Aristotelianism and the Soul in the Arabic Plotinus Peter Adamson

22 Pages·2008·2.34 MB·English

by  Adamson, Peter

Aristotelianismand
the Soul in the Arabic Plotinus
Peter Adamson
It is common for historianso f medieval thoughtt o note that the influence
of Aristotle on Islamic philosophy was tinged with Neoplatonism,t hankst o a
text known as the "Theology of Aristotle." It is now known that the "Theol-
ogy" is in fact not a work of Aristotle's but rathera paraphraseo f parts of
Plotinus's Enneads. Certainly,t he misattributiono f this work to Aristotle fa-
cilitated the spreado f Neoplatonism as an aspect of Islamic peripateticism,a s
representedb y such authorsa s al-Kindi, al-Frhabi,a nd Ibn Sin- (Avicenna).
Some efforts have been made to assess its influence on particularp hilosophers,
most notably Ibn Sink whose notes on the "Theology"h ave come down to us
and who may have doubtedi ts authenticity.'U ntil recentlyt he attentionp aid to
the "Theology"i tself has tended more towardsp hilological than philosophical
analysis, focusing in particularo n possible sources of the text.2 Yet the differ-
ences between the originalw ritings of Plotinusa nd its Arabicp araphrasea re of
considerablep hilosophic interest.I n recent years researchi nto the "Theology"
has begun to pay more attentiont o the philosophicali ssues raised by the para-
phrase.3H ere I hope to furthert his trend by suggesting that, althought he au-
For the Arabic text of Ibn Sina's notes, see 'AbdurrahmanB adawi (ed.), Aristi 'inda 'l-
'Arab( Cairo, 1947), 37-74; French translationi n George Vajda," Les notes d'Avicenne sur la
'Theologie d'Aristote,' " Revue Thomiste,5 1 (1951), 346-406. See also Jules Janssens, "Cre-
ation and Emanationi n Ibn Sina," Documenti e studi sulla traduzionef ilosofica medievale, 8
(1997), 455-77, and Louis Gardet," En l'honneurd u millenaired 'Avicenne: L'importanced 'un
texte nouvellement traduit:l es gloses d'Avicenna sur la pseudo Theologie d'Aristote,"R evue
Thomiste,5 1 (1951), 333-45.
2 See Maroun Aouad, "La Theologie d'Aristote et autres textes du Plotinus Arabus,"
Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques, ed. Richard Goulet (Paris, 1989), 541-90, and F. W.
Zimmermann," The Origins of the So Called Theologyo fAristotle," in Pseudo-Aristotlei n the
Middle Ages: The Theology and Other Texts,e d. Jill Kraye, W. F. Ryan, and C. B. Schmitt
(London, 1986), 110-240.
3 See RichardC . Taylor," Aquinas,t he Plotiniana Arabica and the Metaphysicso f Being
and Actuality,"J HI, 59 (1998), 241-64, and Cristina D'Ancona Costa, "Il tema della 'docta
ignorantian' el neoplatonismoa rabo.U n contributoa ll'analisid elle fontid i 'Teologiad i Aristotele,'
mimar II," in ConcordiaD iscors: Studi offerti a Giovanni Santinello (Medioevo e Umanismo
211
Copyrigh2t0 01 by Journaolf theH istoryo f IdeasI, nc.
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212 Peter Adamson
thor of this paraphrasew as not Aristotle, his own thought was suffused with
Aristotelianism.
