Alterity and Transcendence

111 Pages·2000·14 MB·English

by  Emmanuel Levinas

Alterity and
Transcendence /
./
EMMANUEL LEVINAS
Translated by Michael B. Smith
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THE ATHLONE PRESS
LONDON
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First published in the United Kingdom 1999 by Translator's Note Vll
THE ATHLONE PRESS Preface by Pierre Hayat IX
1 Park Drive, London NWll 7SG
© 1999 The Athlone Press
I THE OTHER TRANSCENDENCE 1
Oringally published as Alterit( et Transcendence© Fata Morgana 1995
1 Philosophy and Transcendence 3
The publishers wish to express their appreciation of assistance given
by the government of France through Le Ministere de Ia Culture in 2 Totality and Totalization 39
the preparation of his translation. 3 Infinity 53
C~UTJT"
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available II PHILOSOPHY OF DIALOGUE AND
from the British Library r J -1 NL L. FIRST PHILOSOPHY 77
K
),)~
N
ISBN 0 485 11519 0 (I 4 Beyond Dialogue 79
5 The Word I, the Word You, the Word
All rights reserved. No part of this publica
tion may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval God 91
system, or transmitted in any form or by any 6 The Proximity of the Other 97
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying
7 Utopia and Socialism 111
or otherwise, without prior permission in
writing from the publisher. ·~
III PEACE AND RIGHT 119
Typeset by Ensystems, Saffron Walden 8 The Prohibition against Representation
Printed and bound in Great Britain by and 'The Rights of Man' 121
Cambridge University Press
9 Peace and Proximity 131
10 The Rights of the Other Man 145
v
Contents
IV CONVERSATIONS 151
11 The Philosopher and Death 153
12 Violence of the Face 169 Translator)s Note
Bibliographical Note 183
Notes 185
193
Index The French 'moi' is consistently translated as I, and
the French 'je' as I, without the italics. The pronoun
'he' and related forms are sometimes used, as in the
French original, to refer to hypothetical persons of
either sex; the terms 'man' and 'fellow man' are also
used in this way. Levinas's 'prochain,' a nominalized
adjective meaning 'next,' is translated sometimes as
'fellow man' and sometimes as 'neighbour.'
English words in square brackets, if in the main
text, are intended to clarify ·ambiguities in my trans
lation; if in the footnotes, to differentiate my notes
from. those of the author. Italicized French words in
brackets are Levinas's own, which I supply either in
cases in wliich a technical distinction might otherwise
be lost, or when the morphology of the original word
carries semantic connotations _that cannot be
translated. !f
I would like to express my gratitude to Alisa Ray
of the Berry College Faculty Research and Sponsored
Programs Office for final manuscript preparation,
and to my wife Helen for her helpful stylistic
/
suggestions.
Vll
VI
l
Preface
/
Philosophy Between Totality
and Transcendence
by Pierre Hayat
'Philosophy is Platonic'
(Emmanuel Levinas)
'Alterity and Transcendence' the title Emmanuel
:·1
Levinas has chosen for the present volume, which
groups twelve texts written between 1967 and 1989,
leads us directly to the idea that· transcendence is
'alive in the relation to the other man' (see below,
p. 126).
l
How are we to perceive what is at stake in this
thesis of Levinas's? First, by recalling that 'transcen
dence' can be construed variously. Levinas insists that
l etymologically 'transcendence indicates a movement
of crossing over (trans), but also of ascent (scando).'1
I
In its etymological sense, transcendence leads us to
the notion of going beyond, of upward movement, or
r of a gesture that moves beyond itself. Transcendence
would appear to be the marker of the paradox of a
I
I relation with what is separate. 'It is a way for the
distant to give itself.'
I
tf
...
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Preface Preface
This tension toward the beyond - this look lifted Thus, man is no longer required to dissolve into a
toward the heights - would, on this view, originally higher reality. Transcendence becomes the intimate
be mediated through ~he sacred. Human beings structure of subjectivity. In other words, it is subjec
bowed before what was beyond them. Their greatness tivity that is found at the beginning of the movement
came from their being dissolved into a higher domain of transcendence. Levin as calls upon Jean Wahl, his
of being, that of the absolute or eternal. friend and interlocutor for several decades, to express
II'
Such is clearly not the direction taken by Levinas. that idea. 'Man is always beyond himself. But that
For in that figure of transcendence we recognize the beyond-oneself must eventually be conscious of the
'magic mentality' that prompts men to believe that fact that it is himself that is the source of transcen
the world in which they live is governed by mysteri dence.'4 The transcendence of subjectivity attests to
ous powers. Levinas reminds us that Western philos this amazing possibility of going beyond any actual
ophy has contributed to the liberation of men from situation and exceeding any definition.
