Pocket battleships of the Deutschland class : Deutschland/Lützow, Admiral Scheer, Admiral Graf Spee

374 Pages·2014·23.97 MB·English

by  Koop

Admiral Graf Spee after the spring 1938 modifications to the bridge tower.
Deutschland/Lützow • Admiral Scheer • Admiral Graf Spee

GERHARD KOOP and KLAUS-PETER SCHMOLKE
Copyright © Bernard & Graefe Verlag, Bonn, 1990
This edition first published in Great Britain in 2014 by
Seaforth Publishing,
Pen & Sword Books Ltd,
47 Church Street,
Barnsley S70 2AS
www.seaforthpublishing.com
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978
1 84832 196 0
First published in the German language under the title Panzerschiffe der
Deutschland-Klasse
by Bernard & Graefe Verlag, Bonn, 1993
First published in the English language by Greenhill Books, Lionel Leventhal
Ltd, 2000

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted
in any form
or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording,
or any
information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing of
both the
copyright owner and the above publisher.

Translated from the German by Geoffrey Brooks
Printed and bound in China through Printworks International Ltd

Contents

Foreword
Introduction

Data
Armour
Armament
Fire Control and Radar
Machinery
Refits
Scale Plans

Panzerschiff Deutschland

Panzerschiff Admiral Scheer

Panzerschiff Admiral Graf Spee

Conclusions
Bibliography
Index of Ships
Foreword
The three Panzerschiffe – ‘armour-clad ships’ – of the Deutschland class were
the first heavy units to be built by Germany after World War I, and they replaced
obsolete pre-dreadnought battleships of the Imperial Navy under the provisions
of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.
The name-ship, Deutschland, aroused worldwide interest when she appeared.
It had been the purpose of the 1922 Washington Treaty ratified by the victorious
sea powers – France, Italy, the United States, Great Britain and Japan – to curtail
the massive naval construction programmes pursued by the latter three nations;
unintentionally, Deutschland overturned the accord and gave impetus to a new
naval arms race. As Germany’s traditional enemy, France reacted to the
‘menace’ with the new Dunkerque class battleships. Mussolini saw a threat to
Italian security from the French and laid down a new class of battleships, to
which France responded in turn. Britain was content to look on, but the United
States laid down new capital units principally as a precaution in view of Japan’s
grandiose naval plans.
Of the many beliefs current at one time or another about the Panzerschiffe, the
most ludicrous was the allegation voiced at the Nuremberg Trials that the six
scheduled, three completed ‘pocket battleships’ were deliberately designed to
spearhead the conquest of the world: rather, they were ships of a hybrid type
engineered to fill certain naval roles whilst apparently complying with the letter
of the Versailles Treaty, under which it was otherwise impossible for Germany
to build a modern, combat-worthy battleship within the tonnage limitations. The
design was completely successful even though the hull shape, the arrangement of
the armament and, above all, the propulsion machinery were revolutionary in
concept.
Pocket Battleships of the Deutschland Class is a companion to two earlier
volumes featuring the Bismarck and Scharnhorst classes. It explains the
development stage, provides a detailed review of the important facts and figures
and recounts the career history of each vessel separately, supplemented by
documentary references, War Diary extracts and combat reports. The text
concludes with a critical epilogue. Also provided are detailed sketches, technical
tables and a comprehensive selection of photographs not previously published in
this compact form, many of which appear in an English-language publication for
the first time.
Without the support and assistance of helpers this book could not have been
compiled. Valuable references, advice and supporting documents were provided
by Werner F. G. Stehr, A. Didrichs and S. Breyer. F. Bavendamm assisted me
where necessary with the reproduction of photographs. To all go my grateful
thanks.
All plans and sketches were prepared by Klaus-Peter Schmolke unless
otherwise stated. Photograph sources were the Town Archive, Wilhelmshaven;
the MAN Archive; A. Klein; Renard, Kiel; Urbahns; the U-boat Archive,
Cuxhaven; Command Naval Base, North Sea; Marine/Kriegsmarine Werft,
Wilhelmshaven; Deutsche Werke, Kiel; the RAF, RN and USN; and PK, Koop
Collection/Gally/Klein. Most of the photographs come from my private
collection, which comprises the comprehensive stock of photographs bequeathed
by the former photographer at the Wilhelmshaven Naval Yard; and from private
albums purchased by me from, or from reproductions made from albums lent to
me by, former crew members of the three ships.
Gerhard Koop
Introduction
At Jutland in 1916 the German High Seas Fleet proved its hitting power against
a superior enemy force, but thereafter it was practically reduced to
insignificance. In his diary entry for 7 October 1918, the Fleet Commander-in-
Chief, Admiral Hipper, stated that the overriding priority for the Navy was the
prosecution of the U-boat war. The duty of the Fleet was to protect the mines
weeping formations and the North Sea U-boat bases. This would be achieved by
having the Fleet in home waters. Thus the great ships eked out a miserable
existence in port or at some secluded anchorage, the monotony broken once or
twice by minor forays. The majority of crews, subjected to a negative influence
under a leadership riddled with outmoded notions of class, grew to think of
themselves as idlers and loafers, and fell an easy prey to the political
whisperings of the time. The growing dissatisfaction came to a head with the
first mutinies, which were put down ruthlessly. But the mob still seethed with
discontent.
Whilst the German Army was bleeding to death in the West, the Fleet
remained inactive. Political agitation continued: the naval blockade was starving
a war-weary German population into surrender. When the United States was still
neutral President Wilson had put forward an alluring 14-point programme for
peace. Despite the risk that entering negotiations with the Entente might be
interpreted at home as weakness — the United States had since sided with
Germany’s enemies – the German Government approached the US President as
an intermediary in the misguided expectation of obtaining an end to hostilities on
fair terms.
In October the situation for Germany was increasingly desperate: on 9
November 1918, at Supreme HQ, Admiral Scheer advised the Kaiser that he
could no longer rely on the loyalty of the Fleet. The German Reich accepted an
Armistice with conditions which came into effect on 11 November 1918. The
Navy was hit very hard. All U-boats, and the most modern sixteen capital ships,
eight light cruisers and fifty torpedo-boats of the High Seas Fleet had to be
surrendered to the victorious powers. In Germany after the capitulation,
revolutionary unrest spread through the surface Navy and the leadership lost its
authority visibly. Many officers simply left the Fleet and went home, the men for
the most part being no longer willing to serve.