First, we should note that the so-called "Theology of Aristotle" is itself
only a part of an original, largerp araphraseo f the Enneads. It is now usually
thoughtt hat this paraphrasew as authoredb y a membero f al-Kindi's circle in
ninth- century Baghdad.4 The original Arabic Plotinus has been preserved in
three separatet exts. The first is the "Theology"( hereafterT h.A)w hich is itself
subdivided into a prologue, a series of "headings"( ru 'is), and ten chapters,
each called a mimar,m eaning "chapter"in Syriac.5T his is by far the longest of
the three texts. We also have the so-called Letter on Divine Science, formerly
attributedt o al-Far-bi but shown by Kraus to belong to the Arabic Plotinus
materials.6F inally, there are the Sayings of the GreekS age, a set of fragments
collected from variouss ourcesb y Rosenthala nd Lewis which also paraphrases
Plotinus in Arabic.7A s arguedb y F. W. Zimmermann,t hese three sources all
derive originally from a lost, perhaps much more extensive, paraphraseo f
Plotinus.8T hey are united both by writing style and philosophical content. I
will call them, collectively, AP; and since I cannot here provide conclusive
argumentsa s to the identity of their author,I will call him the Adaptor.
One of the major goals of al-Kindi and his circle seems to have been the
synthesis of available Greek texts into a coherent philosophy. Thus al-Kindi
himself producedd oxographicawl orks (for example,h is Discourse on the Soul)
and a survey of the Aristotelianc orpus.9I f the Adaptorw orkedi n such a milieu,
he may well have been influenced by other philosophical sources in making a
paraphraseo f Plotinus.Z immermannh as suggested that such an influence is at
84) (Padua, 1993), 3-22; "Divine and HumanK nowledge in the PlotinianaA rabica,"i n John L.
Cleary (ed.), TheP erennial Traditiono fNeoplatonism (Leuven, 1997), 419-42, andR echerches
sur le Liber de Causis (Paris, 1995).
4 Supportingt his are not only the argumentsg iven by Zimmermannb ut also terminological
and stylistic parallels between the Arabic Plotinus and other texts associated with Al-Kindi's
circle: see GerhardE ndress,P roclus Arabus.Z wanzigA bschnittea us der Institutiot heologica in
arabischer Obersetzung( Wiesbaden, 1973), 76-185, and 186ff.
5 Though the use of this Syriac term has been takenb y some as evidence for the identity of
the author,s uch loan-wordsw ere not uncommon in the Arabic translationm ovement undert he
"Abbasids.T hus Zimmermann( 151) does not regardt he term as evidence for a Syriac interme-
diary text.
6 Paul Kraus," Plotinc hez les Arabes:R emarquess ur un nouveauf ragmentd e la paraphrase
arabed es Enneades,"B ulletin de l'Institutd Egypte, 23 (1941), 263-95.
7 Most Arabic texts in 'AbdurrahmanB adawi (ed.), Afluitin 'inda 'l-'Arab (Cairo, 1955);
English translationb y Geoffrey Lewis, based on his improved( but unpublished)e dition of the
Arabic text, in Plotini Opera II, Paul Henry and Hans-RudolphS chwyzer (eds.), Plotini Opera
(Paris, 1959). For Rosenthal'sw ork on the "Greeks age" (al-shaikha l-yniinni) see "Ash-Shayh
al-Yiinini and the Arabic Plotinus Source,"O rientalia, 21 (1952), 461-92; 22 (1953), 370-400;
24 (1955), 42-66.
8Z immermann,1 12-13, 128-31.
9 Arabic edition in al-Kindi,R asi 'il al-Kindi, ed. Muhammad' Abdalhidi Abfi Rida (Cairo,
1950-53). For the Discourse on the Soul, see 272-80.
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TheA rabic Plotinus 213
work in mimarI II, where the Adaptorm ay have drawno n Aristotle'sD e Anima
in order to "reconcile"P lotinus with an Aristoteliant heory of the soul as the
entelechia of the body.10H ere I will examine the relationshipo f soul and body
inA P and expando n Zimmermann'st hesis in an effortt o show thatt he Adaptor
was, in this respect at least, an Aristoteliani nterpretero f Plotinus. I will close
by examining the relationshipb etween AP and a contemporaneousw ork, the
paraphraseo f the De Anima producedi n al-Kindi's circle.
