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Last Modified November 8, 1999
The Shadows of Waco:
The Tactics and Dynamics of Militia
Confrontations
A Militia Watchdog Special Report by Mark Pitcavage, Ph.D. This report may not be copied or
duplicated without the permission of the author.
Introduction: A Standoff in Arizona
When she saw the deputies, Mary Elizabeth Schipke knew trouble was coming. She grabbed her 17-
month old daughter, Amara Venus, and ran into her house trailer. The Pima County deputies and the
Child Protective Services agent they were escorting found that Schipke refused to open her locked
door. Eventually, a deputy entered the trailer through a window to discover that Schipke had locked
herself in a back bedroom. Forcing the door open, the officers at last confronted Schipke—only to
discover that she was pointing a pistol at them.[i]
They slowly backed out of the trailer.
What was going through Schipke’s mind is hard to tell, because the woman had a pattern of erratic
behavior. Schipke lived in a world of conspiracies and plots, many of them directed at her. Her
sense of paranoia was heightened by an extended custody battle surrounding her son Kitt, a battle
that Schipke lost. In 1994, a local newspaper reported that she had become convinced that a local
election had been tampered with because her candidate was stuck with thirteenth place on the general
election ballot. Schipke, a triskaidekaphobe (someone afraid of the number thirteen), believed it was
a plot.
By 1998, Schipke described herself as a “severely physically disabled single mother,” ostensibly as a
result of silicone breast implants and “forced medical experimentation” at Tucson Medical Center
Hospital. Her family, she said, were “victims of severe government abuse…brutally physically
tortured, mentally terrorized, kidnapped, falsely arrested, viciously beaten, retaliated against, denied
justice…thanks to corrupt employees of the state of Arizona.” She claimed Kitt’s father was a drug
dealer who had raped her, that Kitt had perhaps been sold on the “baby meat market.” She herself
had lost her “million dollar inheritance” because she was too sick to protect herself. Schipke founded
the “Parents Council for Family Rights” and became active in a growing movement directed against
child protective services agencies, a movement consisting largely of anti-government extremists
upset at intrusions by the government into the family household.
Nevertheless, despite her hatred of CPS, Schipke wrote them a letter claiming that she and Amara
were living in filth because CPS had not assisted them. This prompted CPS to investigate. On
November 2, 1998, they tried to visit Schipke, but she refused to let them enter. They returned the
following Friday with sheriff’s deputies to assist them.
After Schipke met them with a gun, the deputies radioed the department, which sent officers out to
the neighborhood, a largely rural area on the county line. The department set up a command center
about a half-mile away. In the meantime, Schipke was busy as well. She was busy making phone
calls to various militia and extremist groups.
As SWAT negotiators established phone communications with Schipke that night, law enforcement
officers found themselves besieged with phone calls. Militia members and anti-government
extremists demanded that authorities leave Schipke alone and threatened them with violence. Many
calls came from out-of-state. The department became so concerned that it drastically upgraded the
security of its command post. Militia members did more than simply telephone, however; they also
showed up at the standoff. Some circled the area in vehicles sporting militia flags; others hung
around the command center. At least one militia member videotaped police activity. When a police
helicopter flew by, flares were shot into the air (although it is not known who shot the flares).
According to a Sheriff’s Department spokesperson, many of the militia members were verbally
threatening. “This is going to be Ruby Ridge all over again,” one of them was reported as saying.
Others stated, “We’re with the militia, are you scared yet?”
Luckily, on Saturday morning, before tensions could escalate further, SWAT officers outside the
trailer eventually persuaded Schipke to let two officers into the trailer. After several minutes of
conversation, in which Schipke appeared agitated and uncooperative, the officers, noting that her gun
was holstered, successfully seized and restrained her, ending the standoff. Amara, unharmed, was
turned over to Child Protective Services, while Schipke was charged with two counts of aggravated
assault on a peace officer and one count of endangerment. She was also ordered to have a mental
health evaluation.
