Table Of ContentRETHINKINGMARXISM,2021
Vol.33,No.4,476–511,https://doi.org/10.1080/08935696.2021.1972696
For a Concrete Theory of Transition: The
Political Practice of the Bolsheviks in
Power*
Robert Linhart
Translated by David Broder
Robert Linhart’s translated 1966 text provides a framework for examining the Soviet
transitionasanoverdetermineddevelopment,drawingabalancesheetofthestrategyand
tactics of the New Economic Policy (NEP). Reading Lenin’s shifting practical analyses of
the situation from 1918–23, Linhart takes a thorough inventory of the principle (between
the proletariat and the peasantry) and secondary class struggles—a “complex system of
alliances”—and discerns the “thresholds” beyond which changes in the conjuncture
imposed strategic turns and alternatives. Informed by a conception of a complex social
formation in transition as unevenly articulated and marked by intense contradictions,
LinhartanalyzestheNEPasarevolutionarystrategythatrespondedtoandreconstituted
the “disrupted equilibria” of social forces, operating (subjectively) against objective
limitations.Thisnecessitatednotonlythepoliticaltransformationofstateapparatusesbut
also, for Linhart, crucially emphasized a necessary Cultural Revolution to socialize the
productiveforces(popularcontrolandaccountingofproduction,circulation,anddistribution).
Key Words: New Economic Policy, Soviet Transition, Class Struggle/Alliance,
VladimirIlyichLenin,SocialFormation,PoliticalStrategy
It’swell-knownthatLeninattachedthegreatestimportancetodemonstrating—as
herepeatedlydid—thatwarcommunismhadbeenanerror.Buthealsodemon-
stratedthatthiserrorhadbeenimposedontheBolshevikgovernmentbytheobjec-
tive conditions of the class struggle and the strategy of its adversary: that is,
capitalism. If we want toanalyze areal transition phase,not fromthe viewpoint
ofsubjectivesociology,butfromthatofhistoricalmaterialism,itisofprimaryim-
portancethat wetake thispropositionseriously.
*Thisisatranslationofanarticleoriginallypublishedas“LaNEP:Analysedequelquescarac-
téristiques de la phase de transition soviétique,” Études de planification socialiste, no. 3 (March,
1966)S.E.R.,Paris,1966.IthasbeentranslatedtoEnglishwiththeauthor’skindagreement.
Translation©2021AssociationforEconomicandSocialAnalysis
Revisiting Linhart 477
Thisalsomeansseeingthepropositioninitstwoaspects.Ononehand,anyonewho
doesnotcorrectlyanalyzetheobjectiveconditionsthatforcedtheerrorwouldfallinto
idealist,retrospectivedaydreaming,judgingthetransitioninasubjectiveandabstract
way.Thiswouldthuspreventthemfromaccountingforitsspecificcausesanddeter-
minations.In1922,LeninrefusedtheMensheviksanyrighttocritiquetheregimeofwar
communism,evenifthesubstanceofthiscritiquewasthesameastheonetheBolsheviks
themselvesadvanced,becausetheydenied—andhadalwaysdenied—thenecessityof
thiserror.PickingupononlyoneaspectofLenin’sdialecticalanalysis,theydeformed
its meaning and integrated it into their own fundamental thesis—that is, that the
October Revolution was a monster that ought never to have come into this world,
theprematurechildofanunderdevelopedmodeofproduction.Lenin([1922]2002):
ThesermonswhichOttoBauer,theleadersoftheSecondandTwo-and-a-Half
Internationals, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries preach express
their true nature—“The revolution has gone too far. What you are saying
nowwehavebeensayingallthetime,permitustosayitagain.”Butwesay
inreply:“Permitustoputyoubeforeafiringsquadforsayingthat.”
Buttheinverseisalsotrue.Nottoseethatthepolicythatobjectivelyresultedfrom
the conditions of struggle, from the relations of forces, from the two available
strategies, must be characterized, from the viewpoint of revolutionary strategy, as an
error, is to condemn oneself to universalizing specific conditions as inevitable.
