individuality and community: the perspectives of advaita vedant

285 Pages·2008·1.29 MB·English

INDIVIDUALITY AND COMMUNITY: THE
PERSPECTIVES OF CLASSICAL INDIAN AND AFRICAN PHILOSOPHIES
ILUYOMADE RAPHAEL FUNWA
(B.A (Hons) OSUA
(M.A.) UNILAG
A THESIS SUBMITTED

FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
2007
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Firstly, I wish to extend my gratitude to the Lord whose grace enables me to finish this
dissertation. I thank my supervisor, Associate Professor Saranindranath Tagore whose
dedication has made this work possible. In addition, I owe a debt of gratitude to
Associate Professor Cecilia Lim Teck Neo. I appreciate deeply the contributions of Mr
Ayodele-Oja Olalekan Rafiu, Mr Kim Hak Ze, Mr Sun Wei, Mr Gunardi Endro, Ong
Bendick, Phan Shiaw Hwa Jason and my other colleagues at the National University of
Singapore. The moral support of Professor Soye Bandele, Mr Folorunsho Ishola Elutilo,
Dr. Paul Zakowich, Ms Fiona Zakowich, Ms Elizabetta Franzoso, Mr Leonardo Talpo,
Ms Ruth Sok Nhep, Ms Siew Kheng, Mr Daniel Selvaretnam, Ms Suseela Selvaretnam
and others is deeply appreciated. I am grateful for the moral support of my mother Ms
Comfort Morenike Iluyomade and Mr Adeyeye Ezekiel Adeniyi. Finally, I thank my wife
Kathe Iluyomade and my children, Gift Ayomide Iluyomade and Fiona Oluwaseyi
Iluyomade, for their invaluable support throughout the period of this program. I sincerely
thank Ms Devi Asokan and all the administrative staff of the department of philosophy. I
do not have enough words to show my appreciation to you all, but your support will
forever remain in my good memory. I wish, but for space, to identify each one by name.
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CONTENTS
PREFACE 5
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTORY MATTERS 9

CHAPTER TWO: A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF ADVAITA VENDANTA
PHILOSOPHY
I: THE WORLD IN ADVAITA VEDANTA 32
II: MORALITY AND INDIVIDUALITY 64
III: DUALITY AND IGNORANCE 96
CHAPTER THREE: A CRITICAL EXPOSITION OF YORUBA PHILOSOPHY
I: THE WORLD IN YORUBA NARRATIVES 127
II: MORALITY AND INDIVIDUALITY 160
III: DUALITY AND IGNORANCE 189
CHAPTER FOUR: CONTEXTUALIZING ADVAITA AND YORUBA
CONSTRUCTIONS OF IDENTITY 215

