Securing critical infrastructures and critical control systems : approaches for threat protection

451 Pages·2013·18.93 MB·English

by  Christopher Laing, Atta Badii, Paul Vickers

Securing Critical
Infrastructures and
Critical Control Systems:
Approaches for Threat
Protection
Christopher Laing
Northumbria University, UK
Atta Badii
University of Reading, UK
Paul Vickers
Northumbria University, UK
Managing Director: Lindsay Johnston
Editorial Director: Joel Gamon
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Securing critical infrastructures and critical control systems: approaches for threat protection / Christopher Laing, Atta Badii,
and Paul Vickers, editors.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4666-2659-1 (hardcover) -- ISBN 978-1-4666-2690-4 (ebook) -- ISBN 978-1-4666-2721-5 (print & perpetual
access) 1. Buildings--Security measures. 2. Intelligent buildings. I. Laing, Christopher. II. Badii, Atta. III. Vickers, Paul,
1966-
TH9705.S38 2013
658.4’73--dc23
2012032808
British Cataloguing in Publication Data
A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.
All work contributed to this book is new, previously-unpublished material. The views expressed in this book are those of the
authors, but not necessarily of the publisher.
Editorial Advisory Board
Alan Boulanger, BlueRISC, USA
Alvaro A. Cardenas, University of Texas at Dallas, USA
Tom Fairfax, Security Risk Management Ltd, UK
Ernie Hayden, USA
John Glover, MayneStay Consulting Group Ltd, Canada
Samuel A. Merrell, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Paul Maliszewski, Arizona State University, USA
Chris Sandford, Wurldtech, The Netherlands
Corey Schou, Idaho State University, USA
List of Reviewers
Bill Bailey, Edith Cowan University, Australia
Esteban Garcia-Cuesta, iSOCO, Spain
Robert Doleman, Edith Cowan University, Australia
Ian Ellefsen, University of Johannesburg, South Africa
Tony H. Grubesic, Drexel University, USA
M. A. Hossain, Northumbria University, UK
Peter H. Jenney, Security Innovation, USA
Sean Lawson, University of Utah, USA
Gabriele Oliva, University Campus Biomedico of Rome, Italy
Neil Robinson, RAND Europe, UK
Bonnie Zhu, University of California at Berkeley, USA
Table of Contents
Preface..................................................................................................................................................xiii
Acknowledgment.................................................................................................................................xix
Chapter 1
Security.Threats.and.Risks.of.Intelligent.Building.Systems:.Protecting.Facilities.from.Current.and.
Emerging.Vulnerabilities.........................................................................................................................1
David Brooks, Edith Cowan University, Australia
Chapter 2
Detecting.Cyber.Attacks.on.SCADA.and.Other.Critical.Infrastructures...............................................17
Maurilio Pereira Coutinho, Itajuba Federal University, Brazil
Germano Lambert-Torres, Itajuba Federal University, Brazil
Luiz Eduardo Borges da Silva, Itajuba Federal University, Brazil
Horst Lazarek, Technische Universität Dresden, Germany
Elke Franz, Technische Universität Dresden, Germany
Chapter 3
Proactive.Security.Protection.of.Critical.Infrastructure:.A.Process.Driven.Methodology....................54
Bill Bailey, Edith Cowan University, Australia
Robert Doleman, Edith Cowan University, Australia
Chapter 4
Industrial.Control.Systems:.The.Human.Threat....................................................................................82
Antony Bridges, QinetiQ, UK
Chapter 5
ENISA.Study:.Challenges.in.Securing.Industrial.Control.Systems.....................................................105
Rafal Leszczyna, ENISA, European Union & Gdansk University of Technology, Poland
Elyoenai Egozcue, S21sec, Spain
Chapter 6
Distributed.Monitoring:.A.Framework.for.Securing.Data.Acquisition...............................................144
Matthew Brundage, The University of Tulsa, USA
Anastasia Mavridou, The University of Tulsa, USA
James Johnson, The University of Tulsa, USA
Peter J. Hawrylak, The University of Tulsa, USA
Mauricio Papa, The University of Tulsa, USA
Chapter 7
Motivating.Cybersecurity:.Assessing.the.Status.of.Critical.Infrastructure.as.an.Object.of.