that 'false and cruel transcendence.'2 Reason delivers But 'modern philosophy,' looking at transcendence
us from the illusion of a 'world-behind-the-world.' It from the point of view of subjectivity, renders the
frees mankind from the fear of an imaginary beyond. notion of transcendence problematic. Indeed, is there
The world that, having become for man an object of not something like an an antimony in the proposition:
knowledge, has lost its troubling strangeness, hence 'The subject transcends itself? Either we have a true
forth appears without secrets and open to theoretical transcendence, but in that case the subject is carried
investigation and within technology's grasp. along in its transcendent movement, and, in that
Does this mean that today transcendence has lost adventure, .the subject, ceasing to be itself, loses its
all meaning? With the modern philosophies of the identity, or its substance; or the subject remains itself
subject, we are witnessing a transmutation of the idea in its movement of transcendence, but then there
of transcendence, rather than its eviction. Transcen may be doubt as to whether or not there is true
dence cannot be reduced to the transcendent. It does transcendence.5 Thus, 'the celebrated project of the
not define a dimension of the real that reaches beyond modern philosophers, in which the subject surpasses
the inner life. It accompanies the birth of human itself by creating,' returns the subject to itself, without
subjectivity. 'It is not a question here of making making a true transcendence, a going out from self,
transcendence subjective, but of being amazed at possible.6
subjectivity (. ..) as the very modality of the What is the source of this impossibility, for the
rrtetaphysical.'3 modern philosopher, of maintaining the subject intact
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Preface Preface
tn the movement of transcendence, without the lat In such a relational context, conflict ineluctably
ter's losing its meaning? It lies in his persistant becomes the essential mode of the relation to the I
attachment to the age-old privilege of the One. other, as each subject sees its power of transcendence
Whether transcendence expresses the subject's ability wrested from it by the other. And as Sartre writes:
to distance itself from any real actuality and affirm 'The other as a look is nothing but this: my transcen
itself as pure freedom, or whether it refers to the dence transcended.'8
subject's power of realizing itself in history through In order for a true transcendence to be possible,
the other must concern the I, while at the same time
its works, its underlying principle is in the idea of the
remaining external to it. It is especially necessary that
identity of being.
Levinas is dedicated to rethinking transcendence the other, by his very exeriority, his alterity, should
by other pathways than those taken by the modern cause the I to exit the self. Levinas wants to show
philosophies of the subject. To do this; he does not that the other, by his face, attests to himself, simply,
give a definition of transcendence a priori, but shows directly, without going through any mediation. That
how a 'new transcendence' is the very meaning of exceptional capacity of the face to testify to itself
'the human.' Levinas's philosophy is constructed on outside all objective context and independently of the
the basis of a non-constructed intuition: that of the intersubjective field is, of itself, a message addressed
upsurge of transcen~nce as a 'question to the Other to the subject. By the non-ordinary manner in which
and about the other.'7 Transcendence is born of the it manifests itself, the face opposes violence with
intersubjective relation. metaphysical· resistance. In doing so, the face raises
But in order to bring transcendence into view does the subject to responsibility.
it suffice to assent to the foundational character of We see how Levinas proposes to think the inter
intersubjectivity? When the intersubjective relation is subjective relation: not as a reciprocal but as a asym
presented as a mirror-lik~ relation in which each metrical relation; not on the basis of a common space
subject stands face to face with the freedom of the but across the ecart separating the I from the other,
other, alterity is still being thought on the basis of the as a lowering, in discontinuity.
identity of the I. Transcendence, or the going out In such a relation, the I does not put itself in
from oneself, cannot, under these circumstances, come question; it is put in question by the other. It is
into view. A fortiori, the desire for recognition does precisely in taking the other as one's point of depar
not bring a true transcendence into the subject, since ture that transcendence can emerge. True transcen
through the other it is itself that the subject is seeking . dence is not born of the interiority of a being, of
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Preface Preface
which it would be the prolongation or idealization, also shows that through the question of transcendence
but of exteriority. Transcendence cannot, conse it is philosophy itself that is called into question. For
quently, be felt otherwise than as a subjectivity in in the amazement that prompts philosophical ques
crisis, that finds itself facing the other, whom it can tioning Levinas recognizes the 'disproportion between
neither contain nor take up, and who nonetheless cogitatio and cogitatum' that attests to transcendence
puts it in question. (p. 3).
