Table Of ContentTHE FUTURE OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
Strategic nuclear deterrence as it operated through the 1960s and into the 1970s is
undergoing severe strain. Technological developments in the field of strategic weapons
are undermining most of the conditions for stable mutual deterrence that have
prevailed until now. At the same time-and partly because of these technological
developments - strategic arms control is in difficulties. Changes in the political
relationships between the nuclear powers and the relative failure of East/West detente
have made it harder still to reach agreement restraining nuclear competition. Not only
is strategic nuclear deterrence between the superpowers less predictable than it was but
developments in the nuclear forces of other powers have had a strong impact on the
central strategic balance. In the Third World too there is increasing concern not only
about the perilous state of the Soviet-American nuclear relationship but also about
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Third World states and the profound effect this
must have on stability.
This set of problems was examined at the 1979 annual conference of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies in Villars, Switzerland. The papers
presented and discussed at that conference have been edited and collected in this
volume. They examine the future of strategic deterrence from many different
perspectives - American, Soviet, Chinese, European and Third World. The challenge
for the 1980s is to recognize the changing conditions of strategic nuclear deterrence
and to manage the change so that the risks of conflict are reduced. These papers by
prestigious and international figures are a substantial contribution to a debate which
is likely to gather momentum in the next few years.
The editor
Christoph Bertram
The other contributors
Heclley Bull
McGeorge Bundy
Thierry de Montbrial
Ye hezkel Dror
Lawrence Freedman
Curt Gasteyger
Benjamin S. Lambeth
Edward Luttwak
Laurence Martin
Richard Rosecrance
Michel Tatu
Gregory Treverton
The Future of Strategic
Deterrence
Edited by
CHRISTOPH BERTRAM
Archon Books
Hamden, Connecticut
ISBN 978-1-349-06188-4 ISBN 978-1-349-06186-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-06186-0
© The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1980, 1981
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1981 978-0-333-32394-6
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without permission
First published in the U.K. 1981 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
and in the U.S.A. as an
ARCHON BOOK
an imprint of
The Shoe String Press, Inc.
995 Sherman Avenue,
Hamden, Connecticut 06514
ISBN 978-0-208-01943-1
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
The future of strategic deterrence.
Includes bibliographical references.
Contents: Strategic deterrence thirty years later/
McGeorge Bundy - Future conditions of strategic
deterrence/Hedley Bull - Deterrence and vulnerability
in the pre-nuclear era/Richard Rosecrance - (etc.)
1. Deterrence (Strategy) - Addresses, essays, lectures.
I. Bertram, Christoph, 1937-
U162.6.F87 1981 355'.0217 81-3598
ISBN 978-0-208-01943-1 AACR2
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ... 1
CHRISTOPH BERTRAM
Dir~ctor, IISS
STRATEGIC DETERRENCE THIRTY YEARS
LATER: WHAT HAS CHANGED? ... 5
MCGEORGE BUNDY
Prof~ssor, D~partm~nt of History, N~w York Univ~rsity.
