McGlinchey, S. (2012) Arming the Shah: US Arms Policies To

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McGlinchey, S. (2012) Arming the Shah: U.S. Arms Policies To-
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Arming the Shah

U.S. Arms Policies Towards
Iran, 1950-1979

Stephen McGlinchey
2012

A thesis submitted to Cardiff University for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in International Relations.

  1
Summary

This
 thesis
 reconstructs
 and
 explains
 the
 arms
 relationship
 that
 successive
 U.S.

administrations
 developed
 with
 the
 Shah
 of
 Iran
 between
 1950
 and
 1979.
 This

relationship
 has
 generally
 been
 neglected
 in
 the
 extant
 literature
 leading
 to
 a

series
 of
 omissions
 and
 distortions
 in
 the
 historical
 record.
 By
 detailing
 how
 and

why
 Iran
 transitioned
 from
 a
 low
 order
 military
 aid
 recipient
 in
 the
 1950s
 to

America’s
 primary
 military
 credit
 customer
 in
 the
 late
 1960s
 and
 1970s,
 this

thesis
 provides
 a
 detailed
 and
 original
 contribution
 to
 the
 understanding
 of
 a
 key

Cold
 War
 episode.
 By
 drawing
 on
 extensive
 declassified
 archival
 records,
 the

investigation
 demonstrates
 the
 not
 only
 the
 importance
 of
 the
 arms
 relationship

but
 also
 how
 it
 reflected,
 and
 contributed
 to,
 the
 wider
 evolution
 of
 U.S.-­‐Iranian

relations
 from
 a
 position
 of
 Iranian
 client
 state
 dependency
 to
 a
 situation
 where

the
 U.S.
 became
 heavily
 leveraged
 to
 the
 Shah
 for
 protection
 of
 the
 Gulf
 and

beyond
 -­‐
 until
 the
 policy
 met
 its
 disastrous
 end
 in
 1979
 as
 an
 antithetical
 regime

took
 power
 in
 Iran.

  2
Declaration

This
 work
 has
 not
 been
 submitted
 in
 substance
 for
 any
 other
 degree
 or
 award
 at

this
  or
  any
  other
  university
  or
  place
  of
  learning,
  nor
  is
  being
  submitted

concurrently
 in
 candidature
 for
 any
 degree
 or
 other
 award.

Signed
 ………
 Stephen
 McGlinchey……………………
 (candidate)

 Date:
 17/11/2012

Statement
 1

This
 thesis
 is
 being
 submitted
 in
 partial
 fulfilment
 of
 the
 requirements
 for
 the

degree
 of
 PhD.

Signed
 ………
 Stephen
 McGlinchey……………………
 (candidate)

 Date:
 17/11/2012

Statement
 2

This
  thesis
  is
  the
  result
  of
  my
  own
  independent
  work/investigation,
  except

where
 otherwise
 stated.
 Other
 sources
 are
 acknowledged
 by
 explicit
 references.

The
 views
 expressed
 are
 my
 own.

Signed
 ………
 Stephen
 McGlinchey……………………
 (candidate)

 Date:
 17/11/2012

Statement
 3

I
 hereby
 give
 consent
 for
 my
 thesis,
 if
 accepted,
 to
 be
 available
 for
 photocopying

and
 for
 inter-­‐library
 loan,
 and
 for
 the
 title
 and
 summary
 to
 be
 made
 available
 to

outside
 organisations.

Signed
 ………
 Stephen
 McGlinchey
 ………………….
 (candidate)

 Date:
 17/11/2012

Statement
 4

I
 hereby
 give
 consent
 for
 my
 thesis,
 if
 accepted,
 to
 be
 available
 for
 photocopying

and
  for
  inter-­‐library
  loans
  after
  expiry
  of
  a
  bar
  on
  access
  previously

approved
 by
 the
 Academic
 Standards
 &
 Quality
 Committee.

