Roots of Strategy Book: 4 Military Classics : The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Command of the Air, Winged Defense

1008 Pages·1999·2.61 MB·English

by  David Jablonsky

cover next page >

title:
author:
publisher:
isbn10 | asin:
print isbn13:
ebook isbn13:
language:
subject
publication date:
lcc:
ddc:
subject:
cover next page >
< previous page page_iii next page >
Page iii
Roots of Strategy
Book 4
4 Military Classics
Mahan
THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON
HISTORY, 1660-1783
Corbett
SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME STRATEGY
Douhet
COMMAND OF THE AIR
Mitchell
WINGED DEFENSE
Edited and with introductions by Col. (Ret.)
David Jablonsky, Ph.D.
Professor of National Security Affairs
Army War College

< previous page page_iii next page >
cover next page >

title:
author:
publisher:
isbn10 | asin:
print isbn13:
ebook isbn13:
language:
subject
publication date:
lcc:
ddc:
subject:
cover next page >
< previous page page_iv next page >
Page iv
Copyright © 1999 by Stackpole Books
Published by
STACKPOLE BOOKS
5067 Ritter Road
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055
www.stackpolebooks.com
All rights reserved, including the right to reproduce this book or
portions thereof in any form or by any means, electronic or
mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any
information storage and retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publisher. All inquiries should be addressed to
Stackpole Books, 5067 Ritter Road, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania
17055.
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
First edition
Cover design by Tracy Patterson
Photographs courtesy of the U.S. Naval Institute Press (Corbett,
Douhet); the U.S. Naval War College (Mahan); and the Air
University Press (Mitchell).
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Main entry under title:
Roots of strategy
Reprint. Originally published: Harrisburg,
Pa.: Military Service Pub. Co., 1940.
Includes index.
Contents: The art of war / by Sun Tzu The military
institutions of the Romans / by Vegetius My reveries
on the art of war / by Marshal Maurice de Saxe [etc.]
1. Strategy Addresses, essays, lectures
2. Military art and science Addresses, essays, lectures
I. Phillips, Thomas Raphael, 1892
U161.R66 1985 355'.02 v84-
26826
ISBN 0-8117-2918-4 (Bk. 4)

< previous page page_iv next page >
< previous page page_v next page >
Page v
CONTENTS
Publisher's Foreword vi
Editor's Foreword vii
Introduction: Strategy, Continuity, and Change 1
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-
1783
Mahan 43
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy
Corbett 149
The Command of the Air
Douhet 263
Winged Defense
Mitchell 409
Endnotes 517
About the Editor 535

< previous page page_v next page >
< previous page page_vi next page >
Page vi
PUBLISHER'S FOREWORD
No book series entitled Roots of Strategy would be complete
without the inclusion of those late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
century military theorists who addressedand set the coursefor what
we today call the joint operational and strategic arenas of warfare.
Sun Tzu, Jomini, Clausewitz, Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and
other key strategists throughout the ages addressed themselves
primarily to land forces. Modern warfare integrates land power,
airpower, and sea power. Employment of air and sea power for
strategic objectives was seriously addressed at the turn of the
twentieth century and thereafter by four "crusaders"Alfred Thayer
Mahan, Julian Corbett, Giulio Douhet, and William Mitchell.
We are fortunate to have the strategic significance of these four
writers introduced by the noted author and scholar, Colonel David
Jablonsky, Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Army
War College. Professor Jablonsky has pulled together the best parts
of the writings of the four theorists who have had the greatest
influence on the roles of naval and airpower in the past century.
Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History,
Julian Corbett's Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Giulio
Douhet's Command of the Air, and William "Billy" Mitchell's
Winged Defense continue to have relevance for students and
practitioners of naval and air strategyand indeed, for students of
joint operations and strategybecause their works illustrate the
continuity of the fundamentals of strategic thought, even in today's
era of great and ubiquitous change.

< previous page page_vi next page >
< previous page page_vii next page >
Page vii
EDITOR'S FOREWORD
The purpose of the preceding three Roots of Strategy books was to
make available in compact form the writings of significant strategic
theorists throughout history. This volume is no exception. Alfred
Thayer Mahan and Julian Stafford Corbett dealt with naval strategy
and operational art in a time of great change as navies emerged from
the age of sail. The environment of change was even more
pronounced for the early air theorists, Giulio Douhet and Billy
Mitchell, as they attempted to deal with a new dimension of
warfare. In such an environment, it is not surprising that the four
theorists were not always correct in their calculations of the
relationship of means and endsthe essence of strategy. But the
problems they encountered are as important as their successes for
the modern strategists who must deal with a future that promises to
be marked by both the speed and the ubiquity of change.
My thanks to the following for their help in preparing this volume:
Edward Skender at Stackpole Books; teaching colleagues: Donald
Boose, Joseph Cerami, James Holcomb, Leonard Fullenkampf,
James McCallum, and Richard Mullery; the U.S. Army War College
library staff: Jacqueline Bey, Jane Gibish, Kathryn Hindman, Patsy
Myers, Mary Rife, and Virginia Shope; the Department of National
Security and Strategy staff: Sandy Foote, Jody Swartz and, above
all, Rosemary Moore.

< previous page page_vii next page >
< previous page page_1 next page >
Page 1
INTRODUCTION
STRATEGY, CONTINUITY, AND CHANGE
Modern military forces normally work in an environment in which
the major dilemma is that of properly matching continuity and
change. The answer to this problem lies in the process of what
Richard Neustadt and Ernest May call thinking in "time streams."
The core attribute for such thinking is to imagine the future as it
may be when it becomes the pasta thing of complex continuity.
Thus, the primary challenge is to ascertain whether change has
really happened, is happening, or will happen. "What's so new about
that?" is the operative question that can reveal continuity as well as
change. 1
It is not, however, an easy matter to draw reliable distinctions
between the two in advance of retrospect. How, for instance, could
Herbert Hoover have known in the spring of 1930 that the
accustomed past would not reassert itself? Certainly there was no
guide in the experiences of the 1893 to 1897 depression or the
financial panics of 1907 and 1921. Nevertheless, such sudden
change does not occur often in history; and continuity remains an
important anodyne from the past that can inform the present and the
future. This is why Thucydides can seem so contemporarywhy, for
instance, the contest between Athens and Sparta in the
Peloponnesian War resonated in the Cold War and why the
expedition to Syracuse had overtones for America's "half-war" in
Vietnam.