The Pima County Sheriff’s Department was lucky; the extremists who had intervened in the standoff
situation didn’t do anything more than to make vague threats and efforts at intimidation. But had
tensions been higher, individuals on either side less cautious, or had a mistake been made, the results
could have been tragic. When an armed party inserts itself suddenly and unexpectedly into an
already charged and precarious situation, the chances of intentional or unintentional violence escalate
dramatically.
What is most important to understand, though, is that this Arizona standoff involving militia groups
is not an isolated event. On the contrary, it is a phenomenon associated with the militia movement
that has occurred numerous times across the country. The militia movement, which arose after
deadly standoffs at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, in 1992, and Waco, Texas, in 1993, was created in part to
confront federal and local governments. Its ideology, too, reinforces the notion of confrontations
with law enforcement.
Largely unheralded by either the media or law enforcement, militia-led confrontations with law
enforcement pose a threat to public safety, especially for unsuspecting public officials or law
enforcement officers suddenly facing such situations. “We were all ready and we were all armed,”
stated a Tennessee militiawoman in 1995 who had hurried down to Alabama when she heard that a
militia leader there might in trouble with the law. “If they had drawn their guns on me or my friends,
or drawn their guns on my friends’ property, there would have been a shootout.” It is exactly these
situations that militia confrontations run the risk of generating.[ii]
This report examines the phenomenon of what are herein termed “militia confrontations.” Militia
confrontations may be defined as events in which militia groups learn about and insert themselves
into confrontational situations between citizens and the government in order to force the government
to back down. Militia confrontations should be distinguished from other standoff situations
involving right-wing extremists. For instance, in 1996 a standoff took place in eastern Montana
between federal authorities and an extremist group known as the Montana Freemen. Similarly, in
1997 a standoff took place in west Texas between state authorities and a group calling itself the
Republic of Texas. In both these circumstances, militia members attempted to come to the rescue of
the besieged groups. Such militia rescue attempts are related to militia confrontations, but are
generally not discussed here, because the dynamics are different. In both of the above extremist
standoffs, for instance, the besieged individuals were the subjects of extensive investigations and of
civil and criminal warrants. The existence and nature of the groups were well-publicized by the
media. Authorities were well aware of the nature of the groups and the level of outside sympathy for
the groups. When the standoffs began, authorities understood that attempts would be made from
outsiders to come to the aid of the besieged extremists, and planned accordingly.
In a typical militia confrontation, however, the individual or individuals are not leaders of any
notable groups, nor have they usually engaged in what might be described as a pattern of serious or
organized criminal activity. Instead, they are more likely to be an angry parent or a desperate
landowner. Sometimes, in fact, they will not themselves be members of any extremist group, but will
simply be targeted by such groups as a VOG, or “victim of government.” This fact makes it more
difficult for effective criminal intelligence in identifying potential confrontation situations. It also
makes it more likely that authorities could suddenly find themselves engaged in such a confrontation.
This report is designed to increase understanding of the militia confrontation phenomenon. It
contains a detailed description of the dynamics of militia confrontations. This description is
illustrated by numerous examples. The report further includes, as appendices, four case studies of
militia confrontations in order to provide extended examples and analyses of this phenomenon.
Lastly, it lists several considerations to help authorities better identify the potential for militia
confrontations and to deal with them if they do occur. As a whole, this report provides a detailed
examination of militia confrontations that will enable authorities to better deal with these potentially
dangerous situations.
The Dynamics of Militia Confrontations
Although there are many variations, militia confrontations tend to follow certain patterns, which
allow a better understanding of how and why they occur. There are two general types of militia
confrontations, the sudden and the long-term, but both types generally follow a five-step dynamic:
1. Identifying the “victim” of government
2. Mobilizing support/Getting the word out
3. Appearance at the scene
4. Confrontation Period
5. Aftermath
Identifying the “Victim”
The first step towards a militia confrontation involves the identification of a perceived victim. The
militia movement, though it often engages in aggressive rhetoric, as well as illegal activities,
conceives itself to be essentially a defensive force. It is much easier for militia leaders to mobilize
followers to support what is alleged to be an effort to aid a person in distress than to mobilize them
for an overtly aggressive act.