Signed
 ………
 Stephen
 McGlinchey
 ……………………
 (candidate)

 Date:
 17/11/2012

  3
Acknowledgements

This
  thesis
  was
  made
  possible
  by
  the
  steadfast
  support
  and
  painstaking

supervision
 of
 Dr
 Steve
 Marsh.
 I
 have
 also
 been
 incredibly
 fortunate
 to
 have
 been

embedded
 in
 a
 supportive
 department.
 My
 deepest
 thanks
 go
 to
 each
 and
 every

academic
 and
 administrative
 staff
 member
 at
 EUROP
 who
 have
 aided
 me
 over

the
 last
 few
 years.
 I
 would
 also
 like
 to
 thank
 the
 archivists
 who
 have
 assisted
 me

in
 assembling
 the
 primary
 research
 for
 this
 thesis.
 Finally,
 I
 would
 like
 to
 thank

the
 Gerald
 Ford
 Foundation
 for
 awarding
 me
 a
 generous
 research
 grant.

  4
Table of Contents
Introduction
  6

1.
 American
 Foreign
 Policy
 Contours
 Towards
 the
 Middle
 East,
 1946-­‐1968
  16

Forging
 a
 Cold
 War
 Middle
 East
 Policy
  18

From
 Five
 Regional
 Policies
 to
 Two
  30

The
 Failure
 of
 New
 Thinking
  39

‘A
 Breathing
 Space’?
  51

Conclusion:
 All
 Roads
 Gradually
 Lead
 to
 Tehran
  59

2.
 Building
 a
 Client
 State:
 U.S.
 Military
 Aid
 to
 Iran,
 1950-­‐1963
  61

Consolidating
 the
 Military
 Aid
 Relationship
 With
 Iran
  63

The
 Shah
 in
 the
 Kennedy
 Years
  73

Conclusion:
 The
 Foundational
 Years
  89

3.
 Lyndon
 B.
 Johnson
 and
 Arms
 Credit
 Sales
 to
 Iran
  91

From
 Aid
 to
 Credit
  94

1966:
 The
 Real
 Nadir
  100

From
 Nadir
 to
 Tentative
 Partnership:
 1967-­‐1968
  113

Conclusion:
 Back
 from
 the
 Brink
  122

4.
 Richard
 Nixon’s
 Revolution
 in
 U.S.-­‐Iran
 Arms
 Sales
 Policy
  124

Setting
 the
 Foreign
 Policy
 Agenda:
 1969-­‐1970
  127

Developing
 a
 Post-­‐British
 Framework
 for
 the
 Gulf
  135

Arms:
 Continuity,
 Not
 Change
  141

The
 Tehran
 Arms
 Deal
  152

The
 Downfall
 of
 Nixon,
 and
 the
 Rise
 of
 Congress
  164

Conclusion:
 Revolution,
 Not
 Without
 Consequences
  181

5.
 Gerald
 Ford
 and
 Iran:
 Continuity
 in
 a
 Testing
 Climate
  183

Finding
 Iran
 in
 the
 Ford
 Years
  185

A
 Revisionist
 Trend?
  203

Conclusion:
 Continuity
 and
 Deepening
  228

6.
 Jimmy
 Carter
 and
 U.S.-­‐Iran
 Arms
 Sales
  231

The
 Carter
 Foreign
 Policy
 System
  233

The
 End
 of
 the
 Blank
 Cheque
  236

The
 Rewriting
 of
 the
 U.S.-­‐Iran
 Arms
 Relationship
  248

A
 Middle
 East
 Peace
 (and
 Arms)
 Process
  278

The
 Last
 Gasp
 of
 the
 U.S.-­‐Iran
 Arms
 Relationship
  287

Conclusion:
 A
 Three
 Act
 Affair
  307

Conclusion
  311

The
 Four
 Phases
 of
 Relations
  312

Accounting
 For
 U.S.-­‐Iran
 Arms
 Policy
 Development
  320

Bibliography
  336

  5
Introduction

The
 U.S.
 and
 Iran
 are
 existential
 foes
 in
 the
 contemporary
 era.
 Following
 Iran’s

Islamic
  Revolution
  in
  1979
  and
  the
  taking
  of
  American
  Embassy
  officials
  in

Tehran
 as
 hostages
 that
 same
 year,
 all
 regular
 diplomatic
 contact
 was
 severed.

That
 pattern
 of
 relations
 remains
 to
 this
 day.
 Yet,
 prior
 to
 1979
 both
 nations

enjoyed
 a
 very
 different
 relationship.
 That
 relationship
 was
 built
 around
 Iran’s

pro-­‐American
 monarch,
 Mohammed
 Reza
 Pahlavi
 -­‐
 better
 known
 as
 the
 Shah.

