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Science and the Revenge of Nature
Marcuse & Habermas
C. Fred Alford
UNIVERSITY PRESSES OF FLORIDA
University of South Florida Press/ Tampa
University of Florida Press/ Gainesville
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UNIVERSITY PRESSES OF FLORIDA is the central agency for scholarly publishing of the State of Florida's university system, producing books selected for
publication by the faculty editorial committees of Florida's nine public universities: Florida A & M University (Tallahassee), Florida Atlantic University (Boca Raton),
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ORDERS for books published by all member presses of University Presses of Florida should be addressed to University Presses of Florida, 15 NW 15th Street,
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Copyright © 1985 by the Board of Regents of the State of Florida
Printed in the U.S.A. on acidfree paper
Parts of chapter 9 have appeared in Social Research.
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Alford, C. Fred.
Science and the revenge of nature.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Science—Philosophy—History—20th century.
2. Marcuse, Herbert, 1898—Science. 3. Habermas, Jürgen—
Science. I. Title.
Q174.8.A44 1985 501 85–627
ISBN 0813008174 (alk. paper)
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To Elly, who makes it all more worthwhile, to Thomas C.,
who helped show me the real meaning of reconciliation with nature,
and to my mother and father.
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Contents
Preface ix
1. The Issues Involved 1
2. Freedom and Labor in Marcuse's Early Works 21
3. The Ground of Absolute Freedom in Eros 37
4. Marcuse's New Science and Its Dissolution in Freedom 49
5. Habermas: Science and Survival 69
6. Habermas' Early Studies of Science and the Emergence of Language 88
7. Epistemology or Politics? 106
8. Habermas' New Science 119
9. Conclusion: Reconciliation with Nature or New Categories of Experience? 139
Notes 179
Works Cited 199
Index 211
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Preface
The idea of this book began several years ago with an insight I could not then substantiate: that Herbert Marcuse's "new science" was not as unreasonable as it
appeared at first glance. I think it was the purely utopian and thoroughly playful character of Marcuse's speculations that attracted me. Since that time, my interests
have gone in several different directions, one or two of which are also reflected in this book. After several years of thinking about these issues, I understand better why
Marcuse's "new science" has not been received more responsively. I have also come to appreciate the enormous energy and sophistication with which Jürgen
Habermas has pursued his project. In the end, though, I would say that my preference for Marcuse's philosophy of science over Habermas' has not changed. What
has changed is the enormous number of qualifications, stipulations, and additional considerations that I now believe must be brought to bear on this judgment. In a
sense, that is what this book is about. It is also about why the willingness to experiment with utterly new categories of experience, as Marcuse does, is worthwhile.
I could hardly ignore the intellectual background and historical sources of the thought of Marcuse and Habermas, and I certainly
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do not do so. Indeed, I argue that the problem situation established by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment is never far from either
Marcuse's or Habermas' studies of science. However, my study is not an attempt to explain Marcuse's and Habermas' thought by locating their works within the
Continental philosophical tradition that runs from Kant to Weber, and beyond (though of course some discussion of this intellectual background is necessary). At the
center of my argument is rather an attempt to evaluate the positions of Marcuse and Habermas by pursuing the confrontation between the AngloAmerican philosophy
of science and Continental philosophy, a confrontation begun by Marcuse and developed by Habermas. This confrontation is also part of the historical and intellectual
context of their work, a fact that is appreciated perhaps less frequently than it should be.
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William Galston and James Schmidt, two of my teachers at the University of Texas at Austin, rarely let me get away with a sloppy formulation of an issue. I trust this
book reflects their influence in this regard. A Fulbright Fellowship to the Federal Republic of Germany allowed me to study with Hans Albert and Helmut Spinner at
the Universität Mannheim. I believe I understand the philosophy of social science better for this experience. Jürgen Habermas graciously answered a number of
questions I put to him, especially regarding his understanding of science. This was a helpful and enlightening experience for me, though I am sure that Professor
Habermas would disagree with a number of my formulations of his position. Trent Schroyer pointed out the complexity of Habermas' position on "theoretically fruitful
knowledge," and Gail Landsman directed me to the literature on medical anthropology. Several students in my graduate seminar on the philosophy of social inquiry at
the university of Maryland, College Park, never stopped asking questions about many of the issues in this book. To answer them frequently required additional study,
the benefits of which I hope are also reflected in this book. Bill Pitt, who prepared the index, is a professional in every sense of the word.
