Table Of ContentContents
Cover
Title Page
Foreword by Henry A. Kissinger
Preface
Introduction: Kissinger the Negotiator: A Story That Should Be Told
Part I: How Kissinger Negotiates: The Forgotten Case of Southern Africa
1. Crafting a Negotiating Strategy
2. From Strategy to Execution
3. The Outcome of the Southern Africa Campaign and Insights into
Effective Negotiation
Part II: “Zooming Out”
4. Strategic: Big-Picture Negotiating
5. Realistic: Tracking the Deal/No-Deal Balance
6. Game Changing: Shaping the Deal/No-Deal Balance
7. Multiparty Dexterity: Orchestrating Complex Negotiations
Part III: “Zooming In”
8. Introduction to Kissinger’s Interpersonal Approach and Tactics
9. Reading Counterparts
10. Relationships and Rapport
11. Proposals, Concessions, and “Constructive Ambiguity”
12. Persistence, Momentum, and Shuttle Diplomacy
13. Secrecy, Centralization, and a Dominant Personal Role
Conclusion: Key Lessons on Negotiation from Henry Kissinger
Acknowledgments
Bibliography
Notes
Index
About the Authors
Copyright
About the Publisher
Foreword by Henry A. Kissinger
Among the tools of statecraft, strategic negotiation occupies a prime position.
Over my career, I have conducted many negotiations and made numerous
observations on this vital subject. I have not, however, methodically reviewed
the many negotiations in which I was involved to determine the most effective
strategies and tactics to address different challenges at the table. To my
knowledge, none of the many books written about my foreign policy record as
secretary of state and national security advisor seriously analyzes this central
topic. This book, therefore, is unique. It is the first to delve deeply into my
philosophy and method of negotiation. James K. Sebenius, as lead author, along
with his Harvard colleagues R. Nicholas Burns and Robert H. Mnookin, has
produced a superb and practical analysis of how to forge worthwhile agreements
in complex situations.
This book was not my idea. Until a few years ago, I did not know Jim or
Bob. And while I knew Nick well, his years of government service began after
my time as secretary of state. I have no institutional connections with any of the
authors. This effort originated when the three professors invited me to Harvard
in 2014 as part of their ambitious project to interview all former American
secretaries of state about their toughest negotiations. Thus far, they have
conducted in-depth interviews with seven men and women who have occupied
that office. They plan to draw on these extraordinary discussions to write a major
book on the American diplomatic experience over the last forty years, to serve as
the basis for a three-part public television series.
The book you now hold, however, explores a more focused question: what
analysis and action consistently lead to success (or failure) in complex, high-
level negotiations? Beyond platitudes and well-known principles such as the
importance of credibility, I expressed skepticism during our Harvard interviews
about whether robust answers to this question could be extracted from the
written record. I wondered aloud whether it would be possible to come up with
systematic advice given the diverse contexts, distinctive personalities, and
unique features of individual negotiations.
Subsequent conversations with Jim, Nick, and Bob increasingly persuaded
me that useful, nonobvious prescriptions could be identified. To do this, the
authors have concisely recounted a number of episodes in which I was involved.
They have brought the negotiating aspects to the foreground, with just enough
historical and policy context to make their analysis accessible. Some of these
cases are broadly familiar, such as the opening to China and the disengagement
agreements between Egypt and Israel after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Other
challenging cases, such as negotiating for black-majority rule in Rhodesia in
1976 with Britain and key African states, though widely discussed at the time,
have faded into relative obscurity. Yet viewing these episodes primarily through
a negotiation lens yields fresh understandings. While I disagree with some of
their policy judgments, especially on the Vietnam talks, the authors have done
outstanding work in researching these complex negotiations and generating
actionable insights from them.
I am often struck by the ad hoc approach to vital negotiations taken by
otherwise experienced public officials and private executives. For example, one
courts failure by concentrating on process and tactics divorced from a strategic
conception of one’s fundamental interests and objectives. Another common error
is to expend the bulk of one’s energies getting the parties to the table, hoping
that once they engage face-to-face, a deal will somehow follow. In fact, the more
important challenge can be to act, often beforehand and away from the table, to
shape the situation to one’s advantage. This can mean putting in place strong
penalties for failure to agree and arranging appealing incentives for agreement. It
can mean carefully building supportive coalitions and neutralizing potential
blockers. Jim, Nick, and Bob draw on my record to catalogue many other such
snares—and offer useful advice on avoiding and escaping them.
This book’s importance does not lie mainly in telling the stories of my
negotiations, however colorful or historically intriguing. Instead, readers will
find its true value in its distillation of the valuable principles and practices that
were largely implicit during and after my tenure, occasionally even to me. Given
his familiarity with the relevant academic research plus extensive personal
experience in high-stakes dealmaking, Jim, along with his coauthors, Nick and
Bob, possesses a deep understanding of complex negotiations. This has enabled
them to interpret my experience and to extract thoughtful generalizations from it.
In undertaking this project in the spirit of applied history, Sebenius, Burns,
and Mnookin have made a major contribution to our understanding of
negotiation and diplomacy at a time when the utility and promise of these
activities are often overlooked. When employed with skill and thorough
knowledge of the issues at stake, their analysis promises genuine improvement
in diplomatic support. Every CEO, diplomat, and dealmaker facing complex
negotiation challenges will benefit from reading this book.
Preface
Who are the world’s best negotiators? What makes them effective? When
colleagues, students, and clients ask us these questions, Henry Kissinger’s name
inevitably arises. Some remember his secret negotiations to open U.S.-Chinese
relations after years of mutual hostility. Others recall détente with the Soviets,
the first nuclear arms control deal, the Egyptian and Syrian disengagement
accords with Israel, or the controversies over Cambodia or Chile. Even for those
who know few details of Kissinger’s record, the former secretary of state
regularly features in conversations about great negotiators.
This widespread perception of Kissinger’s negotiating prowess has deep
roots. According to a June 1974 Harris poll, an astonishing 85 percent of
Americans judged that Kissinger was doing a “splendid” job, while 88 percent
considered him to be a “highly skilled negotiator.”1 This represented “the highest
approval rating for anyone in government since the polls were begun.”2 Forty
years later, in 2014, a survey of 1,615 international relations scholars in 1,375
colleges and universities overwhelmingly ranked Henry Kissinger as the most
effective U.S. secretary of state in the last fifty years. This top ranking held
among most subgroups of the expert respondents: liberal, middle-of-the-road,
and conservative; male and female; and so on.3 Even Walter Isaacson,
Kissinger’s often critical biographer, judged him to have been “the foremost
American negotiator of [the twentieth] century.”4
Millions of words have been written both by and about Kissinger the
influential secretary of state, diplomatic historian, and foreign policy analyst.
Along with countless commentators, both sympathetic and critical, Kissinger has
himself chronicled his role in dozens of particular negotiations. Yet, to our
surprise, a serious overall examination of an important aspect of Kissinger’s
record as negotiator does not appear to exist.5 By looking across Kissinger’s
most significant negotiations to ferret out common characteristics, this book
represents our critical exploration of Kissinger’s approach to negotiation and its
underlying logic, strategies, and tactics. Our goal is to generate the prescriptive
insights that are essential to understanding and addressing today’s conflicts and