In the lastanalysis, thisis todeny oneself the possibility of elaborating a general
theory of transition as a normative construct and not as a simple registration of
realevents.Thatis,suchatheoryaswouldmakeitpossibletotrulytakeadvan-
tageofothermorefavorableobjectiveconditions,shouldtheypresentthemselves
in some other moment of the transition in question, or in some other concrete
transition.This isalsotoexposeoneselftotheriskofnotseeingthe importance
ofastrategicturnwhensuchaturnhasbecomeindispensable.Lenin([1965]2002):
Comrades Stukov and Sorin complained that there was a lot of talk about
mistakes and begged us to refrain from inventing them. Of course, it is a
very bad thing to invent mistakes; but itis utterly wrong to brush practical
problemsaside,asComradeGonikmandoes.Hedeliveredquiteanoration
on the theme that “historical phenomena could not assume any other
shape than they have done.” That is absolutely incontrovertible, and, of
course,wehavealllearntthisfromtheABCofcommunism,theABCofhis-
toricalmaterialism,andtheABCofMarxism…ThepurposeIhadinmindin
givingtheseexampleswastoshowthatthecruxofthematteristhis—hasthe
admissionofmistakesanypracticalsignificanceatthemoment?Shouldany-
thingbechangedafterwhathashappened,andhadtohappen?
Wecanconsiderwarcommunismanerrorandcollectivizationasanerror:thatis,
warcommunismasseenfrom1921,theNEPasseenfrom1929,andcollectivization
478 Linhart
asseenfrom1956.Thispointofviewislegitimatesolongaswegraspitsobjective
aspect—solongasweseetheconcretechainofconsequencesasthecomplexhis-
torical development of classstrugglesand antagonisticstrategies.
Intruth,Lenin’sremarksapplytothewholeSoviettransitioninsofarasitdevel-
opedinextremelyunfavorableobjectiveconditions.Theerrorofwarcommunism
rebounded on the following stage (the NEP), which we can analyze as an inverse
anomaly,comparedtostatecapitalism,asageneralline,andwhichalsorebounded
onthenext(Stalinist)stage.Inheritingtheaccumulationofcontradictionsthathad
builtupsincethebeginningoftheRevolution,thislatterstagealsoinheritedpartof
theTsaristsocialstructure,particularlyattheideologicalandadministrativelevel.
Theclassstrugglecontinuedtodevelopthroughoutthisperiod—indeed,inthe
mostdiverseforms(lateronwewillpointoutsomeoftheonesthatcharacterized
theNEP).Throughoutthebeginningofthetransition,thewholesocialstructure
appearedasanimmense,moreorlessstableequilibriumofrelationsofforcesand
antagonistictendencies.
Wemakenoclaimtoanalyzeinjustafewpagesthewholesetofchainsofcause
andeffectortoprovideanexplanationoftheparticularcourseoftheSoviettran-
sition.Wewillsettleforindicating—asgeneralbearings,andasanorm—themain
economicregimes,essentiallyvariantsofstatecapitalism,thattheSovietgovern-
menttriedtoimplantinRussia.Moreprecisely,regardingtheNEP,wewillseekto
comparecertainconcreteaspectsofthedevelopmentoftheclassstruggleandof
real formswiththe main outlinesof the strategictheoryheredeployed.
