatic frame of mind, I would ask the reader not hastily toadopt that suggestion. I offer him a set
of opinions and ideas in part certainly wrong, but where and how much I am unable to tell him.
That is for him to find out, if he cares to and if he can. Would it be better if I hinted in effect that he
is in danger of expecting more, and that I, if I chose, perhaps might supply it? I have everywhere
done my best, such as it is, to lay bare the course of ideas, and to help the reader to arrive at a
judgment on each question. And, as I cannot suppose a necessity on my part to disclaim
infallibility, I have not used set phrases which, if they mean anything, imply it. I have stated my
opinions as truths whatever authority there may be against them, and however hard I may have
found it to come to an opinion at all. And, if this is to be dogmatic, I certainly have not tried to
escape dogmatism. It is difficult again for a man not to think too much of his own pursuit. The
metaphysician cannot perhaps be too much in earnest with metaphysics, and he cannot, as the
phrase runs, take himself too seriously. But the same thing holds good with every other positive
function of the universe. And the metaphysician, like other men, is prone to forget this truth. He
forgets the narrow limitation of his special province, and, filled by his own poor inspiration, he
ascribes to it an importance not its due. I do not know if anywhere in my work I may seem to have
erred thus, but I am sure that such excess is not my conviction or my habitual mood. And to restore
the balance, and as a confession possibly of equal defect, I will venture to transcribe some
sentences from my note-book. I see written there that “Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons
for what we believe upon instinct, but to find these reasons is no less an instinct.” Of Optimism I
have said that “The world is the best of all possible worlds, and everything in it is a necessary evil.”
Eclecticism I have found preach that “Every truth is so true that any truth must be false,” and
Pessimism that “Where everything is bad it must be good to know the worst,” or “Where all is
rotten it is a man’s work to cry stinking fish.” About the Unity of Science I have set down that
“Whatever you know it is all one,” and of Introspection that “The one self-knowledge worth having
is to know one’s mind.” The reader may judge how far these sentences form a Credo, and he must
please himself again as to how seriously he takes a further extract: “To love unsatisfied the world is
mystery, a mystery which love satisfied seems to comprehend. The latter is wrong only because it
cannot be content without thinking itself right.” But for some general remarks in justification of
metaphysics I may refer to the Introduction.
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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
IT is a pleasure to me to find that a new edition of this book is wanted. I am encouraged to hope
that with all its defects it has helped to stimulate thought on first principles. And it has been a
further pleasure to me to find that my critics have in general taken this work in the spirit in which it
was offered, whether they have or have not found themselves in agreement with its matter. And
perhaps in some cases sympathy with its endeavour may have led them to regard its shortcomings
too leniently. I on my side have tried to profit by every comment, though I have made no attempt to
acknowledge each, or to reply to it in detail. But I fear that some criticisms must have escaped my
notice, since I have discovered others by mere chance. For this edition I have thought it best not to
make many alterations; but I have added in an Appendix, beside some replies to objections, a
further explanation and discussion of certain difficulties.
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INTRODUCTION
THE writer on metaphysics has a great deal against him. Engaged on a subject which more than
others demands peace of spirit, even before he enters on the controversies of his own field, he finds
himself involved in a sort of warfare. He is confronted by prejudices hostile to his study, and he is
tempted to lean upon those prejudices, within him and around him, which seem contrary to the first.
It is on the preconceptions adverse to metaphysics in general that I am going to make some remarks
by way of introduction. We may agree, perhaps, to understand by metaphysics an attempt to know
reality as against mere appearance, or the study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the
effort to comprehend the universe, not simply piecemeal or by fragments, but somehow as a whole.
Any such pursuit will encounter a number of objections. It will have to hear that the knowledge
which it desires to obtain is impossible altogether; or, if possible in some degree, is yet practically
useless; or that, at all events, we can want nothing beyond the old philosophies. And I will say a
few words on these arguments in their order.