Mimar III and the Question of entelechia
Studentso f Aristotle are familiarw ith his thesis that soul is the form of the
body. In the De AnimaA ristotle explains this furtherb y claiming that the soul
is the "perfection"o r entelechia of the body (414a26)." Of course there are
various problems with the interpretationo f this doctrine.H ere the most perti-
nent of these problems is the question of whether the soul could exist sepa-
rately from the body.A ristotleh imself gives a qualified" no"t o this questioni n
De Anima II.1 (413a4-6), saying that at least a part of the soul would corrupt
with the body, but the questionw as neverthelessd ebatedi n the laterc ommen-
tary tradition.P lotinus was critical of the Aristoteliand octrineo f soul, since it
seemed to imply that soul was eitheri nseparablef romb ody, or at least properly
conceived of as the form of the body. For Plotinust he soul properlye xists as its
own hypostasis above body. For Plotinus the problem is to explain how soul
can be "in"b ody or relatedt o it at all, whereas for Aristotle the problem is to
explain how, if at all, soul could exist separatelyf rom body.
Some passagesi n AP give the impressiont hatt heA daptorf ollowed Plotinus
in criticizing the notion that soul is the form of body. For example, he did not
depart significantly from his source over the question of whether the soul is
predicatedo f the body:
And the soul is also not in the body like a predicated[ mahmifdt]h ing,
and this is because the predicatedt hing is only an impressionf rom the
impressions of the bearer of predication [hamil], for example color
and figure: for these two are only impressionso f the body [thati s] the
bearerf or them, and the impressionsd o not separatef rom theirb earers
except throught he corruptiono f their bearers.B ut the soul separates
from the body withoutc orruptingo r dissolving throught he dissolution
of the body. (Th.AI I.91 [B 43-44])
10 Zimmermann,1 17.
" Aristotle, On the Soul, tr. W. S. Hett (Cambridge,1 957).
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214 Peter Adamson
But neitheri s [soul] in the body as in a substratum[ hupokeimeno],f or
what is in a substratei s an affection [pathos] of what it is in, like color
and figure, and the soul is separable.( Enn IV.3.20)'2
In both texts we see a theme which is repeatedm any times in Plotinus's
works on the soul and in AP, namely that the soul cannotb e essentially related
to the body because it can survive being separatedf rom body. The Adaptor
repeats the point in the same section and adds a furthera rgumentf or soul's
independence:
The soul is not like a form in matter,a nd this is because the form does
not separatef rom the mattere xcept throughc orruption.T he soul is not
in the body like this, but ratheri t is separatedf rom the body without
corruptionA. lso, matteri s before form, and the body is not before the
soul, and this is because the soul is thatw hich puts form in matter,t hat
is, it is that which informsm attera nd that which gives body to matter.
And if it is the soul that informsm attera nd gives body to it, then there
is no doubt that it is not in the body like form in matter,b ecause the
cause is not in the effect like a predicatedt hing. Otherwise,t he cause
would be an impression for the effect, and this is extremely absurd,
because the effect is the impressiona nd the cause is the impressor.T he
cause is in the effect like the impressinga gent, and the effect is in the
cause like an impressede ffect. (Th.A1 1.96-99[ B 44])
Neither is [soul] as form in matter,f or the form in matter is insepa-
rable, and the form [comes] later to mattera lready in being. But the
soul makes the form in the matter,b eing other than the form. (Enn
IV.3.20 [parallelingT h.A1 1.96-97])
Here the Adaptora dds, in an original passage, that soul cannotb e the form of
matteri n the sense of an "impression"( athar) or effect of the matter,b ecause
then it would be the effect of the body insteado f its cause. However,t he Adap-
tor expands on Plotinus's claim that the soul "makes the form" in the body,
saying twice that soul "informs" and "gives body to" matter (tusawwiru,
tujissimu).T hought hese two verbs might associate the soul more closely with
body than Plotinus does here, the overall impressiono f the passage is that the
soul is not the form of the body, but the cause of that form.