For~rly National S~curity Advis~r to Pr~sidents K~~dy and
Johnson and Pr~sident of th~ Ford Foundation
FUTURE CONDITIONS OF STRATEGIC
DETERRENCE .. . 13
HEDLEY BULL
Prof~ssor of lnt~rnational R~lations, Oxford Univ~rsity
DETERRENCE AND VULNERABILITY IN THE
PRE-NUCLEAR ERA .. . 24
RICHARD ROSECRANCE
Prof~ssor of Politics, C~nt~r for lnt~rnational Studi~s. Corn~ll
Univ~rsity
THE PROBLEMS OF EXTENDING DETERRENCE 31
EDWARD LUTTWAK
R~s~arch Prof~ssor, G~org~town Univ~rsity
CHINA'S NUCLEAR FORCES AND THE STABILITY
OF SOVIET- AMERICAN DETERRENCE 38
GREGORYTREVERTON
Assistant Dir~ctor, IISS
THE RATIONALE FOR MEDIUM-SIZED
DETERRENCE FORCES 45
LAWRENCE FREEDMAN
H~ad of Policy Studi~s. Royallnstitut~ of lnt~rnational Affairs,
London
THE DETERMINANTS OF CHANGE:
DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL
ENVIRONMENT 53
CURT GASTEYGER
Prof~ssor, Gradlmt~ lnstitut~ of lnt~rnational Studi~s. G~Mva
THE DETERMINANTS OF CHANGE:
DETERRENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 60
LAURENCE MARTIN
Vic~-Chanc~llor, Univ~rsity of N~wcastl~-upan-Tyn~
DETERRENCE AND SALT 71
MICHELTATU
Diplomatic correspondent, Le Monde
SOVIET STRATEGIC CONDUCT AND THE
PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY 78
BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH
Senior Ana(vst, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California
PERCEPTIONS OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE
AND THIRD WORLD CONFLICTS ... 90
THIERRY DE MONTBRIAL
Director, /nstitut Franfais des Relations lnternationa/es, Paris
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD-WORLD
CONFLICT 96
YEHEZKEL DROR
Professor of Political Science and Wolfson Professor of Public
Administration and Political Science, The Hebrew University
Jerusalem
Index 104
Introduction
CHRISTOPH BERTRAM
The reason for this collection of papers and for responsibility of releasing them will continue to
the Institute's 21st Annual Conference, held in realize and respect this. In the conclaves of the
1979, for which they were prepared, is explained Oval Office or the Council Room of the Kremlin
more easily in the negative than in the positive. the games that strategists play lose much of their
We felt that the old concepts of deterrence, so relevance. By nature politicians will be most care
ably and persuasively developed in the 1950s and ful to avoid steps that leave no way out, and for
early 1960s, were due for re-examination, that by them - however old-fashioned this may seem to
the law of plausibility the changes in the world the architects of nuclear scenarios - limited
we are living in must have affected the tenets of nuclear war is not a controllable option. It is the
strategic deterrence as they have everything else, uncertainty of control over events which is the
and that it would be necessary to adapt the con fundamental reason why political leaders in
cepts to the realities in order to produce a basis Moscow and in Washington will be most re
for rational policies for the future. luctant to press the nuclear button.
There is no doubt, as both Curt Gasteyger and It is this profound reluctance of the politicians
Laurence Martin remind us in their contributions, to go down an uncertain and highly dangerous
that change has been the rule over the past road, rather than any doctrinal value, which has
30 years, in technology, as in the political en made the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction
vironment, both international and domestic. The (MAD) - the view that effective nuclear deter
United States no longer holds a clear superiority rence rests on the ability of either side to assure
in nuclear strength,c onflicts are no longer mani the destruction of the other, even after having
fested in the traditional arena of East-West been attacked with nuclear weapons - so per
relations, and new technologies have made suasive. But it has the failings of all pragmatic
nuclear weapons, theoretically at least, more approaches in that it is a strategy of the present
usable. What is more obvious than that these and a strategy of risk. Politicians have been
and other changes should also affect nuclear wrong before, pragmatism has failed before and
deterrence - defined as the ability through the miscalculations of the dynamics of crisis are the
nuclear threat to make an opponent refrain from familiar stuff of history. Much of the current
what he might otherwise want to do? strategic debate therefore centres on the relevance
And yet the extent of change has been of the concept for the present and future.