(a)The man who is ready to prove that metaphysical knowledge is wholly impossible has no
right here to any answer. He must be referred for conviction to the body of this treatise. And
he can hardly refuse to go there, since he himself has, perhaps unknowingly, entered the
arena. He is a brother metaphysician with a rival theory of first principles. And this is so plain
that I must excuse myself from dwelling on the point. To say the reality is such that our
knowledge cannot reach it, is a claim to know reality; to urge that our knowledge is of a kind
which must fail to transcend appearance, itself implies that transcendence. For, if we had no
idea of a beyond, we should assuredly not know how to talk about failure or success. And the
test, by which we distinguish them, must obviously be some acquaintance with the nature of
the goal. Nay, the would-be sceptic, who presses on us the contradictions of our thoughts,
himself asserts dogmatically. For these contradictions might be ultimate and absolute truth, if
the nature of the reality were not known to be otherwise. But this introduction is not the place
to discuss a class of objections which are themselves, however unwillingly, metaphysical
views, and which a little acquaintance with the subject commonly serves to dispel. So far as
is necessary, they will be dealt with in their proper place; and I will therefore pass to the
second main argument against metaphysics.
(b)It would be idle to deny that this possesses great force. “Metaphysical knowledge,” it insists,
“may be possible theoretically, and even actual, if you please, to a certain degree; but, for all
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that, it is practically no knowledge worth the name.” And this objection may be rested on
various grounds. I will state some of these, and will make the answers which appear to me to
be sufficient. The first reason for refusing to enter on our field is an appeal to the confusion
and barrenness which prevail there. “The same problems,” we hear it often, “the same
disputes, the same sheer failure. Why not abandon it and come out? Is there nothing else
more worth your labour?” To this I shall reply more fully soon, but will at present deny
entirely that the problems have not altered. The assertion is about as true and about as false as
would be a statement that human nature has not changed. And it seems indefensible when we
consider that in history metaphysics has not only been acted on by the general development,
but has also reacted. But, apart from historical questions, which are here not in place, I am
inclined to take my stand on the admitted possibility. If the object is not impossible, and the
adventure suits uswhat then? Others far better than ourselves have wholly failedso you say.
But the man who succeeds is not apparently always the man of most merit, and even in
philosophy’s cold world perhaps some fortunes go by favour. One never knows until one
tries. But to the question, if seriously I expect to succeed, I must, of course, answer, No. I do
not suppose, that is, that satisfactory knowledge is possible. How much we can ascertain
about reality will be discussed in this book; but I may say at once that I expect a very partial
satisfaction. I am so bold as to believe that we have a knowledge of the Absolute,
certain and real, though I am sure that our comprehension is miserably incomplete. But I
dissent emphatically from the conclusion that, because imperfect, it is worthless. And I must
suggest to the objector that he should open his eyes and should consider human nature. Is it
possible to abstain from thought about the universe? I do not mean merely that to every one
the whole body of things must come in the gross, whether consciously or unconsciously, in a
certain way. I mean that, by various causes, even the average man is compelled to wonder
and to reflect. To him the world, and his share in it, is a natural object of thought, and seems
likely to remain one. And so, when poetry, art, and religion have ceased wholly to interest, or
when they show no longer any tendency to struggle with ultimate problems and to come to an
understanding with them; when the sense of mystery and enchantment no longer draws the
mind to wander aimlessly and to love it knows not what; when, in short, twilight has no
charmthen metaphysics will be worthless. For the question (as things are now) is not whether
we are to reflect and ponder on ultimate truthfor perhaps most of us do that, and are not likely
to cease. The question is merely as to the way in which this should be done. And the claim of
metaphysics is surely not unreasonable. Metaphysics takes its stand on this side of human
nature, this desire to think about and comprehend reality. And it merely asserts that, if the
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attempt is to be made, it should be done as thoroughly as our nature permits. There is no
claim on its part to supersede other functions of the human mind; but it protests that, if we are
to think, we should sometimes try to think properly. And the opponent of metaphysics, it
appears to me, is driven to a dilemma. He must either condemn all reflection, on the essence
of things,and, if so, he breaks, or, rather, tries to break, with part of the highest side of human
nature,or else he allows us to think, but not to think strictly. He permits, that is to say, the
