Alexander Kupatadze PhD thesis

273 Pages·2010·2.59 MB·English

‘TRANSITIONS AFTER TRANSITIONS’:
COLOURED REVOLUTIONS AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN
GEORGIA, UKRAINE AND KYRGYZSTAN
Alexander Kupatadze
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St. Andrews
2010
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‘Transitions after Transitions’: Coloured Revolutions and
Organized Crime in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan
Alexander Kupatadze
In fulfilment oftherequirements forthedegreeof
DoctorofPhilosophy
School of International Relations, UniversityofSt Andrews
St Andrews, UK
August 2010
I, Alexander Kupatadze, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 80 thousand words in
length,has beenwrittenbyme,that it isthe recordofworkcarriedout byme andthat it has not been
submittedinanypreviousapplicationforahigherdegree.
I was admitted as a research student in September 2005 and as a candidate for the degree of PhD in
September 2006; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St
Andrewsbetween2005and2010.
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I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations
appropriate for the degree of PhD inthe Universityof St Andrews andthat the candidate is qualified
tosubmitthisthesisinapplicationforthatdegree.
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ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. Rick Fawn, for
his guidance, thoughtful insight and continuous support and encouragement. Manypeople on
the staff of School of International Relations of St Andrews University assisted and
encouragedmeinvarious ways duringmycourse ofstudies. Iwish tothankall ofthem.
A special thanks goes to my mentor and friend Professor Louise Shelley for her
support andprovidingadvice.
I want to acknowledge with thanks the institutions and programs that funded my
studies at St Andrews: Overseas Research Students Award Scheme (ORSAS); University of
St Andrews PhD scholarship in the field of regional security studies and Open Society
Institute (OSI) Global SupplementaryGrant. The field research would not have been possible
without the generous support of Russell Trust of St Andrews University and British
AssociationforSlavonic andEasternEuropeanStudies (BASEES).
I am grateful to Social Research Center, American University of Central Asia (SRC)
in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan and Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting in Kiev,
Ukraine for hosting me during the field research and for helping in locating the data and
contacting the respondents. Many thanks to the staff of Transnational Crime and Corruption
Center(TraCCC)inGeorgia fortheir assistance.
I am indebted to over one hundred respondents in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.
Certainlythis studywouldnot havebeenpossible without theirhelp.
I am grateful to two good friends Tamara Makarenko and Daphne Biliouri for their
care and for conversations that clarified my thinking on this and other matters. I also want to
thank my fellow PhD students. Their friendship and professional collaboration meant a great
deal tome.
I also acknowledge with thanks Sarah Forbey for editing the dissertation and finally, I
wish to thank my father Vladimer Kupatadze, my mother Nana Kakhniashvili and my sister
TeonaKupatadzefortheirlove,encouragement andforbelievinginme.
iii
ABSTRACT
This dissertation addresses organized crime in post-Soviet Eurasia (Georgia, Ukraine,
Kyrgyzstan) exploring the nexus between politics, business and crime. Based on extensive
field research in the three countries the dissertation examines organized crime groups in the
region and describes their inter-relationships with political and business elites, then discusses
the impact of the three countries’ Coloured Revolutions on crime and corruption. The
impacts of the revolutions on organized crime are situated in several variables, among them
political opposition to incumbent regimes; the strength of civil society and the role of
organized crime groups during the revolutionary processes; personal morals of the leaders
and their views on cooperation with organized crime; and the presence and nature of the
“pact”betweenoutgoingandincomingelites.
The dissertation also takes into account larger explanatory variables, such as
geography, natural resources, industry, and regional wars and documents their role in shaping
organized crime. In accounting for the diverging patterns of the three countries in terms of
post-revolutionary effects on crime and corruption, the role of the West, defined as a “push”
factorfordemocratization,andtheexperienceof earlierstatehoodarealso considered.
The interaction between elites and criminals is regarded as a crucial part of state
formation, and is characterized by shifting dominance between the actors of the underworld
and upperworld. The thesis identifies points of cooperation and conflict between licit and
illicit actors, and provides insight into the collusive nature of criminal networks in the post-
Soviet context, arguing that the distinction between licit and illicit is frequently blurred and
the representatives of the upperworld are sometimes key participants in organized criminal
activity.