Typically, the alleged “victim” (herein simply called victim) is not an actual member of a militia
group, but may well have similar views and opinions. The victim may be a friend or associate of
militia members or of members of other “patriot” groups. This seems to be true most often when the
issue is a drawn-out issue such as a foreclosure, in which long periods of time are available for the
victim to communicate his or her problems and frustrations to friends and associates. The result is
that a general awareness of the victim’s predicament is generated among extremist groups in the area,
and they may eventually be persuaded to mobilize to help. These are also the circumstances in which
law enforcement has the best chance of learning about such situations and anticipating possible
confrontations.
One example involves a soybean farmer in East Arkansas named David Hooker, who ran into
problems in the 1990s repaying a $400,000 loan from a Minnesota-based bank. Hooker then adopted
“common law” tactics, claiming that the loan never occurred and that the bank wasn’t even allowed
to do business in Arkansas. He used similar tactics with a company from whom he purchased farm
equipment. The bank was not impressed and took actions to repossess the land. Hooker’s next
tactic, in August 1997, was to hold what was billed as a “militia rally” on his farm, inviting people to
learn about his situation in an attempt to drum up support. “They are trying to steal my rights by
stealing people’s property,” he told his audience, “It’s time for people to stand up and make these
people stop what they’re doing.”[iii]
One of the attendees at the meeting was Drew Rayner, head of the North Mississippi Militia, and,
significantly, an advocate of militia confrontations. It wasn’t that far from Ocean City, Mississippi,
to Palestine, Arkansas, so Rayner could easily make the journey. “I could have been at home playing
with my grandbabies,” he told a reporter from Little Rock, “But I heard about this on the Internet and
got phone calls about it and I thought I’d come up here and show my support.” Another attendee was
Bill Cockrell, who had previously been the beneficiary of a militia confrontation led by Rayner.[iv]
In the end, though there was much talk about banking fraud, no actual confrontation developed.
Hooker’s farm was eventually seized and sold. Many potential confrontations never develop beyond
the first or second stages, as not enough support is mobilized.[v]
The Hooker situation, well known to local authorities, developed over a period of years, punctuated
by Hooker’s various lawsuits and appeals. However, a more common event is when victim status is
suddenly precipitated. In such cases, local authorities are often unaware that the person or persons
they are about to be involved with could possibly precipitate some sort of confrontation. Sudden
confrontations are most likely to develop due to a raid by law enforcement officers or some other
unexpected appearance by such officers. The subject of the raid or visit may panic—especially if the
subject has actually broken the law—and begin calling for help. Often, such actions will be unknown
to law enforcement officers attempting to enter the residence.
One example of a precipitous confrontation occurred in Parma, Ohio, in 1995. Although some
particulars of the incident are unclear, it appears that a militia member named Andrew Starr admitted
to ATF agents that he and another militia member or sympathizer named Mathew Stedman had
conspired to manufacture illegal firearms. Consequently ATF agents and Parma Police Department
officers went to Stedman’s residence (his parent’s house) on June 23, 1995, and asked if they could
search the house. Stedman replied that he had to restrain his dogs first, then slammed the door on the
officers.[vi]
The officers called for backup, while some went to get a search warrant. Suspecting that the man
might be violent, authorities set up a perimeter around the house and evacuated residents from nearby
houses. They also shut off electricity to the neighborhood. Agents, as well as Stedman’s parents,
tried telephoning Stedman, but there was no answer. The standoff lasted all night long (neighbors
had to sleep at hotels or elsewhere).
Unknown to officers, the residence was empty. Stedman had fled almost immediately, seeking out
members of the militia. By the next morning, Ohio militia members had positioned themselves
around the perimeter, some walking through the neighborhood, while others drove around in
vehicles, communicating by citizens band radio. Militia members told ATF agents they were there to
“monitor the situation.” Militia members, including some from other states, also began phoning the
local ATF offices and the Parma Police Department. ATF agents saw no weapons, though there were
reports that some militia members were armed. However, the fact that the house was empty meant
that there could be no full-fledged confrontation; when shortly after dawn officers entered the house,
they discovered it was empty, and the “standoff” situation quickly evaporated.
