Table Of ContentUFPOES OR
T
THE GERMAN REPLACENVnpRMY,
THE JULY PLOT, AND ADOLF HITLER
WALTER S. DUNN JR.
"A riveting account of the con^spirators
who plotted to kill Hitler in July 1944,
and the methods they used to keep a
half nnillion men from the battlefields of
France and Russia. Without the efforts
of these high-ranking German officers,
the war against Hitler might have had
a completely different outcome. It is a
highly detailed account, but also a
very readable book."
David A. Johnson
Author, Righteous Deception
When a German victory became
impossible, the July 1944 conspirators
plotted to bring a quick end to the war,
hoping to negotiate a peace with the
Western allies and possibly to join them
in a war against Russia. Because the
Allies would not negotiate with Hitler,
the plotters planned to assassinate him
and seize control of the government,
using the Replacement Army to
overcome the S.S. and the Nazi Party.
This army would also maintain order
within Germany, a task that would
require more than half-a-million trained
men. The conspirators convinced key
Replacement Army officers to withhold
men from the Field Army in the spring
of 1944 in preparation for taking over
the country. The result was a German
army that lacked eno^^eserve
divisions to countel^^^^kesion of
(l^^^^Dn back flap)
Heroes or Traitors
The German Replacement Army^
the July Ploty and AdolfHitler
Walter Dunn,
S. Jr.
^
Westport, Connecticut
PBAE'
London
Library ofCongress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Dunn, Walter S. (Walter Scott), 1928-
Heroes or traitors : the German replacement army, the July plot, and AdolfHider /
Walter S. Dunn, Jr.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-275-97715-3 (alk. paper)
I. German. Heer—Histor\'—Wodd War, 1939-1945. 2. WoridWar, I939-I945—
Manpower—Germany. 3. Hider, Adolf, 1889-1945—Assassination attempt, 1944
(July 20). 4. Germany. Heer—Political activit\-. I. Tide.
D757.1 .D86 2003
940.54'0943—dc21 2002030729
British Libran,' Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.
Copyright © 2003 byWalter S. Dunn, Jr.
All rights reserved. No portion ofthis book may be
reproduced, by any process or technique, without the
express written consent ofthe publisher.
Library ofCongress Catalog Card Number: 2002030729
ISBN: 0-275-97715-3
First published in 2003
Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881
An imprint ofGreenwood Publishing Group, Inc.
www.praeger.com
Printed in the United States ofAmerica
The paper used in this book complies with the
Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National
Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-I984)
987654321
10
Contents
vu
Preface
Introduction xi
1 The Replacement Army 1
2 The Strategic Reserve in 1942 15
3 Buildup for Kursk, February 1943 to June 1943 27
4 The Ukraine and Italy, June 1943 to February 1944 45
5 Calm before the Storm, February 1944 to June 1944 69
6 The Catastrophe in France 89
7 The Catastrophe in the East 113
8 Conclusion 155
Bibliography 169
Index 173
Preface
TSvenU' years after the publication ofmy book on die second front,
many historians still believe the cover story promulgated during
the SecondWorldWar thattheAmerican armywas unprepared to fight
after three years ofpreparation that had begun in June 1940. Implicit
in this interpretation is the notion that Gen. George C. Marshall was
foolhardy in his insistence that the American divisionswere ready. Also
implied is thatAmericans were rather deficient as soldiers ifthey could
not be trained sooner. Neither was the case.
The Second World War was a political matter conducted by three
very astute politicians on the Allied side and an equally astute Adolf
Hitier controlling Germany. The outcome of major events was more
often determined by the political ramifications than by military
strength. Resources were squandered on pointiess campaigns such as
Itah' and Burma, which had no strategic objective but did have post-
war political significance. While these sideshows were staged, cam-
paigns ofimmense strategic importance were delayed or canceled for
lack ofresources.
The primary objective of the German generals who conspired to
remove Hitier, take over Germany, and negotiate an early end to the
viii Preface
war in July 1944 was to have Germany emerge intact from the war
and ready to join an alliance against the Soviet Union. This prospect
was not as unreasonable as may appear when one considers the align-
ment ofnations that was to emerge during the Cold War. Both Win-
ston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt believed that they had no
need for a strong Germany to balance the power ofthe Soviet Union,
and theywould have rejected any such offer. However, theywere defi-
nitely interested in ending the war as soon as possible, to reduce the
loss oflife. That goal in fact was achieved as an indirect result ofthe
actions ofthe conspirators, as this work will describe.
This book is the product ofmore than sixty years ofstudy, begin-
ning with an avid interest in the events ofthe Second World War as it
was being fought. Undergraduate work at Durham University in
England under Dr. H.C. Offler drilled home the philosophy that one
must studythe details before making sweeping generalizations. Among
my professors at Durham was Professor Eric Birley, who headed the
British order-of-battle intelligence organization during the war and
whose name pops up as attendingvarious planning sessions, with little
description ofhis role.
—
Orders of battle, logistics, and training not fascinating topics to
—
nonspeciaiists seldom appear in popular histories. However, those
matters often reveal the true situations and options available. This book
includes a considerable amount ofdetail concerning these topics.
I have had personal experience with two ofthe main themes ofthis
work, the use ofmilitaryforce to maintain order in a cit\' and the rapid
organization of military units. In the summer of 1942, the city of
Detroit was paralyzed by a race riot that brought war production al-
most to a halt. A half-mile from my home, a group ofsome twenty
men with baseball bats, shotguns, and rifles gathered at one of the
major east-west streets and stopped automobiles driven by blacks who
were returning from work on the west side of Detroit to the black
neighborhood on the east side. Other streets were blocked by similar
gangs. In reaction to that violent move, black gangs destroyed the
white-owned businesses in the black neighborhoods. Overwhelmed
and unable to cope with the large crowds, the Detroit police needed
assistance.
The army sent 3,000 men ofthe 38th Infantry Regiment to De-
troit to restore order. One battalion was bivouacked on the Detroit
Public Library lawn a half-mile from my home, and another battal-
ion was on the athletic field of Northwestern High School, where
