Description:
In Maschinenschrift.On 30 January 1989, the Warsaw Pact for the first time presentedits own comprehensive force comparison for Europe. The followingreport will examine this presentation in light of. theforce comparison published by NATO in November 1988. Takinginto account the respective criteria employed in counting, thedata used by the Warsaw Pact will be checked critically for comprehensibilityand plausibility, to clarify as far as possiblethe divergences from the data used for the West's comparison.The inclusion of the naval forces in "Europe and adjacent waterareas" in the East's comparison and the various treatments ofstockpiled weapons are taken into consideration.The results may be summarized as follows:1. After an adjustment for the naval forces, an evaluation ofthe data, in absolute figures, of the East's comparison ofthe personnel strengths of the land and air forces in Europeindicates a slight Warsaw Pact superiority: 3.2 million to 3.0million. Furthermore, the East's comparison establishes subcategoriesbased on the organizational structure of the Sovietarmed forces. The data on the personnel strength of NATO forcesare not comprehensible and can therefore be manipulated. TheWest's comparison only considers land forces, arriving at a ratioof 3.1 million to 2.2 million in favour of the Warsaw Pact.2. As regards the number of tanks, the East's comparison seesthe Warsaw Pact enjoying an advantage of 1.9 to 1; theWest's comparison, however, finds a far greater Eastern superiority,namely 3.1 to 1. This considerable difference is explained- although only in part - by the extension of the"tank" category in the East's comparison to include, for example,lighter tanks and amphibious tanks, systems with a far lowercombat potential.3. "Infantry Fighting Vehicles and Armoured PersonnelCarriers" in the East's comparison are put together in acollective category that is not further specified, whereas theWest's comparison considers mechanized infantry combat vehicles- 38 -an "other armoured vehicles" separately. The East's comparisonresults in a ratio of 1.5 to 1 in favour of the Warsaw Pact,whereas adding the two separate data groups of the West's comparisonresults in a quantitative advantage of 2.4 to 1. If, onthe other hand, one only considers the potential combat performanceof comparable, original mechanized infantry combat vehicles,the West's comparison arrives at a relative strength ofas much as 5.4 to 1 in favour of the eastern alliance.4. In terms of artillery systems, the East's comparison calculatesa Warsaw Pact superiority of 1.3 to 1; the West's comparison,however, figures 3 to 1. Here the difference in theestimated extent of the East's superiority results primarilyfrom the lower thresholds for caliber size considered in theEast's comparison, which attributes lighter artillery undue importance.5. Helicopters are placed in a rather broad category in bothforce comparisons, whereby powerful combat and anti-tankhelicopters are not clearly differentiated from helicopterswith support and transport tasks. Furthermore, the East's comparisonalso includes naval helicopters in this category. Whilethe East's comparison appears to document a superficial NATOsuperiority, a correction of this category reveals a slight advantageof the Warsaw Pact here as well. In the West's comparison,the Warsaw Pact's superiority in helicopters is 1.9 to 1.Categorized according to currently armed helicopters belongingto land forces, the Warsaw Pact is seen to have an advantage of1.4 to 1.6. In terms of anti-tank weapons, the East's comparison onlycounts anti-tank missile (ATM) systems, calculating a NATOsuperiority of 1.6 to 1. The West's comparison also accountsfor anti-tank guns and secondary anti-tank systems, giving theEastern alliance an advantage of 2.4 to 1.7. In terms of combat aircraft, the East's comparison - afteran adjustment taking sea-based aircraft into account - arrivesat an Eastern superiority of 1.3 to 1. Here the West'scomparison calculates the Eastern advantage to be 2.1 to 1. Theremaining discrepancy results primarily from the fact that theEast's comparison leaves out the aircraft of the Soviet air armies,adding otherwise unspecified "combat support aircraft" tothe NATO side alone. By using subcategories, the East's comparisoncreates a dubious subdivision into offensive and defensivecombat aircraft.8. In terms of "tactical missile launch systems", modern versionsof which can be mounted as "dual capable systems"with either conventional or chemical - alongside nuclear - warheads, the Eastern alliance has a superiority of 11.8 to 1 or,in absolute figures, of 1,608 to 136 systems, according to itsown calcuations.