Table Of ContentBORIS
GODUNOV
RUSLAN G. SKRYNNIKOV
BORIS
GODUNOV
Edited and Translated
by
Hugh F. Graham
Academic International Press
tgSz
THE RUSSIAN SERIES/Volume 35
Ruslan G. Skrynnikov, Boris Godunov
Translation of Boris Godunov (Moscow, 1978)
English translation and special contents of this book
Copyright © 1982 by Academic International Press.
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ISBN: 0-87569-046-7
Composition by Jayne Berndsen
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Illustrations courtesy of the author
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CONTENTS
Editor’s Introduction xi
Author’s Introduction xviii
I The Beginning 1
II A Time of Testing 11
III Boyar Persecution 27
IV Establishment of the Patriarchate 38
V Foreign Policy 46
VI Drama in Uglich 51
vn
Crown Regent 66
VIII Forbidden and Fixed Years 70
IX The Land Assembly of 1598 80
X Illness 105
XI The Great Famine 115
XII Grigorii Otrepev 126
XIII Disaster 146
Notes 155
Author’s Bibliography 169
Index 170
The Author 176
EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION
Professor Ruslan Grigorevich Skrynnikov has established an enviable
reputation as a leading authority on the history of Russia in the six
teenth century, the field he teaches at Leningrad State University.
He also has made a commitment to bring serious history to the atjpfi-
tion of the general public. To further this aim he lectures to numerous
groups and has written scholarly works on early Russian history in a
popular format. The present volume, one in his series, sheds new
light on an epoch, the treatment of which in the past has been marred
by sensationalism. It is appropriate to comment on certain aspects
of the narrative.
The first chapter supplies background and discusses the reign of
Ivan the Terrible. The tsar had divided Russia into an oprichnina
(crown lands) which was a sprawling appanage he ruled without con
straint, and a zemshchina (the realm) which was the remainder of the
realm administered in the traditional way by prominent boyars. The
oprichnina had its own court, council, chanceries and army. The
suspicious ruler needed new men he felt he could trust to staff them.
The Godunov family’s fortunes recently had been in decline but the
oprichnina revived them. Boris’ uncle obtained a high position in
the royal retinue and was able to advance his nephew’s interests.
Boris avoided the capricious tsar’s official displeasure, which might
mean exile, confiscation of estates, or even death, and took advantage
of his court service, which provided him with a valuable political
education. Professor Skrynnikov disposes of persistent legends that
Boris was of Tatar origin and illiterate.
Professor Skrynnikov emphasizes that a connection with the royal
house was a passport to power. Keenly aware of this the Godunov
family strove to forge such a link, an effort crowned with success
when Boris’ sister Irina was married to Fedor, Ivan’s second son. The
tsar’s rash act-killing his elder son—cleared the way for the latter to
succeed to the throne, and since Fedor was not in full possession of
his faculties and was incapable of ruling chance seemed to have fur
nished Boris a splendid opportunity. However, Professor Skrynnikov
points out that in spite of the marriage connection Boris’ position
was weaker than has often been supposed. He was neither president
of a regency council Ivan had decreed should act in Fedor’s name
EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION vii
nor even a member of it. This explains why Godunov initially pro
ceeded against leading figures like Prince Mstislavskii and the Shuiskii
brothers. He wanted to eliminate members of the regency council
who barred his way, and he quietly succeeded. He soon established
an ascendancy over Fedor and became de facto head of the govern
ment. Professor Skrynnikov stresses the major role rumor played in
shaping the course of events as soon as Godunov’s star began to rise.
Many unfounded stories and gossip eventually found their way into
historical literature, were accepted as fact, and have been repeated
over and over again from the seventeenth century to the present.
One of Boris’ first accomplishments was to make the Moscow
metropolitanate a patriarchal see, as churchmen had long craved. He
devised an ingenious stratagem to outwit Jeremiah, the credulous
patriarch of Constantinople. This achievement won him popularity
and increased support. The chapter on this topic closes with a useful
dissection of the theory of Moscow the Third Rome. It was a defen
sive ideology, designed merely to enhance Russia’s status in the Or
thodox hierarchy.