The
 Shah
 ruled
 Iran
 through
 eight
 U.S.
 Presidencies
 from
 1942
 until
 1979.
 His

desire
 for
 military
 supremacy
 over
 his
 neighbours,
 and
 his
 distrust
 of
 the
 Soviets

led
 him
 to
 seek
 an
 arms
 relationship
 with
 the
 U.S.
 following
 the
 end
 of
 the

Second
 World
 War.
 This
 relationship
 gradually
 deepened
 throughout
 his
 reign,

eventually
 resulting
 in
 Iran
 wielding
 a
 military
 that
 was,
 on
 paper,
 within
 reach

of
 becoming
 the
 world’s
 fifth
 most
 advanced
 force
 in
 1978.

From
 1950,
 the
 U.S.
 armed
 a
 primitive
 and
 relatively
 poor
 Iran
 via
 successive

programmes
 of
 military
 aid.
 This
 laid
 the
 foundation
 for
 Iran’s
 growth
 in
 regional

stature
 and
 the
 consolidation
 of
 the
 Shah’s
 pro-­‐Western
 regime.
 By
 1968
 an

advanced
 arms
 relationship
 based
 on
 credit
 sales
 had
 evolved.
 At
 that
 point
 Iran

was
 America’s
 largest
 single
 arms
 customer,
 purchasing
 approximately
 $150

million
 dollars
 of
 arms
 per
 annum.
 By
 the
 early
 1970s,
 the
 arms
 relationship
 had

transformed
 qualitatively
 and
 quantitatively.
 Replacing
 the
 sales
 pattern
 of
 the

1960s,
 the
 Shah
 embarked
 on
 a
 high-­‐tech
 multi-­‐billion
 dollar
 annual
 spending

  6
spree
 in
 Washington
 from
 mid-­‐1972
 until
 his
 final
 months
 in
 power.
 In
 return,

the
 U.S.
 gained
 the
 net
 security
 benefit
 of
 a
 militarily
 strong
 pro-­‐Western
 state
 in

the
 vital
 Cold
 War
 geopolitical
 battleground
 of
 the
 Persian
 Gulf.

Despite
 the
 significance
 and
 depth
 of
 the
 arms
 relationship
 between
 the
 U.S.
 and

Iran,
 there
 is
 a
 dearth
 of
 detailed
 analysis
 of
 it
 in
 the
 extant
 literature.
 Studies

that
 deal
 in
 whole
 or
 in
 part
 with
 the
 Shah’s
 Iran
 have
 focused
 on
 several
 major

events
 that
 have
 diverted
 any
 sustained
 focus
 on
 arms.
 Firstly,
 Iran
 was
 the

scene
 of
 the
 first
 Cold
 War
 confrontation
 between
 the
 U.S.
 and
 the
 Soviet
 Union

in
 1946.
 Although
 the
 tension
 was
 remedied
 by
 diplomacy,
 it
 became
 evident

that
 Iran
 would
 be
 one
 of
 the
 frontier
 states
 in
 a
 new
 era
 of
 bipolar
 superpower

antagonism.1
 Secondly,
 in
 the
 early
 1950s
 the
 Shah
 temporarily
 lost
 his
 grip
 on

power
 to
 a
 nationalist
 coalition,
 led
 by
 Prime
 Minister
 Mohammad
 Mosaddegh.

Mosaddegh
 pressed
 for
 the
 nationalisation
 of
 the
 Iranian
 oil
 industry,
 which
 had

been
 developed
 and
 operated
 by
 the
 British.
 An
 American-­‐British
 coup
 in
 1953

restored
 the
 Shah’s
 autocracy
 and
 ended
 the
 oil
 dispute.
 This
 event
 has
 been

widely
 studied
 -­‐
 establishing
 the
 importance
 of
 Iranian
 oil,
 and
 the
 growing

1
 See:
 Kristen
 Blake,
 The
 U.S.-­‐Soviet
 Confrontation
 in
 Iran,
 1945-­‐1962:
 A
 Case
 in
 the
 Annals
 of
 the

Cold
 War
 (Boulder:
 University
 Press
 of
 America,
 2009);
 Richard
 W.
 Cottam,
 Iran
 and
 the

United
 States,
 A
 Cold
 War
 Case
 Study,(Pittsburgh:
 University
 of
 Pittsburgh
 Press,
 1988)
 pp.