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Chapter 1
The Issues Involved
Science in the work of Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas is worthy of consideration for several reasons. First, it is an interesting topic in its own right. Second,
their different concepts of science seem to act as lenses through which they view nature and humanity's relationship to it. Humanity's relationship to nature has always
played a central role in critical theory. Considering Marcuse's and Habermas' views of science helps in understanding how and why the concept of nature is so central
to this tradition. Their works also suggest why certain environmental problems are apparently so intractable. Third, this focus upon their views of science illuminates
and clarifies their theories of knowledge. The critique of science, and more generally what is called instrumental reason, is absolutely central to Marcuse's and
Habermas' understanding of the scope and limits of human knowledge. Thus, this book's focus upon science is both a way of gaining access to several different
aspects of the work of Marcuse and Habermas and a way of showing the relevance of recent developments in the philosophy of science to the issue of humanity's
relationship to nature.
The philosophy of science has changed a great deal during the last thirty to forty years, i.e., during the course of the development
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of both Marcuse's and Habermas' work. Both authors have responded to this change, Habermas somewhat more. I take advantage of this ferment in the philosophy
of science, bringing to bear fairly recent developments in this field (as exemplified by the work of Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, W. V. O. Quine,
and Mary Hesse, among others) on the positions of Marcuse and Habermas. In this sense my work is not what has come to be called an immanent critique. I believe
that Marcuse and Habermas are mistaken in some of their fundamental assumptions about science.
Marcuse and Habermas both write about science from the perspective of the critique of instrumental reason, which was developed by the intellectual leaders of the
Frankfurt School of critical theory, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. This critique argues that science is part of a larger way of thinking, instrumental reason,
whose roots can be traced back at least to the Odyssey of Homer, but which came to dominate modern thought during the Enlightenment. Characteristic of this way of
thinking is its orientation toward nature, and, ultimately, man, as an object to be overcome, dominated, and exploited. Various quotes from that great popularizer of
modern science, Francis Bacon, to the effect that science seeks to "hound," "vex," and ''torture" nature in order to gain her secrets, are frequently employed to lend
support to this interpretation. Part of my argument, drawing upon the contemporary philosophy of science, is simply that modern science philosophically understands
itself in such an open, anarchic, and hermeneutic fashion that the equation of science with instrumental reason no longer fits, no matter how thoroughly this equation is
modified.
Another part of my argument examines the projects of Marcuse and Habermas from a perspective much more internal to their own goals and purposes. The question
asked is why and to what purpose each modifies the critique of instrumental reason in the way he does. I conclude that while there are contradictory themes in
Marcuse's work, his version of the critique of instrumental reason serves to rhetorically soften his call for humanity's utter triumph over nature. In contrast to
Marcuse's, Habermas' understanding of science has been received very positively within a number of circles outside of critical theory. Not only does Habermas seem
more reasonable but his position on science has generally kept pace with developments in the contemporary philosophy of science. Nevertheless, I argue that in some
respects Habermas' view of science is less satisfactory than Marcuse's. The way in which Habermas divides
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and categorizes types of knowledge (Habermas' strategy for dealing with what he regards as the exaggerated claims of the critique of instrumental reason) may
contribute to a certain premature freezing of the limits of human knowledge. Certainly there is no more brilliant, innovative, and fascinating social theorist working today
than Habermas. Nevertheless, aspects of Habermas' understanding of science—including Habermas' version of a "new science," the reconstruction of cognitive
competencies—are in need of correction if they are not to stand as an impediment to further creative thought about man's relationship to nature and his environment.
Though I have attempted to restrict my focus to the issues mentioned, it has not always been possible. Marcuse's and Habermas' concepts of science and nature touch
upon so many aspects of their works that it has been impossible to ignore several related issues. For example, chapter 7 is a study of the relationship between
Habermas' critique of scientism and his political program. While addressing such additional issues certainly risks a certain softening of focus, the greater risk—one I
cannot be sure I have entirely avoided—is to approach Marcuse's and Habermas' views of science and nature from a single perspective in order to make a point.
Their views are subtle, complex, and have changed over time. Much of this book is concerned with unpacking their ideas thoroughly, so that the caveats and
qualifications made regarding the conclusions I have drawn will be understandable and will be seen as a central part of the argument.
The Issue at Stake
As the introduction suggests, it is widely held that Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas differ decisively in their analyses of science. Marcuse, it is noted, flirts with
"nature romanticism," in which a new science would discover friendly and helpful qualities in nature overlooked by the domineering attitude toward nature characteristic
of ordinary science. For Marcuse the basic structure of science is historically relative. A revolutionary change in social relations could bring with it a revolutionary new
science as well. Habermas, on the other hand, assumes that the basic structure of science is given by the objective character of human labor. As a mode of
instrumental action, science is in the last analysis not much more than a philo
