A Philosophy of Person and Identity: Where was I when I wasn’t there?

186 Pages·2022·3.982 MB·English

by  Monica Meijsing

Studies in Brain and Mind 21
Monica Meijsing
A Philosophy
of Person
and Identity
Where was I when I wasn’t there?
Studies in Brain and Mind
Volume 21
Series Editor
Gualtiero Piccinini, University of Missouri - St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA
Editorial Board Members
Berit Brogaard, University of Oslo, Norway, University of Miami,
Coral Gables, FL, USA
Carl Craver, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA
Edouard Machery, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
Oron Shagrir, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel
Mark Sprevak, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, UK
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Monica Meijsing
A Philosophy of Person
and Identity
Where was I when I wasn’t there?
Monica Meijsing
Weezenhof 3713
Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Translation from the Dutch language edition: “Waar was ik toen ik er niet was? Een filosofie
van persoon en identiteit” by Monica Meijsing, © 2018. Published by Uitgeverij Vantilt. All
Rights Reserved.
ISSN 1573-4536 ISSN 2468-399X (electronic)
Studies in Brain and Mind
ISBN 978-3-031-09523-8 ISBN 978-3-031-09524-5 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09524-5
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
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Acknowledgments
During my working years, I have learned from many people. I am grateful to them
all, and I want to thank a few of them by name. So, thank you to:
• All my students in Amsterdam, Nijmegen, and Tilburg, for the lively interactions.
• The members of the former Nijmegen-Tilburg Research Group on Philosophy of
Science and Cognition, in particular Ton Derksen and Herman de Regt, for the
wonderful conferences and the heated discussions.
• My colleagues from Tilburg University, especially Maureen Sie, for offering me
opportunities for discussing the ideas of this book, and Jenny Slatman, for head-
ing the Body reading group, where I continue to learn new things every month.
• All the authors of the Here I Am volume, and particularly Hans Dooremalen for
editing it.
• Elizabeth Verwey for helping me with the translation.
• An anonymous reviewer for their very helpful comments.
• And finally, my husband Gerlof, for encouraging and supporting me throughout
the years.
v
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Where Was I? What Am I? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Life and Death, Soul and Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Is There Life After Death? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Out-of-Body Experiences and the Weight of the Soul . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Dualism in Antiquity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Descartes: From Soul to Mind and from Living Body
to Lifeless Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5 Conclusion: The Legacy of Descartes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Consciousness, Person and Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1 New Concepts in Descartes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 Locke on Human Being and Person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3 Contemporary Meanings of Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.4 New Meanings of the Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5 Damasio: Several Forms of Consciousness
and Several Selves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.6 Conclusion: Where Was My Self? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4 Cartesian People 1: The Body a Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.1 The Helm and the Pineal Gland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.2 The Mind, Self-Consciousness, and Certainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3 Existing Cartesian People? The Case of Ian Waterman . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.4 What is Ian Waterman Missing? Proprioception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.5 Proprioception as an Argument Against Descartes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.6 Has Ian Waterman Lost his Body? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.7 Visual Perception, Movement, and the Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
vii
viii Contents
4.8 Conclusion: Not Just Bodiless Thinkers, Nor Just
Passive Feelers, but Active Embodied Creatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5 Cartesian People 2: The Body an Illusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.1 Cartesian Mind and Material Brain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.2 Brains Without Bodies: The Brain in a Vat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.3 Evil Demons and Evil Scientists: The Role of Empirical
Data in Thought Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.4 Empirical Data About Brains Without Bodies: Descartes
and Phantoms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.5 Phantom Phenomena as an Argument for the Possibility
of a Brain in a Vat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.6 Types of Phantom Phenomena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.7 Moving a Phantom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.8 Acquired and Congenital Phantoms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.9 Moving Existing Limbs: Forward Models in the Brain . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.10 Moving Existing Limbs: Ownership and Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.11 Moving Existing Limbs: Intentions to Move . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.12 Possible Explanations for Phantom Movements 1:
The Bell Cord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.13 Possible Explanations for Phantom Movements 2:
Innate Motor Schemas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.14 Possible Explanations of Phantom Movements 3:
Mirror Neurons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.15 Moving Limbs and Brains in a Vat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.16 Conclusion: The Body Is Not an Illusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
6 Lockean Persons 1: Living Without Memory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.1 Locke’s Criterion for Personal Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
6.2 The Memory Criterion as Constitutive
for Personal Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
6.3 The Memory Criterion as Subjective:
The Case of John Demjanjuk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
6.4 The Memory Criterion for Personal Identity
and the Autobiographical Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
6.5 Living Without Autobiographical Memory:
The Case of Clive Wearing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
6.6 The Cliveness of Clive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.7 Conclusion: Amnesic Selves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
7 Lockean Persons 2: Persons and Organisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7.1 Persons and Living Organisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
7.2 Persons Constituted by Organisms: Lynne Baker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Contents ix
7.3 The Anti-Constitution Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
7.4 The Self-Reference Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
7.5 The Development Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7.6 Conclusion: Persons Cannot Be Non-identical
with Organisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
8 The Gradual Origin of Self-Consciousness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
8.1 The Paradox of Self-Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
8.2 Consciousness and Self-Consciousness in Animals . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
8.3 The Gradualist Account: Perception, Movement,
and Self-Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
8.4 Forms of Self-Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
8.5 Conclusion: Full-Blown Self-Consciousness Does Not
Emerge All at Once . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
9 “Here I Am” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
9.1 Self-Consciousness and the First-Person Pronoun . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
9.2 The First-Person Perspective as Criterion of Identity . . . . . . . . . . . 151
9.3 Psychological Identity Criterion or Body Criterion? . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
9.4 What We Are . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
9.5 Human Organisms and Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
9.6 How We Become Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
9.7 The Importance of Personhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
9.8 Conclusion: Our Identity and Our Personhood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
Name Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter opens with an operation I had some time ago, under full anaesthetic. I
was out of it, for the time being. This story sets the stage for the philosophical ques-
tions this book deals with: Where was I when I had no experiences? Was I really not
there? What are we, exactly? When do we still exist and when no longer?
1.1 W here Was I? What Am I?
Some years ago, I had to undergo an operation. Afterwards, I was told it had been a
very gory affair. In fact, there had been so much blood that one of the trainee nurses,
who had been allowed to watch, had fainted. “Oh well”, I said, “good thing I
wasn’t there”.
Naturally, this was a weak attempt at being funny. But it was also rather peculiar.
Was I really not there? Of course I was - yet in a sense I wasn’t. But let us take a
closer look at the episode.
I was wheeled into the OR, slightly sedated but fully conscious. The needle with
the anaesthetic went in my arm, someone said, “sleep well”, which I thought was
rather ridiculous at the time, and immediately afterwards I was in a different room
and it was three hours later.1 Where was I during those three hours? Was I anywhere
at all – did I really exist? During those three hours I didn’t think anything, didn’t
1 It may be that not everybody experiences the period of anaesthesia as completely non-existent;
there may well be individual differences. A lovely example of someone who apparently had the
same experience is this: in the music program Top 2000 a gogo, the Dutch Paralympics athlete
Marlou van Rhijn, who had had to undergo many operations as a child, said that at the age of 11
she went into the operating theatre loudly singing the Beegees song Night Fever until the needle of
the anaesthetics went in, and resumed singing exactly where she had left off the moment she
regained consciousness (van Rhijn 2021). Apparently for her too there had been no time at all
between the start of the period of unconsciousness and the end of it.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1
Switzerland AG 2022
M. Meijsing, A Philosophy of Person and Identity, Studies in Brain and Mind
21, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09524-5_1