Evidence and Agency: Norms of Belief for Promising and Resolving

252 Pages·2015·1.06 MB·English

by  Berislav Marusic

Evidence and Agency

Evidence and Agency
Norms of Belief for Promising
and Resolving
š ć
Berislav Maru i
1
3
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP,
UnitedKingdom
OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford.
ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship,
andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof
OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries
©BerislavMarušić2015
Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted
FirstEditionpublishedin2015
Impression:1
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin
aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe
priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted
bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics
rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe
aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe
addressabove
Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform
andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer
PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress
198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData
Dataavailable
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2015935926
ISBN 978–0–19–871404–0
Printedandboundby
CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CR04YY
LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand
forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials
containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork.
For Jen

Contents
Acknowledgments ix
Introduction 1
1. PromisingandResolvingagainsttheEvidence 3
1.1 ClarifyingtheProblems 7
1.2 TheAppealtoTrying 16
1.3 AnExplanatoryTask:AsymmetriesbetweenAgents,
Lovers,andObservers 20
1.4 Outlook 22
1.5 Conclusion 25
2. SincerityandRationality 27
2.1 Sincerity 27
2.2 Rationality 35
2.3 Propriety 42
2.4 Belief 47
2.5 Conclusion 50
3. TheNon-CognitivistResponse 51
3.1 Intending 53
3.2 Aiming 64
3.3 Accepting 65
3.4 TheCombinedNon-CognitivistResponse 71
3.5 Conclusion 73
4. ThePracticalKnowledgeResponse 75
4.1 PracticalKnowledge 76
4.2 AgainstthePracticalKnowledgeResponse 80
4.3 AgainstthePracticalKnowledgeApproach 85
4.4 Conclusion:PracticalThought 96
5. TheEvidentialistResponse 99
5.1 TheEvidentialist’sBridgePrinciples 100
5.2 ADishearteningView 103
5.3 EpistemicEvasion 106
5.4 Conclusion 120
6. TheSartreanResponse 122
6.1 TheAgent’sPointofView 123
6.2 WhyBelief? 136
viii CONTENTS
6.3 CaseStudies 144
6.4 ObjectionsandReplies 150
6.4.1 BeliefAimsatKnowledge 150
6.4.2 CoordinationwithoutReconciliation 154
6.4.3 ForegoingSelf-Knowledge 155
6.4.4 AComebackforthePracticalKnowledgeResponse? 156
6.4.5 TheIdeaofFreedom 157
6.4.6 PredictivePromises 158
6.4.7 PragmaticEncroachment 159
6.4.8 Betting 160
6.4.9 TheDifferencebetweenPromisingandResolving 161
6.5 Freedom 163
6.6 Anguish 171
6.7 Conclusion 173
7. TrustingagainsttheEvidence 175
7.1 TheEvidentialistResponse 178
7.2 TheCalculatingResponse 183
7.3 TheTestimonialKnowledgeResponse 188
7.4 TheStrawsonianResponse 191
7.5 WhyBelief? 205
7.6 Conclusion 208
Conclusion 210
Postscript 213
Glossary 215
References 217
Index 233
Acknowledgments
MyfirstthanksaretoRichardMoran,whoseworkhasdeeplyinfluenced
meandwhosewritingsIamindebtedtoinwaysthatgofarbeyondthe
references that appear in the text. His Authority and Estrangement
inspired the central line of argument I present; indeed, Evidence and
Agency can be read as my response to his book. I am grateful to Dick
for his enduring support, encouragement, insight, and advice. I have
also been greatly influenced by Pamela Hieronymi, Michael Bratman,
Richard Holton, and Jonathan Adler, even if, in places, I express my
disagreement with them—especially Adler’s evidentialism. Their work
has given me the concepts to formulate my thoughts. I am grateful to
themforseveralconversationsandforcommentsonearlierdraftsofthis
material.
Icouldnothavewrittenthisbookifitweren’tformyteachersBarry
Stroud,JohnMacFarlane,andJanetBroughton,whotaughtmemuchof
whatIknowaboutphilosophy.IamverygratefultoJohnSchwenklerfor
helpful comments on a whole draft of the manuscript and for reading
several chapters multiple times. I thank Jessica Addison and Aarthy
Vaidyanathan, my research assistants, for their suggestions and help
with preparing the manuscript for publication. For helpful conversa-
tions, suggestions, and comments, I also thank Matthew Boyle, Jason
Bridges,AlexByrne,AgnesCallard,FabrizioCariani,EugeneChislenko,
David Christensen, David Enoch, Jeremy Fantl, James Genone, Micha
Glaeser,DanielGreco,SanfordGoldberg,PeterGrönert,MatthiasHaase,
Sally Haslanger, David Hunter, Romy Jaster, Andrea Kern, Christian
Kietzmann, Jonathan Knutzen, Jennifer Lackey, Béatrice Longuenesse,
John MacFarlane, Duncan MacIntosh, Benjamin McMyler, Miriam
McCormick,JohnMaier,KateManne,KateMoran,SarahPaul,Thomas
Raleigh, Michael Randall, Andrew Reisner, Sebastian Rödl, Amélie
Rorty,SherriRoush,GrantRozeboom, JerrySamet,KarlSchafer,Geoff
Sayre-McCord, Ian Schnee, Miriam Schoenfield, Matthew Silverstein,
NishiShah,PaulinaSliwa,SusannaSiegel,MarionSmiley,JudithThomson,
David Velleman,JonathanVogel,Stephen White,Allen Wood, and Palle
Yourgrau. I thank Brian Boeninger, Brad Cokelet, Kevin Falvey, Amir