Table Of ContentWORLD CRISIS AND BRITISH DECLINE, 1929-56
By the same author
THE HISTORY OF THE LIBERAL PARTY 1895-1970
LAND, PEOPLE AND POLITICS
IN THE YEAR OF MUNICH
THE ADVENT OF WAR, 1939-40
NEW ALLIANCES, 1940-41
FROM WAR TO COLD WAR, 1942-48
1939: A RETROSPECT FORTY YEARS AFTER (editor)
WORLD CRISIS AND
BRITISH DECLINE,
1929-56
Roy Douglas
Reader
University of Surrey
M
MACMILLAN
© Roy Douglas 1986
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission
of this publication may be made without written permission.
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or transmitted save with written permission in accordance
with the provisions of the Copyright Act 1956 (as amended).
Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to
this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and
civil claims for damages.
First published 1986
Published by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke. Hampshire RG21 2XS
and London
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
Typeset by
Vine & Gorfin Ltd,
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Douglas, Roy, 1924-
World crisis and British decline, 1929-56.
I. Great Britain-History-20th century
I. Title
941.082 DA566
ISBN 978-0-333-40579-6 ISBN 978-1-349-18194-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-18194-0
Contents
List of Cartoons vi
Acknowledgements vii
1 A Kind of Stability 1
2 The Great Depression 11
3 The Darkening Skies 24
4 Stresa and After 42
5 Polarisation 58
6 Appeasement 71
7 Into War 86
8 Annus Mirabilis 99
9 Grand Alliance 114
10 Strains of Empire 124
11 The Course of War 139
12 Uneasy Peace 157
13 1947 172
14 The Lines are Drawn 188
15 The Deepest Danger 197
16 Withdrawal from Empire 211
17 A Calmer World 225
18 Suez 241
19 Reflections 253
Abbreviations Used in the Notes and Bibliography 272
Notes and References 273
Bibliography 281
Index 286
v
List of Cartoons
The Depression, 1930 23
Some Members of the National Government, 1931 25
The Czechoslovak Crisis, 1938 78
A German Wartime Forecast, 1943 146
The Cost of Victory, 1945 158
Marshall Aid, 1947-48 176
vi
Acknowledgements
The author wishes gratefully to acknowledge those who have helped in
the production of this book. First he would like to thank his wife, and Dr
Michael Burstall of the University of Surrey, who have read and
criticised the manuscript, and whose comments have proved of
enormous value. He would also like to thank the proprietors of
copyrights in the various manuscripts listed in the bibliography, and the
very helpful librarians of the institutions indicated.
The author has tried to keep notes to a minimum. Those statements
which the reader may be disposed to query, and which are not covered
by notes here, will mostly be found in the appropriate volume of the
author's four books covering the period 1938-1948 which are listed
opposite the title-page.
ROY DOUGLAS
Vll
1 A Kind of Stability
The world of early 1929 appeared to have recovered from the 1914 war,
in the sense in which a man may be said to have recovered from the
amputation of a limb. His life is no longer in imminent danger, he has
adjusted himself to the loss, and he is going about his activities in the
way in which he expects to continue for a long time to come.
The countries of western Europe exerted an influence utterly
disproportionate to their size and population. Their empires comprised
about 45 per cent of the land mass of the world, and a similar proportion
of its population. The British Empire, larger than the others combined,
covered rather more than a quarter of the globe. India, which then
included also Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, carried about three
quarters of the total population of that Empire. In Asia and beyond, the
British Empire included Australia, New Zealand, Malaya, Ceylon, parts
of the archipelago joining Asia to Australia, and Hong Kong. A large
part of Africa, many of the West Indian islands, and various territories
in other parts of the world, also came within the Empire. Europe was the
only continent in which - outside the British Isles themselves - Britain
had few possessions: Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus, all of them acquired
and held essentially for strategic reasons. Substantial 'Mandates' had
been acquired at the end of the First World War: over former German or
Turkish possessions for which, at least in theory, Britain was
accountable to the League of Nations. There were also various
Protectorates which were under local rulers, but in which British
interests were safeguarded by 'unequal treaties'. In many places lying
outside the Empire - countries like Egypt and Persia, for example -
British influence was strong. Much even of the territory lying formally
within the British Empire was for practical purposes independent so far
as internal government was concerned- although it was not until1931
that the Statute of Westminster formally acknowledged that the United
Kingdom Parliament would not legislate for these 'Dominions' unless
requested by them to do so. Independent or not, the whole British
Empire looked to Britain for a lead in matters of defence and foreign
policy.
1
2 World Crisis and British Decline, 1929-56
Britain's great organ of defence was the Navy-still, by most tests, the
strongest in the world. The navy, which cost the taxpayer about £55
millions a year, was the essential link of the Empire, and- as wartime
experience had shown-the vital means of ensuring supplies offood and
other goods to the home islands. 'Showing the flag' in foreign waters was
an acknowledged means of emphasising, in a friendly but firm manner,
that British sea power was not to be trifled with. The other British forces
together roughly balanced the Navy in cost, and the number of men
serving in them was three or four times the number of sailors; but their
international importance was far Jess. Nobody expected the British
army to match up to the army of-say-France, or saw any reason why it
should do so. In so far as soldiers were required for defence of the
overseas Empire, they were to a large extent local levies, stiffened by
British officers and troops. Conscription had been in force for a little
under three years of the 'Great War', but it had been abandoned with
relief at the end, and nobody thought of reintroducing it in the peaceful
world of 1929. Why should Britain wish to have a great army on a
continental scale? Soldiers returning from the war were determined that
neither they nor their sons should repeat the experiences of the Western
Front. Pacifists who hated all war on principle, realists who denied that
war was worth what it cost, military officers who had no wish to train
conscripts, taxpayers anxious to reduce their burdens, enthusiasts for
civil liberties who feared that large armies must always be a threat to
those liberties - they all agreed with the ex-soldiers' views for their
disparate reasons.
Britain's economic position was less secure than in 1914, but by no
means alarming. Historians have argued about at just what point
Britain began to decline relative to other countries: perhaps about the
middle of the nineteenth century. The war had given the United States
the dubious benefits of being the universal creditor. Yet the British
economy was still, to all appearances, very strong. Overall exports of
merchandise and bullion were considerably exceeded by imports -
£1292 millions against £926 millions in 19291 - but the difference was
met, and exceeded, by large revenues from overseas investments,
shipping and other services, which totalled £517 millions in the same
year. Thus there was usually a healthy balance available for new
investment overseas.
The recent memories of the First World War, and the 'lessons' which
should be drawn therefrom, dominated political thinking in the 1920s
and, indeed, for long afterwards. The 1914 war had come as a bolt from
a clear sky, in the sense that there was no living tradition of anything
