Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II

294 Pages·1988·16.21 MB·English

by  Waldo Heinrichs

Threshold of War
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Threshold of War
Franklin D. Roosevelt and
American Entry into World War II
Waldo Heinrichs
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
New York Oxford
Oxford University Press
Oxford New York Toronto
Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi
Petaling Jaya Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo
Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town
Melbourne Auckland
and associated companies in
Berlin Ibadan
Copyright © 1988 by Waldo Heinrichs
First published in 1988 by Oxford University Press, Inc.,
198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016-4314
First issued as an Oxford University Press paperback, 1989
Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or ortherwise,
without the prior permission of Oxford University Press, Inc.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Heinrichs, Waldo H.
Threshold of war: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American entry
into World War II/Waldo Heinrichs.
p. cm. Bibliography: p. Includes index.
ISBN 0-19-504424-X
ISBN 0-19-506168-3 (Pbk.)
1. World War, 1939-1945—Diplomatic history. 2. World War, 1939-1945—United
States. 3. Roosevelt, Franklin D. (Franklin Delano), 1882-1945. I. Title.
D753.H38 1988 940.53'2—dc 19 88-5303 CIP
6 8 10 9 7 5
Printed in the United States of America
for Dorothy Borg
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Preface
The literature on American entry into World War II is rich and
abundant but mostly segmented, concerned with particular topics,
regions, or relationships. Histories of the Pearl Harbor attack, for
example, form a world in themselves. Yet world politics was not com-
partmentalized. The cataclysmic changes in the configuration of
world power that occurred in 1940-41—the fall of France, Japan's
alliance with the Axis, the German attack on the Soviet Union —
reverberated between East and West. The configuration of world
power was moving from one of interconnected regional crises toward
a unitary global balance of forces. The United States always needed
to consider the implications elsewhere of a move in any particular
direction.
To understand fully American entry into World War II we need a
modern synthesis combining the story of deepening participation in
the war against Hitler with the related story of the road to Pearl Har-
bor and placing American policy in its global context. The 1952-53
work of William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to
Isolation and The Undeclared War, provides a model in this respect.
We need a book of that scope, incorporating modern scholarship,
integrating the military side — intelligence and operational capability
as well as strategy—with the diplomatic, and attentive to public and
congressional opinion.
By striving for comprehensiveness we may also gain a better
understanding of the foreign policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt. So lit-
tle record exists of the thoughts of this most elusive and dissembling
of presidents that we must rely on inference and try for better
sleuthing. Assessments differ widely, but Roosevelt has impressed me
as an active and purposeful maker of foreign policy, the only figure
with all the threads in his hands. He also had a keen sensitivity for
relations among nations and grasp of great power politics. He took a
comprehensive view. Accordingly, the more completely we reassem-
viii PREFACE
ble the pieces of what we can reasonably assume he knew of world
developments, and of what he could do about it and was advised to
do, the better we may understand his policies.
Comprehensiveness in these dimensions requires concision in
others. The question was how far back from Pearl Harbor could 1 go
in this fashion within the compass of one volume—and the answer
was, not far. March 1941 offers a natural starting point. Earlier Roo-
sevelt had been preoccupied with gaining a third term in the election
of 1940 and winning the Lend'Lease debate. In foreign policy mat-
ters he was at his most opaque. With passage of Lend-Lease he had a
mandate to act. Nineteen hundred forty-one was not necessarily
more important than 1940, but it offered me more of an international
harvest. Also the beginning of spring brought World War II into a
new compaigning season with possible outcomes even worse than
those of 1940. Increasingly in my research the nine-month period
from March to December 1941 took on a character of its own with a
separate yarn to tell.
More than anyone else, Dorothy Borg has made it possible for me
to reach the point of telling this story and with heartfelt thanks I
dedicate this book to her. Her high expectations, rigorous standards,
gentle prodding, and constant, warm encouragement and support
have brought out the best in me as a historian. The East Asian Insti-
tute of Columbia University with its kindred spirits, workshops, and
conferences has been a second home for me professionally. Lectures
to Carol Gluck's Columbia students have greatly helped me develop
the ideas on which this book is based.
My education in Japanese foreign relations and the international
history of East Asia began with Akira Iriye, when we were graduate
students together at Harvard, and I have been tapping his rich and
abundant scholarship ever since. His kindness and help have pow-
erfully assisted me in this project. Of particular benefit was his faculty
seminar on the 1931-49 period, sponsored by the Henry Luce Foun-
dation, which started me organizing research and writing and pro-
vided me the expert criticism of its members, Warren Cohen, Gary
Hess, Sherman Cochran, and Bob Messer. Akira and Gary have
given me the additional benefit of their criticism on the completed
manuscript.
The writing of this book would have been impossible without the
concentrated time and energy permitted by a fellowship from the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 1985-86. I
wish to thank the directors and staff of the Center, especially Asso-
ciate Director Samuel Wells, my colleagues there, especially Jon Su-
Preface ix
mida, and my research assistants Michael Ciriello and Ann Heyer for
making that year so enormously beneficial. Professor Arthur Schles-
inger, Jr., who has helped me so much along the way, was kind
enough to serve as commentator at my Wilson Center symposium.
I wish to thank the Earhart Foundation of Ann Arbor, Michigan,
for a fellowship which made it possible to continue writing through
the following summer. Travel for research was made possible by a
grant from the American Philosophical Society. To Temple Univer-
sity I owe repeated thanks for research support of many kinds since
the inception of this project. In my department at Temple I am
deeply grateful to Russell Weigley and to the late Shumpei Okamoto,
whom we miss so much.
This manuscript has been greatly improved as the result of a care-
ful evaluation by Robert Dallek. I am indebted again to my mentors
at Harvard: Ernest May for his early suggestions about the project
and Frank Freidel for his examination of the product and his sage
advice. More errors than I care to admit were uncovered by the eagle-
eyed scrutiny of portions of the manuscript by Jim Field, Charles
Neu, and Dick Leopold. Scott Sagan gave me a valuable critique from
his perspective in political science. To all these readers as well as Gary
Hess and Akira Iriye my deepest thanks.
My research has been facilitated by the knowledge and profes-
sional skill of many archivists; their courtesy and efficiency has eased
my way through countless boxes and hours. My special thanks to Bill
Emerson at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library for the key suggestions
he made; to John Taylor at the National Archives for his unparal-
leled knowledge of military records; to Dean Allard, director of the
.U.S. Navy Operational Archives for showing the way to so many
valuable naval records and sharing his knowledge as a naval histo-
rian; to Milt Gustafson and Sally Marks for the best-run archive I
can imagine—the Diplomatic Branch at the National Archives; and
the many other archivists who have helped: Richard Von Doenhoff,
Howard Wehman, Tim Nenninger, Ed Reese, Bill Heimdahl, Fred
Pernell, Richard Boylan, Richard Gould, Robert Parks, Martha Craw-
ley, Bernard ("Cav") Cavalcante, and Elaine Everly.
At one stage or another in this project historians and experts of
various kinds have kindly given of their time and knowledge. My
thanks to David Reynolds, Daniel Harrington, Charles Maechling,
Vice Admiral (Ret.) Edwin B. Hooper, Bob Love, Hugh Gallagher,
"Sandy" Cochran, and W. A. B. Douglas and Marc Milner of the
Directorate of History, National Defense Headquarters, Ottawa. My
thanks also to Timothy J. Heinrichs for an expert editing of the