Andrew J. Birtle

334 Pages·2010·4.68 MB·English

by  Andrew J. Birtle

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U.S. A
rmy
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oUnterinSUrgenCy And
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ontingenCy
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perAtionS oCtrine
1860–1941
by
Andrew J. Birtle
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 2009
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Birtle, A. J. (Andrew James)
U. S. Army counterinsurgency and contingency
operations doctrine, 1860–1941 / by Andrew J. Birtle.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. United States. Army—Operations other than war—History.
2. Military doctrine—United States—History. I. Title.
UA25.B57 1998
355.3’4’0973—dc21 97–26216
CIP
First Printed 1998—CMH Pub 70–66–1
F
oreword
Throughout its history, the U.S. Army has conducted a wide variety
of military operations in service to the nation. Over the past two centu-
ries, America’s soldiers have served the Republic as governors, consta-
bles, judges, diplomats, explorers, colonizers, educators, administrators,
and engineers. These myriad missions have often been overlooked as
soldiers and scholars alike focused their studies on major wars and on
the strategic and tactical doctrines that governed them. Comparatively
little attention has been paid to the underlying theories, concepts, and
methods that American soldiers have employed in the conduct of their
many less “conventional,” yet exceedingly traditional, missions.
Over the years the Center of Military History has attempted to rec-
tify this omission in military historiography. Center publications such
as Soldier-Statesmen of the Constitution; Military Government in the
Ryukyu Islands, 1945–1950; The U.S. Army in the Occupation of
Germany, 1944–1946; United States Army Unilateral and Coalition
Operations in the 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention; the multi-
volume Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders; and
The Demands of Humanity: Army Medical Disaster Relief have exam-
ined some of the many roles the U.S. Army has played off the conven-
tional battlefield. U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency
Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941, adds to this body of literature on the
Army’s experience in operations other than war. It is the first of a two-
volume work examining how the Army has performed two of its most
important unconventional missions: the suppression of insurgent or
other irregular forces and the conduct of overseas constabulary and
contingency operations. The second volume will carry the story of the
evolution of Army doctrine for counterinsurgency and contingency
operations up through the end of the Vietnam War.
Although the events discussed in this volume occurred long ago,
many of the issues raised in it have enduring relevance for today’s
Army. People, places, and events may change, but the fundamental
questions involved in suppressing insurrections, fighting irregulars,
administering civilian populations, and conducting foreign interven-
tions remain surprisingly constant. By studying how American soldiers
dealt with these complex issues in the past, this book offers valuable
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insights to guide current and future soldiers when called upon to con-
duct similar operations.
Washington, D.C. JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
10 October 1997 Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History
iv
t A
he Uthor
Andrew J. Birtle received a B.A. degree in history from Saint
Lawrence University in 1979 and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in military
history from Ohio State University in 1981 and 1985, respectively. He
worked for the U.S. Air Force as a historian for approximately three
years before joining the U.S. Army Center of Military History in 1987.
He is the author of a number of articles and monographs as well as a
book on American military assistance to the Federal Republic of
Germany. He is currently writing the second volume in his study of the
development of U.S. Army counterinsurgency and contingency opera-
tions doctrine.
v