Professor Skrynnikov conducts a detailed analysis of the Uglich
affair, central to any estimate of Godunov’s character, and clearly
demonstrates that young Prince Dmitrii, an epileptic, accidentally
caused his own death. The Nagoi family was responsible for the riot
and lynchings in Uglich and the later arson in Moscow. Boris was not
involved in any way; in fact, Dmitrii’s death was disadvantageous be
cause rumor inevitably linked him to the deed. If Boris’ complicity
had been palpable he might well have been driven from office. In
this connection Professor Skrynnikov plausibly argues that Boris
formed no plans to acquire the throne himself until some six years
later. The repressions he carried out in Uglich were motivated by
fear, not anger.
A key chapter investigates the involved question of forbidden and
fixed years, essential to any inquiry into the root causes of serfdom
in Russia. This has been an issue of exceptional importance and con
cern to historians. Professor Skrynnikov has given a succinct outline
of a very complex topic. He is a member of the nonjuridical school
that considers circumstance created a particular climate to which
government statutes responded by tying peasants to the land, al
though Koretskii1 has shown that Soviet historians may hold other
views. The primary concern was to shore up the tax base, which was
threatened by increasing problems occurring during the two weeks
before and after St. George’s Day in November when peasants tradi
tionally enjoyed the right (known technically as departure) to leave
viii EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION
one landlord for another. Historians generally have held that the
origin of serfdom should be sought in a rescript abrogating the right
of St. George’s Day issued by Tsar Ivan in 1581, but Professor Skryn-
nikov flies in the face of tradition, contending no such rescript ever
was promulgated for the simple reason that one has never been found
and later references to it are equivocal. This means Boris Godunov,
not Tsar Ivan, was primarily responsible for establishing serfdom in
Russia, but he was not deliberately scheming to deny peasants free
dom of movement in an effort to curry favor with the lesser gentry
(with the advancement of whose interests he has been identified)Jme
was anxious merely to solve immediate financial problems. No one
foresaw what the long range results of this measure to stabilize govern
ment revenues would be nor that temporary, transient expedients
would become permanent and legally binding on the majority of the
population.
The long chapter describing Boris’ successive maneuvers to be
elected tsar in the teeth of aristocratic opposition affords ample in
sights into this dramatic event, showing that Godunov had consider
able support among the people, and was a master at organizing and
manipulating street demonstrations and other agitational techniques.
When these alone proved ineffective he ingeniously contrived the
Serpukhov campaign to repel a nonexistent Tatar threat. The land
assembly of 1598 that ratified his election was duly constituted and
fully representative for its time.
Professor Skrynnikov shows that once Godunov came to power he
recognized the futility of trying to rule effectively without the sup
port of the boyars and awarded honors and conciliar rank to many
of them. He could not, and so he did not, base his regime exclusively
on the gentry. An intriguing question has been why in 1600 Boris
moved against Bogdan Belskii and members of the Romanov family,
claiming they were practising witchcraft, a serious charge at the time.
He believes Boris’ chronically poor health was the reason. Godunov
was taken ill in 1599 and again the following year; rumor, his nemesis,
immediately exaggerated his disability and created an artificial dy
nastic crisis. His rivals were encouraged to position themselves to
struggle for the throne. Boris managed to survive by banishing (not
executing) his opponents and was free for a short while to pursue his
own policies before disaster overtook him. Professor Skrynnikov ap
plauds Boris’ building program, his interest in western technology and
culture, and his concern for education, which was ahead of its time.
He concludes that on balance Boris was a talented ruler, a fact con
temporaries failed to appreciate until after the Time of Troubles.
EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION IX
Analyzing Godunov’s debacle, Professor Skrynnikov develops a
fundamental thesis—the commons encompassed Boris’ ruin. The
events of this period, in which Marxists detect evidence of the class
struggle, have provided materials that have been enticing to Soviet
historians, and Professor Skrynnikov has marshaled an impressive ar
ray of facts to buttress his opinion. This approach to Boris’ mis
fortunes has often been ignored; the usual reasons given for his fall
are opposition from boyars and princes or from chancery officials,
False Dmitrii’s cunning, the intrusion of Poland, or Boris’ lack of
moral qualities. It is stimulating to consider the present concept.