Obstacles to the Concrete Understanding of the Social
Formation in Transition: Analytical Principles
Astabilizedsocialformationwillexhibitacertainnumberoffactorsforhomoge-
neity that make it easier to characterize it in a univocal manner (e.g., the estab-
lished dominance of one mode of production, the adjustment of all bodies of
control to this same dominance, the generalized penetration of dominant-class
ideology, osmosis between the spontaneous social consciousness of the masses
andjuridicalsuperstructures,etc.).Butthesamecannotbesaidofasocialforma-
tionintransition.Throughoutaperiodofupheaval,weseemultiplemodesofpro-
duction vying in an intense struggle for dominance (some modes that had been
subordinatedbyahighermodemayevenberevivedandexpanded,fueledbydis-
organizationandmaterialdisasters;suchisthecaseoftherebirthofpettymarket
capitalism when a monopolistic structure is broken up by civil war, or even the
return of entire areas to subsistence farming and barter). This struggle between
modesofproductionisspecifiedanddiversifiedatthedifferentlevelsofthestruc-
ture(thepoliticalvictoryofonemodeofproductiondoesnotimmediatelyguar-
anteeitseconomicvictory,justastheideologicalpreponderanceofonemodemay
be broken by military or administrative means, at the level of organizational
Revisiting Linhart 479
expressions),anditisalsofragmentedacrossadiversearrayoflocalconditions.In
thiscontext,thesocialstructureintransitionappearsasaninfinitelycomplexfield
ofdisruptedequilibria,ofconvectionsbrokenordeformedbyinvertedrelations.
It is like a mosaic of different forms, shot through and shaken by antagonistic
shockwaves (theformsof the clashesbetween modesof production).
Morespecifically,wecansuggesthowthisfragmentation,thisdiversification,ex-
pressesitselfintheepochofsocialrevolution.Countlesseventstakeplaceandin-
numerablerelationsdevelopthatarenotonlynotunderthecontrolofthesocialand
politicalleadership—thatis,notsubmittedtoit—butofwhichitisoftenbarelyeven
aware.ItisimpressivetonotethedegreetowhichtheBolshevikleaderswereoften
reducedtothepositionofexplorersorinvestigators,snippetbysnippetbringingto-
gether the different elements of an ever-shifting overall picture. And here we are
talkingaboutthecountryside—thatis,almosttheentirecountry.
Thisobscuringofthedominantfeatures,onaccountofthemultiplicationand
exacerbationofantagonismsandcontradictions,demandsacertaincautioninany
efforts at providing a systematic picture. It obliges us not to eliminate too rapidly
from our theoretical construction those phenomena that may at first glance be judged
atypical.
Asshouldgowithoutsaying,Iamnotheresuggestingthatthemassofdiscord-
antelementsandthefragmentarynatureoftherealformsultimatelyproducean
overallformationthatis“impossibletocharacterize.”Thatwouldbetogiveupon
allanalysisandtodenythestructuralstatusofthesocialformationintransition.
Inanystructure,thereisadominantcharacteristic,ormultipledominantcharac-
teristics.Ifweareheredealingwithamorecomplexsystemofarticulated(orrel-
atively disarticulated) structures, each of them is open to characterization at the
differentmomentsofthedevelopmentofthewhole.Iwillsimplyindicatetheob-
staclesthatanydeterminationofthedominantcharacteristicsrunsinto,whenwe
aretalking abouttransition phases:
– Thistypeofsocialstructureisthelocationparexcellenceforthosethresholds
whosebreakingtranslatesintoachangeinthenatureoftheprincipaldetermi-
nation (the dominant instance is displaced, from political to military or eco-
nomic or ideological; the relations of force change; and so on) for one part or
even forone element.
– Ifwetrytostoptheanalysisatagivenmomentofthedevelopmentofcontradic-
tions, the characterization of the real structure (not of the type of organization
thattheauthoritiestrytoimplant)runsintothecountlessformsofconcealment
and dissembling of relations of production, of clandestine economic worlds.
Theselatteraretheproducts,ortheweapons,ofasharpclassstruggle.
