Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue

407 Pages·1997·6.51 MB·English

by  Nancy Sherman

This book is the first to offer a detailed analysis of Aristotelian
and Kantian ethics together in a way that remains faithful to the
texts and responsive to debates in contemporary ethics.
Recent moral philosophy has seen a revival of interest in the
concept of virtue, and with it a reassessment of the role of virtue
in the work of Aristotle and Kant. This book brings that reassess-
ment to a new level of sophistication. Nancy Sherman argues that
Kant preserves a notion of virtue in his moral theory that bears
recognizable traces of the Aristotelian and Stoic traditions, and
that his complex anthropology of morals brings him into surpris-
ing alliance with Aristotle. She develops her argument through
close readings of major texts by both Aristotle and Kant, illustrat-
ing points of congruence and contrast.
While scrupulously focusing on textual details the book pre-
sents a dialogue between Aristotle and Kant that sheds light on
contemporary debates about the importance in any account of
moral judgment of general principles, on the one hand, and a
grasp of particulars on the other. She also argues for the signifi-
cant role emotions play in both the Kantian and the Aristotelian
accounts of moral agency.

Making a Necessity of Virtue

Making a Necessity of Virtue
Aristotle and Kant on Virtue
NANCY SHERMAN
Georgetown University
CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, CB2 IRP
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, United Kingdom
40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA
10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia
© Nancy Sherman 1997
This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 1997
Typset in Palatino
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Sherman, Nancy, 1951-
Making a necessity of virtue : Aristotle and Kant on virtue /
Nancy Sherman.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-521-56383-6 (hardcover). - ISBN 0-521-56487-5 (pbk.)
1. Aristotle - Ethics. 2. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 - Ethics.
I. Title.
B491.E7S44 1996
179'.9 - dc20 96-26314
CIP
A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.
ISBN 0-521-56383-6 Hardback
ISBN 0-521-56487-5 Paperback
Transferred to digital printing 2004
To Marshall, Kala, and Jonathan

Contents
Preface and Acknowledgments page xi
Abbreviations and Notes on Translations xiv
Chapter 1 A New Dialogue 1
1 The Framing Questions 5
2 Activity, Agency, and External Goods: Aristotle, the
Stoics, and Kant 9
3 A Brief Overview 20
Chapter 2 The Emotional Structure cf Aristotelian Virtue 24
1 Opening a Dialogue on the Emotions 24
2 The Alleged Problem with Emotions 28
3 How Emotions Figure in Morality 39
4 Aristotelian Emotions 52
5 Emotions and Their Relation to Choice 75
6 Cultivating Emotions 83
7 Cultivating Emotions Through Music and Tragedy 89
8 Virtue and Nonconflictual Emotions 93
Chapter 3 A Brief Stoic Interlude 99
1 Against Aristotelian Moderation 101
2 Stoic Therapy 107
3 Stoic Apathy and Kantian Antisentimentalism 116
Chapter 4 The Passional Underpinnings of Kantian Virtue 121
1 Some Background 121
vii
Contents
2 Morality's Foundation and Moral Anthropology 127
3 Kantian Virtue 135
4 The Cultivation of Emotions as Supports for Duty 141
5 Virtue as a Structured Composite 158
6 In What Sense Are We Agents of Our Emotional
Experience? 164
7 Respect as a Distinctive Moral Emotion 175
8 A Few Comparative Notes 181
Chapter 5 The Shared Voyage 187
1 Doing Things Together 188
2 Aristotelian Friendship and Shared Activity 199
3 Friendship and Its Place in Good Living 208
4 Wider Altruism 217
5 Kant and Friendship 224
6 The Ethical Commonwealth as a Social Goal 233
Chapter 6 Aristotelian Particularism 239
1 Brief Remarks on Practical Reason and "Habituated"
Virtue 241
2 Aristotelian Particularism: A Start 243
3 Emotions as Evaluative 248
4 Perception and Intuitionism 254
5 Rules and Practical Insight 262
6 The Practical Syllogism Revisited 276
Chapter 7 Making Room for Practical Wisdom in Kantian
Ethics 284
1 Some Roles for the Categorical Imperative 289
2 The Content of Maxims 294
3 Kantian Universalizability 305
4 Kantian "Reflective" Deliberation 311
5 Comparing Aristotle and Kant on Judgment and
Deliberation 325
Chapter 8 Perfecting Kantian Virtue: Discretionary
Latitude and Superlative Virtue 331
1 How Demanding is Kantian Virtue? 331
vin