The phone calls to police agencies are one of the few clues (if officers do not know beforehand) of
militia or extremist proclivities that a potential standoff or confrontation may provide. This is
because a common extremist tactic is that of the “phone wave.” Militia leaders urge their followers
to bombard local law enforcement and judicial offices with waves of phone calls, to intimidate
people and to tie up the system. There are even videotapes that promote the sometimes frustrating
tactic. Because phone waves are often conducted on behalf of people who are in situations conducive
to militia confrontations (the exception consisting basically of phone waves occurring after an arrest),
phone calls by extremists supporting people in standoff-like circumstances should be taken by
authorities as evidence pointing to the possibility of a militia confrontation.
For example, on April 19, 1999, a regular listener called into Michigan militia leader Mark
Koernke’s “Intelligence Report” shortwave radio program. The listener, a Louisiana woman named
Shannon Champagne, claimed that officers had tried to serve her with a bench warrant for not
appearing in court over a traffic violation, but apparently she attempted to prevent the service,
refusing to open the door for them. She told Koernke that she was willing to “draw a line in the
sand” over the issue. She asked listeners to call the sheriff’s office on her behalf. Koernke told her
that there were people in neighboring states who could help her and that she should call them. The
next day, discussing the incident, Koernke reported that even Canadians had called down to
Louisiana. But one month later, a distraught Shannon called the program again—at that very
moment the local sheriff was evicting her and her boyfriend from their residence. In this case,
perhaps because authorities were in the same room as Shannon, Koernke merely suggested that local
militia members provide “physical assistance” in helping them move and tried to calm Shannon
down.[vii]
Precipitous confrontations are, understandably, hard to predict, but there are some possible
confrontations that are even more difficult to anticipate. These are “opportunity” confrontations, in
which the victim has no connection whatsoever to militia members or extremists, but is nevertheless
identified as a suitable victim by local or other militia groups. Sometimes, as in the case of Shirley
Allen (see appendix), the confrontation occurs because of media publicity given to an initial
incident. However, confrontations may be even more sudden and unanticipated, because many
militia groups have members who routinely use scanners to monitor police and emergency
communications. Thus, based on the incomplete and partial information available through those
sources alone, a militia group could potentially decide to intervene.
An example of a near-intervention incident illustrates the potential dangers of such a confrontation.
In late March 1995, the patriot community was beset, as it so often is, by rumors of an imminent
“roundup” of patriot and militia leaders by federal law enforcement. In Licking County, Ohio, a
county somewhat to the east of Columbus, a militia member spotted two vehicles full of men in black
uniforms and alerted other militia members in that county. These members panicked, because the
alleged sighting took place only two miles from the house of one of the leaders of the militia. The
militia assumed that some sort of government team was out to get him, so they “mobilized.” They
also contacted J. J. Johnson, a telephone lineman in Columbus and at that time spokesperson for the
Ohio Unorganized Militia. Johnson and his wife Helen also assumed some sort of “takedown” was
involved, so they notified militia members near Licking County.