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TABLEofCONTENTS
Chapter1. Introduction 1
1.Definingstate,regime, revolutionandtransition
2.Definingorganizedcrimeandcorruption
3.Thesis Outline
Chapter2.Methodology 14
2.Methodology
1.Sources ofResearch
1.1.Primarysources
1.2Secondarysources
2.ResearchChallenges
3.Validityofthedata
4.Research ethics
Chapter3.Theoretical framework 20
1.Understandingorganizedcrimethroughthelens ofthepolitical-business-criminal
nexus
1.1.Political-criminal nexus
1.1.1.UnderworldDominance
1.1.2.EliteDominance
1.1.3.Symbiotic Balance
1.2.Underworld–UpperworldContinuum
2.CriminalizationoftheStateorStateCapture
3.Networkapproach and organizedcrime groups inGeorgia,Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan
4.Towardmeasuringthe changeinorganizedcrime
Chapter4. Impact ofSoviet andpost-Soviet OrganizedCrime 47
1.Gangs andnewcriminal entrepreneurs
2.Professional criminals (Voryv Zakone)
3.Nomenklaturaandpolice/KGBnetworks
4.Criminal networks inGeorgia,Ukraineand Kyrgyzstan
4.1.TheShadoweconomyinthethreecountries
Chapter5.Rose,Orange andTulipRevolutions 82
1.Unitedandfragmented oppositions
2.Theroleoforganized crime groups intherevolutions
v
Chapter6.Post-revolutionarystate-buildinganddemocratizing 89
1. Thepresenceofthe“OldGuard”
2.Thesurvival ofpatrimonialism
3.Redistributionofspoils
4.Corruptionandcollusion: before andafterthe Revolutions
Chapter7.Formersmugglingheavens orpermanent blackholes? 115
1.Transdniester: “Black hole”intheUkrainianborder?
1.2.Odessa
2.SmugglingthroughGeorgia’s uncontrolledterritories
2.1.AbkhaziaandSouthOssetia
2.2.Adjara
2.3.Pankisi Gorge
3.TheFerganaValleyandits roleinsmugglingthrough Kyrgyzstan
Chapter8.From criminals topoliticians: Georgia, Ukraineand Kyrgyzstan 130
1.Ukraine–Privatisation andre-privatisation: from shadowytakeovers tocorporateraiding
1.1.General trends inunderworld-upperworldrelations
1.2.Prikhvatizatsiaandtheemergenceofoligarchy
1.3.Thedevelopment ofcorrupt economyinDonetsk region
1.4.Theeffect ofthe OrangeRevolution
2.Georgia–Extortion: from Professional criminals tothe‘RevolutionaryGovernment’
2.1.Mkhedrioni
2.2.Thechangingdynamics ofdominancebetweenunderworldandupperworldactors
2.3.Thefight against organizedcrimeafterthe RoseRevolution
2.3.1.“One’s own criminals”v.“Bad criminals”
2.4.There-emergingpolitical-criminal nexus?
3.Kyrgyzstan’s DrugTrafficking: from SportsmenyandUgalovniki toPoliceandElites
3.1.Drugs tradeinKyrgyzstan
3.2.StateCapturebypolitical elites: rulingfamilies inKyrgyzstan
4.Criminals hijacking the law enforcement system or law enforcers monopolizing organized
criminal activity?