66-­‐78;
 Justus
 D.
 Doenecke,
 ‘Revisionists,
 Oil,
 and
 Cold
 War
 Diplomacy’,
 Iranian
 Studies,
 3:1,

(1970)
 pp.
 96-­‐105;
 Lloyd
 C.
 Gardner,
 Architects
 of
 Illusion:
 Men
 and
 Ideas
 in
 American

Foreign
 Policy
 1941-­‐1949
 (Chicago:
 Quadrangle
 Books,
 1970)
 pp.
 210-­‐215;
 John
 L.
 Gaddis,

The
 United
 States
 and
 the
 Origins
 of
 the
 Cold
 War
 1941-­‐1947
 (New
 York:
 Columbia
 University

Press,
 1972)
 pp.
 309-­‐360;
 Gary
 R.
 Hess,
 ‘The
 Iranian
 Crisis
 of
 1945-­‐46
 and
 the
 Cold
 War’,

Political
 Science
 Quarterly,
 89:1
 (March,
 1974)
 pp.
 117-­‐146;
 Joseph
 M.
 Jones,
 The
 Fifteen

Weeks:
 February
 21-­‐June
 5
 1947
 (New
 York:
 The
 Viking
 Press,
 1955)
 pp.
 50-­‐58;
 George

Lenczowski,
 Russia
 and
 the
 West
 in
 Iran,
 1918-­‐1948:
 A
 Study
 in
 Big
 Power
 Rivalry
 (New
 York:

Cornell
 University
 Press,
 1948)
 pp.
 263-­‐315;
 Robert
 Rossow
 Jr,
 ‘The
 Battle
 of
 Azerbaijan,

1946’,
 Middle
 East
 Journal,
 10:
 1
 (1956,
 Winter),
 pp.17-­‐32.

  7
influence
 of
 the
 U.S.
 in
 Iran.2
 Regarding
 oil,
 Iran’s
 role
 in
 the
 establishment
 of

OPEC
 and
 the
 oil
 price
 shocks
 of
 the
 1970s
 has
 also
 been
 examined
 extensively
 in

the
 literature.3
 Finally,
 analysis
 of
 U.S.
 policy
 failures
 before
 and
 after
 the
 Islamic

Revolution
 of
 1979
 has
 absorbed
 the
 bulk
 of
 scholarly
 attention
 paid
 to
 Iran
 in

the
 mid-­‐late
 1970s.4
 Studies
 that
 detail
 events
 in
 the
 1970s
 outside
 the
 hostage

crisis
 and
 oil
 shocks
 largely
 fall
 into
 two
 categories:
 Firstly,
 a
 widely
 cited
 core
 of

texts
 was
 written
 between
 1980
 and
 1991.5
 While
 these
 studies
 are
 useful,
 they

2
 See
 Stephen
 Kinzer,
 All
 the
 Shah’s
 Men:
 An
 American
 Coup
 and
 the
 Roots
 of
 Middle
 East
 Terror

(New
 Jersey:
 John
 Wiley
 and
 Sons,
 2003);
 Steve
 Marsh,
 ‘Continuity
 and
 Change:

Reinterpreting
 the
 Policies
 of
 the
 Truman
 and
 Eisenhower
 Administrations
 toward
 Iran,

1950-­‐1954’,
 Journal
 of
 Cold
 War
 Studies,
 7:3
 (Summer
 2005)
 pp.
 79-­‐123;
 Steve
 Marsh,
 Anglo

American
 Relations
 and
 Cold
 War
 Oil:
 Crisis
 in
 Iran,
 (Hampshire,
 Palgrave
 Macmillian,
 2003);

Kermit
 Roosevelt,
 Countercoup:
 The
 Struggle
 for
 the
 Control
 of
 Iran
 (New
 York:
 McGraw
 Hill,

1979);
 and
 Daniel
 Yergin,
 The
 Prize:
 The
 Epic
 Quest
 for
 Oil,
 Money
 and
 Power
 (London:
 Simon

and
 Schuster,
 1991),
 pp.
 420-­‐478.