BIBLIOGRAPHY 264
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SUMMARY
In this thesis, I develop a middle position, from Advaita and Yoruba philosophies, that
avoids the logical conclusions derived from the binary representations of the individual as
a personal self with ontologically prior marks of personhood and the culturally or
collectivist construction of the individual.
The analysis of the self in Advaita philosophy springs from the Advaita’s main
proposition that Brahman is the basis of individuality and community. I argue that this
presupposition does not discourage the thriving of the person’s distinctive nature.
Consequently, I reflect on the moral implication of Advaita notion of identity. Finally, I
reflect on the problem of alterity that may ensue from Advaita’s construction of identity.
The notion of identity in Yoruba philosophy is developed on the belief that Emi is
the essence of individuality. I discuss the implications of Emi as the basis of individuality
and community alongside the criticism that Emi prohibits the development of the
person’s distinctive nature. Among others, I reason that the idea gives the individual the
liberty of self choice. This is contrary to the position that argues that community good
determines identity in African philosophy. Again, I examine the moral implication of
Yoruba construction of identity. Finally, I consider how Yoruba philosophy addresses the
problem of alterity in relation to identity.
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INDIVIDUALITY AND COMMUNITY: THE PERSPECTIVES OF CLASSICAL
INDIAN AND AFRICAN PHILOSOPHIES
PREFACE
This study is an exercise in comparative philosophy. The discussion will revolve around
Advaita and Yoruba views of individuality in relation to community. This subject matter
has been close to my heart for many years. I grew up in an African culture where
community plays a vital role in the construction of identity. I have firsthand experience of
the two constructs of the self that I will like to call the social and independent constructs.
I learned through my background that both aspects of the self are crucial and that they
ought to be developed in a balanced manner within social and political philosophy. My
fundamental concern is to reflect on how identity is expressed in these two philosophies
in relation to community. Over the years I have reflected on these problems from three
independent philosophical sources: the western tradition, the Advaita sources of India and
Yoruba philosophy. The western liberal and communitarian philosophers hold diverse
positions regarding the source of identity. On the one hand, we have the liberal position
which maintains that identity is formed through rational free choice and on the other hand
is the communitarians who depict identity as something that is derived from community
life. I do not intend to dabble into this interesting debate. However, I will highlight, in the
last chapter, the key issues that surround the liberal-communitarian constructions of
identity. This will be a useful hint for those who will like to conduct some research
between the western views of identity and community and the philosophical traditions
that I am discussing here. By discussing ideas from Indian philosophy: Advaita Vedanta
and African philosophy, especially the Yoruba tradition, I hope to generate a middle
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position regarding the issue of identity and community. This position will respond largely
to the traditional accounts of Indian and Yoruba constructions of individuality. Though
Yoruba and Advaita endorse radically different metaphysical positions, I will argue that
they reach similar conclusions concerning the nature of identity. Thus, this work is an
exercise in comparative philosophy and in the constructive social dimension of political
philosophy.
The first chapter will introduce the reader to the key conceptual problems that are
of concern to me in this work. The problems that are associated with identity constructs
in Indian and African thoughts will be outlined here. More importantly, I will discuss
why some commentators are of the opinion that the virtues that delineate genuine identity
are devalued in India and Africa. Three issues which are central in the study are stated in
this chapter. The first issue involves the source of identity. Subsequent chapters will
show whether the Indian and Yoruba philosophical traditions hold that identity is purely
given or chosen. The second problem reflects on the congruence of morality and
individuality in Yoruba philosophy. Finally, I will be concerned with the notion of self
choice and toleration.
Chapter two will be divided into three sections. The first section will discuss the
Advaita notion of identity in relation to community. I will investigate Advaita’s main
presupposition that Brahman is the basis of individuality. I will show how this
assumption encourages the thriving of our distinctive nature. What does the idea of
Brahman as the source of identity imply? Does it suggest that individuality is antecedent
to community or submerged within its worldviews? These are some of the questions that
will attract our attention. Furthermore, I will examine the view of Brahman as the basis of
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community. Can it be said that this idea provides a basis for co-operative association
where the development of the person’s free and equal nature are uninhibited? Finally, I
will examine how Advaita construes the formation of identity. Section two will dwell on
the moral implications of the Advaita conception of identity. Here, I will focus on the
extent to which the moral identity of the person is construed from the standpoint of
community meanings and whether this gives the individual genuine satisfaction. Section
three will dwell on the philosophical problem of alterity. Working on the Advaita
conception of avidya (ignorance) and duality, I will attempt to develop an account of how
the Advaita person would relate to the differences that are associated with others.
Chapter three will develop the Yoruba account of individuality and community in
three sections. The first section will reflect on the idea of Emi as the essence of
individuality. Against the criticisms that Emi prohibits the development of the person’s
distinctive nature, this section will draw the implications of Emi as the basis of
individuality and community. Does this idea give the individual the liberty of self choice?