The face of the other is the locus of transcendence The manner in which Levinas presents the Ploni
in that it calls into question the I in its existence as a nian approach is significant in this regard. 'The
being for itself. There is in this something like a transcendence of the One' in Plotinus expresses the
trauma of transcendence that prevents the I from· philosophical awakening itself, understood as 'the
remaining within itself, and carries it to the limits of aspiration to a wisdom that is not knowledge, that is
itself. But in that accusation of the I by the other, not representation, that is love' (p. 8). That elan
human subjectivity as responsible for the other and toward the One attests, in Levinas's view, to a certain
before the other is formed. Levinas's philosophy reha way of philosophizing that makes of philosophy the
bilitates pluralism, setting out from the interhuman privileged mode of expression of a nostalgic desire for
face-to-face that cannot be resolved into a higher fusion. Such a philosophy, which associates transcen
unity. But pluralism first defines the structure of dence and the search for unity, fails to recognize 'the
subjectivity. The I paradoxically finds within itself idea of an effective transcendence in sociality' (ibid.).
'the other as such,' that will never be interior to itself. Here Levinas shows his opposition to the 'philoso
The first text of this volume sheds particular light phies of the .same' - he, the philosopher who recog
on the way Levinas understands transcendence. The nizes in the 'relation to the human face the original
study 'Philosophy and Transcendence' (1989), pub locus of transcendence. Through transcendence, Lev
lished in the Encyclopedie Philosophique Universelle, is inas's pluralist philosophy desires to do justice to the
exemplary of the way a great philosopher can inscribe irreducible exteriority of the face and the ultimate
his own approach in his relation to other philoso plurality of the interhuman relation.
phers. Levinas examines the way Plotinus, Descartes, *
Husserl and Heidegger have encountered the ques Setting out from transcendence, we are thus led to
tion of transcendence, showing how the search for two cardinal categories of Levinas's philosophy: total
!
// the original locus of transcendence 'is doubtless one of ity and infinity. Two articles published in the Encyclo-
the main problems of philosophy' (p. 4). But Levinas paedia Universalis, 'Totalite et totalisation' and 'Infini,'
XIV XV
Preface Preface
have the virtue of both proposing a precise conceptual definition of the totality as a unity possessing an
analysis of these two ~ategories and of outlining how intrinsic reality and proceeding from an exclusive
I
the main currents of Western philosophy have principle is 'reductionist.' May not Levinas have
approached them. imprudently enlisted in the polemic conducted by
These two articles in the Encyclopaedia Universalis Franz Rosenzweig against philosophers 'from Ionia
seem to me to be of particular interest for an under to Jena,' taking up the view that totality would not
standing of Levinas's philosophy. Levinas's readers leave room for the particularity of beings? Thus, for
know the use he makes of the idea of the infinite in example, can one not conceive of a living organism as
Descartes, and are not unaware of the presence of a totality without thereby reducing it to an abstract
Rosenzweig in inspiring his critical examination of generality? For the idea of a biological totality allows
the idea of totality. But in the two studies reproduced one precisely to show what makes up the concrete
here, Levinas also shows how the pre-S.ocratics, Aris reality of a singular being. Not only does the idea of
totle, Leibniz, Spinoza and Kant deal with the ideas totality not necessarily lead us to think that reality is
of totality and the infinite. homogeneous (the parts of a whole can themselves be
Levinas's intent is obviously not to present a com diverse), it reveals the diversity of reality differently,
pilation of reference works. Like 'Philosophy and according to whether the totality is static or dynamic,
Transcendence,' the articles 'Totality and Totaliza and whether its parts define the elements of a struc
tion' and 'The Infinite,' testify to the deep immersion ture or the phases of an evolution.
of Levinas's thought in the history of philosophy, and The article 'Totality and Totalization,' a unique
to his taking up of a position that is affirmed within text in the Levinas corpus, is the occasion for remind
that history. Here we are led into Levinas's 'labora ing us that the idea of totality is, in the history of
tory,' in which the author of Totality and Infinity philosophy, the object of a variety of approaches. The
confronts the procedures of the great metaphysical totality designates the perceptual synthesis, but also
systems with his own, on the basis of a theoretical the unity of the concept and the unconditionality of
and historical elaboration of the notions of totality the regulative idea. Levinas also emphasizes that the
and infinity. As such, these two texts may be read as totality is at the heart of philosophical reflection on
a response, perhaps, to the reproach that Levinas the truth defined as a totality, on history understood
makes an overly personal, and slightly equivocal use as totalization, and yet again on the hermeneutic
of the categories of totality and infinity. method that intertwines the whole and the part. It
It has been suggested, in particular, that Levinas's therefore seems that this study should not be over-
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Preface Preface
looked by anyone wishing to grasp the value of the totality itself when it is a question of assuring the
Levinas's critique of the totality. coexistence of responsibility fopoo. the other and the
That critique is primarily directed at the postulate equality of all before the law.
