BEFORE STEVEN M. WOLF ARBITRATOR

195 Pages·2008·0.49 MB·English

BEFORE STEVENM.WOLF
ARBITRATOR
NATIONALCOUNCILOFEEOC )
LOCALNO..216,AFGE, )
AFL-CIO, )
Union, )
) FMCS CaseNo.071012-00226-A
and )
)
U.S.EQUALEMPLOYMENTOPPORTUNITY ) FLSAGRIEVANCE
COMMISSION, )
Agency. )
AGENCY'S POST-ARBITRATIONSUBMISSION
OnApril 7,2006,afterbeinginformedbythe Agencythat it was changingthestatus for
its investigators andmediators to exempt from non-exempt,theUnionfiledagrievancewhichis
thesubject ofthis arbitration. The Uniongrievance,inapplicablepart, alleged:
BeginningonApril 1,2003and continuingtothepresent,the
EEOC,inviolationoftheCBA,thelaw, andregulations, intentionally
failedtopayovertimecompensationtobargainingunit employees inthe
positions ofEnforcement Investigators GS-1810-9,11,and12; positions
ofAlternativeDisputeResolutionMediators GS-301-12and13; andin
thepositions ofParalegal Specialists GS-950—9and11,intheEEOC's
District,Field,AreaandLocal Offices. Inaddition,inviolationofthe
CBA,law,and regulations, theaforementionedbargainingunit
employees wererequiredtoaccept compensatorytime.
BeginningonApril 1,2003and continuingtothepresent,the
EEOC,inviolationoftheCBA,thelaw, andregulations, intentionally
sufferedandpermittedbargainingunit employees inthepositions of
Enforcement Investigators GS-1810-9,11,and12; positions ofAlternative
DisputeResolutionMediators GS-301-12and13; andinthepositions of
Paralegal Specialists GS-950-9and11,intheEEOC's District,Field,
Area and Local Offices, toworkoutsidetheirregularlyscheduledtour
ofduty,toworkin excess of40hours per week; andtoworkinexcess
ofeight hours perdaywithout payment ofovertimecompensationfor
thehours worked.
TheAgencydenies that thereis anyvaliditytotheUnion's claims andseeks dismissal of
theovertimeportionofthe grievance.
This Agencysubmissionwill discuss: (1)jurisdictional issues raisedpre-hearing; (2)
regulatoryrequirements relatingtosufferedandpermittedovertime; (3) exceptions to
requirement topayovertime; (4) analysis oftheevidencepresented; and,(5)damage
considerations.
TheAgency's positionis that: (a) approval bymanagement is requiredbefore employees
canwork extrahours, forpayorotherwise; (b)management has madeit knowntoemployees
that overtimeforpaywill not beapproved,tellingthem thereis nomoneyinthebudget for
overtimepay; (c)management wishes that investigators, mediators andparalegals perform their
duties within40hours aweekor80hours apayperiod,anddonot requireworkbeyondthose
limitations; (d)employees, at times, knowingthat paidovertimewill not beapproved,
voluntarilyrequest toworkbeyondtheirscheduledtourofdutyfor compensatorytimeofffor
personal convenience,inlieuofinvokingexistingoptions toavoidtheextraworktime; orthey
workextratimewithout priorapproval; (e)wherethe extravoluntaryworkis madeknownto
management,the employeereceives compensatorytimeoffonanhour forhourbasis. In
virtuallyeverycaseof allegedovertime,theemployeehadthechoicetoworktheextratimefor
comptimeornot worktheextratimeat all. Furthermore,muchofthealleged "overtime"
workedis not sufferedandpermittedovertime at all.
I.PRE-HEARING ISSUES
TheAgencyreiterates the arguments madeinits motions todismiss filedpriortothe
hearings onthesecondphaseofthearbitration. TheAgencyarguedthen andargues againhere
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that this arbitrationis fatallyflawedbecauseofUnionnon-compliance withtwoobligations: the
requirement ofSection41.07oftheCBAthat theUnionidentifytheemployees involved,office
involved,dateofoccurrence, andhowtheincident is inviolationinanygrievance and,theopt-in
provisionoftheFair LaborStandards Act [hereinafter “FLSA”],29U.S.C §216(b). These
provisions weredesignedtogivenoticeof aclaim so that theAgencywouldnot beblindsidedby
agrievance,that is, deniedsufficient informationtounderstandthenatureofthe claim beforethe
hearing. Unfortunately,theArbitrator's rulings left theAgencyinapositionofidentifying
witnesses andexhibits forhearingwithout understandinganyspecifics relatingtoUnionclaims.