According to J. J. Johnson (who spoke about the incident several days later to a militia group in
Michigan), one militia member monitoring transmissions via scanner found civilian transmissions on
a military channel which seemed to be law enforcement officers reporting about a surveillance target
they were following. The militia assumed that this was in fact a reference to the “situation” in
Licking County and began preparing “for what might possibly be a hostile action.” Eventually,
however, they “stood down,” when it became clear that the police transmissions had to do with a law
enforcement action in Columbus itself. In fact, following a year-long undercover investigation, ATF
agents, U.S. Marshals and Columbus police officers launched major raids against members of a gang
in Columbus called the Short North Posse that had been suspected of drug trafficking, firearms
violations and money laundering. Well over forty members were arrested. The Ohio militia
members had been listening to transmissions coming from the police command post established at
the Ohio State Fairgrounds.[viii]
One can imagine what might have happened had either the Ohio militia actually descended on
Licking County—perhaps encountering a law enforcement officer they thought might be involved in
the "situation”—or alternatively, decided that the events in Columbus merited their attention. A
major police raid against a gang of heavily-armed drug dealers that suddenly encountered armed and
somewhat hostile militia members appearing out of nowhere could easily go awry. The odds for
some sort of encounter were increased by the fact that J. J. Johnson, who coordinated militia
activities during the scare, was a proponent of militia confrontations. In fact, shortly after the scare,
he addressed a group of militiamen and gave them advice on how to handle such situations. Upon
hearing of an event, the militia should first send someone in a vehicle with a pager or other radio to
the scene, to act as the eyes and ears of the militia. Then efforts should be made to make sure that
law enforcement does not have “control of the situation.” Johnson called this activity “FACT,” for
“First Amendment Chaos & Tactics.” Examples of suggested tactics for militia members included
calling the Fire Department and reporting a fire in the neighborhood of the victim, calling the media
and having them show up, ordering pizza deliveries for the house, calling airport shuttle services, and
ordering taxicabs from various companies. Members in the area were urged to take actions such as
setting off strings of firecrackers and unplugging fire hydrants. The idea, he suggested, was to make
police lose control of the situation and to “close them down until help gets on the way.” Johnson did
not elaborate on the nature of that help. The potential tragic effects of gunfire-imitating firecrackers
being set off during a tense standoff situation should be obvious to all.[ix]
Mobilizing Support
After militia groups have identified a victim, the next step towards a militia confrontation is
mobilizing support for such an event. Far more attempts at mobilization are made than actually
succeed, and failure usually indicates that a confrontation will not occur. Human nature being what it
is, many militia members are often more willing to engage the enemy rhetorically rather than to do it
in the flesh. At that point, considerations such as family, job, and jail begin to come into play.
Nevertheless, there are times when militia leaders successfully convince a critical mass of followers
to take action, and confrontations often ensue as a result. Consequently, the procedures involved in
mobilizing support are worth looking at in detail. The examples already given provide some
indication of how support is mobilized—primarily through electronic means, whether the pagers of
the Ohio Militia or Mark Koernke’s shortwave radio show. What they share is the ability to reach
large numbers of followers over great distances in a remarkably short period of time. Leaving aside
print media such as newsletters and magazines, the most common mobilization instruments include:
1) Fax machines
2) Telephones and pagers
3) Shortwave radio
4) Other radio: CBs, ham radio, satellite radio and FM microtransmitters
5) The Internet
These bear discussion in more detail.
One of the most prominent methods of mobilization over the past decade has been the fax machine.
To a certain extent, it has declined in popularity over time, though not as much as some other
methods, such as computer bulletin boards, which have been eclipsed by the Internet. The heydey of
the fax machine was the period 1992-1996, when several fax networks such as the American Patriot
Fax Network were able to reach large numbers of people in the patriot movement. Faxes have the
advantage over telephones and pagers in that they can transmit photographs and other visual
graphics; however, the Internet has largely usurped this function. Faxes, sent long distance over the
phone line, are also somewhat expensive to send. As a result, most of the large fax networks became
moribund, though faxes are still sometimes used.
The power of fax networks can be seen in an example provided by one confrontation from 1995. In
January 1995, local authorities in Whatcom County, Washington, planned to evict a 70-year-old
veterinarian, Donald Ellwanger, from his property. Ellwanger was a tax protester owing more than
$130,000 in back taxes who argued that he was a sovereign of the “Kingdom of God.” He and his
supporters contacted the American Patriot Fax Network, which sent out flyers to patriot and militia
groups throughout the western United States. The effort resulted in forty people showing up at
Ellwanger’s clinic, blockading the property with their vehicles and causing police to back down and
postpone the eviction. The Washington State Patrol and the Whatcom County Sheriff’s Department
gave contradictory answers as to whether or not the people who showed up were militia members,
but Ellwanger himself said that at least some of them were. The power of the fax machine, however,
was incontrovertibly demonstrated. Eventually, authorities successfully evicted Ellwanger.[x]
Telephones and pagers are also frequently used, although the paranoia of many members causes them
to think that such devices are monitored with far greater frequency than they actually are. As a
result, members are frequently asked to use coded messages rather than speak openly. A number of
militia units go so far as to require that all their members wear pagers, so that they can be mobilized
easily by militia leaders.
