34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon

302 Pages·2008·1.62 MB·English

by  Amos Harel

34 D
AYS

34 D
AYS
ISRAEL, HEZBOLLAH,
AND THE
WAR IN LEBANON
AMOS HAREL
AND
AVI ISSACHAROFF
34 DAYS
Copyright © Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, 2008.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproducedin any
manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case ofbrief
quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews.
First published in 2008 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™
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PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave
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Union and other countries.
ISBN-13: 978–0–230–60400–1
ISBN-10: 0–230–60400–5
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Harel, Amos.
34 Days : Israel, Hezbollah, and the war in Lebanon / Amos Harel and
Avi Issacharoff.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0–230–60400–5
1. Lebanon War, 2006. I. Issacharoff, Avi. II. Title. III. Title: Thirty four days.
DS87.65.H37 2008
956.9204(cid:1)4—dc22 2007048534
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.
Design by Newgen Imaging Systems, Ltd., Chennai, India.
First edition: May 2008
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America.
CONTENTS
Introduction and Acknowledgments vii
One The Abduction 1
Two Barak Promises 17
Three Denial 39
Four A New Triumvirate 59
Five Going to War 75
Six The Ship Leaves Port 91
Seven The Soldiers Can Wait 111
Eight Bint J’Bayel, First Round 119
Nine To Us, a Tie Is the Same as Defeat 145
Ten Floundering 165
Eleven The Cabinet 191
Twelve Casualty Count in Saluki 215
Thirteen Not Defeat, Failure 241
Epilogue Until the Next War 253
Notes 263
Index 279

INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
H
ERE AND THERE you can still see them along Israel’s roads and
highways, car bumper stickers, left over from mid-July 2006. Some
of the country’s larger newspapers handed them out during those
days of optimistic patriotism. On one the legend reads, “Israel is Strong!!,” as
if we’re not quite sure and need a reminder. Another reads simply, “We’ll
Win.” When the war ended, many drivers, frustrated and angry, scratched
off the stickers. Their hopes were dashed. The media, full of praise for the
country’s leaders, now attacks them for their haste and stupidity in deciding
to go to war.
Over a year has passed since the end of the second Lebanon war, but its
signs are still clearly noticeable. As far as losses are concerned, this was not a
particularly big war. An average week of Shiite and Sunni violence in Iraq
causes more deaths than were recorded on the Israeli side during 34 days of
war with Hezbollah (161, of whom 119 were soldiers and 42 civilians). But the
war had a far-reaching effect on Israel. More than 4,000 rockets were fired at
the northern towns and villages; this was the first time the Israeli home front
was under constant attack for so long. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) failed
in its attempts to stop the bombing, and the end of the war did not leave Israel
in a controlling position. Israel’s achievements—which included the removal
of Hezbollah from the border and the arrival of a multinational force (whose
efficiency remains controversial)—were nowhere near the level of expectations
defined by the prime minister Ehud Olmert and minister of defense Amir
Peretz at the beginning of the war. Israel was badly scalded by the war, which
had an adverse effect on the way in which Israelis view their leaders, their army,
and even the future of the state within the hostile region that surrounds it.
In some ways, this could have been a case of overreaction. Recuperation
was quick, too. A year later, Israel is enjoying an economic boom; in the
North, restoration of war-damaged property is moving ahead at a reasonable
viii (cid:1) Introduction and Acknowledgments (cid:2)
pace; tourists are again arriving in the thousands. But the swift recovery did
not dispel, or even dull, the national feeling. Many Israelis continue to feel
mistrust, disgust even, toward the leadership and have expressed their doubts
as to the IDF’s ability to face up to future challenges. No less serious is the fact
that our neighbors have also noted the results of the war. Hezbollah’s rocket
war has exposed the vulnerability of Israel’s home front and its leadership’s
indecision in carrying out IDF counterattacks. At least some of the Arab states
now believe that Hezbollah has come up with a winning strategy worthy of
emulation. In this regard, the second Lebanon war could be remembered as
the decade’s key turning point.
As we see it, the war did not begin on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah
abducted two Israeli reserve soldiers. The story has a broader scope that goes
back to Israel’s decision to withdraw from southern Lebanon, a departure that
was completed in May 2000. In this book we have chosen to provide an exten-
sive description of the six years prior to this war, years during which the IDF’s
strength was sorely tried in an effort to curb Palestinian terrorist attacks from
within the occupied territories while Hezbollah was preparing itself for
another potential confrontation with Israel.
All this, of course, could be pure hindsight. Most of the intelligence we
now have was not available to Israel’s decision makers at the time of the with-
drawal from Lebanon; when Israel showed restraint over Hezbollah’s first
abduction of soldiers on Mount Dov (Sha’aba Farms) in October 2000; or
when the government decided to deviate from its former policy when two
more soldiers were abducted. Leaders, especially those in Israel, are under
enormous pressure. In the Israeli case, it is due in part to the hostile environ-
ment in which the country exists; it is also due in part to Israeli society’s
well-known tendency toward mass hysteria.
More than a year and a half has passed since the war. Today, too, some
details remain classified, hidden from the public eye, to become known only
when the archives are opened. Throughout our research and writing of this
book, information continued to flow in our direction, and viewpoints and
aspects sometimes changed. The book, therefore, is based on everything we
knew during the summer and fall of 2007. Future developments may well
shed a different light on some things. There will no doubt be those who will
say that by publishing the book at this time we are jumping to conclusions.
We are convinced, however, that there is enough in what we have seen to
provide a reasonably clear picture of the events of the summer of 2006 in