12 Enneads, vol. IV-VII, tr. A. H. Armstrong( Cambridge,1 984-88). All translationsi n the
paper are my own, though I have consulted Lewis's translationo f AP and Armstrong'st ransla-
tion of Plotinus. When citing AP, I will give the section numberf rom Lewis's translation,f ol-
lowed by the page numberf rom Badawi's edition in brackets.
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TheA rabic Plotinus 215
The passage Zimmermannc ites from mimarI II parallelsp arto f Plotinus's
critiqueo f otherv iews on the natureo f the soul and follows the criticismo f the
Pythagoreant heory that soul is the harmony of the body. Plotinus then ad-
dresses Aristotle's view:
One could examine how it is said of the soul that it is entelechia as
follows: they say that the soul in the composite has the ordero f form
regardingt he ensouled body as matter,b ut is not the form of every
body nor [of body] as body, but "of a naturalo rganic[ body] having life
potentially."I f, then, it is likened [to body] by being placed with it, as
is the shape of the statuet o bronze,t hen when the body was dividedt he
soul would be partitioneda t the same time, and when some part was
cut off a part of soul would be with what was cut off. (Enn IV.7.85)
Plotinus goes on to point out that in his view the entelechia theory of soul
would make several activities of soul impossible, namely, sleep, reason's op-
position to desire, and even thoughti n general. Then, he argues,t here must be
some aspect of soul, the "rationals oul" (logizomenenp suchen), which is sepa-
rable fromb ody. But even the desiringa nd growing functionso f the soul would
be separable, since we desire the non-bodily and the same soul can exist in
differentb odies at differentt imes. He concludes that:" [the soul] does not have
being (to einai) from being the form of something,b ut is a substance,n ot tak-
ing its being from its foundationi n body, but being before becoming of this
[body]"( Enn IV.7.85).N otice that the argumenti s based on showing that soul
cannotb e entelechia if it can be separatedf rom the body, a strategyw e already
saw the Adaptorp reserve in his paraphrase.
The Adaptorp araphrasest he long passage above as follows:
If they say that the most excellent philosophersa gree that the soul is
the perfection [al-tamaimo] f the body, and perfectioni s not substance,
so therefore the soul is not substance, because the perfection of the
thing is only from the substanceo f the thing, then we say thatw e must
examine their saying that the soul is some perfection, and with what
meaning they call it entelechia [intalishla]. We say that the most ex-
cellent philosophersm entionedt hat the soul is in the body only as [bi-
manzil: lit. "in the position of"] a form through which the body is
ensouled,j ust as matteri s body throughf orm. Except that if the soul is
the form of the body, then it is not a form to every body insofar as it is
body, but ratheri s only form to a "bodyp ossessing life potentially."I f
the soul is a perfectiona ccordingt o this description[ sifa], it is not of
the domaino f bodies. This is because, if it were form for the body like
the form that is in a bronze idol, then if the body were divided and
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216 Peter Adamson
partitioned,[ the soul] would also be divided and partitioned,a nd if one
of the memberso f the body were cut off, then something of [the soul]
would also be cut off. And this is not the case. Thereforet he soul is not
a form of perfection like the naturala nd artificial form, but ratheri s
only a perfectionb ecause it is what perfects the body so that it comes
to possess sensation and intellect. (Th.A1 1.67-70 [B 54])
Here the Adaptora grees with Plotinus that soul is not in body as the form
of the body itself, as what he elsewhere calls a "materialf orm."( This, I take it,
is the force of the phrase" naturala nd artifical form"i n the last sentence.) Yet
the Adaptor,u nlike Plotinus, holds that in a sense the soul is the perfectiono r
entelechia of the body. Thatt his approvals tems from the Adaptor'sk nowledge
of Aristotle is clear. First, he says it is a view to which "the most excellent
philosophers agree," replacing Plotinus's more non-committal "it is said"
(legetai). Second, he retains the Greek word entelechia as a transliteration,
which lends an air of authorityt o the view under discussion, and may imply
thath e knows the same word is used in Aristotle.T hird,h e faithfullyr etainst he
quotationf romA ristotle that soul is the form of a "bodyp ossessing life poten-
tially." The translationi n Arabic here is very close to that in the Arabic para-
phrase of the De Anima:
hiya siirat al-jism dha haya bi-al-quwa ("it is the form of the body
having life in potency").( Th.A1 11.68)
al-nafs tamaml i-jism tabi'i dha haya bi-al-quwa( "thes oul is a perfec-
tion for the naturalb ody having life in potency"). (De Anima, Para-
phrase 215.5)"3
All this suggests thatt he Adaptorr ecognizedP lotinus'sq uotationf romA ristotle
and, along with it, the Aristotelianp rovenanceo f the theory of entelechia.