Conclusions 197
Appendices 207
Appendix 1.Quantitativemeasurements of changes inorganizedcrime
Appendix 2.Georgia’s anti-corruptiondrive–an oldtune
Appendix 3. Interviewquestionnaire
Appendix 4.Maps
Bibliography 232
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List ofcharts andtables
CHARTS
Chart 1.Underworld-Upperworldcontinuum
Chart 2.Political-Criminal Continuum
Chart 3. Voice and accountability indicator for Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (World
Bank)
Chart 4. Press freedom index for Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (Reporters without
Borders)
Chart 5. Dynamics of the Corruption Perception Index in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan
(TransparencyInternational)
Chart 6.Control ofcorruptionindicators inGeorgia,Ukraine,Kyrgyzstan (WorldBank)
Chart 7.Bribe frequency(EBRDdataof2002and 2005compared)
Chart 8. Comparison of Kyrgyz and Chinese sources on trade with Kyrgyzstan (in millions of
USD)
Chart 9. Criminal cases of smuggling filed by the Customs Department of Kyrgyzstan,
January–November2006
Chart 10. Ukraine’s regional variation of organized crime groups (Ministry of Interior of
Ukraine)
Chart 11.Propertytransfers inTbilisi andregions in2002-2004(newspaper Alia)
Chart 12. The dynamics of sectoral engagement of organized crime groups (Ministry of
InteriorofUkraine)
Chart 13.Ruleof Law IndicatorinGeorgia,Ukraine,Kyrgyzstan (WorldBank)
Chart 14.OrganizedCrime Index(WorldEconomicForum)
Chart 15.Propertyrights indicator(WorldEconomicForum)
Chart 16.Policeservice reliabilityindicator(WorldEconomicForum)
TABLES
Table1.Volkov’s typologyof roofs
Table2.Volkov’s TypologyofRoofs andtheElite-OrganizedCrimeModel
Table3.Associations withthewordMafia(VCIOM)
Table 4. Irregular payments in tax collection in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan (World
EconomicForum)
Table5.Trust inGeorgianinstitutions (ICCN)
Table6.Paralles betweenthepractices ofprofessional criminals andpolitical elites
Table7.BTIRuleof Law Index
Table8.Criminalizationand/ordelegitimizationoftheState(Fund forPeace)
Table9.BTIPrivatePropertyIndex
Table10.BTIjudiciaryindependenceindex
Table11.Judiciaryindependenceindex (WorldEconomicForum)
vii

Chapter1.Introduction
The so-called “coloured revolutions” in post-Soviet Eurasia (the Rose Revolution in
Georgia, 2003; the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, 2004; the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan,
2005) have engendered much international debate regarding their nature as “democratic
processes.”1 However, the term “revolution” has yet to be defined with precision, and
conclusions have yet to be drawn about whether these events were “democratic” and resulted
inaradical break withthepast.
All three “revolutions” followed allegations on rigged elections that had caused great
popular discontent with the ruling regimes. Furthermore, all three involved active youth
groups (“Pora” in Ukraine, “Kmara” in Georgia and “Kelkel” in Kyrgyzstan), and resulted in
some elite changeover. However, implications of the “revolutions” for organized crime and
corruption in the three countries have been different, even though all three were considered
anti-corruption and anti-crime statements of mass frustration with rampant elite corruption,
clanstructures anddeeply-rootedconnections toorganizedcrime.
The new political leaders in the three countries (Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia,
Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine and Kurmanbek Bakiev in Kyrgyzstan) had reputations as
honest, democratic and clean politicians and the very idea of the revolution presumed that
their governments should combat corruption and crime. However, outcomes varied. In
Georgia, the new authorities took decisive steps to fight organized criminality, with regime
transition resulting in successful investigation of native criminal networks at home and
abroad.
In Kyrgyzstan, corruption and political violence skyrocketed after the “Tulip
Revolution” in 2005, and the state remained weak. Several MPs and influential criminal
leaders wereassassinated after the revolutioninrivalryfor theleadershipofcrime groups and
newly available state resources. Organized crime bosses began to dictate their will to
politicians; criminal figures have even organized mass protests demanding the resignation of
PrimeMinisterFeliks Kulov,oblidginghim tostepdowninDecember2006.
After the “Orange Revolution” in 2004, Ukraine’s political scene was marred by
infighting between political factions, resulting in frequent changes of government which
limited the depth and duration of reform efforts. Corruption and politically-connected
criminal networks remainanational scourge.
1Hale(2006),Chaulia(2006),Pejic(2008),Melnykovska(2008),Kutbettin(2010).
1