extremely difficult to measure. Somehow, there
is a petrifying quality that surrounds nuclear The Nature of the Problem
weapons. Raymond Aron, almost two decades It is in the nature of the problem that the point
ago, called it the decelerating effect of nuclear where the slippery slope of change affects the
weapons: changes in the general environment do credibility of deterrence cannot be pinned down
not necessarily affect the specific environment of with precision. Here lies the weakness in the
nuclear deterrence. Nobody can deny the argument that the famous 'window of opportun
changes. But, as McGeorge Bundy argues in his ity' created by the theoretical vulnerability of
paper, the changes may not matter sufficiently to America's ICBM forces to a Soviet pre-emptive
call for a major reassessment. Bundy's argument strike can be turned into operational advantage
is straightforward: that nuclear weapons are in a by the Soviet Union, or of claims that the
category of their own, and that those with the effectiveness of America's nuclear guarantee to
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Western Europe has come to an end. They How Much is Enough for Deterrence?
attribute precise consequences to imprecise To point to the new relativity of deterrence may,
events, and even the tendency of strategists to in one respect, be no more than to pay tribute
translate conceptual strategic problems all too to common sense; after all, strategic doctrines
eagerly into hardware issues can camouflage, have rarely been able fully to explain strategic
but not effectively remove, this imprecision. reality. The American tendency to polarize
The imprecision in the nature and extent of relative differences over strategic policies has
change will persist. In spite of the new pluralism always seemed to many outside the United
of the international system the bipolarity of States a somewhat artificial exercise, particularly
deterrence remains essentially unchallenged; since strategic planners have tended to display in
neither Chinese nuclear modernization nor practice a much greater flexibility than official
nuclear proliferation will pose immediate prob doctrines seemed to allow them in theory.
lems - they may at this Institute's 31st Annual However, it is important to recognize the
Conference but not at its 21st. Nor are these significance of doctrine, at least for a super-power
major changes affecting the core of deterrence - that defines its security beyond its own territorial
the ability of the Soviet Union and the United integrity. Doctrine may be expendable in the case
States to threaten each other credibly with of medium nuclear powers like Britain and
nuclear devastation. Where the changes are France, where deterrence can be defined as a
visible, however, is at the periphery of deterrence: minimum or last resort capability; and doctrine
the relevance of nuclear forces for other than all is probably expendable in the Soviet Union
out conflicts and for threats other than those where nuclear weapons are not set aside from,
directed at the survival of either super-power. In but are integrated into, the total spectrum of
fact, as this collection of papers shows, the militarily usable force. The Paper by Benjamin
doubts about the effectiveness of deterrence are Lambeth, in Part II, suggests some sympathy for
essentially concerned with the effectiveness of this Soviet approach, but it is, I believe, a
this extended deterrence. Fortress America or temptation that we must resist.
Fortress Russia will remain secure, but security The reason for this lies at least as much in the
beyond the walls of these fortresses is more nature of democratic society as in the need for
difficult to ensure with nuclear threats. strategic rationality. For all its faults MAD did
To make extended deterrence credible again a have three important advantages which no
greater emphasis on nuclear counterforce would strategic doctrine, if it is to be durable, should
be required, both for continental and inter be without: it provided an answer to the old -
continental delivery. But this would hardly but still relevant - question of how much is
demand profound changes in basic nuclear enough?; it provided a basis for democratic
doctrine. What seemed an unbridgeable gap of consensus; and it offered a coherent (if in
views between McGeorge Bundy and his critics adequate) framework for arms control. That we
in fact is not: to argue, as Bundy does, that are all, today, wiser and yet more uncertain about
existing numerical differences in the strategic the attainability of strategic stability a-la-MAD
balance do not have a decisive impact, does not should not allow us to forget that there are more
deny the need for strengthening the credibility of than strategic doctrinal differences distinguishing
the deterrent by reducing vulnerability and the West from the East. Democracies and
offering nuclear options to the American democratic alliances cannot afford the strategic
President that are more than a threat of mutual doctrines of dictatorships.
suicide. And to favour the capability of nuclear In spite of the growing relativity of nuclear
weapons to destroy military targets, rather than deterrence, therefore, we cannot afford a nuclear
cities, does not necessarily imply a war-fighting doctrine that is open-ended - even if this were
strategy but still rests on the need for deterring, optimal for deterrence. Counterforce alone, in
rather than winning, a nuclear war. Insistence the sense that our own military requirements
on doctrinal purity will not do justice to both should simply be dictated by the targets and
technological and political change: deterrence actions of the other side, is not enough. Open
has become more relative; the clarity of previous ended doctrines in a democratic society will
decades is gone. either lack political or financial support or both.