In what sense, then, does the Adaptorr ecommendw e understandA ristotle's
definitiono f soul? He says thatt he soul is in fact the perfectiono r entelechia of
body, but only because it is the source of the body's perfection.H ence he con-
cludes this passage by saying that "the soul is not a form of perfectionl ike the
naturala nd artificial form, but ratheri s only a perfection because it is what
perfectst he body."T his is a doctrinew hich seems to have been in the Adaptor's
3R iidigerA rnzen,A ristoteles' DeA nima:e ine verlorenes pdtantikeP araphrasei n arabischer
undpersischer Oberlieferung(K 61n,1 998).A ll citationsf romt he Arabicp araphraseo f De Anima
are from this text, with page numberf ollowed by line number.N otice thatt he elements of the De
Anima definitionn ot used here by the Adaptor,n amely the words al-tamama nd tab Fi' are used
nearby in 111.67a nd 111.76T. he original passage in the De Anima is at 412a27-28.
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TheA rabic Plotinus 217
mind in a passage we examineda bove (Th.A1 1.96-99),i n which he said thatt he
soul is not literallyt he formo f the body, even though" thee ffect is in the cause,"
in other words the form for the body is in the soul. The Adaptorr epeats the
point when he comes to Plotinus's skepticalr emark:" ther easonings oul, then,
must be entelechia in anotherw ay thant his, if one should use this name"( Enn
IV.7.85).T he paraphraser eads:
As for us, we say that there is no other soul besides this rationals oul,
which is in the body now, and it is that which the philosopherss ay is
the entelechia of the body, even though they only mentionedt hat it is
entelechia and a form of perfectioni n anotherw ay, differentf rom the
way which the materialistsm ention it. I mean that it is not perfection
like the natural, effected perfection, but is rather active perfection
(tamam fai 'il), that is, it makes (yaf'alu) perfection. With this mean-
ing, they say that [soul] is the perfection of the natural,o rganic body
which possesses the soul potentially.( Th.A1 11.75-76[ B 55])14
Notice that the Adaptor here makes a distinction between two possible inter-
pretationso f Aristotle's theory.O n the first, "materialist"th eory,t he soul is a
naturalp erfection caused by something else. This theory would be vulnerable
to the criticisms Plotinus presents in the parallel text. On the second theory,
which the Adaptora dopts,s oul is the source of perfectiona nd as a resultc an be
called a perfectioni n a higher sense. The result is that, where Plotinus is actu-
ally criticizing the doctrine of the De Anima, the Adaptor is only correcting
what he sees as a possible misinterpretationo f that doctrine.
Especially intriguing here is the strategy used by the Adaptor to define
entelechia in a way that is not vulnerablet o Plotinus's arguments.O n the one
handh e is arguingt hat a cause always sharesa naturew ith its effect, so thatt he
effect is "in"t he cause. BothA ristotlea nd Plotinusw ould agreet o this:A ristotle
because the actualityo f the cause must be similart o the actualityo f the effect,
and Plotinus because what participatesi n its cause cannot be wholly different
from its source. But it seems to be the latters ense the Adaptorh as in mind here:
he is not thinkingo f Aristotelianp hysical causality,w here a thing is similart o
its efficient cause in its actuality,b ut of a hierarchicals ort of causality.I n other
words the differenceb etween form in soul and in body is not just that between
agent and patient, but that between a higher and lower version of the same
form. 15
We can detect a furtherN eoplatonistt endency in the Adaptor'sf luid use of
the terms in question. Because the soul is the cause of form in the body, he
holds that there is no sharpd istinctiont o be made between soul and this form.