How can a philosophy which maintains that the community has its basis on Emi support
the development of the person’s distinctive nature? A critical reflection on the above
questions will throw some light on the error of those theories which argue that
community meanings determine moral identity in African (Yoruba) philosophy. I will
argue that though Yoruba philosophy holds that identity is derived as the person
participates in the social space of the community, this does not hinder the person from
pursuing personal goals. Section two will explore Yoruba conception of moral identity
from a critical evaluation of the concept of eniyan (individual). The analysis of eniyan
will show what the idea of the individual as a subject amounts to in Yoruba philosophy.
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How this philosophy harmoniously explores the person’s independent and dependent
nature will be highlighted in this section. Section three will address the philosophical
problems of alterity and identity as entailed in Yoruba philosophy. The key concepts that
will be analyzed in order to arrive at this end are aimo (ignorance) and duality.
The final chapter will discuss the findings in Advaita and Yoruba in a
comparative manner. I will highlight, in this chapter, the key points that underlie the
western liberal and communitarian debate about identity. In both chapters two and three I
will rely on the basic categories of thought in the Advaita and Yoruba philosophies to
interpretively disclose their philosophical stand on the issues of individuality and
community. I will then take these comparatively developed conceptions and apply them
to the social dimension of identity in political philosophy.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTORY MATTERS
I
In this study, I will focus on the subject of individuality and community in the
philosophical traditions of Advaita Vedanta and Yoruba. Advaita Vedanta philosophy is a
non-dualistic philosophy in that it subscribes to the ultimate oneness of the self. Yoruba
philosophy belongs to a dualist tradition. The discussion will center on how the two
philosophical traditions describe the relation of the individual to the community. I hope to
show the specific roles that these philosophical traditions give to the individual in self
determination. The question is whether the individual is empowered to define her own
identity or the community defines it for her. A number of commentators argue that the
classical philosophy of India and Africa settle for the latter view. In this study, I will
argue differently. I will be examining the idea of the self in these philosophical traditions
in order to situate the notion of the individual in relation to community.
Before I proceed to discuss the issues that will introduce us to the notions of
individuality in Advaita and Yoruba philosophies, I should mention briefly two
interesting views of the self and identity that are prominent in the literature. 1 Advocates
1 About these different views of identity, Amartya Sen writes: “it has not, however, always been easy to
persuade social analysts to accommodate identity in a satisfactory way. In particular, two different types of
reductionism seem to abound in the formal literature of social and economic analysis. One may be called
“identity disregard,” and it takes the form of ignoring, or neglecting altogether, the influence of any sense
of identity with others, on what we value and how we behave … In contrast with “identity disregard,” there
is a different kind of reductionism, which we may call “singular affiliation,” which takes the form of
assuming that any person preeminently belongs, for all practical purposes, to one collectivity only-no more
and no less”. See Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny, (London: Penguin Books
Limited, 2006), pp. 19-20.
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of these two positions hold opposing views regarding the source of identity. Both schools
of thought formulate their thesis as if identity issues cannot be pursued in a way that
incorporates the thesis of both camps. I will attempt to show in this study that Advaita
and Yoruba philosophical constructions of identity indicate that this is possible. The main
assumption of the first school of thought is that the self is an independent, autonomous
and complete entity.2 The self, in this perspective, is not to be defined externally for this
has the tendency of inhibiting its freedom. Owing to the fact that the self is a complete
entity, it is argued that the individual will experience self fulfillment when she is allowed
to exercise the right of self legislation. And what this means is that individuals should
choose their central projects independently of any external influence. This is a necessary
condition for genuine individuality to be reflected. Otherwise, the individual will be
conditioned, made to serve the interests of others and, ultimately made to conform to
ideals that are imposed on her rather than the one she chooses for herself. This idea finds
reflection in J. S. Mill’s thinking that those who do not choose their own life are not
better than apes. Mill’s writes:
… the human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling,
mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a
choice … he who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan
of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of
imitation.3
2 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton, (London: Hutchinson &
Co. Ltd., 1964), Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith, (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1965), Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. W. Beck, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1956), R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, (New York: Basic Books, 1974), John Rawls, A
Theory of Justice, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996), R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (London: Duckworth, 1977),
Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred. D. Miller, Jeffrey Paul, (eds.), Natural Rights Liberalism from Locke to Nozick,
(Cambridge, UK, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the
Liberal State, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980)
3 J. S. Mill, ‘On Liberty’ in Three Essays, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 72-73.
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