Cyber.Threats.......................................................................................................................................168
Sean Lawson, University of Utah, USA
Chapter 8
Patching.our.Critical.Infrastructure:.Towards.an.Efficient.Patch.and.Update.Management.for.
Industrial.Control.Systems...................................................................................................................190
Konstantin Knorr, Trier University of Applied Sciences, Germany
Chapter 9
ICS.Software.Protection......................................................................................................................217
Peter H. Jenney, Security Innovation, USA
Chapter 10
A.Community-Oriented.Approach.to.CIIP.in.Developing.Countries..................................................240
Ian Ellefsen, University of Johannesburg, South Africa
Sebastiaan von Solms, University of Johannesburg, South Africa
Chapter 11
Designing.a.Security.Audit.Plan.for.a.Critical.Information.Infrastructure.(CII).................................262
Eduardo E. Gelbstein, Webster University, Geneva, Switzerland
Chapter 12
Safety.and.Security.in.SCADA.Systems.Must.be.Improved.through.Resilience.Based.Risk.
Management.........................................................................................................................................286
Stig O. Johnsen, The Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway
Chapter 13
Fortifying.Large.Scale,.Geospatial.Networks:.Implications.for.Supervisory.Control..
and.Data.Acquisition.Systems.............................................................................................................301
Alan T. Murray, Arizona State University, USA
Tony H. Grubesic, Drexel University, USA
Chapter 14
Information.Sharing.for.CIP:.Between.Policy,.Theory,.and.Practice..................................................324
Neil Robinson, RAND Europe, UK
Chapter 15
Intrusion.Detection.and.Resilient.Control.for.SCADA.Systems.........................................................352
Bonnie Zhu, University of California at Berkeley, USA
Shankar Sastry, University of California at Berkely, USA
Compilation of References................................................................................................................384
About the Contributors.....................................................................................................................419
Index....................................................................................................................................................427
Detailed Table of Contents
Preface..................................................................................................................................................xiii
Acknowledgment.................................................................................................................................xix
Chapter 1
Security.Threats.and.Risks.of.Intelligent.Building.Systems:.Protecting.Facilities.from.Current.and.
Emerging.Vulnerabilities.........................................................................................................................1
David Brooks, Edith Cowan University, Australia
Intelligent.Buildings.(IB).are.facility-wide.systems.that.connect,.control,.and.monitor.the.plant.and.
equipment.of.a.facility...The.aim.of.IB.is.to.ensure.a.facility.is.more.efficient,.productive,.and.safe,.at.a.
reduced.cost...A.typical.IB.integrates.diverse.subsystems.into.a.common.and.open.data.communication.
network,.using.both.software.and.hardware;.however,.IBs.suffer.from.diverse.generic.vulnerabilities..
Identified.vulnerabilities.may.include.limited.awareness.of.security.threats.and.system.vulnerabilities,.
physical.access.to.parts.of.the.system,.compromise.of.various.networks,.insertion.of.foreign.devices,.lack.
of.physical.security,.and.reliance.on.utility.power...IB.risks.are.contextual.and.aligned.with.the.threat.
exposure.of.the.facility...Nevertheless,.there.are.generic.mitigation.strategies.that.can.be.put.in.place.
to.protect.IB.systems...Strategies.include.threat-driven.security.risk.management,.an.understanding.of.
system.criticality,.greater.integration.of.departments,.network.isolation,.layered.protection.measures,.
and.increased.security.awareness.
Chapter 2
Detecting.Cyber.Attacks.on.SCADA.and.Other.Critical.Infrastructures...............................................17
Maurilio Pereira Coutinho, Itajuba Federal University, Brazil
Germano Lambert-Torres, Itajuba Federal University, Brazil
Luiz Eduardo Borges da Silva, Itajuba Federal University, Brazil
Horst Lazarek, Technische Universität Dresden, Germany
Elke Franz, Technische Universität Dresden, Germany
Nowadays,.critical.infrastructure.plays.a.fundamental.role.in.our.modern.society..Telecommunication.and.
transportation.services,.water.and.electricity.supply,.and.banking.and.financial.services.are.examples.of.
such.infrastructures..They.expose.society.to.security.threats..To.safeguard.against.these.threats,.providers.
of.critical.infrastructure.services.also.need.to.maintain.the.security.objectives.of.their.interdependent.
data.networks..As.an.important.part.of.the.electric.power.system.critical.infrastructure,.Supervisory.
Control.and.Data.Acquisition.(SCADA).systems.require.protection.from.a.variety.of.threats,.and.their.
network.infrastructures.are.potentially.vulnerable.to.cyber.attacks.because.security.has.not.been.part.
of.their.design..The.diversity.and.lack.of.interoperability.in.the.communication.protocols.also.create.
obstacles.for.anyone.attempting.to.establish.secure.communication..In.order.to.improve.the.security.of.
SCADA.systems,.anomaly.detection.can.be.used.to.identify.corrupted.values.caused.by.malicious.at-
tacks.and.injection.faults..The.aim.of.this.chapter.is.to.present.an.alternative.technique.for.implementing.
anomaly.detection.to.monitor.electric.power.electric.systems..The.problem.is.addressed.here.by.the.use.
of.rough.set.theory.
Chapter 3
Proactive.Security.Protection.of.Critical.Infrastructure:.A.Process.Driven.Methodology....................54
Bill Bailey, Edith Cowan University, Australia
Robert Doleman, Edith Cowan University, Australia
The.belief.that.a.static.alarm.system.will.safeguard.critical.infrastructure.without.additional.support.
mechanisms.is.misplaced..This.complacency.is.no.longer.satisfactory.with.the.increase.in.worldwide.
threat.levels.and.the.potential.social.consequences..What.is.required.is.a.more.proactive,.comprehensive.
security.management.process.that.adds.to.the.ability.to.prevent,.detect,.deter,.respond,.and.defeat.potential.
harmful.events.and.incidents..The.model.proposed.here.is.proactive.and.grounded.upon.current.opera-
tional.procedures.used.by.major.companies.in.hostile.and.dangerous.environments..By.utilising.a.clearly.
defined.comprehensive.risk.management.tool,.a.more.systematic.security,.threat,.risk,.and.vulnerability.
assessment.(STRVA),.process.can.be.developed..This.process.needs.to.identify.deliberate.targeting.of.
assets.through.multiple.intelligence.gathering.capabilities,.plus.defeat.testing.to.probe.existing.security.
defences..The.consequence.approach.to.a.potential.breakthrough.is.at.the.essence.of.this.methodology.
Chapter 4
Industrial.Control.Systems:.The.Human.Threat....................................................................................82
Antony Bridges, QinetiQ, UK
As.industrial.control.systems.(ICSs).have.been.connected.to.wider.organisational.networks.and.the.In-
ternet,.the.threat.from.unauthorised.access.has.increased...Protecting.these.systems.from.attack.requires.
not.just.the.use.of.appropriate.technological.solutions.but.also.an.understanding.of.the.humans.within.
the.wider.system...It.is.not.sufficient.that.the.human.knows.what.they.need.to.do...They.must.also.be.
willing.and.able.to.do.it...This.chapter.highlights.some.of.the.human.vulnerabilities.within.Industrial.
Control.Systems.and.suggests.that.greater.consideration.of.and.adaptation.to.the.human.limitations.will.
enhance.the.future.security.of.these.systems.
Chapter 5
ENISA.Study:.Challenges.in.Securing.Industrial.Control.Systems.....................................................105
Rafal Leszczyna, ENISA, European Union & Gdansk University of Technology, Poland
Elyoenai Egozcue, S21sec, Spain
In.2011,.the.European.Network.and.Information.Security.Agency.(ENISA).conducted.a.study.in.the.
domain.of.Industrial.Control.Systems.(ICS)..Its.objective.was.to.obtain.the.current.view.on.the.ICS.
protection.primarily.in.Europe.but.also.in.the.international.context..The.‘portrait’.included.threats,.risks,.
and.challenges.in.the.area.of.ICS.protection.as.well.as.national,.pan.European,.and.international.initia-
tives.on.ICS.security..The.study.was.performed.through.desktop.research,.survey.and.interviews,.and.a.
meeting.with.all.involved.stakeholders..This.chapter.highlights.the.most.relevant.parts.of.the.final.report.
of.the.study..It.focuses.on.the.challenges.to.securing.ICS.identified.during.the.research,.but.also.presents.
the.context.and.the.methodology.of.the.study..In.response.to.the.challenges,.the.seven.recommendations.
of.ENISA.for.protecting.ICS.are.proposed.
Chapter 6
Distributed.Monitoring:.A.Framework.for.Securing.Data.Acquisition...............................................144
Matthew Brundage, The University of Tulsa, USA
Anastasia Mavridou, The University of Tulsa, USA
James Johnson, The University of Tulsa, USA
Peter J. Hawrylak, The University of Tulsa, USA
Mauricio Papa, The University of Tulsa, USA
SCADA.systems.monitor.and.control.many.critical.installations.around.the.world,.interpreting.informa-
tion.gathered.from.a.multitude.of.resources.to.drive.physical.processes.to.a.desired.state..In.order.for.the.
system.to.react.correctly,.the.data.it.collects.from.sensors.must.be.reliable,.accurate,.and.timely,.regardless.
of.distance.and.environmental.conditions..This.chapter.presents.a.framework.for.secure.data.acquisition.
in.SCADA.systems.using.a.distributed.monitoring.solution..An.overview.of.the.framework.is.followed.
by.a.detailed.description.of.a.monitoring.system.designed.specifically.to.improve.the.security.posture.
and.act.as.a.first.step.towards.more.intelligent.tools.and.operations..The.architecture.of.the.Smart.Grid.
is.used.to.analyze.and.evaluate.benefits.that.the.proposed.monitoring.system.can.provide..Finally,.the.
effects.and.use.of.Radio.Frequency.Identification.(RFID).and.ZigBee.as.data.acquisition.platforms.are.
discussed.in.the.context.of.the.proposed.solution.
Chapter 7
Motivating.Cybersecurity:.Assessing.the.Status.of.Critical.Infrastructure.as.an.Object.of.
Cyber.Threats.......................................................................................................................................168
Sean Lawson, University of Utah, USA
Based.on.an.analysis.of.key.policy.documents.and.statements.from.civilian.policymakers,.military.leaders,.
and.cybersecurity.experts,.this.chapter.demonstrates.that.although.there.is.still.concern.over.cyber.threats.
to.critical.infrastructure,.other.threat.objects.have.begun.to.figure.more.prominently.in.public.policy.
discourse.about.cybersecurity.in.the.United.States..In.particular,.intellectual.property.and.government.
secrets.are.now.identified.most.often.as.the.primary.object.of.cyber.threats..When.critical.infrastructure.
is.mentioned,.it.is.often.used.as.a.motivational.tactic,.with.collapse.of.critical.infrastructure.serving.as.
a.central.theme.of.hypothetical.scenarios.meant.to.motivate.a.policy.response..This.chapter.documents.
and.critically.evaluates.this.shift.in.U.S..cybersecurity.discourse.
Chapter 8
Patching.our.Critical.Infrastructure:.Towards.an.Efficient.Patch.and.Update.Management.for.
Industrial.Control.Systems...................................................................................................................190
Konstantin Knorr, Trier University of Applied Sciences, Germany
Worm.epidemics.such.as.Stuxnet.and.Conficker.have.raised.great.interest.in.the.public.and.media.lately.
and.stressed.the.question.of.how.our.critical.infrastructure.can.be.protected.against.such.attacks..Besides.
reactive.measures.like.incident.response,.pro-active.counter.measures.are.required..Patch.management.
is.such.an.essential.pro-active.measure.for.the.secure.operation.of.our.critical.infrastructure..It.is.an.
indispensable.activity.which.is.required.in.many.standards..This.chapter.focuses.on.patch.and.update.
management.for.industrial.control.systems.that.are.part.of.our.critical.infrastructure..Standards.for.the.
automation.of.patch.management.and.selected.operational.security.standards.are.discussed.in.the.context.
of.patch.management..The.main.contribution.of.the.chapter.is.the.definition.and.description.of.a.standard.
conform.patch.management.process.for.industrial.control.systems.with.special.focus.on.the.interaction.
between.operator.and.vendor.of.such.systems.