TheAgencyraisedtheseprocedural issues bymotion,bothoral and written,andagainrequests
that thearbitratornowdismiss this portionofthegrievanceonjurisdictional grounds.
Afterhearings lastingeight weeks, theUnionfailedtooffer anyproofthat Agency
managers andsupervisors required investigators, mediators orparalegals toworkmorethan forty
hours aweekoreightyhours apayperiod. Theonlyissueinthis caseis whethertheAgency
"suffered andpermitted"investigators, mediators andparalegals towork extrahours beyondtheir
tourofdutywithout compensation.
A. Non-complianceWithTheRequirements OfTheCBA,Section41.07
TheUnionfailedtomeet theminimum requirements ofthe grievanceprocedure
containedintheCBA. Todefine anissue,theCBA at Section41.07,Step1,requires that “a
writtengrievanceat aminimum shall: (a)identifythe employeeandoffice,and(b)identifythe
incident andthedateit occurred.” Contrarytotheserequirements oftheCBA,inStep2ofthe
grievanceprocess,theUnion gavenospecifics, but insteadallegedthat Agencysupervisors
knewofallegedovertime andthat thesupervisors “knew”that employees couldnot accomplish
theworkwithout workingextrahours. Nonames, incidents orspecifics areprovided.
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AccordingtotheCBA,Section41.07,Step2: “Anyissues not raisedinthegrievancebyStep2
arewaived.” TheAgencythereforerequests theArbitratortodismiss this grievance forfailureto
providetherequiredspecifics byStep2ofthis grievanceprocess toallowtheAgencyto
respond. Thefact that theUnionmayhavefleshedout its claims duringtheArbitrationdoes not
curethe clearwords ofthis contract deficiencyat theStep2stage. Further,theopt-in
requirement underthe FLSAwas craftedtoinsurethat unions seek reliefonlyforemployees
whoaffirmativelyagreewiththeunion's FLSAclaims. Inthis caseasubstantial numberof
unionwitnesses refusedorfailedto cooperateandpresumablywouldnot haveoptedintothe
proceedings iftheyhadbeen giventheopportunitytodoso.1 As aresult oftheUnion’s failure
tocomplywiththeCBAandtheopt-inprovisions ofthe FLSA,theAgencywas forcedto
preparetodefendagainst nonexistent claims whichwastedvaluableAgencyresources and
negativelyimpactedtheAgency’s attempt todefenditselfinthis action. Further, without details
regardingthe Union’s claims, theAgencyhaddifficultycomplyingfullywiththeUnion’s
document request, andwhenthe Unionfinallyidentifiedrepresentativewitnesses, theArbitrator
precludedthe Agencyfrom supplementingits responsewithadditional relevant documents. The
Agencyincorporates hereinbyreferenceits pre-arbitrationmotions andmemorandaregarding
arbitrationprocedures relatedtothis proceeding.
B. Timeliness OfGrievance–30DayTime Limit ForFiling–NoDateOfViolationSpecified
In AGrievance,Therefore NoOpportunityToRaiseTimeliness
Becausethe Unionfailed tosupplyanyinformationas tothedateof anallegedviolation
pertainingto aninvestigator,mediatororparalegal,theAgencywas unabletoraisetheissueof
timeliness ofthegrievanceundertheCBA,Section41.07,requiringthat thegrievancebefiled
1 Forexample,of885potentialInvestigatorwitnesses,100InvestigatorswereidentifiedintheUnion'spre-
hearingsubmissionfortheovertimephaseofthisarbitration,butonly50Investigatorstestified. Atleast6ofthe
Investigatorswhotestifiedstatedthattheydidnotworkextrahours.