- 39 -9. "Large surface ships" and submarines are listed in separatecategories in the East's comparison. Whereas a marginal superiorityis found for the East's submarines, NATO is seen tohave a 5 to 1 advantage in ships in "Europe and adjacent waterareas". Here, the exclusion of the Eastern alliance's superiornaval potential in the peripheral seas is problematical.10. The East's comparison, unlike the West's, fails to considerland-based air defence systems and armoured vehicle launchedbridges. In both cases, the Warsaw Pact maintains a sizeableadvantage. To determine the number of divisions and independentbrigades of combat and artillery troops, the West's comparisoncalculates an Eastern superiority of 2.2 to 1 overall, takingaccount of all divisions with an active personnel corps of over5 percent.11. The general approach of the East's force comparison seemsto involve differentiating between individual categorieswhenever the Warsaw Pact appears disadvantaged, mostly in thecase of the more powerful and offensive systems. Eastern superiorityin such weapon areas, on the other hand, remains concealedbehind expanded categories.12. From the perspective of the West, the most remarkableaspect of the East's force comparison lies in the mere factof its publication. From the perspective of the East, the publicationwould appear important as corroboration of the thesis ofallegedly existent overall "rough parity" in the correlation ofmilitary power in Europe. In this context, the force comparisonis intended to serve as indirect basic argumentational supportfor the East's positions on arms control, even outside negotiations.
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„Annähernde Parität" der Streitkräfte in Europa? Eine kritische Analyse des östlichen Streitkräftevergleiches PDF

44 Pages·1989·6.53 MB·German
by  Anton Krakau, Ole Diehl
#Other Social Sciences #Politics: International Relations
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by Anton Krakau, Ole Diehl| 1989| 44 pages| 6.53| German

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In Maschinenschrift.On 30 January 1989, the Warsaw Pact for the first time presentedits own comprehensive force comparison for Europe. The followingreport will examine this presentation in light of. theforce comparison published by NATO in November 1988. Takinginto account the respective criteria employed in counting, thedata used by the Warsaw Pact will be checked critically for comprehensibilityand plausibility, to clarify as far as possiblethe divergences from the data used for the West's comparison.The inclusion of the naval forces in "Europe and adjacent waterareas" in the East's comparison and the various treatments ofstockpiled weapons are taken into consideration.The results may be summarized as follows:1. After an adjustment for the naval forces, an evaluation ofthe data, in absolute figures, of the East's comparison ofthe personnel strengths of the land and air forces in Europeindicates a slight Warsaw Pact superiority: 3.2 million to 3.0million. Furthermore, the East's comparison establishes subcategoriesbased on the organizational structure of the Sovietarmed forces. The data on the personnel strength of NATO forcesare not comprehensible and can therefore be manipulated. TheWest's comparison only considers land forces, arriving at a ratioof 3.1 million to 2.2 million in favour of the Warsaw Pact.2. As regards the number of tanks, the East's comparison seesthe Warsaw Pact enjoying an advantage of 1.9 to 1; theWest's comparison, however, finds a far greater Eastern superiority,namely 3.1 to 1. This considerable difference is explained- although only in part - by the extension of the"tank" category in the East's comparison to include, for example,lighter tanks and amphibious tanks, systems with a far lowercombat potential.3. "Infantry Fighting Vehicles and Armoured PersonnelCarriers" in the East's comparison are put together in acollective category that is not further specified, whereas theWest's comparison considers mechanized infantry combat vehicles- 38 -an "other armoured vehicles" separately. The East's comparisonresults in a ratio of 1.5 to 1 in favour of the