Table Of ContentTHIS DESTRUCTION OF THE JANISSARIES BY
LIAHIvUD I I IK JUNE, 1826
by
Howard a . Reed
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A DISSERTATION
Presented to the
Faculty of Princeton University
in Candidacy for the
Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy
Recommended for .acceptance by the
Department of Oriental Languages and Literatures
I.lay, 19 SI
A
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The destruction of the Janissaries by Mahmud II on June 15th, 1826
and their formal abolition, two days later mark a turning point in Ottoman
history* Before this extreme measure, various Ottoman reform efforts had
frequently been opposed successfully by the insubordinate Janissary infantry
men who had been jealous to protect their own prerogatives and the status
quo. In the early nineteenth century alone they had helped to depose Selim
III the reformer, had foiled Mahmud II*s first attempt at military reform
in 1808, and had proved to be ineffective soldiers* After the Janissary
cor*ps had been abolished, reform was greatly accelerated,
Mahmud II »s original purpose was to reform the Janissary corps
rather than to abolish it. He was, however, prepared to fight if forced
to do so by Janissary recalcitrance. His attempt at reform was promulgated
as the Eshken.ji measure in May, 1826. This was designed to restore Janissary
military efficiency. The Janissary leaders and civil and religious digni
taries had sworn to carry out this reorganization which had been officially
described as fully consonant with Islamic precepts. Two weeks later the
Janissaries revolted. Within twenty-four hours loyal artillery and other
auxiliary troops had defeated the rebels in Istanbul. Janissary units were
quickly suppressed throughout the Ottoman Empire, and new troops, called
’The Triumphant Soldiers of Muhammad * were organized in their stead. These
new forces were trained in European fashion, with substantial Egyptian
assistance.
Ottoman and European accounts of this event present one of two
generally current explanations for the abolition of the Janissary corps.
They either give the impression that Mahmud II had planned this action since
1808 and leave the reader to wonder why his plan was deferred for eighteen
years, or they repeat the version embodied in Uss-ii Zafer (The Basis of
Victory) written by the official Ottoman historiographer and eyewitness
Mebned Esfad, which implies that Mahmud II simply decided on this action
in May, 1826, and acted promptly on this decision. Neither of these explana
tions is satisfactory, for in the course of this study a number of puzzling
questions which required elucidation have arisen.
1) Why did Mahmud destroy the Janissaries? 2) Why, after his
abortive attempt at military reform in 1808, did Mahmud II postpone
Janissary reorganization for eighteen years? 3) What were the relations
between the Janissaries and Mahmud II in the years 1808 - 1826? 4) Where
did Mahmud II get the idea for his reform? 5) When did he begin to make
definitive plans to reorganize the Janissaries? 6) What was his plan and
hcrw did he execute it? 7) Who were his supporters? 8) How was his plan
changed from one of reorganization to one of abolition? 9) How were the
provincial Janissary units subdued? 10) What were the first reforms
following the removal of the Janissaries on June 17th, 1826, and how were
they received?
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Fairly clear answers to these questions emerged as a result of
this study, l) The Janissaries fought no effective military action after
the campaign against Bussia in 1806 - 1812, and proved their military in
capacity conclusively in the Greek revolution, Mahmud had to reorganize
them or face defeat, 2) He was virtually forced to postpone action be
cause the chaotic condition of the Ottoman Bnpire made it prudent to re
assert his authority in his own domains before running the risk of
emasculating whatever military strength he still possessed in the decrepit
Janissaries, 3) Janissary discipline went from bad to worse after 1808,
In eighteen years they instigated numerous major riots in Istanbul alone.
However, their numbers were so formidable, and their supporters in guilds
and among the Bektashis were so numerous, that it was essential to find a
powerful counterpoise to them before Mahmud II could hope to achieve
success, U) Although Mahmud II may have been impressed by reports of
General Murat's use of artillery against the Madrid mob in 1808, his own
vassal, Muhammad cAli, massacred the Mamluks in 1811 and began military
reorganization under French instructors in 1819. His new Egyptian troops
won in the Sudan in 1821-22 and later in Crete, They nearly destroyed
the Greek forces in 1825-26. These successes, and the persistent
recommendations of Nejib efendi, Muhammad ^Ali's agent in Istanbul, must
have impressed Mahmud II. However, his action in 1826 was clearly the
result of his own carefully nurtured plans. 5) These began to take
concrete form in 1822 when he rid himself of his erstwhile favorite,
Halet efendi, who had argued against Janissary reform. 6) and 7) Mahmud
planned to restore Janissary discipline and to give them European training
in order to make them better soldiers. He began in 1822 by seeking new,
trustworthy leaders among his military, civil and religious officials.
After considerable experimentation he felt strong enough to act openly in
May, 1826. 8) When the Janissaries revolted, Mahmua decided to fight.
His earlier preparations and Janissary incompetency made victory easy.
9) < Ulema support and his quick, brutal success expedited the subjugation
of provincial Janissary groups. 10) Mahmud II*s first reforms in the
summer of 1826 were essentially military, and along the lines of the
Eshken.ji reform. A few important ones were economic and social. These
reforms were imposed in spite of considerable opposition. There was general
surprise in the iinpire and abroad, and the Turks adopted military training
with some enthusiasm initially.