p
reFACe
It has long been accepted that the U.S. Army did not have an offi-
cial, codified, written doctrine for the conduct of counterguerrilla,
pacification, and nation-building activities prior to World War II. The
absence of a formal, written doctrine, however, does not mean that
American soldiers did not develop concepts and theories about such
activities, some of which became enduring principles that guided
Army operations for decades despite their meager mention in the
manuals of the day. It is the contention of this book that there was a
strong continuity in the manner in which the U.S. Army performed
counterinsurgency and overseas constabulary missions in the century
that preceded the outbreak of World War II and that some of the central
principles governing the conduct of such operations were indeed
incorporated into official Army doctrinal literature prior to America’s
entry into that conflict.
Intellectual history—the tracing of the evolution of thought and
ideas over time—is a tricky business. Showing continuity and change
in thought and action is difficult, but explaining how it came about is
even tougher. Writers studying the evolution of military doctrine are
usually aided in their endeavors by the existence of official manuals
that codify the state of military thinking at a particular point in time.
Unfortunately, such manuals are often silent on the less conventional
aspects of the military art. Moreover, one must remember that a system
of comprehensive doctrinal manuals in the modern sense did not exist
in the nineteenth century and was still in its infancy during the early
decades of the twentieth. Consequently, the student of military theory
is forced to cast a wider net, studying not only manuals, but curricular
materials, textbooks, war plans, and the less official publications of
individual soldiers. Murkier still, but no less real, is the realm of per-
sonal experience, folkways, and institutional norms that can be acquired
and passed down over time. Anthropologists maintain that oral tradition
can be a powerful force governing the conduct of human cultures and
institutions. The fact that such traditions are not written down denies
neither their existence nor their significance. Students of military
thought, therefore, must look at deeds as well as words, because by
studying the actions of past soldiers, we may gain insight into the prin-
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ciples and beliefs underlying their behavior. I examined all such
sources then, official and unofficial, words as well as deeds, to gain
insights into the Army’s approach to counterinsurgency and contin-
gency operations.
This volume covers a lot of ground—nearly a century of time and
occurrences that span the globe. Although many different events are
mentioned, this book is not intended to be an operational history.
Similarly, while the volume touches upon subjects as diverse as mili-
tary government, military law, and tactics, it does not present a compre-
hensive review of each of these distinct doctrinal areas. Rather, it
examines these and other subjects selectively to gain insight into what
the pre–World War II Army came to call “small wars”—the interrelated
fields of counterguerrilla warfare, pacification, and overseas constabu-
lary and contingency operations. Though never credited with a manual
of its own, during the century that preceded the outbreak of World War
II a loose body of theory, doctrine, thought, and precedent gradually
evolved within the U.S. Army into what one might call, to paraphrase
Russell Weigley, an American way of small wars.
Many people, far too many to name, assisted in the production of
this volume. I would like to extend a general word of appreciation to
the staffs of the National Archives and Records Administration, the
Library of Congress, the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH),
the U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI), and the Pentagon,
Infantry School, and Command and General Staff College libraries.
Individuals worthy of special mention are Wilbert Mahoney of the
National Archives; Richard J. Sommers, David Keough, and Pamela
Cheney at MHI; and at CMH, Albert Cowdrey, James Knight, Hannah
Zeidlik, Geraldine Harcarik, Catherine Heerin, W. Scott Janes, Arthur
Hardyman, S. L. Dowdy, Beth MacKenzie, and indexer Florence
Brodkey. I am especially grateful to Diane Arms, who edited the book.
Thanks also go to the panel of scholars who reviewed the manuscript
and made many helpful suggestions: Edward Coffman, Timothy
Nenninger, Lawrence Yates, Allan Millett, Brian Linn, Jeffrey Clarke,
and Mary Gillett. Finally, I would like to thank my parents and my
wife, without whose support this work would not have been possible.
Though many people contributed to this volume, the author alone
is responsible for all interpretations and conclusions, as well as for any
errors that may appear.
Washington, D.C. ANDREW J. BIRTLE
10 October 1997
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C
ontentS
Chapter Page
1. Introduction.......................................... 3
Concepts and Doctrine ............................... 3
Antebellum Antecedents .............................. 7
2. The War of the Rebellion, 1861–1865 ................... 23
Pacification, 1861–1863.............................. 24
Francis Lieber and General Orders 100 ................. 32
Pacification, 1863–1865.............................. 36
Tactics and Techniques of the Counterguerrilla War ........ 40
The Legacy of the War of the Rebellion .................. 47
3. The Constabulary Years, 1865–1898 .................... 55
Reconstruction, 1865–1877............................ 55
Constabulary Duty on the Western Frontier............... 58
Indian Warfare and Military Thought.................... 60
U.S. Army Counterguerrilla Operations on the Western
Frontier ........................................ 67
The Army and Indian Pacification ...................... 76
The New Professionalism and the Legacy of the
Constabulary Army ............................... 86
4. Cuba and the Philippines, 1898–1902 ................... 99
The Army’s Approach to Overseas Nation Building......... 100
The Military Government of Cuba, 1898–1902 ............ 104
The Philippine War, 1899–1902 ........................ 108
5. The Imperial Constabulary Years, 1900–1913 ............ 147
The Peking Relief Expedition, 1900–1901 ................ 147
Policing the Philippines, 1902–1907 .................... 153
Governing the Moros, 1900–1913 ...................... 159
The Second Cuban Intervention, 1906–1909 .............. 168
The Imperial Constabulary Mission and Army Doctrine . . . . . 174
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