Alex Wilson

297 Pages·2014·0.93 MB·English

by  Alex Wilson

Alex Wilson

A PYRRHONIST EXAMINATION OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Program in Philosophy

York University

Toronto, Ontario

September, 2014

© Alex Wilson, 2014
Abstract:

In the recent literature in the philosophy of science there is much discussion of
scientific knowledge, but rarely an explicit account of such knowledge. Employing the
Pyrrhonist skeptics modes, I examine the implicit ‘justified true belief’ analysis of
scientific knowledge presented by Stathis Psillos, the primitivist account offered by
Alexander Bird, and Bas van Fraassen’s voluntarist epistemology. I conclude that all of
these positions appear to fail. Psillos’ account relies on a theory of reference that cannot
block skeptical challenges to scientific realism, nor can it identify natural kinds in a non-
ad hoc manner. Bird’s account also cannot refute skeptical challenges to it, nor can it
adequately show how the full truth necessary for knowledge is acquired. Van Fraassen’s
voluntarist epistemology attempts to avoid skepticism at the cost of inconsistency. From
this representative sample of accounts I argue that there is seemingly no account of
scientific knowledge that can as yet withstand Pyrrhonist skeptical scrutiny.
In the first chapter of my dissertation, I give an overview of Pyrrhonist skepticism
and the neo-Pyrrhonism of Robert Fogelin and Otavio Bueno, respectively. In the second
chapter, I exposit Psillos’ semantic realist position, and argue that he gives an implicit
justified true belief analysis of scientific knowledge. Moreover, I examine Bird’s
primitivist account of knowledge. In chapter three, I discuss van Fraassen’s philosophy
of science as stated in constructive empiricism and empiricist structuralism, and his
voluntarist epistemology. In chapter four, I argue that all of these different views fail to
provide a compelling theory of scientific knowledge. In the fifth chapter, I consider how
the traditional Pyrrhonist take on the relation of theory to practice, and the positive
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epistemic additions of Fogelin and Bueno’s neo-Pyrrhonisms. I conclude that the
traditional Pyrrhonists were acting inconsistently when they sought out new theories to
influence their practice, and that the positive epistemic additions to the skeptical modes
of Pyrrhonism fall prey to the modes themselves.

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Acknowledgements:

I would like to thank my mother, Louise Wilson, for all of the unconditional love
and support she given me throughout the pursuit of my doctoral degree. This dissertation
and the completion of my doctoral degree would not have been possible without you.
I would also like to thank the members of my dissertation committee, Jagdish
Hattiangadi, Henry Jackman, and Dan McArthur. I have learned a great deal from all
three of you. In particular, I would like to thank Jagdish, for his sharing his many
insightful ideas on this project, and for his patience. Moreover, I wish to thank Dan for
introducing me to the works of Stathis Psillos which are the subject of a third of this
dissertation.
Furthermore, I am grateful to the many friends I have made at York who have
helped me intellectually, emotionally, or both: Vanessa Lehan, Olaf Ellefson, Jill Cumby,
Mike Tilly, Sean Starrs, Elena Chou, Chris Bailey, Chris Korte, Anne Stebbins,
Madeleine Boyer, and many, many more. I am also grateful to Mina Wilson, for help and
hindrance. I wish to acknowledge my brothers, but Timothy Wilson in particular, for
their support. Antoine Wilson deserves special mention as his short story “Everyone
Else” provided an example of inference to the best explanation in this dissertation. Many
thanks are due to my roommate of four years, Elizabeth Reid, for putting up with me for
so long. I am also grateful to my many friends outside of Canada: Talia Drake, Andrea
Reynolds-Yusim, Cerah O’Grady, Joe Rasmussen, Yvonne Zivkovic, and last but not
least, Peter Distefano.
Particular thanks must go to my Masters thesis advisor, Paul Tang, for his
patience and encouragement during my time at York. Although I was a former student,
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he treated me with all of the attention and encouragement he devoted to the students he
was currently advising. He set an example of mentorship I can only hope to fully
emulate. May he rest in peace.
I would also like to thank Cristal del Biondo for her guidance through York
University’s byzantine bureaucracy, and for her enduring patience and kindness.
Moreover, I wish to thank Kim Eisner for her invaluable logistical support and for
sustaining me with her cynical humor.
Finally, my deepest debt of gratitude is to Dr. George Jack Stanley for believing
in me from the very beginning.