3
 For
 a
 representative
 example
 see:
 Andrew
 Scott
 Cooper,
 ‘Showdown
 at
 Doha:
 The
 Secret
 Oil

Deal
 That
 Helped
 Sink
 the
 Shah
 of
 Iran’,
 Middle
 East
 Journal,
 62:
 4
 (Autumn
 2008)
 pp.
 567-­‐
592;
 Henry
 Kissinger,
 Years
 of
 Upheaval
 (Boston:
 Little,
 Brown
 and
 Company,
 1982),
 pp.

858-­‐966;
 Roy
 Licklider,
 ‘The
 Power
 of
 Oil:
 The
 Arab
 Oil
 Weapon
 and
 the
 Netherlands,
 the

United
 Kingdom,
 Canada,
 Japan,
 and
 the
 United
 States’,
 International
 Studies
 Quarterly,
 32

(1988),
 pp.
 205-­‐226;
 Karen
 R.
 Merrill,
 The
 Oil
 Crisis
 of
 1973-­‐1974:
 A
 Brief
 History
 with

Documents
 (New
 York:
 Bedford
 St.
 Martin’s,
 2007);
 Alexander
 Moens,
 ‘President
 Carter’s

Advisers
 and
 the
 Fall
 of
 the
 Shah’,
 Political
 Science
 Quarterly,
 106:
 2
 (Summer
 1991),
 pp.

211-­‐237;
 David
 S.
 Painter,
 ‘Oil
 and
 the
 American
 Century’,
 The
 Journal
 of
 American
 History,

99:
 1
 (June
 2012),
 pp.
 24-­‐38;
 Tore
 T.
 Petersen,
 Richard
 Nixon,
 Great
 Britain
 and
 the
 Anglo-­‐
American
 Alignment
 in
 the
 Persian
 Gulf
 and
 Arabian
 Peninsula:
 Making
 Allies
 out
 of
 Clients

(Brighton:
 Sussex
 Academic
 Press,
 2009),
 pp.
 29-­‐47;
 Richard
 C.
 Thornton,
 The
 Nixon-­‐
Kissinger
 Years:
 The
 Reshaping
 of
 American
 Foreign
 Policy
 (St
 Paul:
 Paragon,
 2001),
 pp.
 302-­‐
313;
 and
 Daniel
 Yergin,
 The
 Prize,
 pp.
 591-­‐612.

4
 For
 a
 representative
 example
 see:
 David
 Farber,
 Taken
 Hostage:
 The
 Iran
 Hostage
 Crisis
 and

America’s
 First
 Encounter
 With
 Radical
 Islam
 (Princeton:
 Princeton
 University
 Press,
 2006);

David
 Patrick
 Houghton,
 US
 Foreign
 Policy
 and
 the
 Iran
 Hostage
 Crisis
 (Cambridge:

Cambridge
 University
 Press,
 2001);
 Feredoun
 Hoveyda,
 The
 Shah
 and
 the
 Ayatollah:
 Iranian

Mythology
 and
 Islamic
 Revolution
 (Westport:
 Praeger,
 2003);
 Hamilton
 Jordan,
 Crisis:
 The

Last
 Year
 of
 the
 Carter
 Presidency
 (London:
 G.P.
 Putnam’s
 Sons,
 1982);
 Gary
 Sick,
 October

Surprise:
 America’s
 Hostages
 in
 Iran
 and
 the
 Election
 of
 Ronald
 Reagan
 (London:
 I.B.
 Tauris,

1992);
 William
 H.
 Sullivan,
 Mission
 to
 Iran
 (New
 York:
 W.
 W.
 Norton,
 1981);
 and
 Kurt

Waldheim,
 In
 the
 Eye
 of
 the
 Storm
 (London:
 Adler
 &
 Adler,
 1985).

5
 See
 James
 A.
 Bill,
 The
 Eagle
 and
 the
 Lion:
 The
 Tragedy
 of
 American-­‐Iranian
 Relations
 (New

Haven:
 Yale
 University
 Press,
 1988);
 Richard
 W.
 Cottam,
 Iran
 and
 the
 United
 States:
 A
 Cold

War
 Case
 Study
 (Pittsburgh:
 University
 of
 Pittsburgh
 Press,
 1988);
 Mark
 J.
 Gasiorowski,
 U.S.