Boris was a victim of sheer bad luck. No sooner had he consoli
dated his position than Russia was assailed by protracted crop failures
that induced hardship and ultimately caused famine and mass starva
tion. The government did what it could to alleviate suffering, but its
relief measures were concentrated in the towns because Boris was
trying to stimulate their growth and expand their capacity to pay
taxes—his so-called “town edifice.” Peasants received comparatively
little assistance; the harsh fiscal policy was making their life more
difficult, and the bondage statutes encouraged landlords to increase
their exactions. Discontent festered in the countryside.
Fearing a mass rising, Boris reinstituted the right of peasant de
parture at St. George’s Day in 1601, but, significantly enough, did
not extend the provision to include estates belonging to great nobles
and monasteries, crown lands, or the regions around Moscow. This
serves as a clear indication that Boris now had become a champion
of the upper strata of society, whose wrath he feared, but was not
afraid to provoke the lesser gentry. His move failed to achieve its
objective. Peasants interpreted his statutes to mean they might de
part whenever they pleased, and they refused to render service for or
pay imposts and fees either to the crown or their landlords. The
latter, faced with ruin, retaliated swiftly with intensified repression.
In 1603 the growing confrontation led to an outbreak of large scale
violence, headed by a certain Khlopko, which engulfed the central
region of the country and spilled over into Moscow. When Khlopko’s
capture and execution failed to abate the rioting the government
realized it could not prevail without help from the lesser gentry. The
price Boris had to pay for their support was annulment of the right
of departure. Repeal of the statute understandably aroused the peas
ants further and created an even more volatile situation, especially
when it is remembered that the cossacks in the southern borderland
were in ferment. Boris constantly harassed them because he knew
EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION
that their enclaves, which attracted runaway peasants, were a potent
force for destabilizing the center. It is against this background that
the career of the pretender must be set.
Professor Skrynnikov believes the Muscovite boyars sponsored the
pretender. He was unquestionably the Yurii Otrepev the authorities
claimed him to be, who had served in the course of his variegated
career as a courtier in the Romanov establishment before Boris shat
tered its power in 1600. Yurii (Grigorii after he became a monk) had
fascinating adventures. Using contemporary sources that previously
have been largely ignored, Professor Skrynnikov traces Otrep^rs
activities in detail and shows that he was a man of skill, ability and
tenacity, as well as a consummate opportunist, who while intriguing
in Poland maintained contact with the cossacks. In desperation they
turned to him as a feasible alternative to the hated Godunov; thus,
False Dmitrii was given a chance to lead a broad-based peasant revolt,
but his temperament made him reluctant to commit himself to such
a course and he preferred to negotiate with his Polish patrons. This
combination of factors spelled disaster for Boris and ruin for Russia.
Although Otrepev promised the king of Poland lavish awards of
Russian territory if he should succeed, the royal council was divided
as to the wisdom of backing a pretender and at best he received luke
warm support. The small mercenary army he recruited in Poland was
defeated, but Godunov’s commanders were slow to follow up their
victory. This respite gave peasants and cossacks time to rally to
Otrepev, in whom they sensed a leader capable of formulating the
goals of their spontaneous movement.
Principal figures in Moscow felt obliged to close ranks around the
tsar, but the residue of ill will towards him remained such that re
sistance to Otrepev’s peasant and cossack army was feeble and some
officers went over with their men. As the situation deteriorated Boris
stepped up repression, further alienating society as denunciations
multiplied and his government carried out summary reprisals. Boris
withdrew to the Kremlin and gave himself over to the sorcery and
divination to which he always had been prone. He died suddenly in
April 1605, thereby ensuring False Dmitrii’s triumph. The narrative
closes with the murder of Godunov’s wife and son. His dynasty was
extinct and its collapse was the prologue to a massive peasant war
that shook Russia to its foundations.
No previous discussion of Boris Godunov has provided such a co
hesive explanation of the ramifications of his career. The justice of
this observation becomes clear when available literature on the topic