Warsaw Pact,whereas adding the two separate data groups of the West's comparisonresults in a quantitative advantage of 2.4 to 1. If, onthe other hand, one only considers the potential combat performanceof comparable, original mechanized infantry combat vehicles,the West's comparison arrives at a relative strength ofas much as 5.4 to 1 in favour of the eastern alliance.4. In terms of artillery systems, the East's comparison calculatesa Warsaw Pact superiority of 1.3 to 1; the West's comparison,however, figures 3 to 1. Here the difference in theestimated extent of the East's superiority results primarilyfrom the lower thresholds for caliber size considered in theEast's comparison, which attributes lighter artillery undue importance.5. Helicopters are placed in a rather broad category in bothforce comparisons, whereby powerful combat and anti-tankhelicopters are not clearly differentiated from helicopterswith support and transport tasks. Furthermore, the East's comparisonalso includes naval helicopters in this category. Whilethe East's comparison appears to document a superficial NATOsuperiority, a correction of this category reveals a slight advantageof the Warsaw Pact here as well. In the West's comparison,the Warsaw Pact's superiority in helicopters is 1.9 to 1.Categorized according to currently armed helicopters belongingto land forces, the Warsaw Pact is seen to have an advantage of1.4 to 1.6. In terms of anti-tank weapons, the East's comparison onlycounts anti-tank missile (ATM) systems, calculating a NATOsuperiority of 1.6 to 1. The West's comparison also accountsfor anti-tank guns and secondary anti-tank systems, giving theEastern alliance an advantage of 2.4 to 1.7. In terms of combat aircraft, the East's comparison - afteran adjustment taking sea-based aircraft into account - arrivesat an Eastern superiority of 1.3 to 1. Here the West'scomparison calculates the Eastern advantage to be 2.1 to 1. Theremaining discrepancy results primarily from the fact that theEast's comparison leaves out the aircraft of the Soviet air armies,adding otherwise unspecified "combat support aircraft" tothe NATO side alone. By using subcategories, the East's comparisoncreates a dubious subdivision into offensive and defensivecombat aircraft.8. In terms of "tactical missile launch systems", modern versionsof which can be mounted as "dual capable systems"with either conventional or chemical - alongside nuclear - warheads, the Eastern alliance has a superiority of 11.8 to 1 or,in absolute figures, of 1,608 to 136 systems, according to itsown calcuations.- 39 -9. "Large surface ships" and submarines are listed in separatecategories in the East's comparison. Whereas a marginal superiorityis found for the East's submarines, NATO is seen tohave a 5 to 1 advantage in ships in "Europe and adjacent waterareas". Here, the exclusion of the Eastern alliance's superiornaval potential in the peripheral seas is problematical.10. The East's comparison, unlike the West's, fails to considerland-based air defence systems and armoured vehicle launchedbridges. In both cases, the Warsaw Pact maintains a sizeableadvantage. To determine the number of divisions and independentbrigades of combat and artillery troops, the West's comparisoncalculates an Eastern superiority of 2.2 to 1 overall, takingaccount of all divisions with an active personnel corps of over5 percent.11. The general approach of the East's force comparison seemsto involve differentiating between individual categorieswhenever the Warsaw Pact appears disadvantaged, mostly in thecase of the more powerful and offensive systems. Eastern superiorityin such weapon areas, on the other hand, remains concealedbehind expanded categories.12. From the perspective of the West, the most remarkableaspect of the East's force comparison lies in the mere factof its publication. From the perspective of the East, the publicationwould appear important as corroboration of the thesis ofallegedly existent overall "rough parity" in the correlation ofmilitary power in Europe. In this context, the force comparisonis intended to serve as indirect basic argumentational supportfor the East's positions on arms control, even outside negotiations.

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Author:Anton Krakau, Ole Diehl
Publication Year:1989
ISBN:3693731
Pages:44
Language:German
File Size:6.53
Format:PDF
Price:FREE
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