14 Reading bi-al-quwa.
15 am indebtedt o Prof. RichardT aylorf or bringingt o my attentiont he importanceo f this
distinctionh ere.
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218 Peter Adamson
Hence he can still agree with Aristotle that the body possesses soul potentially,
and notf orm potentially." Soul"i s being treatedh ere as a word with different
levels of application,s ince the Adaptorc onsiders it to be both a principles epa-
rable from the body, and hence distinct from the body, and a principlew hich is
"in" and "informs"a particularb ody. The passages we have looked at so far
indicate that the Adaptori s determinedt o hold on to both of these conceptions
of soul, as both independentf rom and within body. This is perhapsu nremark-
able: the Adaptor does not depart greatly from Plotinus in this dual view of
soul. After all, Plotinus does think of the soul as "fallen"i nto the body and as a
result will also speak of soul being "in"t he body in some sense.16 However, as
we will see in the next section, the Adaptora ssociates soul with body more
closely than does Plotinus, and even holds that the soul can in a sense become
corporeal.
The Soul's Relationshipt o the Body
The attemptt o detect Aristoteliani nfluence on the Adaptorm ust take into
account the extent to which Plotinus's own thought has absorbedA ristotelian
elements. To the extent thatt he Adaptorj ust repeatst hese elements in his para-
phrase,w e cannot say that the Adaptorr eally departsf rom Plotinusb ecause of
the influence of, for example, the De Anima. On the other hand I would argue
thatt hese Aristotelianc omponentso f Plotinus's system facilitatet he Adaptor's
project of bringingA ristotle into the text of the Enneads. This is one reason to
think that the Adaptori s not so much interestedi n revising Plotinus to accom-
modate his Aristotelians ources as he is in describing a single system of "an-
cient" thoughtw hich is drawnf rom a numbero f differents ources. In this sec-
tion such a strategyw ill emerge with regardt o the relationo f soul and body.
Here is an example of how the Adaptorp araphrasesp artso f Plotinus'st ext
that have an Aristotelianr ing to them:
If the body is simple and they do not say that the materiali s such as to
have life through itself-for matter is not like that-but what is as
form brings the life, then if they say that this form is a substance,t hen
not the composite, but one of these [partso f the composite] will be the
soul. (Enn IV.7.3)
We say that the simple body is composed from mattera nd form. It is
impossible to say that the body possesses soul from the side of matter,
because matteri s not a quality for it. The body only possesses soul and
life from the side of the form, because the body possesses taxis [taqis]
and exposition throught he soul, and the taxis and exposition are from
16 See, for instance, Enn IV.8.1.
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TheA rabic Plotinus 219
the domaino f the soul, because it belongs to the soul that there is taxis
throughi t. (Th.AI X.35 [B 125])
Here Plotinus indirectlyc omparess oul to form ("whati s as form brings life").
This is the occasion for the Adaptort o say more explicitly that the body's re-
ception of form is its reception of soul. Furthermoret,h e fact that the body is
"composed from mattera nd form,"p ut together with the close association of
soul and form, seems to license the Aristotelianc onclusion that a living body is
a compoundo f soul and matter.T he Adaptorc omes closer to this conclusion in
another,s imilarp assage:
As for the soul, it is fixed and eternali n one state, not corruptinga nd
not passing away. Through [the soul] the man becomes what he is,
namely the true thing in which there is no falsehood, when it is sub-
joined to the body. The need of the soul for the body is like the need of
form for matter,a nd like the need of the artisan for the instrument.