Foreign
 Policy
 and
 the
 Shah:
 Building
 a
 Client
 State
 in
 Iran
 (Ithaca:
 Cornell
 University
 Press,

1991);
 Michael
 T.
 Klare,
 American
 Arms
 Supermarket
 (Austin:
 University
 of
 Texas
 Press,

1984);
 and
 Barry
 Rubin,
 Paved
 With
 Good
 Intentions:
 The
 American
 Experience
 and
 Iran

(Oxford:
 Oxford
 University
 Press,
 1980).

  8
are
 dated
 and
 were
 written
 without
 considerable
 access
 to
 primary
 sources.

Secondly,
 the
 availability
 of
 archival
 material
 has
 attracted
 renewed
 scholarly

interest.
 To
 date,
 that
 work
 has
 largely
 focused
 on
 Iranian
 domestic
 perspectives,

or
 has
 fallen
 into
 one
 of
 the
 areas
 noted
 above.6

This
 thesis
 suggests
 that
 the
 much
 neglected
 arms
 relationship
 was
 actually
 one

of
 the
 defining
 characteristics
 of
 U.S.-­‐Iran
 relations
 prior
 to
 1979.
 Moreover,
 it

was
  a
  relationship
  without
  comparison.
  Utilising
  a
  diplomatic
  history

methodology,
 this
 thesis
 harnesses
 newly
 declassified
 archival
 material
 to
 offer

the
 first
 detailed
 analysis
 of
 the
 U.S.-­‐Iran
 arms
 relationship
 with
 the
 Shah.
 The

thesis
  draws
  extensively
  upon
  archival
  records
  from
  the
  Kennedy,
  Johnson,

Nixon,
 Ford,
 and
 Carter
 Presidential
 libraries/collections,
 and
 from
 the
 State

Department
 collection
 in
 the
 U.S.
 National
 Archives.
 Other
 collections
 available
 at

the
 National
 Archives
 such
 as
 the
 Department
 of
 Defense
 and
 Central
 Intelligence

Agency
  collections
  also
  feature
  where
  available. 7 These
  sources
  are

supplemented
 with
 multiple
 volumes
 of
 the
 Foreign
 Relations
 of
 the
 United
 States

(FRUS)
 series.
 The
 major
 focus
 of
 the
 thesis
 falls
 within
 the
 1960s
 and
 1970s
 -­‐

the
 period
 which
 contained
 the
 most
 notable
 developments
 in
 U.S.-­‐Iran
 arms

policy.
  Hence,
  that
  period
  reflects
  the
  bulk
  of
  the
  primary
  source
  research

6
 See:
 Gholam
 Reza
 Afkhami,
 The
 Life
 and
 Times
 of
 the
 Shah
 (Berkeley:
 University
 of
 California

Press,
 2009;
 Alidad
 Mafinezan
 and
 Aria
 Mehrabi,
 Iran
 and
 Its
 Place
 among
 Nations

(Westport:
 Praeger,
 2008);
 Abbas
 Milani,
 The
 Shah
 (New
 York:
 Palgrave
 Macmillan,
 2012);

Trita
 Parsi,
 Treacherous
 Alliance:
 The
 Secret
 Dealings
 of
 Israel,
 Iran,
 and
 the
 United
 States

(New
 Haven:
 Yale
 University
 Press,
 2007);
 Steven
 R.
 Ward,
 Immortal:
 A
 Military
 History
 of

Iran
 and
 its
 Armed
 Forces
 (Washington
 D.C.:
 University
 of
 Georgetown
 Press,
 2008);

7
 The
 majority
 of
 these
 collections
 remain
 closed.
 Yet,
 the
 Digital
 National
 Security
 Archive
 proved

an
 excellent
 source
 to
 remedy
 this
 via
 their
 extensive
 private
 collection
 of
 documents

obtained
 by
 their
 proactive
 use
 of
 freedom
 of
 information
 requests.
 Often
 they
 have
 been

able
 to
 procure
 heavily
 redacted,
 yet
 still
 useful
 documents
 outside
 of
 the
 normal

declassification
 schedule
 in
 the
 National
 Archives
 system.

  9