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within 30days ofthe allegedviolation. AlthoughtheArbitratorrejectedthis argument becauseit
was not raisedinStep1or2,theAgencyherebypreserves this issueas relatedtothelackof
specificityinthe grievancediscussed above.
Unioncounsel complainedconsistentlythroughout theproceedings that shedidnot get
all necessarydocumentationconcerningthehours ofworkofnon-exempt employees. TheCBA,
byexpresslyrequiringspecificinformationrelatingto grievances inSection41.07andproviding
arequirement that grievances be filed "within30calendardays aftertheincident givingriseto
thegrievanceoccurs,"containedprovisions intendedtolimit theburdensomeness ofdocument
disclosures requiredbystatute. Unfortunately,theUnionignored compliance withthose
provisions andtheArbitratorinterpretedtheprovisions topermit ageneral,non-specific
descriptionofthe grievance. That interpretationis contrarytothespirit andintent ofSection
41.07oftheCBA. HadtheUnionidentifiedthe affectedindividuals allegedlysufferedand
permittedtoworkovertimeinatimelymanner,thesearchfordocuments couldhave,and would
have,beenmoreeffective.
TheUnionaskedquestions ofmost ofthetimekeepers that was clearlyaimed at
demonstratingthat the Agencydidnot make anadequateorindeed anysearchfortherecords
requestedbythe Unionas part ofits records demandpriortothe arbitration. Inalmost every
situation,thetimekeepers rememberedthat intherecent past theyhadbeenaskedtoaccumulate
andsubmit timerecords. Ina few cases, theydidnot.2 However,theUnionselectedthe
timekeeperwitnesses. Others not selectedtotestify, ordidnot appear althoughoriginallylisted,
might havebeeninvolvedinthesearch fordocuments inthat particularoffice. Again,because
theAgencyhadlittlepriorknowledgethat this irrelevant andimproperissuewouldberaised
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priorto thesimultaneous submissions ofwitness lists andexhibits, it didnot havethe
opportunitytoproperlydefenditself against thesecharges anddidnot identifyorpresent
timekeeperwitnesses.
Underthestatutethe Agencyhas theobligationonlytosupplyrelevant records
reasonablyavailable. 5U.S.C.§7114(b)(4). TheAgencydidthat,andwhileits responsewasn’t
perfect,it was adequatetotherequest. Thereis nodiscoveryundertheCBA. Neitherpartywas
entitledtodiscovery; and,ofcourse,theAgencyhadnoabilitytoobtainanyinformationfrom
theUnion,apart from the30-daypre-arbitrationsubmission.
TheUnion’s remedy,ifit felt theAgency’s responseundertheFederal Sector Labor
Management Relations Statutewas inadequateorincomplete,was tofileanUnfair Labor
Practicecharge. BecausetheUnionhas stewards inmost,ifnot all,oftheoffices andsincemost
ofthetimekeepers areinthebargainingunit,theUnionhadtoknowwhether thedocument
productionbythe Agencywas adequate andresponsive. HavingfailedtofileaULP withinsix
months ofanyallegedbreach,themattershouldberegardedas closed. Moreover,theArbitrator
foreclosedinquiryorexplanationbythe Agencyinto its process forrespondingtothe Union’s
informationrequest,indicatingthat,forhim,it was not at issuesimplybecausetheUnion
attorneycriticizedits sufficiency. (T.2916-2919)
C. Representational Witnesses AndEvidence Is Not Sufficient ToEstablish Class-wide
“SufferedAndPermitted”Violations
"Suffered andpermitted"is aconcept uniquetothesupervisor/employeerelationship.
Did theparticularsupervisorknoworshouldheorshehaveknownoftheextratimeworked?
Did thesupervisorhavetheopportunitytoprevent the extraworkpriortoit beingdone? Was
2 Oneofthetimekeeperswhodidn’trecallanyrequestwasMs.MoorefromCincinnati. Shewasconfused
abouteverythingduringhertestimonyandwashardlyreliable. Hertestimonywascontradicteddirectlyand
specificallybytheCincinnatiDirectorWilmaJavey. (T.5737-5738).