There is an extra difficulty when it comes to analyzing NEP and its real develop-
ment: namely, that Lenin’s death interrupted the systematic theorization of
Soviet history and made it less intelligible to us. Until 1923—at least at each
480 Linhart
turning point and upon each important shift—Lenin always characterized the
outcome of the relations of force and analyzed the different specific combinations,
each deployed in turn, of the five modes of production existing in Russia. First
wasMarch1918andtheneedtobringtogetherthetwotechnicallymostprogres-
sive modes of production (socialism and monopoly capitalism); then came war
communismandtheforcedeconomicisolationofonemodeofproduction,inop-
positiontotherest;thenspring1921andthelimitedalliancebetweenallmodesof
production on a nonmarket basis; then autumn 1921 and the further retreat that
ended up granting a certain economic dominance to small-market capital. But
from 1923—that is, for the greater part of the stage we are studying—we do not
find this vigorous explanation of each present moment in its specificity and of
eachturnintheBolshevikleaders’explanationsoftheirpoliticalpractice(theex-
ception came in 1928 with the passage from “restoration” to “reconstruction,”
thoughthiswasnot,properlyspeaking,adisplacementintherelationofforces).
InpresentingthesocialformationoftheNEPperiod,Iwilltrytocombinethe
followingtypesofanalysis(whichIconsiderindispensableforanalyzinganytran-
sitionphase):
– An inventory, whichcan on certain conditionsconstitute an outright analysis.
– Theprincipleofthecombinationofthedifferentmodesofproductionpresent.An
analysis of “coherent economic systems,” to adopt Lenin’s expression, and of
economicsystemsthathavecohered inan extraeconomicmanner(beitpolit-
ical or military).
– Aperiodization.
1.Byinventory,which,ifsystematic,canconstituteananalysisoftherealstructure
—Imeanadescriptionofpartsofthesocialformation,orsetsoffactsattachedto
anygivenlevelofthestructure.Ibelievethattheirprincipleistypicalofalltran-
sitionphasesingeneral,itbeingunderstoodthateachtransitionphaseandeach
moment of a phase constitutes a specific and differentiated organization of this
principle. This categorycan encompass:
– The various types of disequilibria at all levels (local production units, sectors,
etc.) between relations of production, juridical relations, labor relations, the
levelthe productiveforces have reached,and soon.
– Thevarioustypesofinvertedorconcealedrelations:forexample,relationsofex-
ploitation in the countryside, under the cover of socialist juridical statuses or
familial forms,andso on.
– Theenduranceofthesubjectiveandhumansubstanceofthestate’sadministra-
tiveandeconomicapparatus,despiteitsobjectiverolehavingbeenoverturned.
– Afterthepoliticalcrushingofaclass,andmostimportantlythebourgeoisie,the
perpetuationofitsmonopolyofknowledgeandofitssubjectiveattitudeswithin
Revisiting Linhart 481
laborrelations(theproblemsofformerownersbeingtakenbackonasdirectors
or “specialists”).
– Thedeploymentofgreatfiguresofstrategyandtactics(offensive,encirclement,
“Brest-Litovsk,”etc.) thatcan giveformtolocal or specified policies.
– Thegradualdisplacementsofpoliticalpowerandthethresholdsthattheseshifts
reach(suchastheconquestofthelowerorgansofthenewSovietstateappara-
tus by kulaksbetween1925and 1928).
– Therelationsofforcebetweensocialclassesandgroupsatalllevelsofthestruc-
tureintransition,withtheirexpressions:factionswithintheparty,antagonisms
within the state apparatus.
Inthis,thereisawholearrayofdescriptionstobemade.Whenthisissystemati-
cally elaborated, it will doubtless allow us to spell out a series of partial laws or
“effects.”
To take one example, we can identify a “Bukharin effect.” That is, a state mo-
nopoly which exceeds the state apparatus’s own organizational capacities
allows less control of real flows than a realistic form of regulation would. It
goes without saying that, if we are sure to find similar effects in all transitions
toward socialism, they will assume different forms and significance in different
places,perhapsconcerninglimitedsectorsorelsethewholeeconomy,andsoon.
Thatiswhywemust,ineachcase,indicatewhetherwehavefoundageneral-
type effect, and show the specific place that this effect occupies within the
structureunderanalysis.Ihadsomeinklingofthis,althoughinaninsufficiently
developed way,withregardtoAlgeria whenI indicateda “structuralhomology”
betweenthe twophases of thebattle over tradein Algeria andin Russia.