These findings indicate that the destruction of the Janissaries was
the culmination of four years of preparation. This action paved the way
for the important series of nineteenth century Ottoman reforms known as the
Tanzimat.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Frontispiece: Map of the City of Constantinople........... . . . i
Note on Transliteration.......................................ii
Abbrevi&tions............................................... iii
I. PRELIMINARIES TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE JANISSARY
CORPS........................................... . . 1
The State of the Ottoman Empire in the Early Years of Mahmud
II's Reign. The Failure of Military Reform in 1S08. Janissary
Uprisings and Their Threat to the State, 1808-1822.
II. REFORM BECOMES IMPERATIVE.............................. 50
Halet Efendi’s Dismissal and the Promotion of Hiiseyin Agha
in 1822. The Sultan Consolidates His Position among the
* Ulema, Bureaucrats and Janissaries to Assure Success,
1822-1326.
III. THE ESHKENJI REFORM OF MAY, 1826 ....................... 107
Final Appointments and Dispositions in 1826. Mahmud II
Attempts Reorganization rather than Destruction of the
Janissaries. The Conferences of May 25 and 28, 1826, and
the Eshlcen.1i Reform Document. Initial Drills of the
Sshken.1l Recruits, June 12-14.
17. THE FINAL JANISSARY REBELLION AND THE ABOLITION OFT HE
CORPS, JUNE 14-17, 1826................................ 190
Careful Preparations of Mahmud II and His Supporters. Loyal
Troops and Populace assemble beneath Sacred Banner.
Janissary Indecision and Their Quick Defeat in Istanbul.
Repercussions throughout the Empire and European Reactions.
7. MAHMUD II’S INITIAL MILITARY REFORMS, JUNE-SEPTUiBER
1S26.................................................2%$
First Unit of the * Triumphant. Soldiers of Muhammad*
Reviewed on June 20. Reorganization of Some Military Units,
Abolition of Others, and Hasty Efforts to Create a Disciplined
Army. Opposition Quickly Silenced. The Suppression of the
Bektashi Dervishes.
Bibliography.............................................364
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
AT 1 characters of the New Turkish written with Latin
letters have been transliterated as they appear in references
and in the bibliography. In the text the following changes
have been made:
New Turkish Transliteration
c j
c - - ch
9
g gh
1 1
f sh
\
Ottoman Turkish and Arabic rain and hamza have
been represented by c and * respectively.
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ABBREVIATIONS
Babinger, G. 0. W. ~ Franz Babinger. Die Geschichtesschreiber der
Osmanlm und Ihre Werke, Leipsig, 1927c
Belin I* - A(lphonse F.) Belin. "Etude sur la propriete fonciere en
pays musulmans, et specialement en Turquie (Rite Hanefite),"
Journal Asiatique, Serie V, Tome XVIII (1861), 390-4315 477^516;
Tome XIX (1862),156-212; 257-358.
Belin II. - A(lphonse F.) Belin. "Du regime des fiefs militaire dans
1*Islandsme, et princdpalement en Turquie," Journal Asiatioue,
Serie VI, Tcme XV (1870), 187-301.
Brockelmann, G. A. L. - Carl Brockelmann. Geschichte der Arabischen
Litteratur,“*2 vols., and 3 Supplements, Berlin and Leiden, 189& -.
E. I. - Encyclopaedia of Islam, Edited by M. T# Houtsma (and others),
Leiden, 1908-38.
E. J. W. Gibb, H. 0. P. - E. J. W. Gibb. A History of Ottoman Poetry,
6 vols., London, 1900-09# "~
Hammer, Staatsver. - Joseph von Hammer £-PurgstallJ. Des Qsma.ni schen
Reichs, Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung, 2 vols., Wien, 1815.
Hammer, G. 0. D. - Joseph von Hammer f-purgstallj, Geschichte des
Osmanischen Dichtkunst, 4 vols., Pesth, 1836-38.
Hammer, G. 0; R. - Joseph von Hammer (-Purgstalll. Geschichte des
Osmanischen Reichs, 10 vols., Pest, 1827-35#
I. A. - Islam Ansiklopedisi. Edited by A. A. Adivar, Istanbul, 1940 -.
J. A. - Journal Asiatique, Paris, 1822 - .
J. A. 0. S. - Journal of the American Oriental Society, New Haven, 1843
M. 0. G. - Mitteil ungen zur Osmani schen Geschichte. Wien, 1921-22.
Mustafa Nuri, Neta^i.i. - Mustafa Nuri, Neta'ij ul-vuqutat, 4 vols#.
Istanbul, 1294-1327/1877-1909#
c 0> M. - Mehmed Tahir. f0smanli Muellifleri, 4 vols., in 3. Istanbul.
1334-43/circa 1915-2^---------------
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— iv—
_g. A, - Semseddin Sami. Qamus al-aclam. 6 vols., Istanbul> 1307-16/
"1889-98.
S. *0. - Mehmed Sureyya. Sicill-i*Osmani. 4 vols., Istanbul, 1308/began
" 17 August, 1890.
Uzunjarjill, Kapu. Peak. I, II. - Ismail Hakkl Uzunyarglll. o.qmanl Y
Devleti ^egkilatindan Kapukulu Ocaklari, 2 vols., Ankara , T,£4?-Vi.
Uzunjarplli, 0. D. M. & B. T. - Ismail Hakkx Uzunjarjill. OsmaniK
Devletlnlh Merkez ve Bahriye Tegkilatl, Ankara, 1948.
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