exercise of thought so long as it is entangled with other functions of our being; but as soon as
it attempts a pure development of its own, guided by the principles of its own distinctive
working, he prohibits it forthwith. And this appears to be a paradox, since it seems equivalent
to saying, You may satisfy your instinctive longing to reflect, so long as you do it in a way
which is unsatisfactory. If your character is such that in you thought is satisfied by what does
not, and cannot, pretend to be thought proper, that is quite legitimate. But if you are
constituted otherwise, and if in you a more strict thinking is a ant of your nature, that is by all
means to be crushed out. And, speaking for myself, I must regard this as at once dogmatic
and absurd. But the reader, perhaps, may press me with a different objection. Admitting, he
may say, that thought about reality is lawful, I still do not understand why, the results being
what they are, you should judge it to be desirable. And I will try to answer this frankly. I
certainly do not suppose that it would be good for every one to study metaphysics, and I
cannot express any opinion as to the number of persons who should do so. But I think it quite
necessary, even on the view that this study can produce no positive results, that it should still
be pursued. There is, so far as I can see, no other certain way of protecting ourselves against
dogmatic superstition. Our orthodox theology on the one side, and our common-place
materialism on the other side (it is natural to take these as prominent instances), vanish like
ghosts before the daylight of free sceptical enquiry. I do not mean, of course, to condemn
wholly either of these beliefs; but I am sure that either, when taken seriously, is the mutilation
of our nature.Neither, as experience has amply shown, can now survive in the mind which
has thought sincerely on first principles; and it seems desirable that there should be such a
refuge for the man who burns to think consistently, and yet is too good to become a slave,
either to stupid fanaticism or dishonest sophistry. That is one reason why I think that
metaphysics, even if it end in total scepticism, should be studied by a certain number of
persons.
And there is a further reason which, with myself perhaps, has even more weight. All of us, I
presume, more or less, are led beyond the region of ordinary facts. Some in one way and
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some in others, we seem to touch and have communion with what is beyond the visible
world. In various manners we find something higher, which both supports and humbles, both
chastens and transports us. And, with certain persons, the intellectual effort to understand the
universe is a principal way of thus experiencing the Deity. No one, probably, who has not
felt this, however differently he might describe it, has ever cared much for metaphysics.
And, wherever it has been felt strongly, it has been its own justification. The man whose
nature is such that by one path alone his chief desire will reach consummation, will try to find
it on that path, whatever it may be, and whatever the world thinks of it; and, if he does not, he
is contemptible. Self-sacrifice is too often the “great sacrifice” of trade, the giving cheap what
is worth nothing. To know what one wants, and to scruple at no means that will get it, may be
a harder self-surrender. And this appears to be another reason for some persons pursuing the
study of ultimate truth.
(c)And that is why, lastly, existing philosophies cannot answer the purpose. For whether there is
progress or not, at all events there is change; and the changed minds of each generation will
require a difference in what has to satisfy their intellect. Hence there seems as much reason
for new philosophy as there is for new poetry. In each case the fresh production is usually
much inferior to something already in existence; and yet it answers a purpose if it appeals
more personally to the reader. What is really worse may serve better to promote, in certain
respects and in a certain generation, the exercise of our best functions. And that is why, so
long as we alter, we shall always want, and shall always have, new metaphysics. I will end
this introduction with a word of warning. I have been obliged to speak of philosophy as a
satisfaction of what may be called the mystical side of our naturea satisfaction which, by
certain persons, cannot be as well procured otherwise. And I may have given the impression
that I take the metaphysician to be initiated into something far higher than what the common
herd possesses. Such a doctrine would rest on a most deplorable error, the superstition that
the mere intellect is the highest side of our nature, and the false idea that in the intellectual
world work done on higher subjects is for that reason higher work. Certainly the life of one
man, in comparison with that of another, may be fuller of the Divine, or, again, may realize it
with an intenser consciousness; but there is no calling or pursuit which is a private road to the
Deity. And assuredly the way through speculation upon ultimate truths, though distinct and
legitimate, is not superior to others. There is no sin, however prone to it the philosopher may
be, which philosophy can justify so little as spiritual pride.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION (1-7)
Preliminary objections to metaphysics answered.