The elaborationofageneral theoryoftransitions demandsagreat numberof
preciseanalysesofrelativelycoherentandlimitedprocesses,whichwefindinall
transitionphases.Theyalsooccupydifferentfunctionstherein,betheydecisiveor
secondary.Inthesectionofthetextentitled“SpecificAspectsoftheClassStruggle
UnderNEPandSocialFormsPropertothisStage,”wewillseesomeindications
thatcan be developed inthisdirection.
2.Theprincipleofcombinationamongtheexistingmodesofproductionistobeconsti-
tuted through the designation and characterization of the different typical—or
dominant—formsofproductionanddistributionsucceedingoneanotherorover-
lapping(orevensimplybeingattempted)duringthetransitionphase.Wecandis-
tinguishbetweenseveralmodesintheearlystagesoftheSoviettransition,which
Lenin himself moreor lessexplicitly designated:
– Theeconomicsystemcalled“statemonopolycapitalism,”or“statecapitalism,”
with its variants of either the principally state (or cooperative) organization of
exchange, or the principally capitalist organization of exchange. (We would
482 Linhart
more accurately say that the capitalist organization of exchange introduces
more than one variant and alters the system in the direction of an NEPian—
i.e., competitive—state capitalism, with the predominance of the market, and
soon.Doubtless,wewouldhavetodistinguishbetweenaprivateorganization
of exchange based on barter, or at least existing in a period in which market
categories are weakened, and an outright capitalist organization of exchange
with an organizedmarketanda solidfinancial system).
– The preponderance ofsocialmanagement.
– The preponderance ofbig-capitalist management.
– War communism.
– State capitalism on the basis of the market, or a competitive state capitalism
(here meaning that the monopoly is destroyed by the economic dominance
of small production, which excludes any real planning, gives a prominent
roletomarketfluctuations,andsoon,andweighsdownontheverystructure
ofthemonopolizedsectors).Thishasmultiplevariants,dependingonmoreor
lessstrict regulation bythe proletarianstate.
3.Periodizationisthetheoreticaloperationthatconsistsofdetectingtheprinciple
ofthescansionofagivenstageandthedisplacementofcontradictions(changesin
theformoftheprincipalcontradiction,changesintheprincipalaspectofthecon-
tradiction,the temporarilydecisive roleof asecondarycontradiction, etc.).
InthisinstancetheperiodizationofNEPmustregisterthechangesintheprin-
cipalcontradiction(thecontradictionbetweenthedevelopmentandnondevelop-
ment of all the productive forces—of whatever social nature—and one of the
forms of this contradiction was the worker-peasant alliance on the basis of the
market). But it must simultaneously show how the secondary contradictions
were articulated with this principal contradiction (the financial question, the
problem of foreign trade, etc.) and developed in such a way as to threaten it (in
particular the contradiction between private commerce and the state sector,
between kulaks and speculators and the working class, the contradiction in the
new state apparatus, etc.). The three types of analysis whose principle I have
just outlined will be deployed here—at some moments each distinctly so, and
atothermomentsoverlapping.Iftheycannotbearticulatedwithoneanothersys-
tematically andatall points,the faultfor thatowes togapsin our knowledge.
If we could exactly determine—while also measuring their extent—the real
forms of which we can often only establish a fragmentary inventory, it would
then be easy to resolve the problems of characterizing economic regimes (the
systemsofrelationsbetweenmodesofproductions)andtheproblemsofperiod-
ization.Butoftenweareforcedtoextrapolate,toconstructsystemsonthebasisof
indices, to provide a summary evaluation of the specific weight of this or that
partial phenomenon. The pages that follow are but a first approach, an attempt
to advance some propositions and to construct a few facts relevant to a theory
of transition. Nor is this, properly speaking, a history of the NEP. It seeks, at
Revisiting Linhart 483
most,toorganizesomeofthenodesoftheproblem,inwhichsuchahistorywould
have tobe rooted inorder toachieve coherence.