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Table of Contents:

Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Chapter 2: Stathis Psillos and Alexander Bird: Two Scientific Realist Accounts
of Scientific Knowledge 42
2.1 The “No Miracles Argument” 45
2.2 Psillos’ Semantic Realism 49
2.2.1 A Summary of Psillos’ Scientific Realism 49
2.2.2 Psillos’ Three Stances of Scientific Realism 50
2.3 The Circularity of the “No Miracles Argument” 55
2.4 Underdetermination 60
2.5 The Pessimistic Meta-Induction and the Causal-Descriptive Theory of
Reference 70
2.5.1 The Pessimistic Meta-Induction 70
2.5.2 The Descriptive Theory of Reference 71
2.5.3 The Causal Theory of Reference 72
2.5.4 The Causal-Descriptive Theory of Reference 78
2.5.5 The Luminiferous Ether and The Electro-Magnetic Field 79
2.5.6 Reference to Abstracta 83
2.6 Theories of Truth 86
2.6.1 The Correspondence Theory of Truth 86
2.6.2 The Correspondence Theory of Truth and Our Indirect
Access to the World 87
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2.6.3 Correspondence and Our Mediated Access to the World 91
2.7 Truth-likeness 94
2.7.1 Psillos’ Intuitive Approach 94
2.8 Psillos’ Account of Scientific Knowledge 99
2.8.1 Psillos’ (1999) Account of Scientific Knowledge 100
2.8.2 Psillos’ (2009) Account of Scientific Knowledge 103
2.8.3 Psillos’ (2011) Account of Scientific Knowledge 108
2.9 Alexander Bird 109
2.9.1 Scientific Knoweldge as Unanalyzable 109
2.9.2 Bird on Truth 111
2.9.3 Bird on Belief 112
2.9.4 E=K 112
2.9.5 Bird and The Causal Theory of Reference 116
2.10 Conclusion 119
Chapter 3: Bas van Fraassen’s Anti-realist Account of Scientific Knowledge
120
3.1 van Fraassen’s Epistemology 121
3.1.1 Probabilism and Knowledge 121
3.2 van Fraassen on Theory Change 125
3.2.1 The Seeming Incoherence of Scientific Theory Change 125
3.2.2 Voluntarism and Scientific Theory Change 127
3.3 Constructive Empiricism 130
3.3.1 Observability 131
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3.3.2 The Inference to the Best Explanation 134
3.3.3 The Scientific Realist Demand for Explanation 136
3.3.4 Putnam’s Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism 139
3.3.5 The Empirical Content of Theories 140
3.3.6 Underdetermination 142
3.3.7 Unification and Conjunction 143
3.3.8 Metaphysical Baggage 147
3.3.9 Constructive Empiricism and Skepticism 149
3.3.10 Empiricist Methodology 150
3.3.11 The Pragmatic Virtues 153
3.3.12 Explanation 157
3.4 Empiricist Structuralism 160
3.5 Conclusion: van Fraassen and Knowledge 162
Chapter 4: A Pyrrhonist Examination of Psillos, Bird, and van Fraassen 164
4.1 Psillos 165
4.1.1 Psillos’ Three Stances of Scientific Realism 167
4.1.2 The “no miracles argument” 169
4.1.3 Chang and Stanford contra Psillos 172
4.1.4 Voluntarism and Psillos’ Causal-Descriptive Theory of
Reference 182
4.1.5 The Voluntarist Theory of Reference and Scientific Realism
193
4.1.6 The Pessimistic Meta-Induction 196
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4.2 Underdetermination 199
4.2.1 Theoretical Virtues 203
4.3 Truth 207
4.3.1 Psillos’ Success Argument 209
4.32 Truth-likeness 216
4.3.3 Background Knowledge 218
4.4 Psillos’ Account of Scientific Knowledge and Facticity 219
4.5 Alexander Bird 223
4.5.1 The Primitive Account of Knowledge and The Mode of
Hypothesis 225
4.5.2 Bird and Scientific Methodology 225
4.5.3 The Inference to the Only Explanation 230
4.5.4 Bird and The Causal Theory of Reference 233
4.5.5 Full Truth, Approximate Truth, and Facticity 235
4.6 Bas van Fraassen 236
4.6.1 van Fraassen and The Empirical Stance 237
4.6.2 Ladyman’s Dilemma 239
4.6.3 Nagel on What Counts as Experience 241
4.6.4 van Fraassen and Observability 242
4.6.5 van Fraassen and Justification 245
4.6.6 The Darwinian Explanation for the Success of Science 248
4.6.7 van Fraassen and Theory Change 251

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4.6.8 Psillos’ Defense of The Inference to the Best Explanation
253
4.6.9 Metaphysical Baggage 254
4.6.10 Empiricist Structuralism and Instrumentalism 256
4.6.11 Voluntarist Reference? 257
4.6.12 Facticity and van Fraassen 259
4.7 Conclusion 260
Chapter 5: Neo-Pyrrhonism and Scientific Knowledge 263
5.1 Pyrrhonism and Practice 264
5.1.1 The Relation of Theory to Practice 264
5.1.2 A Pyrrhonist Examination of Methodism 270
5.2 Fogelin and Bueno 273
5.2.1 Fogelin 273
5.2.2 Bueno 278
5.3 Conclusion 280
Bibliography 282
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