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theextratimeworkedso frequentlythat thesupervisorshouldhaveanticipatedtheextrawork
andpreventedit? Was this aflexiblescheduleworkerwhose extratimewas not overtime? As
thetestimonyclearlyshowed,theincidents wherebargainingunit employees chosetoworkextra
hours variedfrom officetoofficeandfrom supervisortosupervisorwithinthoseoffices3.
This hearingwas conductedimproperly,andagainst theAgency’s will,becausethe
arbitratordecidedtoconduct it as aso-called"representative"proceeding,insteadofrequiring
prooffor each claimant andproofthat all persons forwhom reliefwas beingsought were
subjectivelyinterestedinpursuingrelief,i.e.,hadoptedintotheproceeding,arequirement found
intheFLSAitself. Infact,hadtheprocess beenfollowed correctly,theactual numberof
individuals electingtoparticipateinanytypeof awardwouldlikelyberathersmall.
TheArbitrator appears tohavetakenthepositionthat theAgencywaivedthe right to
protest this process becauseofsomethingformerAgencyRepresentativeJames Sober(inthe
exemptionphaseofthis arbitration),was understoodtohavesaid earlyonintheprocess. Mr.
Soberdoes not recall agreeingtothat arrangement. But anyoffhand comment madeearlyinthe
process before anyprogress was made towards schedulingshouldnot preclude adifferent
positionlater. TheAgencyfiledaformal motioninJune2007arguingthat arepresentative
proceedingwas unauthorizedbythe FLSA. Wepersist inthat positionbut will not burdenthis
Submisssionwitharepetitionofthearguments previouslyadvancedinsupport ofthat position.
Wewill confineourselves heretopointingout that at thetimethis issuewas presented,the
parties hadnot expendedanyenergyonthemerits caseso there was noprejudicetotheUnionby
theAgencychangingits position(ifthat is indeedwhat happened)onwhethertheproofcouldbe
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TheAgencycontendsthishearingdemonstratedthatwitnesseswerenotrepresentativeofmuch. Theuse
of "representativewitnesses"madesenseintheexemptionphaseoftheinstantarbitrationbecauseinvestigators,
mediatorsandparalegalswerecoveredbyjobdescriptionsthatwereconsistentforeachjobcategory.
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representative. Further FLRAlawthat characterizedtheFLRAopt-inproceedingtobe
procedural,andhencenot bindingintheadministrative(i.e.,arbitral)forum,merelyauthorizes,
but doesn’t require, representativeproceedings. Moreover,thereis abasis tobelievethat that
authoritywouldnot be followedbythe FLRAifsubmittedtoit as alegal issueinamore
compellingcircumstancethantheonein whichtheFLRA characterizedtheopt-inrule,where
therewereveryfewaffectedemployees. UnitedStates Department oftheNavyNaval Explosive
Ordinance Disposal TechnologyDivision IndianHead,Marylandand AFGE, Local 1923,57
F.L.R.A.No.280(2001); United States Department of InteriorBureauofReclamationand
International FederationofProfessional andTechnical Engineers Local 128,59F.L.R.A.No.
123(2004); DeAsenciov.Tyson Foods, Inc.,342F.3d301,310(3dCir.2003); Prickett v.
DeKalbCounty,349F.3d1294,1297 (11thCir.2003); Kernv.Siemens Corp.,393 F.3d120,
128(2dCir.2004); and Cameron-Grant v.Maxim HealthcareServices, Inc.,347F.3d1240,
1248(11thCir.2003).
TheArbitrator’s decisiontointerpret theAgencyRepresentative’s statements priortothe
exemptionphaseoftheArbitrationas agreeingtoa representational typeofhearings procedure
fortheclaims phasewas inconsistent withhis otherrulings whichtreatedthetwophases
separatelyonotherissues; e.g.separatepre-hearingsubmissions foreachphase. Thesubsequent
Agencyrepresentativeenlistedfortheclaims phasesought,weeks priortothedatepre-
arbitrationsubmissions wereordered,to requirethepresentationofeachclaimant witness to
establish liability. TheArbitrator's denial ofthat procedural request was beyondtheArbitrator’s
authorityundertheCBAandcontrarytothespirit ofCBAprovisions andtheletterofthe FLSA.