I. Coherent Economic Systems and the Organization of
Production and Exchange
CombinationsofDifferent ModesofProductionintheFirstPartofthe
Soviet Transition
WecansaythatthroughoutthewholeoftheSoviettransitionphase,whichwas
theobjectofLenin’spoliticalpractice,andthenuntil1929,therewasnochallenge
toLenin’sanalysisofthemodesofproductionthatcoexistedinRussia.Thesefive
modesof productionare well-known:
1. The “patriarchal”peasant economy(subsistencefarming)
2. Small commodity production
3. Private capitalism
4. “Statecapitalism”(monopolycapitalism)
5. Socialism
At most, the description of the specific forms of these modes could be further
refined. The analysis of the particular forms of kulak exploitation, through the
prismof collectivist or invertedcapitalistrelations, isone of these descriptions.
Ifmakingthisinventoryoftheexistingmodesofproductionposesnoparticular
problem,analyzingthecombinationsbetweenthesemodesofproductionisamuch
thornierquestion.
Mostimportantly,itisessentialtoseparateoutspontaneousorcompelledcom-
binations of these five modes of production—combinations that were unstable,
aberrant, or contradictory from the economic point of view—from those that truly
constituted coherent economic systems for the passage toward socialism in
what was, from the outset, a predominantly petty-bourgeois economy. Truth be
told, in the Soviet transition, a “coherent economic system” (such as Lenin
broadly outlined) only ever appeared in the form of brief moments of respite,
lights glimpsed through the storms of the Revolution. Twice only could the
Soviet leaders cling to their economic norm without being overwhelmed by the
military or political hurricane: from March to June 1918 (when, between
the Brest-Litovsk peace and the Czech uprising, Lenin tried to set in motion the
system of state capitalism) and from spring to autumn 1921 (when the NEP
soughttoreturnto1918again,beforebeingsweptalonginthetideofthemarket).
Until March 1918, the armed struggle against imperialism and the bourgeoisie
determined everything else. The question of the commanding heights of the
economy, of the factories, of the machinery of production and exchange,
484 Linhart
merged with the question of power in the state, and seizing hold of them was a
vitalnecessity.
Itwasonlyinspring1918that,inamomentoftemporarycalm,Lenindrewup
thefirstbalancesheetofthedisorderlynationalizationsoffensive,andelaborated
thetheoryofstatecapitalismasatransitionaleconomicregime.Infact,thelong
discussion with the left communists (which continued into 1919 and until the
adoptionoftheNEP)represented,inLenin’stheory,theconstitutionofacoherent
scienceoftransition,ofwhichthetheoryofstatecapitalismwasbutoneelement.
It would be worth retracing the whole of this discussion. Here, I will settle for
notingwhatseemtobethemostfundamentalpointsinthemaintexts(the“infan-
tile disorder,” thediscussion of theCPSU program atthe 8thCongress).
Leninsoughttoshowthat,inthecomplexsocialformationconstitutedbythe
five modes of production, the economic alliance between monopolist capitalism
andtheproletariat(anallianceatthefoundationoftheregimecalled“statemo-
nopoly capitalism”) was a correct policy for the transition toward socialism. To
thatend, heelaborated the followinganalysis:
1. Inallsocialformationsofdominantimperialist-monopolistcharacter,thesimple
market base and small capitalism have not disappeared. The exploitation of
petty-bourgeoisformsiseventheveryformofexistenceofimperialist-monop-
olistcapitalism(asseenintherelationsoftownandcountry).Themonopolyis
but a “superstructure,” of which simple market production is still the base. By
consequence, even in countries where monopolist dominance is assured,
small-commodity production tries (hopelessly) to erode it. Conversely, upon
some disaster (war, civil war) the monopolist superstructure collapses and
bringsthebaseoutintotheopen,withtherebirthofcountlesssmallexchanges,
owing to the disorganization of transport, the reappearance of the unusual
developmentofsubsistence,andsoon.