underlying thoughts of totality: the totality leaves Just as ethical responsibility is not unaware of the
nothing outside (p. 41). Such a postulate applies in the social totality, so thought could not constitute itself
first instance to thought, to the extent that totality without the work of the concept. Between the totality
gathers the diversity of reality into a sole concept. But and the infinite, Levinas's philosophy lets a tension,
it also applies to society, since the social totality makes rather than a disjunction, appear. It affirms the pri
possible the grouping of individuals in the same place, macy of ethics, which exceeds but does not exclude
beneath the same set of laws and amidst the same the concept.
institutions. Between the concept and the infinite, between
It is in taking the idea of the infinite as his starting totality and transcendence, Levinas's philosophy
point that Levinas justifies the overflowing of the traces a singular path, one that runs into that of the
totality, since there is no common measure between masters of Western philosophy. Levinas reminds us
the idea of the infinite and the infinite of which it is that in Plato truth is the result of the synthesis of the
the idea. The thought of the infinite does not take concept, but that the good is to be sought beyond
possession of the infinite of which it is the idea. being, in an impossible totalization (p. 50). Can we
Setting out from the infinite, which 'is close to the not discern here a double homage to Platonic philos
idea of transcendence,' ethical responsibility is vali ophy - to a conceptual, clear and universalizable
dated (p. 54). That responsibility of the I is brought philosophy, but also to a philosophy open to transcen
about by the other man, who is refractory to concep dence, beyond totality?
tualization, and whose social status does not do justice
*
to his uniqueness. Thus we see that the refusal of Just as transcendence is not a philosophical theme
I i! totality does not derive, in Levinas, from a decree of among others because it calls philosophy itself into
the /, but rather from the relation to the face, which. .question, ·so ethics is not, in Levinas, a branch of
I .
'blocks totalization.' philosophy, because it is given as 'first philosophy.'
Does this mean that Levinas asks us to chose the The relation to the other who addresses the I is, for
infinite over the totality? That would be a misunder Levinas, the ultimate situation, or the 'last presuppo
I standing. Ethical transcendence wrests the individual sition.' Question of the question, source of all ques
/ free from the social totality, but is reflected within tions: the relation to the other forbids philosophical
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Preface Preface
discourse from closing in upon itself. It is from this This text, which presents a wonderful homage to the
angle that Levinas wonders about the dialogical philosophy of Martin Buber, allows us to nuance the
essence of philosophy. interpretations that merely oppose Levinas to Buber,
Four texts included here - 'Beyond Dialogue' forgetting the deep ties that bind the two thinkers.
(1967), 'The Word I, the Word You, the Word God' But Levinas also initiates a difficult dialogue with
(1978), 'Ethics and First Philosophy. Proximity to the Buber. When Levinas declares, 'When I speak of first
Other' (1986), and the preface to Martin Buber's philosophy, I am referring to a philosophy of dialogue
Utopie et socia/isme (1977)9 show how the occasion that cannot not be an ethics,' we recognize a proxim
-
of dialogue allows Levinas to validate the primacy of ity to Buber: the beginning of philosophy is not the
ethics. cogito, but the relation to the other (p. 98). But we
Already in Plato it is shown that philosophy is not also understand that Levinas diverges from Buber by
to be reduced to the logos because it implies the recognizing in the dialogue the non-reversible cir-
relation with an interlocutor. The qu~st for truth cumstance of ethics. ·
cannot be detached from the living presence of the Thus, the originary dialogue is situated 'beyond
interlocutors. But the Platonic dialogue has as its goal the dialogue' in that it testifies to 'the search for a
the union· of the participants in the dialogue around proximity beyond the ideas exchanged, a proximity
the true idea.10 that lasts even afer dialogue has become impossible'
The merit of Martin Buber's philosophy of dia (p. 87). That the fundamental conjuncture of the
logue is precisely that it brings out the intrinsic value human is not the agreement of men around shared
of the dialogical I-Thou relation. 'Buber's thought ideas Buber had perceived. But for Levinas the rela
prompted me to engage in a phenomenology of tion that constantly reinstates the humanity of man is
sociality' (p. 103). Buber teaches us that relation not the formal structure of the reciprocal relation in
between the I who addresses a thou and the thou which the I is a you for the other and the you is
who calls upon an I is the initial structure of meaning, discovered to be another I. Beyond the reversibility of
beyond what can be stated. In the text of 1978, that structure, Levinas wants to find the asymmetrical
published on the occasion of the 1O Oth anniversary of ethical relation, which consists for the I in 'going
Suber's birth, Levinas writes: 'To say "you" is the toward the Other where he is truly other' (p. 88). 11
primary fact of Saying ... Saying is that rectitude Levinas continues to pursue this dialogue with
from me to you, that directness of the face-to-face, Buber in the preface to Utopie et socialisme. After
directness of the encounter' par excellence (p. 93). having presented Buber's thesis, which sets the politi-
XX XXI