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Therefore we must develop criteria for how to what extent we are falling into the familiar
much is enough, MAD or no MAD. and persuasive trap of applying the lessons of
Laurence Martin hints at this in his Paper (in the past (which we have only just realized) to the
Part II) when he warns that the West should not conditions of the future (which we do not fully
try to deny the Soviet Union the ability to strike know). Will the Soviet Union of the past two
hostages in the West - even if this were techno decades be that of the next two decades? Are
logically feasible: 'Do not try and get at the we now designing a military response that might
last Russian silo'! This warning is perhaps un have been wise under the conditions of the 1970s
necessary simply because economic constraints but may be inadequate, or over-adequate, for
will limit strategic technology and procurement. the conditions of the 1980s? There are many who
But to rely on this would mean not only leaving believe that the Soviet Union may pass the zenith
the definition of strategic policies to the Ministers of her military power by the ntid-1980s. The
of Finance; it also means that we have no balance of interest in the Strategic Arms Limita
criteria for developing a strategy of encouraging tion Treaty negotiations (SALT) could shift
constraints on the other side. between the United States and the Soviet Union
It is no coincidence that, at a time of un in the next few years: over the past decade, the
certainty about nuclear doctrine, there is also Soviet Union was trying to catch up, while the
uncertainty about what it is we should try and United States sought to maintain the status quo,
achieve in arms control. But if we do not know not least through SALT; in the next decade, the
what it is we want to restrain, and what it is we roles may be reversed. How can we get these
can afford to give up in return, will it make sense phases more in line with each other? And how
to enter into arms-control negotiations? The can Western strategic decisions influence Soviet
scepticism over the relevance of arms control to behaviour? This points to one important and
our nuclear problems has its root here: since we continuing function of SALT: to serve as a frame
are not sure what it is we want to achieve through work for the avoidance of major miscalculations
arms control, we are doubtful about the wisdom and misunderstandings, and to provide a
of getting involved in such a process. It is now boundary for strategic programmes and thus
more important to define the substantive criteria a degree of predictability in the strategic
for restraint than the procedural devices through competition.
which arms control should be pursued. And it is
an indication of the lack of criteria for the The Political Dimension
former that much of the present debate on arms There is little in the next few years which
control centres on the relative merits of choice threatens to change fundamentally the con
among the latter. ditions of deterrence. But as deterrence becomes
more relative, we will have to address longer
The Function of SALT term trends. Nuclear proliferation will be a
If our objectives in arms control have become gradual process but, in the long run, it is
more modest, it is one direct consequence of the probably irreversible. Professor Dror's Paper
Soviet refusal to abide by Western criteria of provides powerful arguments why this is so. The
stability. The very open-endedness of the Soviet nuclear forces of Third-world countries will not
military effort and the absence of visible matter in the central balance in the immediate
doctrinal criteria of restraint in the Soviet future, but they will complicate it, particularly
system are simply not compatible with the for the Soviet Union. ICBM vulnerability still
approach that has dominated Western strategic affects only one part of the strategic triad, and it
arms-control thinking for the past decade. may be that new systems can mitigate that but the
There is a visible degree of frustration among era of general strategic vulnerability is dawning.
those who were present at the conception of the All this will strain the credibility of nuclear forces
effort to define criteria of strategic restraint, for other than contingencies of vital security
through negotiation, and there is a strong argu importance, and we may have to think again, as
ment that the West should do unilaterally what the French theorists of the 1950s would have it,
it needs to do to shore up its security, irrespective of multiple centres of deterrence. Similarly, the
of arms control. And yet we must ask ourselves potential for non-nuclear deterrence in limited
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