TheAgencycontinues tomaintainthat “suffered and permitted”overtimeissues areuniqueto
eachsupervisorandhis orhersubordinates. Andfurther,the FLSAitselfmandates proofof
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subjectiveagreement byeachemployeefor whom reliefis beingsought basedonsucha claim.
Toextrapolatetoothersupervisors andalleged grievants denies theAgencydueprocess towhich
it is entitledas amatteroflaw.
Althoughthe FLSAdoes permit anemployeetobringa claim forhimselfandother
“similarlysituated” employees, 28U.S.C.§216(b),suchacollectiveactionis not perse
appropriatein everycircumstance. Where, as here,employees arestationedindifferent offices
andunits withinanoffice,workat thedirectionofdifferent officedirectors andsupervisors, are
subject tovaryingpractices, rules andpolicies governingtheperformanceoftheir workand
perform that workonavarietyofdifferent workschedules, theemployees arenot similarly
situated. It wouldbeanabuseofdiscretiontoimputetheexperiences of afew tothe groupas a
whole. SeeEnglandv.NewCenturyFinancial Corporation,370F.Supp.2d.504,510(E.D. La.
2005)(allowingacollectiveFLSA actionis inappropriate wherethe groupof plaintiff-
employees workunderdifferent managers andwere“subject todifferent managerial
requirements whichoccurred at various times as aresult ofvarious decisions bydifferent
supervisors madeon adecentralizedemployee-by-employeebasis.”). Inaddition,thewitnesses
presentedbytheuniontestifiedtotheirindividual circumstances, but didnot demonstrateany
first handknowledgeofthehours workedbyothers workingintheirownoffice,muchless the
schedules andworkinghabits ofemployees workinginotherEEOC offices throughout the
nation.
At aminimum incidents ofallegedovertimewererandom,scattershot andnot theproduct
ofanover-arching,nation-widepolicyorpractice. Undersuch circumstances, the groupis not
homogenous andacollectiveactionis whollyinappropriateandcontrarytolaw. Holt v.Rite
Aid Corp.,333F.Supp.2d1265,1273(N.D.Ala.2004)(whereincidents ofovertimewere
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anecdotal andvaried accordingtohoweachemployee chosetoundertakehis duties, no general
conclusions couldbedrawnregardingFLSAviolations andindividualizedinquires intothe
circumstances ofeachemployeewas necessarytodetermineliability); Clausmanv.Nortel
Networks, Inc.,2003WL21314065(S.D. Ind.2003)(same). Furthermore,thetestimonyof
Union witnesses demonstrates that whetherornot an employee allegedlyworkedovertime
turnedonindividual circumstances peculiartotheemployee, andwas not theproduct of general
rule,policyorpracticeoftheemployer. For example,NovellaWest,accordingtohersupervisor
inPhiladelphia,approachedherduties withsuch acompulsivediligencethat sheallegedly
workedat homeoff-the-clockinsecret toinsureshe achievedperfection,onlyoccasionally
mentioningtohersupervisorthat shedidsomeextrawork at home. (T.1565; 1618; 1650-1651
and1662) Certainlythis standout employee's desiretoworkextratimeat homecannot
mechanicallybeimputedtoall groupmembers. Bascov.Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,2004WL
1497709(E.D. La.2004) (a court can forecloseaplaintiff’s right toproceedcollectivelywhere
theactionrelates tospecific circumstances personal totheplaintiffratherthananygenerally
applicablepolicyorpractice.)
D. Documentation Issue
Agreat deal ofarbitrationhearingtimewas usedbyUnioncounsel toelicit testimony
that extraworktimewas not recordedonthebiweeklycost accountingsheet and/orinthe
Federal Personnel Payroll System [hereinafter“FPPS”]. It is clearthat not all AgencyDistrict,
Field,Areaand Local offices keeptrackofextrahours workedforcredit orcompensatorytime
inthesameway,andnot all offices recordcredit orcompensatorytimeonthebiweeklycost
accountingsheet ortheFPPS. However,thereis norequirement that everyhourworkedbe
reflectedonthecost accountingsheet,whichis usedtotrack wherethepayroll is distributed
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