The task is not impossible (2), or indefensible (3-7).
BOOK I APPEARANCE
I. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES (11-18)
Attempt to explain error by taking primary qualities alone as real (11). The secondary shown to be
unreal (12-14). But the primary have no independent existence (14-17), save as useful fictions (17-
18).
II. SUBSTANTIVE AND ADJECTIVE (19-24)
Problem of Inherence. Relation between the thing and its qualities is unintelligible (19-24).
III. RELATION AND QUALITY (25-34)
I. Qualities without relations are unintelligible. They cannot be found (26-27). They cannot be
got bare legitimately (27-28), or at all (28-30).
II. Qualities with relations are unintelligible.
They cannot be resolved into relations (30), and the relations bring internal discrepancies (31).
III. Relations with, or without, qualities are unintelligible (32-34).
IV. SPACE AND TIME (35-43)
Their psychological origin is irrelevant (35). Space is inconsistent because it is, and is not, a
relation (36-38), and its connection with other content is unintelligible (38). Time, as usually
taken, has the same vices (39, 0). And so has Time taken otherwise, for the “now” is self-
inconsistent (40-43)
V. MOTION AND CHANGE AND ITS PERCEPTION (44-53)
Motion is inconsistent; is not so fundamental as Change (44, 45). Change is a new instance of our
dilemma and is unintelligible (45-49). Perception of Succession is not timeless (49-51). Its true
nature (51-53).
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VI. CAUSATION (54-61)
Effort to avoid the contradiction of Change. But the Cause and its Effect are not compatible (54,
55). Illusory attempt at explanation (55, 56). The Cause spreads to take in all the conditions, and
yet cannot be complete (56-58). Its relation to its effect is unintelligible (58). Causal sequence must
be, and cannot be, continuous (58-61).
VII. ACTIVITY (62-70)
Whether an original datum, or not, is irrelevant (62). It has a meaning which implies change in
time (63), and self-caused change (64, 65). Passivity what and how connected with Activity.
Occasion what (65). Condition and Sum of Conditions (66-68). Activity and Passivity imply one
another, but are inconsistent (68-70).
VIII. THINGS (71-74)
Our previous results have ruined Things (71). Things must have identity which is ideal, and so
appearance (72, 3). Everyday confusion as to Things’ identity (73-74).
IX. THE MEANINGS OF SELF (75-102)
The Self at last, but what does it mean? (75, 76).Self as body excluded (77). I. Self as total contents
of experience at one moment (77). II. Self as average contents of experience, (77-79). III. Essential
self (80, 81). Personal identity (81-86). IV. Self as Monad (86-87). V. Self as what interests (88).
VI. Self as opposed to Not-self (88-96). Each is a concrete group (89, 90). But does any content
belong solely to self (90, 91), or to Not-self (91,92)? Doubtful cases (92-94). Self and Not-self on
the whole are not fixed (95,96). Perception of Activity, its general nature (96-100). VII. Self as
Mere Self (100-101).
X. THE REALITY OF SELF (103-120)
Self is doubtless a fact, but, as it appears, can it be real? (103-104). (a) Self as Feeling proves for
several reasons untenable (104-107). (b) Nor is self- consciousness in better case (107-111). ©
Personal Identity useless, and so also functional unity of self (112-114). (d) Self as Activity, Force,
or Will (114- 117). (e) Self as Monad (117, 118). Conclusion (119, 120).
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