Shortwave radio has emerged as one of the most important tools in the propagation of militia news
and alerts. Technology allows militia and patriot figures to conduct radio talk shows from their own
homes, using telephone lines to connect to a radio transmitter hundreds or even thousands of miles
away. In addition, they reach people who may not be able to access the Internet with ease. Often
such shows are sponsored by precious metals dealers or survival goods merchants who rely on the
fear and paranoia inspired in listening audiences by the program hosts to generate sales. Some
shortwave radio hosts routinely broadcast messages about extremists in distress, and either explicitly
or implicitly urge that listeners rally to help them. During the Montana Freemen standoff, militia
members in New England were urged to contact shortwave hosts if they faced “hostile encounters.”
Suggested a militia newsletter, “This will get you a nationally broadcast forum 24 hours per day; our
underground networks will be activated and we will do everything in our power to assist you.”[xi]
One recent example comes from Mark Koernke’s “Intelligence Report.” In July 1999, an extremist
named Robert Bournes was indicted on weapons charges, but was for a time unwilling to give
himself in. He seemed to have been encouraged in this by Koernke, who held out the example of a
Michigan militia member who had recently been given a forty-year sentence. Koernke used his
radio program to mobilize support for Bournes, suggesting that militia groups in Michigan, Indiana
and Ohio were on alert and were ready to fight the feds. His broadcasts were highly confrontational,
even suggesting that although the militia would not go against “rank and file” federal agents, it would
go after the people who sent them. Predicting actual fighting, he said the conflict "probably won't
start the way you think, but will probably involve a secondary event on the road."[xii]
Although shortwave radio is the most powerful radio format, in terms of mobilizing support, it is not
the only one. Various other formats, including satellite radio, ham radio, and FM microtransmitters
are often used. These signals can generally only be picked up by a small number of people, but the
Internet is increasing the reach of such programs, because it is possible to send audio programs out
through the Internet, even more or less “live.” Thus many of these programs are also “broadcast”
over the Internet.
The Internet, in fact, is quickly becoming the most important tool of militia and “patriot”
mobilization, surpassing shortwave radio. Extremists recognized the power of computer
communications long before the Internet became widely used. They easily made the leap to the
Internet in the 1990s, using features such as e-mail lists and Usenet newsgroups. The advent of the
World Wide Web in the mid-1990s opened up a new avenue of approach, one which extremists
quickly adopted. The first extremist website, Stormfront, a Neo-Nazi site, began operation in early
1995. Today there are thousands.
The Internet offers inexpensive, extremely fast communication. Militia members and other
extremists can post daily or even more frequent updates to developing situations on their own
webpages. By 1997 one confrontation episode in Massachusetts even had its own Web site. Aside
from online chat, the quickest form of Internet communication remains Usenet. Usenet is a
collection of thousands of discussion groups, to which people post messages on related subjects. One
such newsgroup, for instance, is misc.activism.militia, started in January 1995 to talk about the then
still-new militia movement. Because Usenet does not involve designing webpages, but merely
typing messages, it often approaches “real time” in the speed of its interactions. Rumors, repeated
often in a short span of time, quickly become accepted as fact. As a result, Usenet often plays an
important role in mobilizing militia support. During the 1997 “siege” of Shirley Allen in Roby,
Illinois, for instance, militia and “patriot” sympathizers daily discussed the situation and what should
be done.
One example of a Usenet alert may provide an illustration of their inflammatory nature. The
following example comes from late 1997, when an Oregon family had a brief confrontation over
land. It is only an edited portion of the entire message, which describes the situation in more detail;
typography is as in original:
Forum: Alt.conspiracy
Subject: Militia Alert – No More Burning of Men, Women & Children
Date: 1997/11/07
Author:
