Rousseau, Nature, and the Problem of the Good Life

119 Pages·2006·15.81 MB·English

by  Laurence D. Cooper

Laurence D. Cooper
Rousseau, Nature,
and the
Problem of the Good Life
The Pennsylvania State University Press
University Park, Pennsylvania
B li'.:i9.. M'3 (00
To Vicki
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Cooper, L urence D., 1962-
Rouss au, nature, and the problem of the good life / Laurence
elle plaft chaque jour davantage-Emile V:410
D. Cooper.
p. cm.
includes bibliographical references and index.
lSBN 0-271-01922-0 (cloth: alk. paper)
lSBN 0-271-01923-9 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 1712-1778. 2. Philosophical
anthropology-History-18th century. 3. Phil sophy of
nature-Hi t ry- J8th century. 4. Political cience--History-18th
century. I. Title.
B2138.M3 C66 1999
194---<lc21 98-50149
CIP
1.
Copyright© 1999 The Pennsylvania State University
All rights reserved
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minimum requirements f American National Standard for Information Sciences
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I
Contents
Preface/ ix
Acknowledgments / xv
Abbreviations / xvi
Introduction: Rousseau and the Question of the Good Life / 1
Roussau, Nature, and History/ 4
The Plan of This Book / 11
1 The Goodness of All Good Lives / 17
Beyond Happiness, or What Makes the Good Life Good / 19
The Two Components of the Good Life/ 30
2 Nature and Human Nature, Part I: What ls Natural?/ 37
The Fixedness of Man's "Present Nature" / 41
Charting the Human Landscape: Two Chasms
One Bridgeable, the Other Not/ 4 7
Charting the Human Landscape: Five Human Types,
Three Natural Men, One Civilized Savage/ 51
"What ls Natural in the Savage State" and "What Is Natural
in the Civil State" / 59
viii Contents
3 Nature and Human Nature, Part II: Emile, or the Naturalization
of Second Nature/ 67
Between Aristotle and Hobbes, Between Plato and Freud:
Preface
A Word on Rousseau's Distinctiveness/ 69
Sublimation in Rousseau: Conscience as Alchemist/ 80
What Else Is Natural, and Why/ 105
4 The Problem of Self-Love/ 115
The Stakes / 119
Amour-Propre's Inevitability / 120
The philosophy of]ean-Jacques Rousseau is famous-some would say infamous
Amour-Propre's Ambiguity / 122
-for its apparent contradictions. At some places it appears radically individ
Amour-Propre's Influence on Character and Behavior/ 130 ualistic; at others, just as radically collectivist. In some works Rousseau rhap
sodizes about nature or love and emerges as a founder of Romanticism, while
What Amour-Propre Is and How It Arises/ 136
in others he speaks the harder language of austere virtue and so seems a mod
Answers and Rebuttals: An Attempt at Dialectic / 13 7 em Stoic. And there are other paradoxes as well. Indeed, so manifold and so
pronounced are these contradictions that they have led to an astounding array
The Birth of Amour-Propre / 150
of conflicting interpretations. Perhaps no other philosophical corpus-and
How Much Amour-Propre, and What Kind? Gentleness almost certainly no other corpus as systematically coherent as Rousseau's
Versus Cruelty, Pride Versus Vanity/ 160 -has been subject to so many contrary readings.1 Rousseau has been variously
tagged as a revolutionary, a conservative, a protototalitarian, and a progressive
I . Beyond Amour-Propre? Prospects and Possibilities/ 172
-and these designations only cover his political thought.2 The psychological,
5 Critical Reflections on Rousseau's Naturalism/ 183 anthropological, and aesthetic aspects of his thought are equally subtle and
have given rise to their own interpretive controversies.
A Return to Wholeness / 186
But if the most problematic of Rousseau's paradoxes stern from the conflict
The Perils of Rousseau's Naturalism: ing character of his solutions, the most significant is found in his basic diag
Some Concluding Reflections / 190 nosis of the human condition. The greatest paradox in Rousseau's work is the
Rousseau's Subjectivism and Its Consequences/ 191 l. Rousseau insisted that his thought was a systematic whole whose many contradictions are
resolvable. (See Dialogues Ill:211-14.) It should be noted at the outset that I accept his claim, even
The Denial of Amour-Propre's Naturalness and the if many others do not. The most convincing argument for the truth of Rousseau's claim is made by
Consequences for Our Moral Lives/ 195 Arthur M. Melzer in The Natural Goodness of Man: On the System of Rousseau's Thought (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990). It is my hope that the present work will, among other things,
References / 209 shed further light on the truth and meaning of Rousseau's claim.
2. For a sense of the breadth and persistence of the interpretive controversy surrounding
Rousseau's works, see Guy H. Dodge, ed., Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Authoritarian Libertarian! (Lexing
Index/ 215 ton, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1971). See also the bibliographical surveys in Asher Horowitz, Rousseau,
Nature, and History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 3-26, and Peter Gay's introduc
tion to The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, by Ernst Cassirer (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1954), 17-24.
x Preface Preface xi
contrast between his exculpatory claim that man is naturally good and his before, but that was before he had fully developed his reason-and before any
damning insistence that man is wicked and mean. Few have argued either side one had been able to explain what is at stake and what nature really is, as
of this paradox as strenuously as Rousseau, let alone both sides. The signifi Rousseau now has done.
cance of this paradox has little to do with the difficulty it presents to To the second problem, however, there is no such easily imagined solution.
Rousseau's readers. Indeed, as veteran readers of Rousseau know, the paradox That problem is as forbidding as it is simple: nature, as Rousseau conceives it, is
is not all that difficult to resolve, for what is exculpated and what is indicted not teleological. It does not comprehend ends. Consequently, it does not pre
are two separate things-namely, nature and man, respectively. It is nature scribe any particular way of life for human beings once they have departed from
that is good. To say that man by nature is good is to say thatman was good their original state. In short, it lays out no path. To be sure, it offers certain
while he remained natural. Today, no longer natural, he is corrupt and corrupts consolations. Some are able to admire nature's harmony and take a certain joy
all he touches. As Rousseau puts it at the start of book I of Emile, "Everything in doing so.3 And the wise among us can even find a measure of freedom
is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates through studying nature: they can recognize the unnaturalness of certain pas
in the hands of man" (37). Among the things that have degenerated in the sions and liberate themselves, at least partly, from their stranglehold.4 But
hands of man, he explains, is man himself. these are only palliatives, not solutions. As Rousseau sees it, no one has yet
Rather, the contrast between natural goodness and human degradation is so found in nature a comprehensive solution to the human problem. No one has
significant because in it is contained the whole grim logic of man's lot as been able to derive from that pure source a prescription for impure humanity.5
Rousseau sees it. That logic might be expressed as follows. Man is sorely in No one, that is, prior to himself. For this is exactly what Rousseau purports
need of redemption, yet the very corruption that has put him in such dire need to have done. He offers a broad range of prescriptive thought, and there is no
prevents him from successfully developing a solution. An attempt at a solu part of that thought that does not in some essential way take its bearings from
tion, being of his own making, would surely fail: "everything degenerates in
the hands of man," or as Rousseau puts it in the Second Discourse, "the vices 3. Rousseau believed that modem men and women, though penneated by unnatural tastes and
that make social institutions necessary are the same ones that make their impulses, could still appreciate at least some of nature's beauty. He expected that readers would
abuse inevitable" (172-73). Humanity, it would seem, is hopelessly lost, its respond to his evocative descriptions of natural beauty and it was not a mistake to do so. Indeed, he
seems to have been a major force in inspiring a new sensibility. Toward the end of his life and con
vision so blurred by corruption that it can never hope to find its way out of the tinuing afrer hi death, a new pag wa rucn"'1 in European culrurnl hi.wry. The literary classes began
morass in which it has placed itself. w discover the beauty uf the councry,i<le, rhe charm of ru£ti.c Ii fe, nncl the volupt1111l1 plca~Wl' of
But perhaps things are not quite as bleak as this logic would suggest. After fr ly exprc$ing ne's reeling,. Pr[scin • nature, once lightly re<1arded, cam ro mean something g o<l
and pure, and"Rouss\'au. Lhe man 11f nalurc, came r, be h~iled as a prophet. For a lasclnating11ml su ·.
all, man may be fallen, but nature is not-indeed, it is wholly good. If we could
cinct discussion of Rousseau's place in this new cultural regime, see Simon Schama, Citizens: A
discover a way to be guided by nature, we just might find a road out of our pre Chronicle of the French Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 150-62.
sent misery. Surely whatever hope we have, if any, lies in nature. 4. Rousseau allows that "true philosophers," motivated in part by a love of order, can free them
$dv fr m many iUu ·ions and unnaturnl pa sions. In thLS they nuumam a closer prox.lmity to narure
And so it does, except that there are two problems. The first, a practical
than either fulsc philus phers, wlw are mnLiV!ltcd ot<lrdy by th le ire for distincrio1,, or ordinal)•
problem, is that man would seem bound to foul whatever solution nature individ11als. Bui c,ven d1e,,e true philosc:Jphers, of whom Socrates would seem ti> have 1,cen the tcues1
might offer up to him. It is hard to imagine that he who causes everything he of all, cannot free themselves totally from unnaturalness. Although motivated in part by the love of
order and the dispassionate love of truth, they are also motivated by pride: they take pleasure in com
touches to degenerate would not botch this too, especially given that he failed
paring themselves to others. And while their pride is more natural than the vanity that motivates
to hew to nature's way the first time. This is no small difficulty, though perhaps most human activity and all false philosophy, it is still unnatural and hence an infringement of nat·
we may be granted license for a certain optimism nonetheless. Perhaps by ural freedom. For Rousseau's praise of true philosophers, see Narcissus 102-7, and FD 63. For more
on Rousseau's estimation of Socrates, see Chapter 4, below, "Amour-Propre's Ambiguity." See also
adopting a nature-based solution, man would be returning to nature, at least in
Julie IV-12:402-3 and IV-7:351-52, in which Wolmar is presented as a true philosopher.
part, and so would cease to cause everything he touches to degenerate. Per
5. Others, of course, such as Aristotle, had claimed to derive ethical and political principles
haps, if he were to follow a path laid out by nature, he could avoid the effects from nature. But since their understanding of nature was to a significant extent teleological, their
of his blurred vision and find his way back to health; perhaps he could even prescriptions are rejected by Rousseau as invalid. For more on the contrast between Rousseau's
understanding of nature and Aristotle's, see Chapter 3, below, "Between Aristotle and Hobbes,
find his way up, to a new healthfulness. True, he strayed from nature once
Between Plato and Freud."
xii Preface Preface xiii
nature. Much-indeed, most---of his prescriptive thought is not offered for it was built upon, not only in theory but also, to a significant extent, in prac
direct, practical use (he would certainly challenge our self-appropriated tice. A new social order began to emerge in Europe, an order based on the the
license for optimism). But he insists on its theoretical validity, and he bases his ories of liberal (and protoliberal) figures such as Locke and Hobbes. Whatever
claim for that validity on the grounds that his "prescriptions" would lead to the differences between them, these theories were constructed upon a shared
the replication of natural goodness.6 Although nature is nonteleological and insight. A successful political and social order, it was believed, must be built
thus would seem to tell us little about how we ought to live once we have left upon and must reinforce the desire for self-preservation, for no other passion
our original state, Rousseau coaxes some rather substantial answers from it can be enlisted so reliably and effectively into the service of peace and security.
after all. How he does so, and what these answers are, is the essential subject In accordance with this insight, liberal theory and a newly emerging liberal
of this book. politics validated the pursuit of rational self-interest and encouraged the pur
suit of comfortable self-preservation; they promoted commerce and commerce
My purpose is twofold. First, through an exploration of his treatment of nature, friendly virtues and so produced a new world.
I hope to improve our general understanding of Rousseau's thought. Although Although he sympathized with much of the motivation behind liberal polit
nearly all readers would agree that nature holds a central place among ical philosophy (namely, the desire to tame religious fanaticism and aristo
Rousseau's ideas, there is confusion as to what nature actually means for cratic vainglory), Rousseau detested this new world. He saw in its ethos a prod
Rousseau, and there is considerable disagreement over the role it plays in his toward selfishness and exploitation and an undermining of all but the coldest
thought. My intent is to clarify Rousseau's meaning and to establish the role and most cruel of social bonds. In place of fanaticism it put complacency; in
as I see it, the preeminent role-that nature plays, not only in his diagnostic place of vainglory, pettiness of soul. In short, he saw the world produced by
thought but also in his constructive or prescriptive thought. I shall offer a new modem politics, the world whose leading human type was the bourgeois, as a
interpretation, one that differs significantly from those expounded by other further, disastrous step away from natural goodness. And he recognized that
scholars. The focus of Rousseau's thought about nature is the soul: it is on the this step had its source in the modem reconceptualization of nature. As bad as
basis of their inner state that individuals are judged to be natural or unnatural. the old world may have been, at least it had believed in the naturalness of
Yet if naturalness is in the first instance a psychological notion, it nevertheless the sublime. The new world, shorn of this faith, was running headlong, even
has enormous political implications. Nature is the source of all of Rousseau's eagerly, into degradation-and it would continue to do so unless it found a
moral and political standards. Thus my inquiry, if successful, will lead to a way to believe once more in the naturalness of the sublime.
more complete understanding not only of Rousseau's philosophical anthropol In Emile and elsewhere, Rousseau sets out to solve this problem. He does so
ogy but also of his political thought. by articulating an original, dual-level understanding of nature. At one level
My second purpose goes beyond Rousseau scholarship per se and concerns Rousseau actually extends the modem tendency to truncate the realm of the
one of the larger issues of political philosophy. Rousseau presents us with an natural. In the Second Discourse he defines nature in such a way as to deny the
opportunity to consider whether it is possible to derive moral and political naturalness of virtually every characteristic that we customarily regard as dis
standards from a nonteleological understanding of nature-and, if it is possi tinctively human. Only the most primitive, submoral aspects of our being are
ble, with what effects. held to be natural. All the rest-not only sublimity but also language, reason,
Early modem philosophers, including political philosophers such as Hobbes, sociability, and sensibility-are held to be unnatural. But at another level
repudiated classical teleology and adopted a rather low understanding of what Rousseau vastly enlarges the compass of nature, and enlarges it "vertically," as
is natural to human beings. Instead of referring to virtue and self-perfection, as it were. He introduces a distinction between "what is natural in the savage
it had for Aristotle, nature now came to refer, most of all, to the desire for self state" and "what is natural in the civil state." And while the former is limited
preservation. The natural ceased to be a distant and difficult end toward which to the primitive, to the merely physical, the latter, it turns out, comprehends
to strive and became instead a firm and accessible base on which to build. And the very highest human capacities and possibilities. Few human beings are as
sublime or as highly developed-mentally, morally, aesthetically, and spiritu
6. Regarding Rousseau's practical intention, see Melzer, Natural Goodness of Man, 252---82. ally-as either Emile or the solitary dreamer of the autobiographical writings,
xiv Preface
and both of these figures are explicitly presented as "natural men." Clearly,
nature has once again been redefined. With his dual-level conception,
Rousseau has found a way to assert the naturalness of the sublime even while
remaining true to the modem scientific naturalism that had denied the natu
Acknowledgments
ralness of the sublime.
Nevertheless, even if Rousseau radically redefines nature, he still does not
return to a teleological understanding of it. His acceptance of modem scien
tific naturalism prevents him from returning to anything like an Aristotelian
conception of nature. Even if nature yields moral and political standards, it
does not specify a single end for civilized man. Even if nature once again
comprehends the sublime, it does not prescribe any particular way of life. The
prescribing is left for the philosopher, for Rousseau.
When nature was thought to be teleological, the job of the moral and polit This book has benefited from the contributions of many people, beginning
ical philosopher was to investigate it. Nature would yield substantial answers with my teachers at Duke University, where it started out as a doctoral disser
in response to interrogation, or so it was thought.7 When nature has been dis tation. Ruth Grant supervised the project from its inception and offered con
covered not to be teleological, however, the philosopher who wishes to find in structive advice throughout the dissertation process. I am particularly grateful
it the ground for a noble human type must do more than interrogate. He must for her gentle insistence that I spell out some things that needed to be spelled
be more creative. Rather than expect answers to his questions, he must out and for her unwavering confidence in the value of the undertaking.
develop proposals of his own and then test them against nature. Nature Michael Gillespie offered extensive and very helpful comments on the initial
remains the final arbiter, but it merely nods, as it were, rather than speaks. No proposal and the final dissertation draft. He also taught me much about mod
longer a source of positive guidance, it is at most a touchstone. em political philosophy, as did Thomas Spragens.
Doubtless this complicates the philosophical enterprise. Those who would Christopher Kelly read and responded to drafts of each chapter as it was
base a high human type and an understanding of the good life on a nonteleo written. I am grateful for his thoughtful responses to my arguments and for the
logical conception of nature proceed at a serious disadvantage compared to benefit of his expertise, which was my surest check against glaring interpretive
their teleologically minded predecessors. But at least that disadvantage isn't error. Arthur Melzer read the whole of my manuscript and raised challenging
fatal-so, at least, Rousseau purports to show. And for a world that seeks a questions that made me more deeply aware of the complexities of Rousseau's
moral and political lodestar but that largely continues to reject classical tele thought. Jeff Reno undertook the tedious task of converting my manuscript
ology, any disadvantage that is less than fatal ought to be tolerable. And any from a computer language of the forgotten past to one of the present.
philosophical corpus that makes a serious claim to have surmounted this Much of my work on this book was facilitated by the generous financial sup
obstacle ought to be given considerable attention. port of the Symposium on Science, Reason, and Modem Democracy at Michi
gan State University and by the moral and intellectual support of its directors.
Parts of Chapter 4 appeared as "Rousseau on Self-Love: What We've
7. I am well aware that there was nothing simple about this enterprise, that is, that for the best
of classical philosophy, nature was not simply teleological-that, rather, it encompassed origins as Learned, What We Might Have Learned," in the Review of Politics 60:4 (1998).
well as ends, and bodily needs and impulses as well as spiritual goals; that the tension between these My thanks to the publisher for permission to reprint.
things constituted a tension within nature itself; and that because of this internal tension, the ends
Finally, it is a great and long-awaited pleasure to acknowledge those to
prescribed by nature could serve as practical ends only in the most indirect and oblique {not to say
utopian) of senses. Still, however distant and even impractical these ends may have been, they were whom I owe the most: my parents, Hyman and Ann Cooper, for their support
ends, and they did arise from nature. For valuable discussions of the ways in which Aristotle's con and confidence throughout the years of my education; my wife, Vicki, for her
ception of nature was not simply teleological, see Michael Davis, The Politics of Philosophy: A Com loving and sustaining presence; and my sons, Ben and Aaron, who came along
mentary on Aristotle's Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), esp. 7-8, and Mary P.
Nichols, Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle's Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Little late in the making of this book but in time to confirm, delightfully, that
field, 1992), 14--19. Rousseau was indeed onto something with his principle of natural goodness.
Abbreviations Introduction
Rousseau and the Question of the Good Life
Full bibliographical information on the following works by Rousseau can be
found in the References.
d' Alembert Letter to M. d' Alembert on the Theater
Beaumont Jean,Jacques Rousseau citoyen de Geneve aC hristophe de Beaumont,
archeveque de Paris
Bordes Preface of a Second Letter to Bordes
CG Correspondence generale de Jean,Jacques Rousseau
Confessions The Confessions
Corsica Constitutional Project for Corsica
Dialogues Rousseau, Judge of Jean,Jacques: Dialogues
Emile Emile, or on Education
FD First Discourse
Fragments Fragments politiques
Julie Julie, or the New Heloise What is the best way of life? What ends should one pursue, and how should
Languages Essay on the Origin of Languages one pursue them?
Last Reply Last Reply by J.}. Rousseau of Geneva One who would put the question of the good life to Rousseau must be pre,
LM Lettres morales pared for a peculiar response. For one thing, Rousseau endorses not one but
Narcissus Preface to Narcissus three very different kinds of lives. Sometimes he praises the life of the true cit,
oc
Oeuvres completes izen, at other times the life of what he calls "the natural man living in the state
PE Discourse on Political Economy of society," and at still other times the life of solitary reverie and contempla,
Reveries Reveries of the Solitary Walker tion. Other philosophers, to be sure, had suggested that different ways of life
SC On the Social Contract are indicated for different individuals. But only with Rousseau does the notion
SD Second Discourse arise that there is more than one valid substantive ideal. Unlike any of his
predecessors, Rousseau proposes that man has available several valid goals
several divergent but equally valid paths-and not just different degrees of
realizing the same goal.
2 Rousseau, Nature, and the Problem of the Good Life Introduction: Rousseau and the Question of the Good Life 3
Consider, by contrast, the Socratic tradition. Certainly the members of chat that the only way to achieve a high degree of naturalness amid civilization is to
tradition did not advise the same sort of life for everyone. The Socratic tradi be reared in a very particular way. Once corrupt passions have taken root in the
tion saw the philosophical life, which it held to be the highest and the most soul, there is little that can be done to subdue them; only the prevention that
human of lives, as the province of the few. The majority was seen as unfit for comes with good education can do much good.1 Instead of detailing the steps
that best but most demanding of lives. Nevertheless, all individuals would needed to become capable of enjoying solitary reverie, he describes the idio
flourish to the extent they could partake of the single good for man: reason. syncratic development of the one person whom he knows to have achieved
All ways of life were to be measured by the extent to which they partook of that end, namely, himself. He goes to great lengths to underscore his unique
this good. And the different ways of life prescribed for different individuals ness and hence, by implication, the improbability that anyone will follow after
(on the basis of different dispositions and capacities) could be seen as occupy him. It would be incorrect to characterize Rousseau as a determinist, but he
ing different places on a single scale defined by that single good. The philo clearly believes that character is destiny and that character is formed, for the
sophic life was held to be the purest form of the life of reason and hence the most part irreversibly, by social, political, and even material circumstances.2
best life, but other ways of life, including the political life and even a life lived Rousseau does not directly answer the question of how one should live.
in accordance with good laws, could also partake of reason and hence could Instead, he addresses the question of what one should be and how one might
also be fulfilling, even if only to a lesser degree. Rousseau, on the other hand, become what one should be. The focus of his moral and political thought is the
allows for three different scales defined by three different substantive goods. education of the soul. Even when he gives practical advice for individual use
The exemplary citizen, "the natural man living in the state of society" (Emile as, for example, in the Lettres morales-his emphasis is on achieving the right
IIl:205), and the solitary dreamer exemplify three highly divergent but equally setting rather than on establishing specific rules or principles of conduct. Parts
valid versions of the good life; they stand atop separate but equally valid scales. of the Lettres do indeed read like a handbook, but a handbook for enjoying rus
For reasons that will later become clear, none of these ideals lies within the tic simplicity rather than what we might normally expect from "moral letters."
practical reach of modern men and women. But that counts little against the For these reasons, among others, putting the question of the good life to
fundamental point. For Rousseau, human nature is such that any one of three Rousseau is a complicated affair.3 Nevertheless, it is precisely this question that
very different ways of life, defined by three very different substantive goods, drives the following inquiry. The chapters that follow present an interpreta
can lead to its fulfillment. tion of Rousseau's thought on the content and basis of the higher possibilities
But the multiplicity of good lives is only one factor complicating Rousseau's --or, more precisely, the better possibilities-available to human beings. Because
answer to the question of the good life. Another factor is that he answers the Rousseau's position on this question is tripartite, my interpretation takes
question only indirectly. Although he does dispense a variety of specific practi account of all three versions of the good life. (My emphasis, however, is on the
cal advice, ranging from breast feeding (a good thing) to urban life (a very bad life of "the natural man living in the state of society," the version exemplified
thing), he never proposes either a code of conduct, or a set of principles of
action, or even a catalog of virtues. He has written no Ethics. Rather than pro 1. The Lettres morales represent a partial, but only a partial, exception to this statement. By fol
vide guidance for conduct, he addresses the sources of good conduct-which is lowing the advice given in the Lectres, one can take a few steps toward naturalness. But one will still
to say, the circumstances favoring the development of a healthy soul. This fall far short of Emile's naturalness. And even those steps have more to do with where to place one
self than with what to do.
holds true for each of the three varieties of the good life. Instead of offering a 2. Rousseau at one time planned to write an entire book on the moral effects of material cir
guide to good citizenship, Rousseau articulates the principles and institutions of cumstances. This book, which would address the influence of specific forces (climate, diet, light,
a worthy republic, on the apparent premise that it is only the formation of such noise, and so forth) on charactet, was to have been called "La morale sensitive, ou le materialisme
a republic that can lead to good citizenship. Without the right laws and insti du sage." The project is discussed at Confessions IX:343--44.
3. Among the other factors that make Rousseau's answer to the question of the good life a com
tutions, no set of principles or rules and no amount of exhortation will suffice plicated one is the unsystematic way he presents his philosophical system. Not only does he seem to
to produce good citizens. Instead of offering a set of principles for those who contradict himself by proposing one solution in one work and another in another work, he seems to
would be natural men in the state of society, he describes and explains the edu criticize in one work the solution put forth in another. For example, his severe critique of social man
as such in the individualistic and "naturalistic" Second Disco1me would seem to include, by implica
cation of such a man; he writes an Emile rather than an Ethics on the premise tion, the austere ancient republics that he admires and that he elsewhere praises.
4 Rousseau, Nature, and the Problem of the Good Life Introduction: Rousseau and the Question of the Good Life 5
by Emile, since that version is by far the most relevant to most modern peo What place does nature have, and what place can it have, in the lives of those
ple. )4 Because Rousseau's treatment of this question concentrates on character, who long ago departed the state of nature for artificial civilization? Is there any
or the soul, so does my interpretation. part of us, apart from our bodies and their impulses, that either is or can be
To judge from the hundreds of serious studies of his life and works, the world natural? Does the moral realm have any basis in nature-is it possible to par
would not seem to lack for books on Rousseau. Yet for all the scholarly atten take of natural goodness in social life-or has every acquisition since the
tion, Rousseau's thinking on the problem of the good life-that is, his think departure from the state of nature been but another layer of unnaturalness,
ing on the development of a healthy soul-has been only minimally explored. alienating us that much more from our natural core?
Surprisingly few scholars have commented on this all-important question. For Broadly speaking, scholarly writings on this question have expressed one of
that matter, only a handful have written about Emile, which, besides being the three interpretive tendencies. One tendency is to see in Rousseau's depiction
work in which Rousseau's understanding of the soul is most fully related, is also of conscience evidence that nature does indeed play a role in the moral realm.
the one Rousseau considered "his greatest and best book" (Dialogues I:23 ). (A At various places in his work, Rousseau seems to present conscience as a nat
recent bibliography lists only nine works on Emile, compared with forty-two ural phenomenon. More than once he calls it the voice of nature.6 From this
on the Social Contract and thirty-two on the Discourses. )5 What's more, much some interpreters have concluded that the departure from the state of nature
of what has been written on this subject, most notably on the matter of nature, did not amount to a total alienation from nature. Far from it: civilized man
has been marred by serious misunderstanding. To correct this misunderstand may not be as simply or as perfectly natural as his savage ancestor-unlike the
ing would be a step toward a fuller, more useful interpretation of Rousseau. savage, civilized man has unnatural passions and temptations-but he does
have a natural core. What's more, that core is larger than the savage's, for the
savage lacked conscience: conscience only develops in those in whom reason
and sociality have developed. Rousseau makes strong claims for conscience.
Rousseau, Nature, and History
Conscience, he says, is universal and constant. It is always and everywhere the
same, independent of historic epoch and social contingency. Thus nature does
Rousseau's high regard for nature is obvious and widely acknowledged. Less indeed extend into the social and moral realm. If we have become alienated
obvious, though, is his view of nature's relevance to civilized men and women. from nature, it is because we have ceased to listen to its timid voice, not
because this voice is absent or mute.7
4. That "the natural man living in the state of society" is the most relevant of Rousseau's three
theoretical ideals to modem men and women can be confirmed by process of elimination. To be a cit It is in the "Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar" (in book IV of Emile)
izen of the type Rousseau admires is simply not possible any longer: it would require political institu and in the Lettres morales that most of these claims about conscience appear.
tions of a sort that are not found in the world of large, commercially oriented nation states. Nor is it
Not surprisingly, this first interpretive tendency, the tendency to see con
possible for ordinary people to become solitary dreamers of the sort described in the Reveries: to be
such a person would require an extremely unlikely combination of circumstances and natural genius. science as evidence that nature extends into the moral realm, is popular
This leaves "the natural man living in the state of society," or Emile. Emile, too, represents what for among those who read the "Profession of Faith" and the Lettres morales as
all practical purposes is an unattainable ideal-as Rousseau readily admits. (See his Letter to Philib
ert Cramer, 13 October 1764 (CG Xl:339). See also Judith Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of
Rousseau's Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), esp. 22-32, and Roger D. 5. The bibliography appears in N. J. H. Dent, A Ro1<Ssea11 Dictionary (Cambridge, Mass.: Black
Masters, The Political Philosophy of RoHSseau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 3---0). Emile's well Publishers, 1992), 261-74. At Dialogues IIl:213, "the Frenchman" comments that Emile "is
chief value lies in the light it sheds on the human predicament--on what is and on what, theoreti much read, little understood, and ill-appreciated." One thing at least has changed: it is no longer
cally, might be. But at least one can take some steps in Emile's direction. For example, one can retreat much read.
from urban life into rustic simplicity, and one can incorporate at least some of the tutor's methods into 6. Rousseau's depiction of conscience is addressed in Chapter 3.
one's own child rearing (for example, giving one's child significant freedom and avoiding displays of 7. Those who subscribe to this interpretation of conscience and nature tend not to formulate it
arbitrary willfulness). Emile is a philosophical treatise and not an educational manual: "it is a new sys in just these terms. Their emphasis is normally on the particular characteristics of conscience rather
tem of education the plan of which I present for the study of the wise and not a method for fathers than on its natural status. See, for example, N. J. H. Dent, RoHSseau: An Introduction to His Psycho
and mothers" (OC 111:783). Nevertheless, it is a treatise from which one might derive significant logical, Social, and Political Theory (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988); Maurice Cranston, The Noble
practical use. Even its philosophical exploration of the human condition cannot help but have some Savage: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1754-1762 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); and Shk
practical impact, if only indirectly, by virtue of opening one's eyes and deepening one's perspective. lar, Men and Citizens.