Thereforet he man is the soul, because he is what he is throught he soul
and becomes fixed and eternal through it, and through the body he
becomes passing-awaya nd corrupting.( Th.AI X. 12-13 [B 122])
If this [body] is a parto f us, the whole is not immortal,b ut if it is a tool,
then it must, as given for some time, be of a naturet o exist for that
time. But [the otherp art]i s the most importanta nd is the man himself.
If [the soul] is this, then it is to body as form to mattera nd as user to
tool. (Enn IV.7.1)
Here Plotinus suggests that there is analogy between soul and form, and the
Adaptore nlarges on this analogy by saying that, as form "needs"m atter( pre-
sumably in order to be instantiateda s a particular),s o the soul "needs" the
body, so that it can have something to use, like an instrument.
But the most crucial passage for the idea that a human is compoundedo f
soul and body comes in a more complex discussion found in mimar X. The
parallel Greekt ext is Enn VI.7.4-5. Here Plotinus gives a detailed explanation
of how "man"i s emanatedf rom nous to Soul and then into matter,a rguingt hat
"man"e xists separatelya t each level. There are, then, three versions of man,
and, as Plotinus says (Enn VI.7.6), the intellectualm an (ho en n8 anthropos)
"illuminatest he second [man],a nd this illuminatest he third."I n this parto f the
paraphraset he Adaptoru nderstandsP lotinus to be saying that the "third"o r
"lower"m an is in effect the man of Aristotle's De Anima: a living thing com-
posed from soul and body. His interpretations eems to be based to some extent
on a passage where Plotinuss upposes living things to be such composites:" but
the living thing is [composed] from soul and body" (Enn VI.7.4, line 12). The
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220 Peter Adamson
Adaptorf ollows this with the paraphrase:
If the description[ sifa] of man is what is composed from rationals oul
and body, then it is impossible that [the man] has a figure [shabah] of
this descriptionw hich is eternal.T he man is only parts at the point of
the assemblyo f the soul andt he body.B ut ratherh, is quiddity[ maihiyya]
indicates the man being generated in the future, not the man who is
called the intellectuala nd formal man. (Th.AX .56 [B 142])
But if that which is [composed] from rational soul and body is the
logos of the man, how could it be an eternalh ypostasis,w ith this logos
of this sort of man being generatedw hen body and soul are brought
together?( Enn VI.7.4)
Here Plotinusi s denying that" man"i s in fact a compoundo f soul and body
or more precisely, that the logos of that composite would be the logos of man.
Rather,h e wants to hold thatt he logos of man must be a higherp rinciples epa-
ratef romm atter.H e makest his clear a few lines laterw hen he rejectsA ristotle's
idea that the logos would be a "this in a this" (tod 'en tode). At this point, the
Adaptorp araphrasesa s follows:
One must, when one wants to describe a materialt hing, describe it
with its mattera s well, and not describe it only with the word which
made this thing. If one wants to describe an immaterialt hing, then one
may describe it only with the form. (Enn VI.7.4)
One must,e ven thougho ne must speako f the logoi of enmatteredf orms
as regardingm atter[ meta hulis], yet grasp even more the logos which
makes, for example, the man. (Th.AX .59 [B 143])
Here the Adaptorh as changed the point of the passage. Plotinus argues that
there is a place for discussion of matterw hen defining the materialt hing but
that the logos is primarilya transcendentp rinciple. By contrast the Adaptor
argues (as would Aristotle) that it is only immaterialt hings that are described
or defined purely with referencet o an immaterialf orm."7
With these slight shifts in the paraphraseth e Adaptorh as preparedt he way
for a more Aristotelianr eading of Plotinus: that man, considered as a living,
materialt hing, is the above-mentionedc ompound of body and soul. Thus we
must describe man as a compound of both mattera nd form, or soul. He also
recognizes the two "higher men" of Plotinus, the man of pure soul and the
17 CompareA ristotle'sc omments at MetaphysicsH .4, 1044a33-1044b1 1, where he stresses
the need to mention the materialc ause in giving an account of generateds ubstances.
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