2. Yet in Russia monopolist dominance did not manage to impose itself. A vast
pettycommodityproductionremainedthepreponderantmodeofproduction,
stimulatedbythegeneraldisorganization(whichencouragedspeculation).But
monopolist dominance is identified with the existence and solidity of “com-
manding heights,” which, when taken into possession, represent the core of
a socialization of the economy. It thus seems that in 1918 the problem posed
wasnotonlyamatteroftakingoverthe“commandingheights”butalsoofpre-
servingthemagainstahaphazardassault,orevenofconstitutingthemwiththe
aidofspecialists,whichistosay,themonopolists.Thepositionofthemonop-
oly-capitalist mode of production (the fourth mode: state capitalism) was
hanginginthebalance,foritwasviolentlycontestedbythesmall-commodity
andsmall-capitalistmodesofproduction,whichwereeconomicallyandtech-
nically backward and ideologically attached to anarchic petty-bourgeois pro-
duction. If the working class continued to strike blows against the capitalist
monopolies, it would risk strengthening not socialism but rather small
Revisiting Linhart 485
capitalism (which would profit, regardless of its own effective capacity, from
thedisorganizationofamajornationalizedsectorofproduction)andexposing
the market “base” of the monopoly. Indeed, the big capitalists’ monopoly of
knowledge regarding the processes of production and circulation was not
something thatcould be brokeninstantly.
3. Thus,wheninMarch1918Leninproposedahalttothenationalizationsoffen-
sive—sealingcontractswiththebigmonopoliststoallowthemtomanagetheir
enterprisesinthenameoftheSovietstate—hewasbutdrawingtheconclusion
of thefollowing twopropositions:
(i) Inbigindustry,capitalisa“realconditionofproduction”(Marx);one
does not abolish a real condition of production; rather, one sets up
the means to replace it and, in the meantime, tries to use it such as
it is. Hence, the attempt to “buy off” the big capitalists as organizers
of the productionprocess.
(ii) Modesofproductiondonotenterintorelationsofhierarchyandsuc-
cessionthatarefixedonceandforalltime.Afterall,amoreadvanced
mode of production may, in given conditions, see its dominance
taken away from it. In this case, any policy that depended on the
worldwidedevelopmentofmodesofproduction(andsimplysituated
the current period within the “era of the dominance of finance
capital”) without analyzing the true relations of force between
modes of production in Russia would risk—upon proceeding into a
hasty and extreme offensive against capitalist monopolies—being
translated into a generalized regression toward a more primitive
form ofproductionand exchange.
Weshouldaddthatthepositiveconsequencesofthisanalysiscouldnotbereal-
ized.Themonopolycapitalistsrefusedthepactand,inconcertwiththeimperial-
istaggressors,againposedthequestionofpowerandthemilitaryquestion.This
constrained the Bolsheviks to resume the offensive. Under the pressure of their
adversaries’ strategy, the Bolsheviks carried forward the very policy that Lenin
hadrejected:anall-outstruggleagainstcapitalistmonopolies,unlimitednational-
izations, at the same time as an economic struggle against the petty bourgeoisie
(requisitions).Hence,onemodeofproductionfounditselfisolated,inaconfron-
tation withallthe others.
In 1921 (especially in autumn, after the disastrous harvest), there appeared the
very consequences that Lenin had feared in the case that such a mistaken line
would beimplemented.Thatistosay, thebreakupofmonopoliesandtheanar-
chicdevelopmentofsmallproductionandpettycommodityexchange—inshort,
theresurrectionandpowerfuldevelopmentofthe“base,”thesmall-commoditymodeof
production(mode deproduction marchand).
Thebreakingofmonopolieswouldforcethesocialistmodeofproductioninto
everclearerretreat—andanalliancewithalltheothermodes.Inthenewsystem,
